¹ To avoid unnecessary complexity, I discuss liberal theory on a general level and am not concerned with questions of precise definition. As I use the term, the liberal tradition has at its center the individual and his rights, more or less regardless of how these rights are established and regardless of whether they extend beyond the essentially negative rights of classical liberalism to encompass economic and other welfare rights. Thus, in addition to Locke, Montesquieu, and Mill, this view includes Hobhouse and both Rawls and Nozick.

² Locke, John, The Second Treatise of GovernmentGoogle Scholar, in Locke, , Two Treatises of Government, ed. Laslett, Peter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; “Declaration of Independence,” reprinted in Hamilton, Alexander, Jay, John, and Madison, James, The Federalist (New York: Modern Library, n.d.), 619–22.Google Scholar

³ Hume, David, “Of the Original Contract,”Google Scholar in Hume, , Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary, ed. Miller, Eugene, rev. ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Classics, 1985)Google Scholar. See also the important discussion of Simmons, A. John, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), chaps. 3 and 4.Google Scholar

⁴ See Pitkin, Hannah, “Obligation and Consent,” American Political Science Review 59, no. 4 (12 1965): 990–99CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Waldron, Jeremy, “Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism,” Philosophical Quarterly 37, no. 147 (04 1987): 127–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Kant, Immanuel, “On the Common Saying: ‘This May Be True in Theory, but It Does Not Apply in Practice,’”Google Scholar in Kant, , Kant's Political Writings, ed. Reiss, Hans (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).Google Scholar

⁵ A full exposition of fairness theory, on which I will draw here, can be found in Klosko, George, The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation (Savage, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1992)Google Scholar. Other grounds of political obligation that do not involve voluntary commitment include gratitude, a natural duty of justice, and consequentialism. For an additional possibility, reciprocity, see Hall, Mark and Klosko, George, “Political Obligation and the United States Supreme Court,” Journal of Politics 60, no. 2 (05 1998): 466–68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶ Simmons, A. John, On the Edge of Anarchy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 256–60.Google Scholar

⁷ It is possible to deny the need for the services in question altogether, which would make it easier to defeat arguments for political obligations. Such an approach, however, would take one beyond the parameters of liberal theory. In this essay, I confine my attention to liberal theory, and so do not discuss this approach. In addition, although the specific benefits discussed in this essay are those of a modern industrial society, my arguments could easily be recast to be made applicable to other kinds of societies.

⁸ See especially Sandel, Michael, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Taylor, Charles, “Atomism,”Google Scholar in Taylor, , Philosophy and the Human Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁹ Hart, H. L. A., “Are There Any Natural Rights?” Philosophical Review 64, no. 2 (04 1955): 185CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Some of the language used below in describing the workings of the principle is from Klosko, , Principle of FairnessGoogle Scholar

¹⁰ Lyons, David, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), 164CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 112Google Scholar. The underlying moral principle is analyzed by Arneson, Richard, “The Principle of Fairness and Free-Rider Problems,” Ethics 92, no. 4 (07 1982): 616–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹¹ For discussion, see Klosko, , Principle of Fairness, chap. 2.Google Scholar

¹² Though I will not discuss other possible members of this class, I do not rule out that others may exist.

¹³ The dependence of political obligation on accepting benefits is noted in Rawls, , Theory of Justice, 113–16Google Scholar; as well as Nozick, Robert, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 95Google Scholar; and Dworkin, Ronald, Law's Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), 192–93.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Nozick, , Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 93–94.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Ibid., 94.

¹⁶ Ibid., 95.

¹⁷ Throughout this essay, I generally use the terms “nonexcludable goods” and “public goods” interchangeably. As the term is commonly used, public goods are not only nonexcludable, but are also characterized by “nonrival consumption,” that is, A's consumption of the good does not affect the amount available for consumption by other individuals. This aspect of public goods is not of immediate concern here. On public goods, see Head, John G., Public Goods and Public Welfare (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1974).Google Scholar

Returning to the three conditions, it should be noted that for condition (2) to be satisfied, the public goods in question must be worth their costs for all recipients, including those who would prefer not to cooperate rather than to have the costs imposed on them. For reasons of space, I discuss only condition (2) in this essay. Throughout, I assume that conditions (1) and (3) are met, and so do not examine them in detail. For discussion of these and other important aspects of the principle of fairness, see Klosko, , Principle of Fairne.Google Scholar

¹⁸ The main exceptions would be circumstances under which the benefits were not worth their costs. For example, in hopeless circumstances, military defense will not be worth the costs needed to secure it. See Klosko, , Principle of Fairness, 55–56.Google Scholar

¹⁹ The discussion here draws on Klosko, , Principle of Fairness, chap. 2Google Scholar, where I also consider and counter other possible arguments against obligations in such cases.

