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THE GROUND OF LOCKE'S LAW OF NATURE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 July 2012

Thomas G. West
Affiliation:
Politics, Hillsdale College

Abstract

This essay will show that Locke’s teaching on the law of nature is not based on divine revelation, or a juridical doctrine of individual rights, or self-ownership, or self-preservation, or reasoning from premises that are not rooted in the empirical world. I will argue, on the contrary, that the real ground is found in his understanding of the conditions of human happiness. This conclusion is far from evident on the surface of Locke’s writings. Locke draws his reader into an amazingly complex line of reasoning, scattered up and down in several of his books, leading finally to the real basis of his teaching on the law of nature. Locke engages the reader in a dialogue, in which initially plausible arguments are put forward, then implicitly questioned, leading to new arguments, which again are questioned, and so on. Locke says that “long and sometimes intricate deductions of reason” are necessary to discover the law of nature. Locke writes treatises, not Platonic dialogues. Nevertheless, a dialogical thread will take us from one of Locke’s books to another, until we put together all the relevant passages to show the complete picture of his argument.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 2012

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References

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11 Locke, John, Two Treatises of Government (1690), 2d ed., ed. Laslett, Peter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970)Google Scholar. In my quotations from Locke, I have modernized capitalization, punctuation, spelling, and italics. Books I and II of the Two Treatises are commonly called (as I will call them) the First Treatise and Second Treatise, although those are not Locke's titles.

12 Locke, Second Treatise, chap. 2, sec. 4.

13 Ibid., chap. 2, sec. 6.

14 Ibid., chap. 2, sec. 4.

15 Locke, First Treatise, chap. 6, sec. 67.

16 Locke, Second Treatise, chap. 6, sections 6 and 54.

17 Locke, , Of the Conduct of the Understanding (1706), in Some Thoughts Concerning Education and Of the Conduct of the Understanding, ed. Grant, Ruth W. and Tarcov, Nathan (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996), sec. 2Google Scholar. Conduct was originally intended to be the longest chapter in an expanded edition of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Locke never found time to complete it. He left instructions for his literary executor that Conduct was to be dealt with “as you think fit.” It was published shortly after his death. See Woolhouse, Roger, Locke: A Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 386, 458Google Scholar.

18 Locke, , An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (4th ed., 1700), ed. Nidditch, Peter H. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), bk. 4, chap. 20, sec. 5Google Scholar. Also sec. 3: “[A] great part of mankind are, by the natural and unalterable state of things in this world, and the constitution of human affairs, unavoidably given over to invincible ignorance” of the most important matters of their lives.

19 Waldron, God, Locke, and Equality, 72, acknowledges that Locke discerns “enormous differences in reason and rational ability among those we are accustomed to call human.” This leads Waldron to the conclusion that Locke's human beings do not clearly constitute a single species, and that there can therefore be no fundamental human equality, unless God is brought into the argument to guarantee the oneness of humanity (81 and elsewhere). Beginning with this same observation (“enormous differences in … rational ability”), my argument goes in a different direction.

20 Locke, Conduct of the Understanding, sec. 6. A “natural,” in Locke's sense, is an idiot, someone grossly deficient in the usual intellectual powers.

21 Locke, Second Treatise, chap. 6, sections 54–55, 59, 60, 63.

22 Ibid., chap. 6, sec. 59.

23 Ibid., chap. 2, sections 11, 12.

24 Ibid., chap. 9, sec. 124, my emphasis.

25 Quite a few scholars have noted that Locke's law of nature is unknown in the rude state of nature, e.g., Zuckert, Natural Rights and the New Republicanism, 274: “in the state of nature … human beings are ‘ignorant’ of the law of nature (II 124).” Fewer scholars have noticed the shockingly anti-egalitarian implications of that ignorance in light of the argument in chapter 6 for “equality … in respect of jurisdiction or dominion.”

26 Strauss, Natural Right and History, 230.

27 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality among Men (1755), Preface, in The First and Second Discourses, ed. Masters, Roger D. (New York: Bedford/St. Martin's, 1964), 94Google Scholar.

