¹ By calling happiness a “nonmoral” good in Kant's ethics, I have in mind several points. For example, in Kant's view, a happy person is not necessarily a morally good person and a vicious person is not necessarily unhappy. Happiness is a natural end that each person has, but the pursuit of (one's own) happiness is not a moral requirement—except indirectly, when its neglect would increase our temptations to neglect our duties. So far as it is compatible with morality, each person's happiness is a (conditional) good for that person, that is, something rational (but not a duty or virtue) for the person to pursue. We have a duty of beneficence to others, but this directs us to help them to achieve the (permissible) ends they choose, not to improve their characters or to fulfill a moral ideal. Having a good will (roughly, a will to do what is right) is, by contrast, a moral good, for maintaining a good will is necessary and sufficient for being a morally good person. It is an unconditional good, a fundamental requirement of morality.

² My brief sketch of a contemporary view of human flourishing is just a summary of how I interpret common understandings of the idea, but few philosophers seem to discuss it independently of the texts of Aristotle and other ancient philosophers. John Cooper uses the term “human flourishing” to capture (roughly) Aristotle's idea of eudaimonia or “happiness,” and he credits Elizabeth Anscombe for suggesting this translation. See Cooper, John, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 89–143Google Scholar, esp. p. 90n.; and Anscombe, G. E. M., “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Philosophy, vol. 33, no. 124 (01 1958), pp. 1–19CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Other scholars prefer “happiness” as the appropriate translation, while making clear that Aristotle's conception of “happiness” differs from familiar contemporary conceptions. See, for example, Annas, Julia, The Morality of Happiness (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1993)Google Scholar; Sherman, Nancy, The Fabric of Character (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989)Google Scholar; Kenny, Anthony, Aristotle on the Perfect Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Kraut, Richard, Aristotle and the Human Good (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).Google Scholar

³ See Aristotle, , Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Irwin, Terence (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1985)Google Scholar, esp. Book I. Many similarities and variations are described in detail in Annas, , The Morality of HappinessGoogle Scholar. Since my aim is to emphasize the contrasts between Aristotle's idea of “happiness” (or human flourishing) and quite different Kantian ideas, in referring to Aristotle's eudaimonia I will either use the term “human flourishing” or else use quotation marks (“happiness”).

⁴ Strictly speaking, Kant splits virtue (as he conceives it) from happiness (as he conceives it), but not Aristotelian “virtue” from Aristotelian “happiness.” “Virtue,” according to Kant, is a “capacity and considered resolve” and “strength” to resist “what opposes the moral disposition within us.” Kant, Immanuel, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Gregor, Mary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 186 [380], 194 [390], and 197 [394]Google Scholar. (The numbers in brackets here and later indicate pages in the standard Prussian Academy edition.) A virtuous person, then, must have not only a will to do what is right (a “good will”) but also a resolve to resist temptations and strength of will to do so. Virtue, according to Aristotle, requires reshaping or getting rid of desires that might compete with our doing the right thing; and thus Aristotle's fully virtuous person, being temperate rather than merely continent, has no need for the strength of will to resist temptations that Kant refers to.

⁵ Kant, Immanuel, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. Paton, H. J. (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1964)Google Scholar, hereafter Groundwork, p. 93 [395]Google Scholar. See also Kant, , Metaphysics of Morals, p. 193 [389].Google Scholar

⁶ Kant, , Groundwork, p. 67 [399].Google Scholar

⁷ Kant, , Metaphysics of Morals, p. 193 [389]Google Scholar, and Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Beck, Lewis White (New York: Macmillan, 1993), p. 20 [22].Google Scholar

⁸ Kant, , Groundwork, pp. 73 [405] and 67 [399].Google Scholar

⁹ Kant, , Metaphysics of Morals, p. 269 [480].Google Scholar

¹⁰ This characterization is quite vague, but inevitably so, for several reasons. Our ends tend to be indeterminate; our priorities for cases of conflict are often undecided; and it is unclear to what extent ignorance, irrationality, and misjudgment in a person's adoption of ends is supposed to modify or cancel the judgment that helping the person to realize those ends would be promoting the person's happiness.

