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The Insidious Ambiguity of “Ideology”
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 January 2025
Abstract
This essay identifies and explores three dominant intellectual traditions that critique and theorize about ideology: Marxist, prudentialist, and social scientific. For these traditions, the word ‘ideology’ names interest-serving rationalizations, pseudoscientific totalitarian zealotry, or political outlooks. The blending of these three specialized meanings has generated a colloquial sense of ideology that is philosophically untenable and damaging to political discourse. According to this colloquial sense, all thinking is ideological and we are all ideologues. In response, I instead offer in this essay an adverbial account of ideology. In this account, “ideology” names a kind of epistemic vice. Admitting that this is something we all may do sometimes, I describe how we think when we think ideologically. Finally, I conclude with some suggestions about how education might help us avoid the epistemic vice of ideological thinking.
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References
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68 Science’s own conclusions are exempt from this treatment. A science that treats the activity of science as just another series of causes and effects in the world would destroy its own authority, for we would have no reason to trust a scientist who admits that his conclusions were not justified with evidence and reasons but were instead merely the causal product of incidental forces.
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