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THE LIBERTY OF PROGRESS: INCREASING RETURNS, INSTITUTIONS, AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 December 2017

Peter J. Boettke  and
Rosolino A. Candela
Peter J. Boettke
Affiliation:
Economics, George Mason University
Rosolino A. Candela
Affiliation:
Political Science, Brown University
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Abstract:

This essay argues that liberty generates progress via the generalized increasing returns to commercial activity. These increasing returns to expanding commercial activity follow from the gradual, cumulative process of institutionalizing particular liberties. As a society adopts an institutional framework from accumulated liberties, there is greater scope for productive specialization and social cooperation under the division of labor. Greater scope for market exchange also delivers social norms and commercial values that tolerate experimentation and innovation. Taken together, the accumulation and institutionalization of liberties gives rise to generalized increasing returns to commercial activity. It is through this cumulative process that the creative powers of a free civilization are unleashed, delivering societies from poverty and subjugation.

Keywords

entrepreneurshipinstitutionslibertyprogresseconomic growth
Type
Research Article
Information
Social Philosophy and Policy , Volume 34 , Issue 2 , Winter 2017 , pp. 136 - 163
Copyright
Copyright © Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 2017 

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Footnotes

*

We wish to thank David Schmidtz, Bas van der Vossen, and an anonymous referee for their very helpful comments in drafting this essay. We also gratefully acknowledge Christopher Coyne, Douglas Rasmussen, and Virgil Storr for reading this essay and for providing helpful feedback.

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