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Rule Utilitarianism, Equality, and Justice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 January 2009

John C. Harsanyi
John C. Harsanyi
Affiliation:
School of Business Administration, University of California, Berkeley.
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Extract

Utilitarianism and the Concept of Social Utility

In this paper I propose to discuss the concepts of equality and justice from a rule utilitarian point of view, after some comments on the rule utilitarian point of view itself.

Let me start with the standard definitions. Act utilitarianism is the theory that a morally right action is one that in the existing situation will produce the highest expected social utility. (I am using the adjective “expected” in the sense of mathematical expectation.) In contrast, rule utilitarianism is the theory that a morally right action is simply an action conforming to the correct moral rule applicable to the existing situation. The correct moral rule itself is that particular behavioral rule that would yield the highest expected social utility if it were followed by all morally motivated people in all similar situations.

Type
Research Article
Information
Social Philosophy and Policy , Volume 2 , Issue 2 , Spring 1985 , pp. 115 - 127
Copyright
Copyright © Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 1985

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References

1 The author wants to thank the National Science Foundation for supporting this research through grant SES77–06394–A02, administered by the Center for Research in Management, University of California, Berkeley.

2 Any moral decision, under either version of utilitarianism, is a constrained maximization problem, with social utility as the maximizand. But the actual constraints of maximization are different under the two versions of utilitarianism. An act utilitarian must try to maximize social utility under the assumption that the strategies of all other utilitarians are simply given, independent of his own strategy. In contrast, a rule utilitarian must try to maximize social utility under the assumption that all utilitarians will always use the same strategy. See Harsanyi, J. C., “Rule Utilitarianism and Decision Theories,” Erkenntnis 11 (1977), pp. 44–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar As a result, the alternatives will also be different under the two utilitarian theories. Under act utilitarianism, they will be alternative individual acts. Under rule utilitarianism, they will be alternative moral rules; in fact, as closer analysis would show, they are alternative comprehensive moral codes.

3 Moore, G. E., Principia Ethica (London: Cambridge University Press, 1903), p. 17.Google Scholar

4 For a discussion of these problems, see my Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), Chapter 4; and “Rule Utilitarianism and Decision Theory,” pp. 27–30.

5 Harsanyi, , “Rule Utilitarianism, Rights, Obligations, and the Theory of Rational Behavior,” Theory and Decision 12 (1980), p. 128.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6 Mill, John Stuart, “Utilitarianism,” Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government, ed. Ernest, Rhys (New York: Everyman's Library, E. P. Dutton and Co., 1926), pp. 43–44Google Scholar, quoted in Narveson, J., Morality and Utility (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), p. 148.Google Scholar

7 Presumably, under any moral theory, we would have to assume that moral rules will be made publicly known to enable people to comply with them. But under rule utilitarian theory there is an additional reason for assuming that moral rules will be publicly known. For, in principle, every individual can compute what set of moral rules will yield the highest social utility.

8 Harsanyi, J. C., “Some Epistemological Advantages of the Rule Utilitarian Position in Ethics,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 7 (1982), pp. 395–396.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

9 See Brandt, Richard B., “Toward a Credible Form of Utilitarianism,” Morality and the Language of Conduct, Castañeda, H. N. and Nakhnikian, G., eds. (Detroit: Wayne University Press, 1963), pp. 120–123Google Scholar; Lyons, D., The Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism (London: Oxford University Press, 1965)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, passim; Hare, R. M., Freedom and Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 130–136.Google Scholar

10 Smart, J. J. C., “An Outline of Utilitarian Ethics,” Utilitarianism, For and Against (London: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 10.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

11 Prichard, H. A., Moral Obligation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968)Google Scholar; Ross, W. D., Foundations of Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1939)Google Scholar; Nozick, R., Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974).Google Scholar

12 My argument in this section has greatly benefited from Professor Narveson's discussion of these topics (J. Narveson, Morality and Utility, pp. 34–37). But he may not agree with all that I will say.

13 Of course, there is a very strong case for remedial actions in favor of social groups unjustly treated in the past. But it is a more difficult question how far we may go in discriminating against people not belonging to these social groups, if these people have no personal responsibility for the unjust policies of the past.