¹ Precise estimations are hard to obtain and there are discrepancies among sources. Quoted estimates are based on data from the Secretaria de Seguridad Pública de la Ciudad de México, http://www.ssp.cdmx.gob.mx/

² See Rotberg, Robert I., The Corruption Cure: How Citizens and Leaders Can Combat Graft (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017), 290–94 and 301–321;Google Scholar Underkuffler, Laura S., Captured by Evil: The Idea of Corruption in Law (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013), 242–43.Google Scholar Notably, organizational behavior literature explores the importance of rules in promoting desirable behavior and good character. See Katz, Daniel, “The Motivational Basis of Organizational Behavior,” Systems Research and Behavioral Science 9, no. 2, (1964): 1099–1743.Google ScholarPubMed

³ For a contrasting view, see Ferretti’s paper in this volume. Her analysis suggests that institutional corruption can always be traced to corrupt individuals’ actions, thus her “continuity” theory. On my model, by contrast, people create institutions. In the process, because they have limited foresight, they can inadvertently institute opportunities and incentives that corrupt agents interacting with the institutions they create. Where my model is accurate, it explains rather than merely posits corruption.

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⁸ Rose-Ackerman, Susan, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For a classic approach to the issue also see Rose-Ackerman, Susan, Corruption: A Study in Political Economy (New York: Academic Press, 1978).Google Scholar

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¹⁰ Underkuffler, Captured by Evil, 223.

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⁴⁵ Rotberg, Corruption Cure, 30.

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⁵⁷ Ibid., 41.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 310.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 38.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 312.

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