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OWNERSHIP AND THE MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SELF
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 February 2020
Abstract:
The idea of self-ownership has played a prominent role in justifying normative conclusions in moral and political philosophy. I argue that whether or not we are self-owners, there is no such role for it to play. Self-ownership is better thought a conclusion of moral and political arguments rather than their source. I then begin to explore an alternative idea—that the self is morally significant—that provides what those who rely on self-ownership ought to be looking for.
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- Copyright © Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 2020
References
1 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, II, 4.
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