Thanks to Olga Kesarchuk for her research assistance and to Jeffrey Kopstein and Lucan Way for their comments on earlier drafts of this article.

1. On regime types in Central Asia, see Collins, Kathleen, Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia (Cambridge, Eng., 2006)Google Scholar; Melvin, Neil J., “Authoritarian Pathways in Central Asia: A Comparison of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Uzbekistan,“ in Ro'i, Yaacov, ed., Democracy and Pluralism in Muslim Eurasia (London, 2004), 119-42Google Scholar; and Schatz, Edward, “Access by Accident: Legitimacy Claims and Democracy Promotion in Authoritarian Central Asia,” International Political Science Review 27, no. 3 (2006): 263-84.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2. See Linz, Juan J., Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder, Colo., 2000).Google Scholar

3. Legitimacy may be asserted through claims to “divine right,” to national traditions, to charismatic authority, and so on. How ordinary citizens respond to these legitimacy claims is, of course, a different matter. For a discussion that produced a broad debate about how to understand the position of the individual under Stalinism, see Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization (Berkeley, 1995).

4. Most observers argue that the Andijan crackdown was brutal and unnecessary. For an argument more sympathetic to the position of the Karimov regime, see the controversial report by Shirin Akiner, Violence in Andijan, 13 May 2005: An Independent Assessment (Silk Road Paper, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Silk Road Studies Program, July 2005, at http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/publications/0507Akiner.pdf (last consulted 1 November 2007). Although it is difficult to assess how much a massacre like that in Andijan affects a ruler's legitimacy, ordinary citizens in Tashkent, Kokand, and Andijan were more than willing to share with me their negative views of the Karimov regime. Author's fieldnotes, Tashkent, Kokand, and Andijan, Uzbekistan, May 2006.

5. By using the adjective soft, I mean that a regime is less likely to engage in political assassination, arbitrary or politically motivated incarceration, or flagrant human rights abuses than its harder authoritarian counterpart. Of course, any use of such practices is normatively reprehensible. The first reference to “soft” authoritarianism that I can find is Francis Fukuyama, “Asia's Soft Authoritarian Alternative,” Nexu Perspectives Quarterly 9, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 60-61.

6. On the metaphor of a “marketplace of ideas,” see McCombs, Maxwell E. and Shaw, Donald L., “The Evolution of Agenda-Setting Research: Twenty-Five Years in the Marketplace of Ideas,” Journal of Communication 43, no. 2 (Spring 1993): 58–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

7. What constitutes “excessive” coercion is, of course, rooted in the particulars of place and time. Though any tradition is plural and lends itself to a range of interpretations and selective appropriations, whether a regime is viewed as legitimately exercising authority depends on a society's baseline understanding of what constitutes acceptable behavior. To act outside the range of traditionally acceptable behaviors is to take a political risk.

8. For a discussion of how international linkages affect regime types, see Levitsky, Steven and Way, Lucan A., “Linkage versus Leverage: Rethinking the International Dimension of Regime Change,” Comparative Politics 38, no. 4 (2006): 379–400.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

9. See Keck, Margaret E. and Sikkink, Kathryn, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, 1998).Google Scholar

10. See “Toppling Musharraf: Heat Rises on Pakistani Leader,” The Independent, 20 February 2006, at http://news.independent.co.uk/world/asia/article346493.ece (last consulted 1 November 2007).

11. In this issue of Slavic Review, Robert A. Saunders insightfully uses the “nation branding” literature to discuss Kazakhstan. Whereas his account implies that the structure of international affairs recommends that elites engage in “nation branding,” I emphasize the domestic sources of such practices. For me, Kazakhstan's engagement of international perceptions emerges from its approach to domestic legitimacy and control—an approach that distinguishes this regime type from others.

12. I prefer the term public perceptions to the more common public opinion, since the latter is often mistakenly reduced to answers to survey questions. See Katherine Cramer Walsh, “Scholars as Citizens: Studying Public Opinion through Ethnography” (paper presented at the conference “Political Ethnography: What Insider Perspectives Contribute to the Study of Power,” University of Toronto, 27-28 October 2006).

