Article contents
Evolutionary Ethics and the Search for Predecessors: Kant, Hume, and All the Way Back to Aristotle?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 January 2009
Extract
Hopes of applying the findings and speculations of evolutionary theorizing to the problems of ethics have yielded a program with a (deservedly) bad reputation. At the level of norms – substantival ethics – it has been a platform for some of the more grotesque socio-politico-economic suggestions of our times. At the level of justification – metaethics – it has opened the way to some of the more blatant fallacies in the undergraduate textbook. Recently, however, a number of people, philosophers and biologists, have sensed that a more adequate evolutionary ethics might be possible. United in the conviction that it simply has to matter that we humans are modified monkeys rather than the creation of a Good God, in His image, on the Sixth Day, they argue that recent developments in evolutionary biology, especially those dealing with the genetic basis of social behavior (“sociobiology”), open the way to a satisfactory biological understanding of morality.
- Type
- Research Article
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 1990
References
1 Ruse, Michael, Taking Darwin Seriously (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986)Google Scholar; “Evolutionary Ethics,” Singer, Peter, Companion to Ethics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990).Google Scholar
2 Although the question is still controversial, there is strong evidence linking evolutionism, via the ideas of Ernst Haeckel, with National Socialism. See Gasman, Daniel, The Scientific Origins of National Socialism: Social Darwinism, Ernst Haeckel and the Monist League (New York: Elsevier, 1971).Google Scholar
3 Most obviously, the so-called “naturalistic fallacy.” See sMoore, George E., Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903).Google Scholar See also Taking Darwin Seriously, ch. 3.
4 See Richards, Robert, Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988)Google Scholar; Wilson, Edward O., On Human Nature (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978)Google ScholarPubMed; Wilson, Edward O., Biophilia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984)Google Scholar; Alexander, Richard, The Biology of Moral Systems (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1987)Google Scholar; Mackie, John, “The Law of the Jungle,” Philosophy, vol. 53 (1978), pp. 553–73CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hume's Moral Theory (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979); Murphy, Jeffrie, Evolution, Morality, and the Meaning of Life (Totowa: Rowan and Littlefield, 1982)Google Scholar; but see Kitcher, Philip, Vaulting Ambition (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985)Google Scholar; Midgley, Mary, Evolution as a Religion (London: Methuen, 1985).Google Scholar
5 Ruse, Michael, Sociobiology: Sense or Nonsense? (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979).Google Scholar
6 London: John Murray.
7 I discuss these points, in depth, in my Darwinism Defended: A Guide to the Evolution Controversies (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1982).
8 Hofstadter, Richard, Social Darwinism in American Thought (New York: Braziller, 1959)Google Scholar; Russett, Cynthia, Darwin in America: The Intellectual Response, 1865–1912 (San Francisco: Freeman, 1976)Google Scholar; Jones, Greta, Social Darwinism and English Thought (New York: Braziller, 1980).Google Scholar
9 See especially his Social Statics (London: Chapman, 1851).
10 See Richards, Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior. In this paper, I will not offer an extended treatment of Spencer's work, partly because I do not think he is in the first rank of moral philosophers, but more particularly because I have and am giving detailed discussion elsewhere. See Ruse, Taking Darwin Seriously, esp. chs. 2 and 3, and Ruse, , Molecules to Men: The Concept of Progress in Evolutionary Biology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991).Google Scholar
11 See Sumner, William G., The Challenge of Facts and Other Essays (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1914).Google Scholar
12 Wilson, Edward O., Biophilia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984).Google Scholar
13 Hudson, W.D., Modern Moral Philosophy (London: Macmillan, 1970).Google Scholar
14 Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903).
15 Ruse, , Sociobiology: Sense or Nonsense? (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979).Google Scholar
16 Wilson, Edward O., Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975).Google Scholar
17 Hamilton, William D., “The Genetical Evolution of Social Behaviour. I,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, vol. 7 (1964), pp. 1–16CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; “The Genetical Evolution of Social Behaviour. II,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, vol. 7 (1964), pp. 17–32.
18 Trivers, Robert L., “The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism,” Quarterly Review of Biology, vol. 46 (1971), pp. 35–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
19 Darwin, Charles, Descent of Man (London: John Murray, 1871).Google Scholar
20 Ruse, Sociobiology: Sense or Nonsense? See also Michael Ruse, Darwinism Defended: A Guide to the Evolution Controversies.
