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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 January 2017
The Russo-Polish War occasioned some of the most anxious moments in the history of relations between Soviet Russia and the Weimar Republic. Within Germany, the advance of the Red Army toward Warsaw in 1920 aroused strong, but contradictory emotions. First, it led many Germans to anticipate the destruction of Poland and to hope for the restoration of the Reich’s former eastern territories. Simultaneously, however, the westward Russian march raised fears of the invasion of Germany by Bolshevik forces. Within Russia, a similar dichotomy of views about Germany existed. On one hand, the German government was considered a hostile, though negligible and temporary—a Communist revolution there was thought imminent—factor in Russia’s situation. On the other, Germany was held important enough to Russia that serious proposals of a far-reaching alliance against Poland and the Entente were made to her. The former view rested on a fundamentally optimistic assessment of Russia’s prospects; the latter, on a sober one. Grounds for concern were afforded by the Soviet Republic’s grave economic problems and by worry about whether the weary Red Army could defeat Pilsudski’s forces, whose offensive capacity had been demonstrated by their capture of Kiev in May 1920. If Germany, which had had military forces in the field against the Bolsheviks only a year before, should actively assist the Poles, Russia’s situation could be appreciably worsened. Surprisingly, therefore, although there are several recent, excellent studies of Soviet-Polish affairs and the Russo-Polish War, and a voluminous literature on relations between the Soviets and the Weimar Republic, little attention has been paid to Soviet policy toward Germany during the conflict with Poland. To explain that policy, and its apparent contradiction, is the purpose of this article.
1. See especially Josef, Korbel, Poland between East and West: Soviet and German Diplomacy toward Poland, 1919-1933 (Princeton, 1963)Google Scholar; Wandycz, Piotr S., Soviet- Polish Relations, 1917-1921 (Cambridge, Mass., 1969)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Norman, Davies, White Eagle, Red Star: The Polish-Soviet War, 1919-20 (New York, 1972)Google Scholar.
2. Among the major studies which deal with German-Soviet relations in 1920 are: Louis, Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs: A History of Relations behveen the Soviet Union and the Rest of the World, vol. 1 (London, 1930)Google Scholar; Carr, Edward Hallett, German-Soviet Relations between the Two World Wars, 1919-1939 (Baltimore, 1951)Google Scholar, and vol. 3 of his The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923 (New York, 1953); Gustav Hilger and Alfred, Meyer, The Incompatible Allies: A Memoir History of German-Soviet Relations, 1918-1941 (New York, 1953)Google Scholar; Lionel, Kochan, Russia and the Weimar Republic (Cambridge, 1954)Google Scholar; Gerald, Freund, Unholy Alliance: Russian-German Relations from the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to the Treaty of Berlin (New York, 1957)Google Scholar; Herbert, Helbig, Die Tr'ager der Rapallo-Politik (Gottingen, 1958)Google Scholar; John, Erickson, The Soviet High Command: A Military-Political History, 1918-1941 (London, 1962)Google Scholar; and Linke, Horst Günther, Deutsch-soivjetische Besichun'gen bis Rapallo (Cologne, 1970)Google Scholar. The best treatment of the German side is Höltje, Christian, Die Weimarer Republik und das Ostlocarno- Problem 1919-1934: Revision oder Garantie der deutschen Ostgreme von 1919 (Wiirzburg, 1958).Google Scholar
3. Warren, Lerner, “Poland in 1920: A Case Study in Foreign-Policy Decision Making under Lenin,” South Atlantic Quarterly, 72 (Summer 1973): 410.Google Scholar Lenin's views at this time are inferred from Marchlewski's criticism. Professor Lerner interprets Lenin's position differently.
4. See V. I. Lenin, speech to the Ninth Party Congress on March 29, 1920, Polnoe sobranie sochineniia (hereafter cited as PSS), 55 vols. (Moscow, 1958-65), 40: 235-36; speech on April 29, 1920, ibid., p. 332; comments in “The Infantile Disease of ‘Leftism' in Communism, ” written in April and May 1920, ibid., 41: 78 and 96; speech of September 22, 1920, ibid., p. 282; Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, pp. 214-20; Isaac, Deutscher, The Prophet Armed: Trotsky: 1879-1921 (London, 1954), pp. 464–65 Google Scholar; Klara, Zetkin, Reminiscences of Lenin (New York, 1934), pp. 18–19 Google Scholar; and Norman, Davies, “The Missing Revolutionary War: The Polish Campaigns and the Retreat from Revolution in Soviet Russia, 1919-21,” Soviet Studies, 27, no. 2 (April 1975): 183–84 Google Scholar. Lenin expressed his revolutionary expectations to several German Communists, most notably Paul Levi, during the Second Congress of the Comintern in August 1920, and acidly dismissed their skeptical and negative reception of his views. See Angelica, BalabanofF, Impressions of Lenin (Ann Arbor, 1964), pp. 109–12 Google Scholar; and Buber-Neumann, Margarete, Von Potsdam nach Moskau: Stationen eincs Imvcges (Stuttgart, 1957), p. 81.Google Scholar
5. Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR (hereafter cited as DVP) (Moscow, 1957), 2: 650. Concerning the Soviet requests and the negative German response to them, see my “German-Soviet Economic Relations, 1918-1922” (Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins University, 1972), pp. 130-38.