28 Locke, Second Treatise, chap. 6, sec. 55.

29 Ibid., chap. 6, sec. 60.

30 Ibid., chap. 6, sec. 57.

32 Ibid., chap. 5, sec. 34.

33 Ibid., chap. 6, sec. 60.

34 Strauss, Natural Right and History, 233.

35 Locke, Second Treatise, chap. 14, sec. 166.

36 Ibid., chap. 14, sec. 159.

37 Ibid., chap. 11, sec. 136.

38 Ibid., chap. 14, sec. 164.

39 Ibid., chap. 14, sec. 166.

40 Ibid., chap. 3, sec. 16.

41 Ibid., chap. 2, sec. 10.

42 Ibid., chap. 14, sec. 166.

43 Again, the point is well known to scholars, e.g., Simmons, Lockean Theory, 17: “The law [of nature] binds us, we are told, because we are all God's ‘workmanship’, although no real explanation of that claim is offered.”

44 Locke, First Treatise, chap. 6, sections 52–54.

45 Locke, Essay, bk. 4, chap. 10, sections 1, 4, and 5.

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47 Locke, Second Treatise, chap. 2, sections 4, 6.

48 Ibid., chap. 6, sec. 56.

49 Ibid., chap. 2, sec. 6.

50 Scholars sometimes neglect or underemphasize the passages in the Second Treatise where Locke speaks of positive duties to other men and of parents to children. For example, Forde, Steven, “Natural Law, Theology, and Morality in Locke,” American Journal of Political Science 45, no. 2 (April 2001): 401–2, 408CrossRefGoogle Scholar (“Locke's rights … entail duties on the part of others…. [T]hese are purely negative, duties to do no harm…. The Second Treatise appeals to very little beyond immediate self-interest.”) In his long discussion of Lockean natural law in Natural Rights and the New Republicanism, 187–288, Zuckert similarly focuses almost exclusively on Locke's doctrine of natural rights as opposed to the duty of everyone to preserve others and of parents to care for their children. If the objection is raised that Locke's duty to others is conditional—only “when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind” (Second Treatise, chap. 2, sec. 6)—one may respond that no major classical or medieval philosopher teaches, as a natural right or natural law duty, that one is obliged to sacrifice one's own life to preserve another's.

51 Locke's use of the technique of esoteric writing—concealing things from inattentive readers through the use of various literary devices such as the use of deliberately inadequate arguments, and indicating his real meaning “between the lines”—has been well documented by Strauss, Natural Right and History, 206–9; Pangle, Spirit of Modern Republicanism, 137–38; Zuckert, Michael P., Launching Liberalism: On Lockean Political Philosophy (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 82106Google Scholar.

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53 Locke, , A Letter to the Right Rev. Edward Lord Bishop of Worcester, in The Works of John Locke in Ten Volumes (1801) (Elibron Classics, 1991), 4: 5354Google Scholar, my emphasis.

54 Locke, Second Treatise, chap. 3, sec. 16; Locke, , Some Thoughts Concerning Education (5th ed., 1705, but corrected on the basis of earlier editions), ed. , John W. and Yolton, Jean S. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), sec. 116Google Scholar, emphasis added.

55 Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, “Epistle to the Reader,” 6–7.

56 Ibid., 7, 9.

57 Locke, Essay, bk. 4, chap. 20.

58 Locke, Essay, “Epistle to the Reader,” 9.

59 Ibid., 8.

60 Locke, First Treatise, chap. 2, sec. 7, my emphasis.

61 Locke, Essay, bk. 3, chap. 10, sec. 34.

62 Locke, First Treatise, chap. 9, sec. 86.

63 Accordingly, Locke uses the phrase “God and nature” twice in the pages immediately following the passage quoted here (ibid., chap. 9, sections 90 and 93).

64 Ibid., chap. 9, sec. 86.

66 Ibid., chap. 9, sec. 88.

67 Ibid., chap. 9, sections 88, 97

68 Ibid., chap. 9, sections 86, 88, 92.

69 Ibid., chap. 9, sec. 90.

70 Ibid., chap. 9, sec. 91.

71 Ibid., chap. 9, sec. 88.

72 Aristotle, , The Politics, trans. Lord, Carnes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), bk. 1, chap. 2CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

73 Aristotle, , Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Bartlett, Robert C. and Collins, Susan D. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), bk. 9, chap. 7, 1168a7–9Google Scholar.