13. On propaganda in harder authoritarian contexts, see, for example, Wedeen, Lisa, Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric and Symbols in Contemporary Syria (Chicago, 1999)Google Scholar; and Mickiewicz, Ellen, Split Signals: Television and Politics in the Soviet Union (Oxford, 1988).Google Scholar

14. For sociologists, psychologists, and media studies scholars, “framing” refers to the selection of particular aspects of diverse reality for emphasis in public depictions. Framers thus package information for public consumption. See Goffman, Erving, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (Cambridge, Mass., 1974).Google Scholar

15. Elections in Kazakhstan have uniformly failed to meet international standards. Author's fieldnotes, Almaty, Astana, Karaganda, Kazakhstan, December 2005.

16. Nazarbaev did, indeed, enjoy widespread support and would likely have won a free and fair election, had one been held.

17. Author's fieldnotes, Almaty, Astana, Karaganda, Kazakhstan, December 2005. On the use of “administrative resources” in Ukraine, see Jessica Allina-Pisano, “Informal Politics and Challenges to Democracy: Administrative Resource in Kuchma's Ukraine“ (unpublished manuscript, University of Ottawa, n.d.).

18. See Schatz, Edward, Modern Clan Politics: The Power of “Blood” in Kazakhstan and Beyond (Seattle, 2004), chap. 6.Google Scholar

19. On similar dramas in authoritarian Mauritania, see Jourde, Cédric, “'The President Is Coming to Visit!’ Dramas and the Hijack of Democratization in the Islamic Republic of Mauritania,” Comparative Politics 37, no. 4 (2005): 421-40CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On similar processes in post-Soviet Russia, see Wilson, Andrew, Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World (New Haven, 2005).Google Scholar

20. I use the passive voice to signal that the perpetrators of such acts are rarely known or found, and any ties to major figures in the regime are the subject of much speculation.

21. This was little consolation to victims such as Zamanbek Nurkadilov (found murdered in November 2005) and Altynbek Sarsenbaev (assassinated in February 2006).

22. For a similar argument about the ability to manipulate the structure of a situation so that it becomes easier to persuade an opponent, see the discussion of “heresthetics” in William H. Riker, The Art of Political Manipulation (New Haven, 1986).

23. Baron Cohen's Kazakhstan was what discourse analysts refer to an “empty signifier“—for it implicitly invoked a widespread ignorance about the “real” Kazakhstan..

24. Schatz, “Access by Accident.“

25. See, for example, the Op-Ed piece by former Secretary of Energy, Bill Richardson, “Crazy for Kazakhstan,” Washington Times, 30 July 2001.

26. The examples in this paragraph were reported in Ron Synovitz, “Kazakhstan: MTV Europe Awards Host Caricatures Kazakh TV Journalist,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 4 November 2005, at http://www.rferl.org/features/features_Article.aspx?m=ll&y=2005 &id=BC8819F5-9EEE-4220-B2E2-3E6AD0DCB131 (last consulted 1 November 2007).

27. Sean Roberts argues that the political elite was socialized in die Soviet period— when Kazakhstan was indeed economically and politically backward. Thus, it was particularly sensitive to this negative depiction. See Sean R. Roberts, “Borat and Kazakhstan: The Political Psychology of the Relationship,” The Roberts Report on Central Asia and Kazakhstan, 22 October 2006, at http://roberts-report.blogspot.com/2006/10/ borat-and-kazakhstanpolitical. html (lastconsulted 1 November).

28. Synovitz, “Kazakhstan: MTV Europe Awards.“

29. Aleksandr Sidorov and Timur Murtazin, “MID Kazakhstana reshitel'no ne smeshno,” Kommersant, 16 November 2005, at http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.htmlPdoc Id=626662 (last consulted 1 November 2007). Baron Cohen had hosted the show in 2001, as well, but not as “Borat.“

30. “Doch’ Nazarbaeva raskritikovala reshenie zakryt’ sait britanskogo komika, oskorbivshego vsekh kazakhov,” News.ru, 21 April 2006, available at: http://www.newsru.com/world/21apr2006/borat_print.html (last consulted 27 November 2007).

31. Steven Lee Myers, “Kazakhs Shrug at ‘Borat’ While the State Fumes,” Nexv York Times, 28 September 2006, at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/28/movies/28bora.html?ei=5088&en=ab828b4ca9230dd3&ex=1317096000&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss&page wanted=print (last consulted 1 November 2007).

