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Too Much of a Good Thing? Assessing Access to Civil Justice in Russia
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 January 2017
Abstract
Kathryn Hendley argues that easy access to the civil courts in Russia is a deliberate policy choice aimed at countering the popular image of courts as hopelessly corrupt and incompetent that is propagated by the media. Judicial officials present judges as heroically struggling to cope with the deluge of cases in a timely fashion. Relying on field work and analysis of caseload data, Hendley shows that the burden on trial-level Russian judges has been exaggerated for effect. She documents the procedural mechanisms available to facilitate rapid turnaround of simple cases. She argues that the flood of cases could easily be stanched by increasing filing fees, but that judicial officials cling to the open door policy as a way of proving the value of the courts. Rather than discouraging the demand for courts, they prefer to tinker with the supply side of the equation.
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References
The field research reported on in this article was funded by a Fulbright research grant and a Title VIII Hewett Policy Fellowship from the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research. Additional funding was provided by the Law School at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. Earlier versions of this article were given as a keynote address at the conference on “Changing the Russian Law: Legality and Current Challenges,” in Helsinki, Finland, as part of the series on “Property Rights, Power, and the Rule of Law“ at Northwestern University, and at the University of South Carolina. The article benefitted from comments received at these venues as well as from comments by the anonymous reviewers for Slavic Review.
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