¹¹ Slote, Michael, From Morality to Virtue (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 39–57.Google Scholar

¹² Kant, , Groundwork, pp. 61–62Google Scholar [393–94]. I rely on a (possibly controversial) interpretation explained in my paper “Is a Good Will Overrated?” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Volume 20: Moral Concepts (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996), pp. 199–217.Google Scholar

¹³ G. E. Moore thought that the way to see what is “good in itself” is to consider the item in question “in isolation” from everything else, i.e., “apart from all effects and accompaniments.” Here “in itself” is taken quite literally: just look into the thing itself and you will see its goodness. (See Moore, G. E., Principia Ethica [1903; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959]Google Scholar, and Moore, , Ethics [1912; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965[.)Google ScholarPubMed This is not the ordinary use of the term, I think, nor is it Kant's. Crucially, it is not what Kant means by “unconditionally good.” See Korsgaard, Christine, “Two Distinctions in Goodness,” Philosophical Review, vol. 92, no. 2 (04 1983), pp. 169–95CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and my “Is a Good Will Overrated?”

¹⁴ There is some disagreement among Kant scholars, I think, about whether Kant admits that there are individual-agent-relative values, things that are merely good to or for a person in a sense that does not necessarily give others reasons to act (e.g., to help or refrain from interference). (I say “individual-agent-relative” here to distinguish the values in question from those that might be described as “rational-agents-relative.” In a sense, all value according to Kant stems from what persons rationally will and thus is not something that could exist independently of all [possible] valuing agents.) Of course, it is agreed that Kant's view is that insofar as attainment of happiness is consistent with morality, the happiness of every person is something that we have some moral reason to promote; and thus “morally permissible happiness,” in Kant's view, is not simply valuable to the person who would attain it. The disagreement, I think, concerns whether Kant acknowledged the category of value judgments entirely relativized to individual agents.

¹⁵ See, for example, Moore, , Principia EthicaGoogle Scholar; Moore, , EthicsGoogle Scholar; Perry, R. B., General Theory of Value: Its Meaning and Basic Principles Construed in Terms of Interest (New York: Longmans, Green, 1926)Google Scholar; Lewis, C. I., An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1947)Google Scholar; and Ross, W. D., The Right and the Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930)Google Scholar. These are classics of intrinsic value theory. In discussions of environmental ethics the term has reappeared in recent years, but without much attention to the controversies that earlier theories of intrinsic value raised. See, for example, Environmental Philosophy, ed. Mannison, D. S., McRobbie, M. A., and Routley, R. (Canberra: Australian National University Research School of Social Sciences, 1980)Google Scholar. For more contemporary use of the term, see Hurka, Thomas, Perfectionism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).Google Scholar

¹⁶ Kant, , Groundwork, p. 102 [434–35].Google Scholar

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 83 [416]; Aristotle, , Nicomachean Ethics, Book 1, ch. 1.Google Scholar

¹⁸ I distinguish living a happy life from aiming to do so because it seems possible that fully virtuous persons could be living a happy life (in Aristotle's sense) while for the most part not holding the ideal of this sort of life as a deliberative goal; for example, they could be concentrating instead on the particular choices at hand (in the manner of one with acquired virtues). The deliberate pursuit of a happy life might be more appropriately the ideal for novices who are not yet fully virtuous or for certain special decisions that require consciously reviewing one's life as a whole.

¹⁹ Kant would not fully accept Aristotle's view about the value of happiness even in Aristotle's sense, but their views are closer regarding that.

²⁰ Ross, like Moore, was an intuitionist regarding “intrinsic value,” but, unlike Moore, he was not a consequentialist who thought that the right thing to do is always to maximize intrinsic value. See Ross, , The Right and the Good.Google Scholar

