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Against Cohen On Proletarian Unfreedom*
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 January 2009
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In a series of important papers, G.A. Cohen has developed a forceful argument for the claim that workers are rendered unfree by capitalist institutions. His argument poses a powerful challenge to those (such as myself) who think that capitalist institutions best promote freedom. Yet, formidable as it is, Cohen's argument can be shown to be flawed at several crucial points. It is not one argument, but three at least, and one of the goals of my criticism of Cohen on this question is to distinguish and assess the various separate lines of reasoning that together make up his case for the unfreedom under capitalism of workers as a class. Cohen argues of workers that they are rendered unfree by the institution of private property on which the capitalist system depends, that they suffer a form of collective unfreedom under capitalism, and that they are forced to sell their labor power under capitalism.
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References
1 “Capitalism, Freedom and the Proletariat” in the Idea of Freedom, ed. Alan, Ryan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979)Google Scholar; “Illusions about Private Property and Freedom,” J., Mepham and D., Ruben, eds., Issues in Marxist Philosophy, vol. IV (Hassocks, Sussex: Harvester Press, 1981)Google Scholar; “Freedom, Justice and Capitalism,” New Left Review, vol. 125 (1981); “The Structure of Proletarian Unfreedom,” J., Roemer, ed., Analytical Marxism (Cambridge University Press, 1986)Google Scholar; and “Are Workers Forced to Sell Their Labor-power?” Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 14, no. 1 (1985).
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14 I do not mean to suggest that Cohen's is the best statement of a liberal negative view of freedom, but only that it is Cohen's that I shall deploy in my argument against him.
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23 ibid., p. 250.
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