²⁰ Because the benefits supplied by the state are indispensable, the principle of fairness is able to generate obligations even when compliance with them is costly. Theories with other bases — in particular, those based on a natural duty of justice — are able to generate only weak obligations; see Klosko, George, “Political Obligation and the Natural Duties of Justice,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 23, no. 3 (Summer 1994): 251–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On the role of indispensability in fixing the content of political obligations, see Klosko, George, “Fixed Content of Political Obligation,” Political Studies 46, no. 1 (03 1998): 53–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²¹ For our purposes, it is not necessary to distinguish law and order from the legal order. The benefits from both can be considered together under the designation “law and order.” The highly integrated character of modern society and the role of authority in overseeing this integration are well discussed by Finnis, John in his Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), chap. 9Google Scholar. An eloquent account of the value of stable background conditions is given by Edmund Burke in his November 1789 letter to Charles Depont, reprinted in Burke, , The Selected Letters of Edmund Burke, ed. Mansfield, Harvey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 256–58.Google Scholar

²² For Simmons's other criticisms of the principle of fairness, see Simmons, , Moral Principles, chap. 5Google Scholar; and Simmons, A. John, “The Anarchist Position: A Reply to Klosko and Senor,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 16, no. 3 (Summer 1987): 260–68Google Scholar. I respond to these arguments in Klosko, , Principle of Fairness.Google Scholar

²³ Simmons, , On the Edge of Anarchy, 5.Google Scholar

²⁴ Locke, , Second Treatise, sec. 95Google Scholar. In his most recent work, Simmons describes “the natural freedom of persons” as “a basic and plausible Lockean premise.” Simmons, A. John, “Justification and Legitimacy,” Ethics 109, no. 4 (07 1999): 752.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁵ Simmons, , On the Edge of Anarchy, 72–79.Google Scholar

²⁶ Ibid., 76.

²⁷ Ibid., 256.

²⁸ The means through which the imposition of obligations on Jones can be justified are discussed in Klosko, , Principle of Fairness, chap. 2Google Scholar; for reasons of space, I do not repeat that material here. We should note, however, that in all cases, ceteris paribus principles hold in regard to conditions. The obligations in question are prima facie and so hold in the absence of strong countervailing considerations; for a brief discussion of prima facie obligations, see Klosko, , Principle of Fairness, 12–14.Google Scholar

²⁹ As argued in Klosko, , Principle of Fairness, 48–49Google Scholar, the burden of proof here is on proponents of a given cooperative scheme. Given the great value of indispensable goods, however, it should be possible for them to meet this in many cases.

³⁰ Simmons, , On the Edge of Anarchy, 258.Google Scholar

³¹ Both quotations are from ibid.

³² Simmons's argument here represents a departure from his position in Moral Principles. In that work, he is within the liberal tradition, as he does not question state supply of indispensable benefits. The essence of his argument for “philosophical anarchism” is that, without questioning state supply, none of the basic arguments for political obligations survives scrutiny. In On the Edge of Anarchy, in contrast, Simmons departs from mainstream liberalism and is in effect an anarchist in a more conventional sense, in that he is committed to the nonliberal factual claim that voluntary association can provide important benefits we require.

³³ I am grateful to Colin Bird for discussion on this point.

³⁴ It could be argued that from a Lockean perspective, the individual himself should be the judge of feasibility. Although I agree that there is a presumption in favor of the individual's judgment, this does not hold without limits; some external standard of plausible feasibility should be appealed to here as well. Although this claim is necessarily somewhat vague—and no doubt controversial—on an abstract level, it becomes less so as it is employed in particular cases. As Richard Arneson argues, the fact that someone believes that “national defense is manna from heaven” does not free that individual from obligations he would otherwise have. In a case such as this, the individual has an obligation to acquaint himself with the morally relevant facts of the situation. Arneson, , “Principle of Fairness,” 632Google Scholar. When the individual'ss alternative measures do not satisfy a plausible standard of feasibility, the presumption that he should judge for himself is overruled.

