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The Justification of Equal Opportunity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 January 2009

Alan H. Goldman
Alan H. Goldman
Affiliation:
Philosophy, University of Miami
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Extract

As a preliminary to the justification of equal opportunity, we require a few words on the concept. An opportunity is a chance to attain some goal or obtain some benefit. More precisely, it is the lack of some obstacle or obstacles to the attainment of some goal(s) or benefit(s). Opportunities are equal in some specified or understood sense when persons face roughly the same obstacles or obstacles of roughly the same difficulty of some specified or understood sort. In different contexts we might have different sorts of benefits or obstacles in mind. But in the current social context, and in the context of this discussion, we refer to educational and occupational opportunities, chances to attain the benefits of higher education and of socially and economically desirable positions, benefits assumed to be desired by many or most individuals, other things being equal. And we generally divide obstacles into two broad classes: those imposed by the social system or by other persons in the society, for example, the hardships of life in the lower economic classes or barriers from prejudices based on race, sex, or ethnic background; and those imposed by natural disabilities, for example, low intelligence or lack of talents.

The initial question is whether a moral society is obligated to create equality in opportunities in the senses just defined. I shall assume here initially that there is some such obligation on the part of society or the state, although I shall specify its nature and limits more precisely below. With the exception of certain libertarians, almost everyone, liberal and conservative alike, agrees in this assumption.

Type
Research Article
Information
Social Philosophy and Policy , Volume 5 , Issue 1 , Autumn 1987 , pp. 88 - 103
Copyright
Copyright © Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 1987

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References

1 See Westen, Peter, “The Concept of Equal Opportunity,” Ethics, vol. 95 (1985), pp. 83–850.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 I am counting as natural obstacles only those physical and mental characteristics that handicap persons for positions in society because they directly affect their ability to perform in those positions, characteristics such as low intelligence. Race is of course a natural characteristic, but it constitutes an obstacle only because of attitudes of others that are highly relative to social and historical context. “Directness” of effect here is admittedly a matter of degree. I shall admit below that the distinction between natural and socially imposed obstacles is not sharp in all cases, but it is, I believe, morally crucial where it is also intuitive.

3 For a libertarian exception, see Nozick, Robert, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974)Google Scholar, ch. 8; for the liberal view, see Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971)Google Scholar, ch. 2; for a conservative view, Frankel, Charles, “Equality of Opportunity,” Ethics, vol. 81 (1971), pp. 191–211.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4 Goldman, A., Justice and Reverse Discrimination (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), ch. 4.Google Scholar

5 A. Goldman, “Real People (Natural Differences and the Scope of Justice),” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming; see also “Justice and Hiring by Competence,” American Philosoohical Quarterly, vol. 14 (1977), pp. 17–28.

6 Schaar, John, “Equality of Opportunity and Beyond,” J.R., Pennock and J.W., Chapman, eds., Equality (New York: Atherton, 1967).Google Scholar

7 ibid.

8 Daniels, Norman, “Meritocracy,” John, Arthur and William, Shaw, eds., Justice and Economic Distribution (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1978).Google Scholar

9 This justification is endorsed by George Sher, “Predicting Performance,” elsewhere in this volume.

10 See Rawls, A Theory of Justice; and Thomas, Nagel, “Equal Treatment and Compensatory Discrimination,“ Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 2 (1973), pp. 348–363.Google Scholar

11 I argue this at greater length in “Justice and Hiring by Competence,” and in Justice and Reverse Discrimination, ch. 2.

12 We also make allowances for certain disadvantages that are not socially imposed, such as insanity. This, however, constitutes a third category here, since insanity is not considered a natural condition. This complication is, in any case, irrelevant here.

13 For further discussion of this type of theory and problems with it, see Goldman, A., “The Paradox of Punishment,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 9 (1979), vol. 42–58.Google Scholar