74 Locke, First Treatise, chap. 9, sec. 97.

75 Ibid., chap. 11, sec. 106.

76 Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, sec. 104.

77 Locke, First Treatise, chap. 9, sec. 86.

78 Ibid., chap. 9, sec. 92, my emphasis.

79 Locke, Second Treatise, chap. 8, sec. 111; First Treatise, chap. 11, sec. 106; Second Treatise, chap. 3, sec. 16;

80 Locke, First Treatise, chap. 6, sec. 57.

81 Ibid., chap. 6, sec. 56.

82 Ibid., chap. 6, sec. 58, quoting Psalm 106:38.

84 Ibid., chap. 6, sec. 59.

85 Ibid., chap. 6, sec. 56.

86 Ibid., chap. 6, sec. 58. This aspect of Locke's analysis of human nature is well analyzed by Myers, Our Only Star and Compass, chap. 4.

87 Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, sec. 90.

88 Locke, First Treatise, chap. 6, sec. 58.

90 Ibid., chap. 9, sec. 97.

91 Locke, Second Treatise, chap. 8, sec. 107.

92 Ibid., chap. 2, sections 4, 6, 7.

93 Ibid., chap. 3, sec. 19.

95 Ibid., chap. 9, sec. 123.

96 Becker, Carl L., The Declaration of Independence: A Study in the History of Political Ideas (New York: Knopf, 1948), 6061Google Scholar.

97 In ibid., 62–73, Becker argues that Locke is in substantial agreement with the “eighteenth century.”

98 Locke, Second Treatise, chap. 6, sec. 56.

99 Strauss, Natural Right and History, 248–51. The mis-paraphrase is from Locke, Second Treatise, chap. 5, sec. 43.

100 Strauss, What Is Political Philosophy?, chap. 8, and Strauss, , Liberalism: Ancient and Modern (New York: Free Press, 1968), chap. 2Google Scholar.

101 Strauss, Natural Right and History, 251; What Is Political Philosophy?, 49. Strauss treats Locke and Hegel as if they are in agreement in Natural Right and History, 250–51: “labor is, in the words of Hegel, a negative attitude toward nature…. [F]reedom is negativity.”

102 Locke, , Epistola de Tolerantia (“Letter on Toleration”) (Gouda, Netherlands: Justum ab Hoeve, 1689), 73Google Scholar, my translation.

103 Strauss presents the deliberately exaggerated teaching sketched in the last two paragraphs in What Is Political Philosophy? chap. 1, part III. It is no accident that this chapter of that book, because of its title, is one of the first things that Strauss's readers are likely to encounter. It was in my case.

104 Manent, Pierre, Modern Liberty and Its Discontents, ed. Mahoney, Daniel J. and Seaton, Paul (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 105, 99Google Scholar.

105 Locke, First Treatise, chap. 6, sec. 51. The entire First Treatise is a refutation of the doctrine that will should take the place of reason. See especially chap. 6, sec. 58 (“reason, his only star and compass”).

106 Lawler, Peter Augustine, “Natural Law, Our Constitution, and Our Democracy,” in Pestritto, Ronald J. and West, Thomas G., ed., Modern America and the Legacy of the Founding (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006), 213Google Scholar.

107 Locke, First Treatise, chap. 6, sec. 59; Second Treatise, chap. 7, sec. 78.

108 Locke, Conduct of the Understanding, sec. 6.

109 Strauss, Natural Right and History, 92.

110 Locke, Reasonableness of Christianity, chap. 14, p. 253.

111 Locke, Essay, bk. 2, chap. 7, sec. 3.

112 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Acceptance Speech for the Renomination for the Presidency, June 27, 1936, in Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, American Presidency Project, www.presidency.ucsb.edu; repeated in State of the Union Message to Congress, January 11, 1944, ibid.