²¹ Although interpretation is controversial, Bentham and Mill, as usually understood, represent classic utilitarianism; see Bentham, Jeremy, The Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789; Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1988)Google Scholar; and Mill, John Stuart, Utilitarianism, ed. Sher, George (1863; Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1979)Google Scholar. G. E. Moore and W. D. Ross are intuitionists with regard to intrinsic value; R. B. Perry and C. I. Lewis advocate the sort of naturalism that is intended here. Few, if any, contemporary philosophers defend the intuitionist position. Critics of classic utilitarianism are legion, but the most often cited is Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971)Google Scholar. Naturalistic definitions of value are also widely rejected. See, for example, Hare, R. M., Freedom and Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963)Google Scholar; Wise, Allan Gibbard Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990)Google Scholar; Blackburn, Simon, Spreading the Word (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984)Google Scholar; and Korsgaard, Christine et al. , The Sources of Normativity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²² For often-cited statements of rule-utilitarianism, see Urmson, J. O., “On the Interpretation of the Philosophy of J. S. Mill,” Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 3 (1953)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Brandt, Richard, “Toward a Credible Form of Utilitarianism,” in Morality and the Language of Conduct, ed. Castaneda, Hector-Neri and Nakhnikian, George (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1963)Google Scholar; Rawls, John, “Two Concepts of Rules,” Philosophical Review, vol. 64 (1955), pp. 3–32CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Lyons, David, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Ruleutilitarianism developed in response to objections to “act-utilitarianism,” which holds that in every case we ought to act in the way that would maximize utility even if this would contravene important rules (actual and ideal) that are generally useful. The standard objection was that act-utilitarianism would endorse acts of injustice (e.g., false witness, even murder) in cases where these acts would promote (even slightly) more utility. Ruleutilitarianism tries to block this objection by maintaining that we should follow the generally useful rules of justice, even in these cases. But there are subtle differences in different versions of rule-utilitarianism.

David Cummiskey argues that, despite Kant's own beliefs contrary to utilitarianism of all sorts, features of Kant's basic moral theory, when followed out consistently, lead to a kind of consequentialism that is akin to rule-utilitarianism. See Cummiskey, David, Kantian Consequentialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. I disagree, but cannot argue the point here.

²³ I sketch such a reconstruction in “A Kantian Perspective on Moral Rules,” Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 6 (1992), pp. 285–304Google Scholar. See also chapters 10 and 11 in my Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 196–250Google Scholar; and my essay “A Kantian Perspective on Political Violence,” The Journal of Ethics, vol. 1 (1997), pp. 105–40.Google Scholar

²⁴ In Kant's moral theory, “the Categorical Imperative” represents the most fundamental moral requirements, expressed in an imperative form—as a “command of reason” (Groundwork, pp. 83, 84 [413, 416])Google Scholar. It is supposed to be an unconditional requirement of reason that grounds particular moral duties, which are morally and rationally binding even if they do not serve our self-interest or further our chosen ends. Kant presents the Categorical Imperative in several formulas, which he suggests amount to the same basic idea (ibid., pp. 103–4 [436–37]). The interpretation of these formulas, whether they are equivalent, and even how many there are remain controversial. The first formula is: “Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law” (ibid., p. 88 [421]). A variation, used in Kant's examples, is: “Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature” (ibid., p. 89 [421]). This is followed by the influential “humanity formula”: “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end” (ibid., p. 96 [429]). Kant writes of both “humanity” and “persons” as “ends in themselves,” which have an “unconditional and incomparable worth” as opposed to mere “price” (ibid., p. 102 [434]).

²⁵ In a late essay, Kant takes the extreme stance that a person would not have a right to tell a lie to an assassin to save a friend from murder. See Kant, Immanuel, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, with On a Supposed Right to Lie because of Philanthropic Concerns, trans. Ellington, James W. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1981), pp. 63–67Google Scholar. Most contemporary admirers of Kant, I think, reject this position. See, for example, Donagan, Alan, The Theory of Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 88–89Google Scholar. For Kant's controversial position on other matters, see Metaphysics of Morals, pp. 220–21Google Scholar [424–45], 96–97 [278–79], 168–69 [363–69], 218–19 [422–33], 127–33 [316–23].

²⁶ Kant, , Metaphysics of Morals, pp. 127–33Google Scholar [316–23], 176 [371]; see also Reiss, Hans, “Postscript,” in Kant: Political Writings, ed. Reiss, Hans (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 267–68Google Scholar. See also Kant, Immanuel, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, ed. Greene, T. M. and Hudson, H. H. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), p. 142n. [154n.].Google Scholar

²⁷ Kant, , Metaphysics of Morals, pp. 144–45 [336].Google Scholar

²⁸ My point is that Kant endorsed some particular principles as absolute that are indefensible even within his own basic theory, not that there are no defensible principles that hold without exception. Much depends on how the forbidden activity is described. When motives are included in the description, it becomes more plausible that we can describe acts that are always wrong, e.g., “torturing someone merely for your amusement.” Some labels— e.g., “murder” and “rape”—seem implicitly to indicate an unacceptable motive.