³⁵ Lenin, Vladimir I., The State and RevolutionGoogle Scholar, in Lenin, , The Lenin Anthology, ed. Tucker, Robert C. (New York: Norton, 1975), 380.Google Scholar

³⁶ Although not discussed in this essay, a set of acceptable rights is presupposed by fairness theory. A principle of political obligation is only a single moral requirement, which must exist in the context of — and be consistent with—a network of other acceptable principles. For discussion of how considerations along these lines limit political obligations under fairness theory, see Klosko, , Principle of Fairness, 122–25Google Scholar. Defining the boundary between acceptable and unacceptable violations of rights raises complex issues that cannot be discussed here. At the very least, for an alternative mechanism to meet this transition requirement, the transition from existing society cannot cause greater violations of rights than would be alleviated by the development of the alternative mechanism. For discussion of this point, I am grateful to David Brink.

³⁷ It could be argued that trash collection is of little importance and is not a public good. However, brief reflection indicates that an acceptable means of dealing with trash is a necessary public health measure, and that some combination of this and other such measures constitutes an indispensable public good. For discussion of how to determine the form in which an essential public good should be provided, see Klosko, , Principle of Fairness, 80–81.Google Scholar

³⁸ Weber, Max, “Politics as a Vocation,”Google Scholar in Weber, , From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. and trans. Gerth, H. H. and Mills, C. Wright (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), 78.Google Scholar

³⁹ Libertarian anarchists have described several reasonably plausible arrangements for immediate physical protection; these arrangements have been based on voluntary protective associations. See Friedman, David, The Machinery of Freedom (New York: Harper and Row, 1973)Google Scholar; Friedman, David, “Anarchy and Efficient Law,” in Sanders, John and Narveson, Jan, eds., For and Against the State (Savage, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996), 235–54Google Scholar; Benson, Bruce, The Enterprise of Law (San Francisco, CA: Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy, 1990)Google Scholar; and Rothbard, Murray, For a New Liberty (New York: Macmillan, 1978)Google Scholar. Central to these proposals is the idea that many aspects of protection are excludable goods and thus are subject to market forces. As Friedman points out, in existing societies, significant percentages of security expenditures and security personnel are private. Friedman, , Machinery of Freedom, 219Google Scholar; see also Benson, , Enterprise of LawGoogle Scholar. Detailed examination of these anarchist proposals is not possible in this essay. However, even if protection could be provided through voluntary associations, theorists have not shown how such associations can provide other essential public goods.

⁴⁰ Friedman characterizes provision of defense as “the hard problem”; his suggestions here are highly speculative (Friedman, , Machinery of Freedom, chap. 34)Google Scholar. Rothbard's suggestions are similarly improbable (Rothbard, , For a New Liberty, 237–41 and chap. 14)Google Scholar. Benson concedes the need for state provision of defense (Benson, , Enterprise of Law, 373)Google Scholar. Gametheoretic explanations of alternative provision also have problems with respect to defense; see note 63 below.

⁴¹ That the territorial basis of state services is a problem for consent theory is seen in Beran, Harry, The Consent Theory of Political Obligation (London: Croom Helm, 1987)Google Scholar; for discussion, see Buchanan, Allen, Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 70–73.Google Scholar

⁴² Small territories like Monaco or Lichtenstein are sheltered by the protective umbrella provided by the great powers, and therefore arguably have political obligations to those countries. For brief discussion, see Klosko, , “Political Obligation and the Natural Duties of Justice,” 260 n. 18.Google Scholar

⁴³ See note 36 above.

⁴⁴ Though I will not go into depth on the matter, I should note here that the plausibility condition's background requirement plays an important role, both here and in the next section, in ruling out changes in conditions that would make organized coercive mechanisms unnecessary. For example, a proponent of some alternative mechanism who is faced with the objections to alternative supply presented in this section could not respond to these objections by saying that his mechanism would work if large-scale changes in human wants and desires could be brought about.

⁴⁵ I quote Hume: “Almost all the governments, which exist at present, or of which there remains any record in story, have been founded originally, either on usurpation or conquest, or both, without any pretence of a fair consent of voluntary subjection of the people.” Hume, , “Of the Original Contract,” 471.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ The moral context and additional requirements of fairness theory are discussed throughout Klosko, , Principle of FairnessGoogle Scholar; see also note 36 above.

⁴⁷ In cases where there are such morally relevant differences, one might wonder whether the differences (1) cause the dissolution of existent political obligations, or (2) prevent any such obligations from being constituted in the first place. Though I will not discuss the matter here, I believe the latter option is more likely.