113 Locke, Second Treatise, chap. 5, sec. 32, 35.

114 Locke, Essay, bk. 4, chap. 20, sec. 4. Compare the philosophic poet Virgil: God “willed that our way be hard,” but the harshness of nature had the beneficial effect of compelling us to undertake “pitiless hard labor,” leading to the invention of “the various arts one by one.” Georgics, bk. 1, lines 119–67, trans. Karl Maurer, in an email from the translator.

115 The Laws of Plato, trans. Pangle, Thomas L. (New York: Basic Books, 1980), bk. 3, 677a–678b, 679cGoogle Scholar.

116 Locke, Conduct of the Understanding, sec. 4.

117 Ibid., sec. 6.

118 Locke, Second Treatise, chap. 5, sec. 42.

119 Locke, Reasonableness of Christianity, 247–48: a writer sometimes puts something in the center of a list in order to indicate its importance. Locke's example is the Biblical letter of Paul to the Hebrews: “This description of faith (that we might not mistake what he means by that faith, without which we cannot please God, and which recommended the saints of old) St. Paul places in the middle of the list of those who were eminent for the faith.”

120 Locke, , Some Considerations of the Lowering of Interest and Raising the Value of Money (1691), in Works of John Locke, 5: 41Google Scholar.

121 Strauss, to Karl Löwith, June 23, 1935, in Strauss and Löwith, “Correspondence Concerning Modernity,” Independent Journal of Philosophy vol. 5/6 (1988): 183Google Scholar.

122 Locke, First Treatise, chap. 5, sec. 47.

123 Machiavelli, Niccolo, The Prince (1513), trans. de Alvarez, Leo Paul S., 2d ed. (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 1989), chap. 25, 146–47Google Scholar.

124 Two such comedies are Measure for Measure and The Merchant of Venice.

125 Locke, Second Treatise, chap. 6, sec. 57.

126 Ibid., chap. 2, sec. 6.

127 Locke, First Treatise, chap. 9, sec. 92.

128 Locke, Essay, bk. 2, chap. 21, sec. 36.

129 Pangle, Spirit of Modern Republicanism, 206, argues that the Essay's “emphasis on the pursuit of happiness” and not self-preservation is to be contrasted with the emphasis in the Two Treatises on “self-preservation and property” and corresponding de-emphasis on the pursuit of happiness. So far I agree. But Pangle draws a conclusion that the evidence does not support: that there is “a clear ascent from the former [Essay] to the latter [Two Treatises].” In the end, Pangle maintains, “preservation is the regulatory principle for happiness” in Locke's argument. My argument is the opposite: happiness is the regulatory principle for preservation, because happiness is the end of human life, and preservation is only part of the means.

130 Locke, Essay, bk. 1, chap. 3, sec. 3.

131 Ibid., bk. 2, chap. 21, sec. 43.

132 Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, sec. 143.

133 Locke, Essay, bk. 2, chap. 20, sec. 2.

134 Locke, Essay, bk. 2, chap. 21, sec. 63.

135 Ibid. In the rest of this section, I will put all references to Essay, bk. 2, chap. 21, in the text, where I will provide only the section number.

136 Locke, First Treatise, sec. 58.

137 Locke, Essay, bk. 2, ch. 21, sec. 55.

138 Ibid., bk. 2, ch. 21, sec. 51.

139 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003)Google Scholar (majority opinion of Justice Anthony Kennedy).

140 Locke, Essay, bk. 2, chap. 21, sec. 55. The context of Locke's remark is the assumption, which he verbally denies in the passage in question, that there is no pleasure or pain in a life after death. My argument in the text does not depend on the existence or nonexistence of an afterlife, because Locke's contrast holds good either way.

141 Locke, Essay, “Epistle to the Reader,” 6.

142 Locke, Essay, “Epistle Dedicatory,” 3.

143 Locke, Essay, bk. 2, chap. 21, sec. 43.

144 Ibid.

145 Machiavelli, , letter to Vettori, Dec. 10, 1513, in Machiavelli: The Chief Works and Others, trans. Gilbert, Allan (Durham: Duke University Press, 1965), 2: 929Google Scholar.

146 Locke, Reasonableness, chap. 14, 266.

147 Ibid., chap. 14, 279–80.

148 Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, sec. 58.

