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BEING MORAL AND HANDLING THE TRUTH*
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 February 2014
Abstract
It is generally agreed that Kant went too far in his claim that it is wrong to lie even if doing so will save an individual's life. The question remains whether it is morally permissible to tell a lie even if this does not involve saving the life of another individual. In this essay, I seek to answer this question affirmatively while at the same time setting strong constraints for when a lie (not involving saving a life) is morally permissible. I argue that lying is morally permissible in the face of what I call an egregious morally infelicitous question. Further, in some cases, lying is not only morally permissible but even reflects an unmistakable instance of considerable self-sacrifice. Needless to say, lies that constitute an instance of self-sacrifice are extremely rare. However, this possibility brings into sharp relief the truth that a lie need not stem from unsavory moral motives; it is upon this truth that the argument that it is morally permissible to lie in the face of an egregious morally infelicitous question relies. This essay ends with the quite poignant observation that there is nothing stable about out a society in which, owing to an unfailing duty to tell the truth, a person can obtain the truth merely by asking an egregious morally infelicitous question.
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- Research Article
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- Copyright © Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 2013
Footnotes
*
In writing this essay, I am very grateful to Cheshire Calhoun and David Schmidtz, for their searching comments, as well as the reactions of John Hilla and Eric Lynch. I would also like to thank the following undergraduate students at Syracuse University for their excellent inquiries regarding the argument: Paul Berman, Anna Koulouris, Andrew Reiss. I am especially grateful to Richard Bodnar, a former undergraduate, for his illuminating discussions from years ago that have influenced my thought.
References
1 For a very informative discussion of Aristotle's official views on the subject, see Zembaty, Jane S., “Aristotle on Lying,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 31, no. 1 (1993): 7–29CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
2 For an excellent discussion of the subject of paternalism, see Dworkin, Gerald, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
3 We have a fascinating difference between parents telling their child that she or he was adopted and parents telling their child that they had considered aborting her or him. With adoption, stark physical differences between the parents and the child can invite an inquiry by the child. Even so, the child is being affirmed, whereas we do not have a concomitant affirmation with parents telling their child that they had considered aborting her or him.
4 Cf. Grice, Paul, Studies in the Ways of Words (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), chap. 2Google Scholar.
5 See, e.g., Korsgaard, Christine M., “The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing with Evil,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 15, no. 4 (1986): 325–49Google Scholar.
6 I owe this line of thought to Hughes, Paul M.' informative essay “The Logic of Temptation,” Philosophia 29 (2002): 89–110CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
7 Sherman, Nancy makes this point in Making a Necessity of Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, as does Korsgaard in “The Right to Lie,” 325–49.
8 Foot, Philippa, “Moral Beliefs” in her collection Virtues and Vices: And Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 110–31Google Scholar.
9 For an excellent discussion in this regard, see Benton, Robert J., “Political Expediency and Lying: Kant vs. Benjamin Constant,” Journal of the History of Ideas 43, no. 1 (1982): 135–44CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
10 I am referring to the phenomenon known as battered woman syndrome. The quote is from Carpenter, Teresa, “The Final Self-Defense,” The New York Times (December 31, 1989)Google Scholar. For a discussion of the battered woman syndrome in legal theory, see, e.g., Dressler, Joshua, “Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers: Some Reflections,” Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 3 (2006): 457Google Scholar, and Krause, Joan, “Distorted Reflections of Battered Women Who Kill: A Response to John Dressler,” Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 4 (2007): 555Google Scholar.
11 Regarding the example of a friend acknowledging that he is experienced a measure of arousal with respect to his friend's spouse, it is interesting that in comparison to married individuals college students who are dating seem to be much more accepting of a friend making that admission. The explanation here seems to be twofold: (a) college dating rarely entails the same level of commitment as marriage and everyone knows this; (b) the character of college dating is much more susceptible to approval and disapproval. This is in keeping with the reality that exchanging marriage vows is typically transformative in terms of the depth of commitment that the two individuals express to one another, with that exchange often eliciting an extraordinary depth of emotion (even occasioning tears) on the part of both individuals taking the marriage vows.