32. “Bush to Hold Talks on Ali G Creator after Diplomatic Row,” Daily Mail, 12 September 2006, at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/pages/live/articles/news/news.htmlPin_ article_id=404852&in_page_id=1770 (last consulted 1 November 2007).

33. “Borat a Growing PR Headache for Kazakhstan,” CTV.ca, 28 September 2006, at http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060928/borat_white_house_ 060928?s_name=&no_ads (last consulted 1 November 2007).

34. Insert to Foreign Affairs, January/February 2007, 1 (emphasis added).

35. I leave aside the question whether advertisements in Foreign Affairs and the New York Times were the best way to reach the people who were most likely to have been influenced by Baron Cohen's character.

36. Myers, “Kazakhs Shrug.“

37. Author's fieldnotes, Astana, Atyrau, and Karaganda, Kazakhstan, May 2007, as well as in Almaty, Kazakhstan, May 2006 and May 2007.

38. Baron Cohen was not painting on a blank slate. Western reporting on Turkmenistan, for example, typically highlighted the absurd and comedic aspects of Turkmenbashi's rule, deemphasizing the regime's repressiveness. Borat thus tapped a popular, nascent (if uneven, underdeveloped, and often inaccurate) discourse about the “stans.” See Eric Freedman, “Framing the Turkmenbashi: Western Press Portrayals of the President of Turkmenistan“ (paper presented at the Central Eurasian Studies Society conference, Boston, Massachusetts, 1 October 2005).

39. Reuters quotation of Baron Cohen, as quoted in “Borat a Growing PR Headache for Kazakhstan.“

40. Unlike film-going audiences, those people with whom Baron Cohen's character interacted in the making of the film were generally unaware that they were partaking in a parody. Indeed, much of the film's humor rested on the fact that the audience was privy to the deceit, while the poor dupes on screen were not.

41. See the Kazakhstani Ambassador's comments, quoted in Nikola Krastev, “Kazakhstan: Borat Movie Ridicules Kazakhs, Americans Alike,” Radio Free Europe/'Radio Liberty, 6 November 2006, at http://wvvw.rferl.org/features/features_Article.aspx?m=ll&y=2006 &id=BDF83982-A615-4991-BE8A-E91BEBlDAEEB (last consulted 1 November 2007).

42. “Doch’ Nazarbaeva.“

43. Quoted in Rupert Manwaring, “Borat Haunts a Nation,” Epigram Online, no. 183, 6 November 2006, at http://www.epigram.org.uk/view.php?id=1108 (last consulted 1 November 2007).

44. “Kazakhskikh metsenatov prosiat nagradit’ Borata natsional'noi premiei,” Lenta, ru, 23 November 2006, at http://www.lenta.ru/news/2006/ll/23/prize/_Printed.htm (last consulted 1 November 2007).

45. Stephen Collinson, “Kazakhstan ‘Makes Benefit’ Tourism,” News.com.au, 20 November 2006, at http://www.news.com.au/story/0,23599,20789105-1702,00.html (last consulted 1 November 2007).

46. Flora Bagenal and John Harlow, “Borat Make Benefit Kazakh Tourist Boom,” The Sunday Times, 3 December 2006, at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article658191. ece (last consulted 1 November 2007).

47. On Russia's use of its energy resources to fuel “soft power,” see Hill, Fiona, “Moscow Discovers Soft Power,” Current History 105, no. 693 (October 2006): 341-47Google Scholar.

48. Such a space is even larger in liberal democracies, where “spin” has become an industry. See Riker, Art of Political Manipulation.

49. That regimes must learn to survive is a commonsensical, yet often overlooked, conclusion. The failures of soft authoritarian regimes in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan speak to its salience. On these failures, see Hale, Henry E., “Regime Cycles: Democracy, Autocracy, and Revolution in Post-Soviet Eurasia,” World Politics 58, no. 1 (October 2005): 133-65CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

50. Adamson, Fiona B., “Global Liberalism versus Political Islam: Competing Ideological Frameworks in Internadonal Polidcs,” International Studies Review 7, no. 4 (December 2005): 547-69.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

51. Author's interview with Azat Peruashev, First Secretary of the Civic Party of Kazakhstan, Almaty, 9 December 2005.

52. I thank Jeffrey Kopstein for this rendering.