²⁹ Kant, , Groundwork, p. 89 [421].Google Scholar

³⁰ Kant, , “On a Supposed Right to Lie because of Philanthropic Concerns” (supra note 25).Google Scholar

³¹ Kant, , Groundwork, pp. 95–96Google Scholar [427–29]. Kant's humanity formula has been interpreted in many different ways. My view is developed in my essay collection Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory (supra note 23), pp. 38–57, 197–225Google Scholar; in my essay “Donagan's Kant,” Ethics, vol. 104 (1993), pp. 22–52Google Scholar; and in my essay “A Kantian Perspective on Political Violence” (supra note 23).

³² Kant, , Metaphysics of Morals, p. 56Google Scholar [230–31]. See also Reiss, , ed., Kant: Political Writings, pp. 73–74, 80Google Scholar. “External freedom” is the ability to act as one chooses without hindrance from others. Kant holds that the exercise of external freedom is unjust when it is incompatible with the equal freedom of all under universal laws. We exercise our external freedom through intentional acts, but external freedom is contrasted with two kinds of internal freedom presupposed by moral agency: that is, the ability to act without being determined by natural causes (negative freedom) and “being a law to oneself” (rational autonomy or positive freedom). See Kant, , Groundwork, p. 114Google Scholar [446–47].

³³ Rawls's first principle says that “each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.” Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 60Google Scholar. The interpretation of this principle is discussed in a later section (ibid., pp. 201–51).

³⁴ See Rosen, James, Kant's Theory of Justice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 173–208Google Scholar; and Guyer, Paul, “Kantian Foundations for Liberalism,” Jahrbuch für Strafrecht und Etik/Annual Review of Law and Ethics, vol. 5 (1997), pp. 121–40.Google Scholar

³⁵ For example, freedom might be understood to include the more positive idea of having certain basic opportunities and resources to live a full life as a rational, autonomous person, and, if so, unjust “hindrances to freedom” might include more than murder, slavery, theft, and the like. Holtman, Sarah develops this idea in an excellent Ph.D. dissertation, “Kant, Justice, and the Augmentation of Ideal Theory,” University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1996.Google Scholar

³⁶ Kant, , Metaphysics of Morals, p. 56 [230–31].Google Scholar

³⁷ Ibid., p. 57 [231].

³⁸ Ibid., pp. 56–58 [230–33], 129–33 [318–23]. My interpretation of Kant's views on these matters differs somewhat from that presented in Rosen, , Kant's Theory of Justice, pp. 115–72.Google Scholar

³⁹ Kant divides human nature into rational nature and sensuous nature. We learn about our sensuous nature empirically—for example, by observing how we feel and act in various circumstances. We cannot help but think of ourselves also as persons with practical reason, and philosophical examination of the idea is supposed to show that this requires attribution to ourselves of some rational dispositions distinct from the desires, impulses, and inclinations attributed on the basis of experience. Kant seems to suppose that human beings have a preference for freedom to live as rational autonomous persons over satisfaction of other desires both because this is a common desire, hard to repress, and also because it is a rational disposition and we are rational (or so we must assume).

⁴⁰ The suggestion assumes that Kant thought we have a rational disposition, not only to avoid making irrational choices, but also to develop and exercise our practical rationality over time by pursuing morally necessary ends and pursuing happiness within the limits of our duties. Insofar as we think of the relevant “external liberties” as those needed to fulfill this rational disposition (with due respect to others), then it makes sense to say that it is not just our desires but also our rational nature that places a high priority on these external liberties.

⁴¹ See Mill, , Utilitarianism (supra note 21), pp. 41–63Google Scholar; and Mill, J. S., On Liberty, ed. Rapaport, Elizabeth (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1978).Google Scholar

⁴² Kant, , Metaphysics of Morals, pp. 190–93Google Scholar [385–88], 243–48 [448–54]. An imperfect duty, according to Kant, is somewhat indefinite regarding what actions are required to fulfill it. Imperfect duties contrast with perfect duties, which have the form “Always do X” or “Never do X.” Typically, as with beneficence, an imperfect duty is a duty to make it a matter of principle (maxim) to pursue a broadly described end (such as “the happiness of others”) for moral reasons. This leaves open, as a matter of judgment (but not unlimited discretion), when, how much, and in what ways to promote the end.