21 Isaac, Glynn, “Aspects of Human Evolution,” ed. Bendall, D.S., Evolution from Molecules to Men (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 509–43.Google Scholar
22 Goodall, Jane, The Chimpanzees of Gombee: Patterns of Behaviour (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987).Google Scholar
23 Lumsden, Charles and Wilson, Edward, Promethean Fire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983).Google Scholar
24 An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Nidditch, Peter H. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975).Google Scholar
25 Even though I have separated biological altruism from literal altruism, without further clarification of the latter term the discussion may seem intolerably flabby. But in line with my comments at the beginning of this discussion, I see as a major aim of this paper precisely to clarify what an evolutionist might mean by moral (literal) altruism, by playing off the idea against the thoughts of the great moral philosophers. I will return to definition at the end of this paper. For the moment, however, I will stress that more is meant than just good feeling. There has to be at some level a sense of obligation.
26 Trivers, Robert L., Foreword to Dawkins, R., The Selfish Gene (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. v–vii.Google Scholar
27 “Does Evolutionary Biology Contribute to Ethics?”, Biology & Philosophy, vol. 4 (1989), pp. 287–302.
28 Chimpanzee Politics (London: Jonathan Cape, 1982). Although I stress that mine is an empirical position, I shall say no more here about the evidence, primarily because I have looked at such issues in detail elsewhere. See Ruse, , Taking Darwin Seriously; The Darwinian Paradigm (London: Routledge, 1989)Google Scholar; Ruse, Michael and Wilson, Edward O., “Moral Philosophy as Applied Science,” Philosophy, vol. 61 (1986), pp. 173–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
29 The best discussion of these points, especially about the (literal) altruist being very wary of others’ cheating, is John Mackie, “The Law of the Jungle.” See also, on the biological side, Trivers, Robert, “The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism,” Quarterly Review of Biology, vol. 46 (1971), pp. 35–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
30 Richards, Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior.
31 Murphy, Evolution, Morality, and the Meaning of Life.
32 Nozick, Robert, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge: Harvard: University Press, 1981).Google Scholar
33 Ruse, Molecules to Men.
34 Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory.
35 ibid.
36 Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Beck, L.W. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949)Google Scholar; Kant, Immanuel, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Beck, L.W. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959).Google Scholar
37 Kant, , Foundations, p. 39.Google Scholar
38 ibid., p. 47.
39 ibid., p. 40.
40 Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1971).Google Scholar
41 Rawls, John, “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,” Journal of Philosophy, vol. 77 (1980), pp. 515–72.Google Scholar
42 ibid., p. 519.
43 As Rawls, , Theory of Justice, pp. 502–3Google Scholar, notes, evolutionary biology is a godsend to any Kantian or social contract theorist. Instead of having to make up stories about a fictional first parliament or a hypothetical original position, you can let the genes do the work for you.
44 Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Smith, N. Kemp (London: Macmillan, 1963).Google Scholar
45 Ruse, Michael, Homosexuality: A Philosophical Inquiry (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988).Google Scholar
46 Singer, Peter, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 1, no. 3 (1972), pp. 229–43.Google Scholar
47 Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals.
48 Ruse, The Darwinian Paradiam.
49 Ruse, Taking Darwin Seriously, esp. ch. 6.
50 Hume, David, A Treatise of Human Nature, Selby-Bigge, L.A. ed., 2d edn.Nidditch, Peter H. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 176.Google Scholar
51 ibid.
52 ibid., p. 469.
53 ibid., p. 469.
54 ibid., p. 477.
55 ibid., p. 477.
56 ibid., pp. 577–78.
57 See Richards, Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior.
58 Ruse, Michael, “Darwinism and Determinism,” Zygon, vol. 22 (1986), pp. 419–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
59 Lewontin, Richard, Rose, S., and Kamin, L.J., Not in Our Genes (New York: Pantheon, 1984).Google Scholar
60 Hume, David, A Treatise of Human Nature, pp. 483–84.Google Scholar
61 This is not to deny that some, like Lumsden, Charles and Wilson, Edward O., Genes, Mind & Culture (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981)Google Scholar, suggest that the genes track culture much more closely than we imagine.
62 Hume, , Treatise, p. 489.Google Scholar
63 ibid., p. 581.
64 ibid., p. 571.