149 Ibid., sec. 70.

150 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. 1, chap. 5, 1095b14–1096a5.

151 Locke, Essay, “Epistle to the Reader,” 6.

152 Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, sec. 101–2, 87.

153 Locke, Conduct, sec. 2.

154 The Republic of Plato, trans Bloom, Allan (New York: Basic Books, 1968), bk. 6, 503c–dGoogle Scholar.

155 Strauss, Natural Right and History, 151.

156 Aristotle, Politics, bk. 1, chap. 2.

157 Locke, Essay, bk. 4, chap. 12, sec. 11.

158 Ibid., bk. 2, chap. 21, sec. 52.

159 Ibid., bk. 2, chap. 21, sec. 53.

160 Lawrence v. Texas, 574.

161 Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, sec. 117.

162 Locke uses the expression “common good” in Second Treatise, chap. 9, sec. 131; the equivalent phrase “public good” appears more frequently, e.g., chap. 1, sec. 3; chap. 7, sec. 89.

163 Locke, First Treatise, chap. 9, sec. 92.

164 Locke, Second Treatise, chap. 6, sec. 57.

165 Locke, Second Treatise, chap. 4, sec. 23.

166 Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, sec. 116.

167 Locke, First Treatise, chap. 9, sec. 86.

168 Ibid., chap. 9, sec. 88.

169 Locke, Second Treatise, chap. 3, sec. 17.

170 Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, end of “Epistle Dedicatory” and sec. 96.

171 Ibid., sec. 135.

172 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. 9, chap. 4, 1166b25–29.

173 Pangle, Spirit of Modern Republicanism, 206, quoted in note 129 above.

174 Locke, Essay, bk. 3, chap. 6, sections 30, 37.

175 Locke, Second Treatise, chap. 6, sec. 57.

176 Ibid., chap. 2, sec. 6.

177 Locke, Essay, bk. 2, chap. 20, sec. 5.

178 Locke, Second Treatise, chap. 7, sections 77–81.

179 Locke, First Treatise, chap. 6, sec. 59.

180 Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, sec. 116.

181 Locke, Epistola de Tolerantia (“Letter on Toleration”), 68–69, my translation.

182 Locke, First Treatise, sec. 58.

183 Locke, Essay, bk. 4, chap. 20, sections 2, 5.

184 Ibid., sec. 6.

185 Ibid., sections 9, 11, 17.

186 Ibid., sec. 18.

187 Locke, Reasonableness of Christianity, chap. 14, 265–66.

188 Ibid., chap. 14, 270–71.

189 Ibid., chap. 14, 276, 269; chap. 1, 2; chap. 14, 288, 279.

190 Ibid., chap. 3, 18–19.

191 Locke, Second Treatise, chap. 6, sec. 58.

192 Locke, Essay, bk. 1, chap. 3, sec. 6, my emphasis.

193 I leave aside the question of whether there are significant conflicts between the commandments of Jesus in the New Testament and the law of nature. Locke's general procedure, following the example of Thomas Aquinas, is to write as if there is a complete agreement, while occasionally allowing the attentive reader to notice that this is not always the case. Locke indicates several such conflicts in Reasonableness, chap. 12, most obviously on 218–19. See Pangle, Spirit of Modern Republicanism, 151–58. To the extent that there is a conflict, it seems that Christianity stands in need of being understood in light of reason.

194 Locke, Essay, bk. 2, chap. 28, sec. 8.

195 Ibid., sec. 12.

196 Locke, Second Treatise, chap. 8, sec. 122; chap. 11, sections 136–37; chap. 11, sec. 138 (government cannot take “property,” i.e., life, liberty, or estate, without the consent of the people in person or through elected representatives: Locke implies that laws imprisoning or fining criminals—depriving them of “estate” or life—must receive this consent).

197 Locke, Essay, bk. 2, chap. 28, sections 10, 12.

198 Ibid., sec. 12.

199 Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Preface.

200 Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, “Epistle Dedicatory.”

201 Locke, Essay, bk. 2, chap. 28, sec. 12.

202 Locke, First Treatise, chap. 2, sec. 9.