⁴³ Kant, , Groundwork, p. 66 [398].Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Kant, , Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 116–26 [110–20].Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 19–26 [21–26].

⁴⁶ Slote may intend a somewhat different point, namely, that character traits that are virtues are so because our having them tends to promote our own good and the good of all others combined more or less equally. This claim would not imply that a virtuous person actually has the policy or attitude of weighing others′ good equally with his or her own. Slote does not explicitly identify a person's good with “happiness,” I think, and therefore the position that I describe is only “suggested” by his remarks. See Slote, , From Morality to Virtue (supra note 11), pp. 4–57, 98.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ See, for example, Rand, Ayn, The Virtue of Selfishness (New York: New American Library, 1964)Google Scholar; and Nietzsche, Friedrich, On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Kaufmann, Walter and Hollingdale, R. J. (New York: Vintage Press, 1968).Google Scholar

⁴⁸ “Virtue ethics” refers to a cluster of moral theories that hold that the primary concern of moral theory should be to explain good and bad moral character traits (virtues and vices) rather than right and wrong action. How to define “virtue ethics” more specifically is a matter of controversy. See, for example, Crisp, Roger and Slote, Michael, Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997)Google Scholar. This includes a useful bibliography.

⁴⁹ I draw (and oversimplify) here from an excellent philosophy Ph.D. dissertation by Tiberius, Valerie, “Deliberation about the Good: Justifying What We Value,” University of North Carolina, 1997.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ I distinguish here valuing something from judging that, all things considered, it is good to pursue or have in the relevant context. I suppose that a person who is resolute in never immorally pursuing happiness might still value being happy in general—for example, might desire it, intend to satisfy the desire when doing so is morally permissible, feel disappointment at losing happiness even when this is morally necessary, and affirm these desires and attitudes on reflection. A fully virtuous person, perhaps, values happiness only insofar as it is not immoral to gain it or have it, for (in Kant's view) the correct moral judgment is that happiness is only a conditional good, and a fully virtuous person may have learned to value such goods only when the condition for their value is satisfied. The tendency to value our happiness over that of others, I think, Kant would ascribe to human nature as something that we cannot entirely overcome. Having the tendency is not our fault, in Kant's view, nor is it entirely regrettable (because it feeds competition on which progress depends). Our primary moral responsibility with respect to this tendency is not to try to transform or transcend it by training our sensibility, but rather not to let the tendency lead us to act in ways that violate or neglect our duties to others and to ourselves.

⁵¹ In Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud stresses the rarity of such love and argues that the ideal of equal love of all persons is both contrary to human nature and not an admirable ideal. (See Freud, Sigmund, Civilization and Its Discontents, trans. Riviere, Joan [London: Hogarth Press, 1930].)Google Scholar Needless to say, many Christians profess a different belief.

⁵² There is controversy among commentators about how to interpret the indeterminacy or “playroom” in Kant's principles. This room for discretion is construed narrowly by David Cummiskey in his Kantian Consequentialism and by Baron, Marcia in her Kantian Ethics (Almost) without Apology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995)Google Scholar. Mary Gregor accepts a broader interpretation that allows more moral discretion regarding the balance between charity and our own projects. The main features of my understanding of Kant's principle, which is also broad, are indicated in Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory, pp. 147–75, but some revisions, I now see, are needed.Google Scholar

⁵³ As noted earlier, Kant says that we have an “indirect” duty to promote our own happiness, but this does little to help meet Slote's objection because this duty is only an application of our more general duties, e.g., to respect the rights of others and to promote their happiness (along with our own “perfection”).

⁵⁴ “I cannot do good to anyone in accordance with my concepts of happiness (except to young children and the insane), thinking to benefit him by forcing a gift upon him; rather, I can benefit him only in accordance with his concepts of happiness” (Kant, , Metaphysics of Morals, p. 248 [454]).Google Scholar

⁵⁵ There are, of course, many refinements that would need to be made if we were trying to articulate the principle as subtly and completely as possible. For example, qualifications are needed regarding cases where the person who refuses help is incompetent, obviously “not herself,” etc. But what I have said is enough, I hope, for present purposes.

