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Aristotle's Elusive Summum Bonum

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 January 2009

Sarah Broadie
Sarah Broadie
Affiliation:
Philosophy, Princeton University
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Extract

The philosophy of Aristotle (384–322, b.c.e.) remains a beacon of our culture. But no part of Aristotle's work is more alive and compelling today than his contribution to ethics and political science — nor more relevant to the subject of the present volume. Political science, in his view, begins with ethics, and the primary task of ethics is to elucidate human flourishing. Aristotle brings to this topic a mind unsurpassed in the depth, keenness, and comprehensiveness of its probing.

Type
Research Article
Information
Social Philosophy and Policy , Volume 16 , Issue 1 , Winter 1999 , pp. 233 - 251
Copyright
Copyright © Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 1999

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References

1 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (hereafter NE), Book I, ch. 4, 1095a15–16.

2 NE I 3, 1095a5–6; II 2, 1103b26–28.Google Scholar

3 NE I 7, 1098a12–20Google Scholar; cf. 10,1101a14–16; Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics (hereafter EE), Book II, ch. 1, 1219a.

4 NE II–VI.Google Scholar

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6 NE VII 11–14; X 1–5.Google Scholar

7 NE I 4, 1095a17–20.Google Scholar

8 NE I 4, 1095a20–28.Google Scholar

9 NE X 8, 1178b8–9.Google Scholar

10 NE X 8, 1178b9–22Google Scholar; Aristotle, , Metaphysics, Book XII, chs. 7 and 9.Google Scholar

11 The well-being of nonrational animals is not eudaimonia; see EE I 7, 1217a20–29Google Scholar; NE I 9, 1099b32–1100a1; X 8, 1178b25–28.Google Scholar

12 See previous note; see also NE I 7, 1098a1–3.Google Scholar

13 NE I 7, 1097b6–11; IX 9, 1169b18–19.Google Scholar

14 Thus, Aristotle commonly uses “spoudaios” (literally: “serious”) to mean “morally good.”

15 NE II 1, 1103a18–26.Google Scholar

16 NE III 5, 1114a12–18.Google Scholar

17 See, e.g., Aristotle, , Generation of AnimalsGoogle Scholar, Book V, ch. 8, 788b21.

18 Genesis 8:21.

19 NE X 6–8Google Scholar; Metaphysics I 2Google Scholar; Protrepticus B 23–28 (Düring).Google Scholar

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21 Mill, J. S., “Utilitarianism,” in Mill's Ethical Writings, ed. Schneewind, J. B. (New York: Macmillan, 1965), pp. 75–76.Google Scholar

22 It is not clear whether Mill in fact takes this to be the formal meaning of “summum bonum,” or whether he even considers the question of the formal meaning.

23 This word and its clumsy adjectives are high-flown and sexist, but less misleading than the alternative, “politician” and its cognates.

24 NE I 2, 1094a18–19.Google Scholar

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26 NE I 2, 1094a22–24.Google Scholar

27 Witness the title of Bentham's seminal An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789).Google Scholar Mill, too, addressed policymakers and individuals, without distinction.

28 NE I 2, 1094b7–10.Google Scholar

29 NE I 7, 1098a16–18.Google Scholar

30 For a detailed interpretation, see Broadie, Sarah, Ethics with Aristotle (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 198–202.Google Scholar

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39 Cf. EE VIII 3, 1248b26ff.Google Scholar: “The good person is one for whom the natural goods are good.” For a fuller development of the theme, see Plato, , Euthydemus, 280b–282e.Google Scholar

40 NE III 4, 1113a25–33.Google Scholar

41 It is to be emphasized that this is intended as an analysis of what is implied by judging another to be of a character such that one would not be him no matter what advantages (as usually understood) might be attached. It is a further question whether such an undiluted attitude exists or should exist, even in the “good person.”

42 NE I 6, 1096a23–33.Google Scholar

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46 The example is from Lawrence, Gavin, “Nonaggregatability, Inclusiveness, and the Theory of Focal Value: Nicomachean Ethics I.7. 1097b16–20,” Phronesis, vol. 42, no. 1 (1997), pp. 32ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

47 NE I 6, 1096b17–19Google Scholar; Metaphysics I 1, 980a20–28.Google Scholar

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49 See the previous note; see also Aristotle, , PoliticsGoogle Scholar, Book VII, ch. 14, 1333a30–b11, and Book VIII, ch. 3, 1337b29–1338a13.

50 NE X 7Google Scholar, 1177b19–34; 8, 1178b21–23.