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NORMS, EVALUATIONS, AND IDEAL AND NONIDEAL THEORY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 December 2016

Robert Jubb
Robert Jubb*
Affiliation:
Politics and International Relations, University of Reading
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Abstract:

This essay discusses the relation between ideal theory and two forms of political moralism identified by Bernard Williams, structural and enactment views. It argues that ideal theory, at least in the sense Rawls used that term, only makes sense for structural forms of moralism. These theories see their task as describing the constraints that properly apply to political agents and institutions. As a result, they are primarily concerned with norms that govern action. In contrast, many critiques of ideal theory are structured and motivated by their commitment to an enactment model of political theorizing. This instead sees political agents and institutions as instruments for producing or promoting better states of affairs. Enactment models treat the evaluations that rank different states of affairs as justificatorily basic, rather than norms governing action on which structural models focus. This reveals an important feature of debates about ideal theory. Whether ideal theory is capable of appropriately guiding action will depend on what the criteria for appropriately guiding action are, about which different theorists have importantly different views. For example, some popular strategies for defending ideal theory fail, while it may be much less clear that some alternatives to ideal theory can provide action guidance than their advocates claim.

Keywords

ideal theoryfeasibilitynormsevaluationspolitical realismjustification
Type
Research Article
Information
Social Philosophy and Policy , Volume 33 , Issue 1-2 , Fall 2016 , pp. 393 - 412
Copyright
Copyright © Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 2016 

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References

1 Sen, Amartya, “What Do We Want from a Theory of Justice,” Journal of Philosophy 103, no. 5 (2006): 215–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 Sen, “What Do We Want from a Theory of Justice,” 224.

3 Swift, Adam, “The Value of Philosophy in Nonideal Circumstances,” Social Theory and Practice, ed. Swift, Adam and Robeyns, Ingrid, vol. 34, no. 3 (2008): 365ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4 Ibid., 365.

5 David Wiens, “Against Ideal Guidance,” Journal of Politics 77, no. 2 (2015): 433–46, at 435.

6 Laura Valentini, “Ideal vs. Non-Ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map,” Philosophy Compass 7, no. 9 (2012): 654–64.

7 Robert Jubb, “Playing Kant at the Court of King Arthur,” Political Studies 63, no. 4 (2015): 919; see also Enzo Rossi and Matt Sleat, “Realism in Normative Political Theory,” Philosophy Compass 9, no. 10 (2014): 690.

8 Bernard Williams, “Realism and Moralism in Political Theory,” in Williams, In the Beginning Was the Deed, ed. G. Hawthorne (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 1–17. See, for instance, William Galston, “Realism in Political Theory,” European Journal of Political Theory 9, no. 4 (2010): 385–411, where Williams’s piece is “the best entry point into [its] topic” (387).

9 Williams, “Realism and Moralism in Political Theory,” 1.

10 Ibid., 2.

11 Ibid., 3.

12 Jubb, Robert, “The Real Value of Equality,” Journal of Politics 77, no. 3 (2015): 679–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

13 Sen, “What Do We Want from a Theory of Justice,” 226.

14 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 8–9.

15 Zofia Stemplowska, “What’s Ideal about Ideal Theory?” Social Theory and Practice 34, no. 3 (2008): 319–40, at 324ff.

16 For more-detailed arguments against this understanding of ideal theory, see Robert Jubb, “Tragedies of Non-Ideal Theory,” European Journal of Political Theory 11, no. 3 (2012): 229–46.

17 Sen, “What Do We Want from a Theory of Justice,” 237.

18 Mills, Charles, “‘Ideal Theory’ as Ideology,” Hypatia 20, no. 3 (2005): 171 Google Scholar; Farrelly, Colin, “Justice in Ideal Theory: A Refutation,” Political Studies 55, no. 4 (2007): 845.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

19 There are three things this argument does not show that might have led Farrelly and Mills into the mistake of claiming that theories which do not provide presently helpful guidance are false. First, it does not show that theories which do not give us instructions about what to do now are useful in some other way. There are though plenty of pointless truths. Second, it does not show that any theories are conditional in the relevant sense. Farrelly’s and Mills’ claims are however suitably general. Third, it does not show that we have the epistemic tools to assess or justify theories dealing with circumstances significantly different from our own. But truths do not have to be accessible to us.

20 Mills, “‘Ideal Theory’ as Ideology,” 170–71.

21 Farrelly, “Justice in Ideal Theory: A Refutation,” 845: italics suppressed.

22 Sen, “What Do We Want from A Theory of Justice,” 216–17.

23 Ibid., 216–17.

24 Farrelly, “Justice in Ideal Theory: A Refutation,” 848ff.

25 Sen, “What Do We Want from A Theory of Justice,” 218.

26 See for example Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 102ff.

27 Williams, “Realism and Moralism in Political Theory,” 1.

28 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 29ff.

29 Simmons, “Ideal and Nonideal Theory,” 34.

30 Robert Jubb, “Tragedies of Non-Ideal Theory,” European Journal of Political Theory 11, no. 3 (2012): 229–46.

31 Tamar Schapiro, “Compliance, Complicity, and the Nature of Nonideal Conditions,” Journal of Philosophy 100, no. 7 (2003): 329–55; and Schapiro, “Kantian Rigorism and Mitigating Circumstances,” Ethics 117, no.1 (2006): 32–57.

32 Tommie Shelby, “Justice, Deviance and the Dark Ghetto,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 35, no. 2 (2007): 126–60.

33 Pablo Gilabert and Holly Lawford-Smith, “Political Feasibility: A Conceptual Exploration,” Political Studies 60, no. 4 (2012): 818–19.

34 Alan Hamlin and Zofia Stemplowska, “Theory, Ideal Theory and the Theory of Ideals,” Political Studies Review 10, no. 1 (2012): 53ff.

35 Gilabert and Lawford-Smith, “Political Feasibility: A Conceptual Exploration,” 818–19.

36 Ibid., 820.

37 Rawls, John, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 137.Google Scholar

38 Hamlin and Stemplowska,“Theory, Ideal Theory and the Theory of Ideals,” 58.

39 Ibid.

40 Gilabert and Lawford-Smith, “Political Feasibility: A Conceptual Exploration,” 820.

41 David Wiens, “Against Ideal Guidance,” Journal of Politics 77, no. 2 (2015): 437.

42 Wiens, “Against Ideal Guidance,” 435ff.

43 Hamlin and Stemplowska, “Theory, Ideal Theory and the Theory of Ideals,” 53; Wiens, “Against Ideal Guidance,” 437.

44 Wiens, “Against Ideal Guidance,” 437.

45 Pablo Gilabert and Holly Lawford-Smith, “Political Feasibility: A Conceptual Exploration,” 819.

46 Wiens, “Against Ideal Guidance,” 437.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid., 444: italics suppressed.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid., 440.

51 Ibid., 442.

52 Ibid., 439.

53 Ibid.

54 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 31.

55 Ibid.,130–36.

56 See in particular John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005) 47–88.

57 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, 29.