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²⁴ Ibid., p. 1897. But see ibid., p. 1909 n. 222.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 1882.

²⁶ Radin, , “Property and Personhood,” p. 966 (footnote omitted).Google Scholar

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⁴⁵ Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan [1651], ed. Smith, W. G. Pogson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909), pt. 1, ch. 10, p. 67Google Scholar. Actually, a willing buyer and a willing seller would jointly determine the price.

⁴⁶ Munzer, , “Kant and Property Rights in Body Parts”Google Scholar (supra note 2) surveys the stronger pronouncements and suggests ways of using Kant's general moral theory to soften them.

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⁴⁸ Kant, , The Metaphysics of Morals, p. 219.Google Scholar

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⁶⁸ Ibid., cap. 46–47, pp. 86–87. The standard text for Anglo-Saxon laws from 600 a.d. until the Norman Conquest in 1066 a.d. remains Liebermann, F., Die Gesetze der Angelsachsen, 3 vols. (Halle am Saale: Max Niemeyer, 1903–1916).Google Scholar

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Economists cannot tell us the value of bodily integrity, emotional well-being, or life because these are not defined by the market. The costs of accidents can only be determined collectively—after the fact by a judge or jury, or before by a legislature or regulatory agency.

⁷³ Ibid., pp. 790, 820.