⁵⁶ Even prudence, however, normally allows options, for it is a conditional rational imperative to promote our own happiness, and our working conceptions of happiness are neither fixed nor completely determinate. Insofar as Kant conceives of happiness as satisfying freely chosen, desire-based ends, we can often avoid doing something that previously seemed necessary for happiness by modifying the ends we choose to pursue.

⁵⁷ Singer, M. G., Generalization in Ethics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), pp. 311–18.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ I discuss these issues more fully in “Promises to Oneself,” in my Autonomy and Self-Respect (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 138–54.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ It is important to keep in mind that the principle of beneficence, a quite indeterminate (“imperfect”) duty to adopt the happiness of others as an end, is not the only moral consideration regarding how to treat others that we must take into account when deliberating about what to do in particular situations. We must also respect others' rights, treat them with respect, show proper gratitude, and so on. The principle of beneficence by itself does not tell us when, how, or how much to do for others. For this, we need good judgment guided by the Categorical Imperative. For example, the basic idea of humanity as an end in itself does not leave it as “optional” whether to throw a life-preserver to someone about to drown or to wait to “help” someone else later.

⁶⁰ Note, however, that Kant treats certain aspects of “human flourishing” as matters that it is morally impermissible to ignore or neglect. For example, according to Kant, there is a “perfect duty to oneself” to avoid suicide and an imperfect duty to oneself to “develop and increase (one's) natural perfection” of body and mind (Metaphysics of Morals, pp. 218–20Google Scholar [422–24], 239–40 [444–46]). Unlike Aristotle, Kant insists on a sharp distinction between rational prudence and morality. Then he does not place the ideal of human flourishing under rational prudence as a necessary end, but rather makes the pursuit of some aspects of it an imperfect moral duty to oneself. Thus, although he denies the right of prudential reason to demand that we pursue the ideal of human flourishing as an end, he makes room in his moral theory to affirm aspects of that ideal as requirements of reason.

⁶¹ Kant treats “practical reason” as reason concerned to determine what we ought to do. This contrasts with “theoretical reason,” which is concerned with understanding the world as it actually is. Practical reason is called “pure” when its serves to determine what we ought to do independently of our natural desire for happiness and our individual inclinations. This contrasts with “empirically conditioned” practical reason, which tries to determine what we ought to do in order to satisfy our desire to be happy and to achieve our personal ends. Kant argues that pure practical reason is the source of the most fundamental moral principle, the Categorical Imperative. A person fully committed to following the fundamental moral principle has a “good will” and is “worthy to be happy.” The most complete good is a good will combined with deserved happiness, but having a good will alone is not enough to make one happy and being happy does not entail that one has a good will. See Kant, , Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 15–20Google Scholar [15–22], 116–19 [110–13].

⁶² See, for example, Kant, , Groundwork, pp. 85–86Google Scholar [418–19].

⁶³ It must be remembered that we are concerned here with beneficence that does not violate justice, due respect for persons, or other obligations. Also, I assume that our duties to give lifesaving aid, to meet essential human needs, etc., are justifiable as high-priority duties in Kant's ethics on grounds that are not simply applications of the very general and indeterminate duty to promote others' happiness. That duty, as I understand it, concerns contributions to others' happiness beyond those more elementary duties (even though Kant does not separate these issues in The Metaphysics of Morals).

⁶⁴ By “the Hypothetical Imperative” I mean the most general principle behind our reasoning that we ought to do various particular things because they are necessary as a means to furthering our ends. The Hypothetical Imperative tells us to take the necessary means (when available) to the ends that we choose to pursue or else abandon these ends. A more complete explanation is given in my Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory, chs. 1 and 7.

⁶⁵ Critics of the Kantian perspective might object that it must be irrational to choose personal projects that we know are not “the best” for us, but the objection presupposes the controversial claim that the course that does most to cause us to meet the descriptive criteria for “flourishing as a human being” is also “best” in a normative sense.

⁶⁶ The predisposition to acknowledge moral principles as authoritative in our decision making, according to Kant, is something that we must attribute to ourselves as rational moral agents, but it is not an aspect of our nature that we discover and understand empirically as, for example, we come to know our desires and feelings.

⁶⁷ See Kant, , Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 128–38 [122–32].Google Scholar