⁴⁸ See Klosko, , Principle of Fairness, chap. 3Google Scholar. For discussion of the attitudes in modern liberal states toward democratic institutions and democracy as a value, see Klosko, George, Democratic Procedures and Liberal Consensus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), chap. 5.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ This fact would perhaps constitute a morally relevant difference if Jones's alternative preferences were so strong as to raise questions of conscience, in which case imposing majority decisions on him would represent an injustice. Though I cannot discuss here the complex issues concerning pacifists and conscientious objectors, I do believe that their situations involve this sort of strong alternative preference. In such cases, however, the recognition that the individual still has some obligations is seen in provisions for alternative service. For discussion of conscientious-objection practices in some two dozen countries, see Moskos, Charles C. and Chambers, John Whiteclay, eds., The New Conscientious Objection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).Google Scholar

⁵⁰ See Taylor, Michael, The Possibility of Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987)Google Scholar, discussed below. Similar views are advanced by many additional scholars; the contributors to Sanders and Narveson's For and Against the State constitute a representative sample.

⁵¹ Hardin, Garrett, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science 162, no. 13 (12 1968): 1247.Google ScholarPubMed

⁵² Taylor, , Possibility of Cooperation, 1.Google Scholar

⁵³ Jon Elster, quoted in Taylor, , Possibility of Cooperation, 19.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Under other conditions, a correct construal of the situation would posit it as a game of chicken rather than as a prisoners' dilemma; see note 62 below.

⁵⁵ Taylor, , Possibility of Cooperation, 12.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ See ibid., chap. 3, for discussion of this process, including the complexities concerning discounts on future payoffs, a factor I have omitted here.

⁵⁷ Anthony de Jasay, for one, argues that treating large-number games as supergames solves the difficulties that they present. See de Jasay, Anthony, Against Politics (London: Routledge, 1997), 206–8, 215–16Google Scholar. However, he deals only with performance and nonperformance of contracts, as opposed to wider forms of noncompliance, including noncontribution to necessary public goods. In the context of contributing toward these goods, noncompliance can be far more difficult to detect (as discussed below), and raises problems that de Jasay's argument does not address. For example, in many public-goods cases, a given individual's incentives to enforce another individual's compliance are significantly different from the incentives he would have in a contract situation. In a typical public-goods case, Jones's defection causes no detectable damage and so does not harm Smith or affect the costs associated with Smith's compliance.

⁵⁸ Taylor, , Possibility of Cooperation, 61.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Olson, Mancur, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), 36, 48.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Ibid., 12.

⁶¹ For complexities here, see Klosko, , Principle of Fairness, appendix 2.Google Scholar

⁶² These problems cannot be overcome by analyzing public-goods provision with the model of the game of chicken; see Taylor, , Possibility of Cooperation, chap. 2Google Scholar. In a chicken scenario, different individuals or subgroups must be able to supply the relevant goods without outside assistance. However, in a large society, this condition will not ordinarily hold for the public goods that interest us. In addition, one must explain the incentives of individuals in these subgroups; these incentives appear to conform to those found in an N-person PD.

⁶³ The problems with game theory are epitomized by its inability to deal with providing defense. For instance, in Against Politics, de Jasay gives the problem extremely scant attention and offers no solution. See de Jasay, , Against Politics, 208Google Scholar. In Sanders and Narveson's For and Against the State, a collection in which the practical and moral necessity of the state is assessed from a variety of game-theoretic perspectives, the problem of defense receives no serious attention.

⁶⁴ Ostrom, Elinor, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Conclusions similar to Ostrom's are also presented in Ellickson, Robert, Order Without Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Ostrom, , Governing the Commons, 25.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Ibid., 183–84.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 211.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 183.

⁶⁹ The experimental evidence supporting nonstate solutions to PD problems suffers from severe flaws. Specifically, the experiments that provided this evidence involved small groups of subjects and assigned artificially low values to the costs and benefits of cooperation. See Harriott, Howard, “Games, Anarchy, and the Nonnecessity of the State,”Google Scholar in Sanders, and Narveson, , eds., For and Against the State, 131–34.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Taylor, , Possibility of Cooperation, 105–6.Google Scholar

⁷¹ Ibid., 105.

⁷² For discussion of other specific moral requirements generated by membership in communities, see Dagger, Richard, Civic Virtues (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), chap. 4Google Scholar