65 Williams, B., Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London: Fontana, 1985)Google Scholar; MacIntyre, A., After Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981).Google Scholar
66 Arnhart, Larry, “Darwin, Hume, Annihilism,” The Claremont Review of Books (1988), pp. 10–12.Google Scholar
67 Urmson, J., Aristotle's Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988).Google Scholar
68 Aristotle, , Complete Works, ed. Barnes, J. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984)Google Scholar : Nicomachean Ethics, 1099b1.
69 ibid., 1098al, 7–17.
70 Michael Ruse, The Darwinian Paradigm.
71 I am not claiming that the Aristotelian and the Darwinian overlap entirely. There is a built-in teleology to the former's position quite lacking in the latter. Nevertheless, there may be a direct link between the positions via Cuvier. See Ruse, Michael, The Darwinian Revolution: Science Red in Tooth and Claw (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979).Google Scholar
72 Aristotle, , On the Soul, 415a, pp. 26–67Google Scholar, translated by Lear, Jonathan, Aristotle: The Desire to Understand (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 100.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
73 Aristotle, , Politics 1253a, 1–3.Google Scholar
74 ibid., 1253, 7–18.
75 Wilson, , Sociobiology, p. 379.Google Scholar
76 ibid., p. 384.
77 Aristotle, , Nicomachean Ethics, 1130b, 30–31al.Google Scholar
78 Hughes, A.L., Evolution and Human Kinship (Oxford: University Press, 1988).Google Scholar
79 Aristotle, , Nicomachean Ethics, 1130b, 30–31al.Google Scholar
80 ibid. 1158b, 12–23.
81 ibid.
82 Horowitz, Maryanne Cline, “Aristotle and Woman,” Journal of the History of Biology, vol. 9, no. 2 (Fall 1976), pp. 183–213.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
83 Symons, D., The Evolution of Human Sexuality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979).Google Scholar
84 Williams, Bernard, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, p. 44.Google Scholar
85 Lear, , Aristotle: The Desire to Understand, p. 189.Google Scholar
86 Williams, , Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, p. 44.Google Scholar
87 Ruse, Taking Darwin Seriously.
88 John Mackie, “Law of the Jungle,” is the best discussion thus far in ‘literal altruism’ (a term he does not use), and Mackie, , Hume's Moral Theory (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979)Google Scholar, is the best discussion on “objectification” (a term he does use).
89 Rawls admits explicitly that he speaks of a closed “well-ordered” society, leaving “questions of justice between societies,” admitting that “to what extent the conception of justice for the basic structure will have to be revised in the process, cannot be foreseen in advance.” Rawls, John, “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,” Journal of Philosophy, vol. 77 (1980), pp. 515–72.Google Scholar
90 Hume, , Treatise, pp. 483–84.Google Scholar
91 Remember: “we blame a person, who either centers all his affections in his family, or is so regardless of them, as, in any opposition of interest, to give the preference to a stranger, or mere chance acquaintance.” Hume, , Treatise, p. 489.Google Scholar
92 For full discussion of this point, see Ruse, Taking Darwin Seriously, esp. chs. 5 and 6.
93 See Lumsden and Wilson, Genes, Mind, and Culture.
94 Most expressly as found in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, reprinted in ed. Wollheim, R., Hume on Religion (London: Collins, 1963).Google Scholar
95 Reynold, Vernon and Tanner, R.E.S., The Biology of Religion (London: Longman, 1983)Google Scholar; Wilson, Edward O., On Human Nature (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978).Google ScholarPubMed
96 Lumsden and Wilson, Genes, Mind and Culture.
97 Mulder, Monique Borgerhoff, “Kipsigis Bridewealth Payments,” in Betzig, L.L., Mulder, M. Borgerhoff, and Turke, P.W. (eds.) Human Reproductive Behavior: A Darwinian Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 65–82.Google Scholar
98 Boyd, R. and Richerson, P., Culture and the Evolutionary Process (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985)Google Scholar; Cavalli-Sforza, L. and Feldman, M., Cultural Transmission: A Quantitative Approach (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981)Google ScholarPubMed; Lumsden and Wilson, Genes, Mind & Culture.
99 See, for instance, Laura, Betzig, Monique, Borgerhoff Mulder, and Turke, P.W. (eds.), Human Reproductive Behavior: A Darwinian Perspective.Google Scholar
100 Perhaps he notion of ‘supervenience’ would help here. In a somewhat different context, see Rosenberg, Alexander, The Structure of Biological Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
- 16
- Cited by