6. Text in Jan, Meijer, ed., The Trotsky Papers, 1917-1922, 2 vols. (The Hague, 1964-71), 2: 210–13.Google Scholar
7. Lenin, comment on February 19, 1920, PSS, 40: 146.
8. Lenin, letter to Chicherin containing instructions for Kopp, July 22, 1920, PSS, 51: 242.
9. Enver Pasha to Seeckt, August 26, 1920. Nachlass Seeckt, quoted in Rabenau, Friedrich von, Seeckt: Aus seinem Leben 1918-1936 (Leipzig, 1940), p. 307 Google Scholar. See also Freund, Unholy Alliance, p. 79; and Francis L. Carsten, The Reichswehr and Politics, 1918 to 1933 (Oxford, 1966), pp. 70-71. Enver Pasha had been virtual dictator of Turkey during the World War, but had fled his country under sentence of death in 1919. The purpose of his trip to Russia, which Seeckt had helped arrange, was to obtain Soviet aid for his plans to regain power in Turkey.
10. Kamenev, S. S. to Trotsky, July IS, 1920, Direktivy Clavnogo Komandovaniia Krasnoi Armii (1917-1920): Sbornik dokumcntov (Moscow, 1969), p. 610–12.Google Scholar
11. L., Trotsky, Stalin: An Appraisal of the Man and His Influence (New York, 1941), p. 1941 Google Scholar; and Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 3: 210. Karl Radek may also have been among Trotsky's supporters. He opposed carrying the war into Poland, for which Lenin charged him with “defeatism” (Zetkin, Reminiscences of Lenin, p. 18), and shared Trotsky's basic assumptions about the disunity of the capitalist world and about the position of Germany in particular. See the assessment of Radek's speech to the Ninth Party Congress, April 1, 1920, in Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 3: 321.
12. See Kamenev's ebulliently optimistic speech of May 5, 1920, in Sowjetrussland und Polen: Reden von Kameneiv, Lenin, Trotski, Marchleivski, Sokolnikow, Radek und Martow in der Vereinigten Sitzung des All-russischen Zentral-Exekutiv-Komitees des Moskauer Rates der Arbeiter- und Bauemdelegierten, der Gewerkschaftsverbdnde und der Betriebsrdte am 5. Mai 1920 (n.p., 1920), pp. 3-6.
13. See his articles in Pravda of May 25-26 and July 11, 1920.
14. Trotsky (Stalin, p. 328) claims that Stalin, contrary to his public utterances, supported Lenin in the important decision to accept or to reject the Curzon ultimatum. Evidence presented in Ullman, Richard H., The Anglo-Soviet Accord (Princeton, 1972), p. 166 Google Scholar, tends to support this view. Carr (Bolshevik Revolution, 3: 210) doubts that Stalin took any position in the Politburo on the issue.
15. Deutscher, Prophet Armed, p. 447. See L. Trotskii, report on January 6, 1920 to the Moscow Party Committee, Sochineniia, vol. IS (Moscow-Leningrad, 1925-27), pp. 83-103; his speech on January 12, 1920 about Russia's economic position and tasks, ibid., pp. 27-52; speech of January 28, 1920, ibid., pp. 52-83; and the instructions from the first half of January 1920 concerning the conversion of the Third Army into the First Labor Army in L., Trotskii, Kak voorushalas’ revoliutsiia (Na voennoi rabote), 3 vols, in 5 (Moscow, 1923-25), vol. 2, part 2, pp. 37–40.Google Scholar
16. Deutscher, Prophet Armed, pp. 490-98.
17. Ibid., p. 459. See also Trotsky's communications to Zinoviev, January 28, 1920; to Sklianskii, March 12, 1920; and to the Moscow and Petrograd Party Committees, May 2, 1920, in Trotsky Papers, 2: 20-21, 122-25, and 158-59, respectively.
18. Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, pp. 178-80; and especially Trotsky to Lenin, Kamenev, Krestinskii, Bukharin, copy to Chicherin, March 24, 1920, Trotsky Papers, 2: 132-35.
19. Trotsky, Stalin, p. 328.
20. Text in Soivjetrussland und Polen, pp. 11-24.
21. Trotsky, speech of May 10, 1920, published as Sowjetrussland und das bürgerliche Polen: Rede in einer V olksversammlung (Berlin, 1920). Trotsky's only reference to revolutionary hopes came in closing and was ritualistic: “The Poland of workers and peasants lives! The Russia of workers and peasants lives! The world revolution, the liberation of all workers, lives!”
22. Articles of May 19, 27, and 28; June 6 and 17; and August 3, 1920.
23. Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, pp. 213-14; Deutscher, Prophet Armed, pp. 463-65; and Korbel, Poland between East and West, p. 49. Trotsky persisted in his efforts to bring the Soviet offensive to a halt even after the Politburo had rejected Curzon's offer, but without success.
24. Der szveite Kongress der Kommunist Internationale: Protokoll der Verhandlungen vom 19. Juli in Petrograd und vom 23. Juli bis 7. August 1920 in Moskau (Hamburg, 1921), pp. 681-83. Trotsky's reticence at the Congress about events in Poland is also noted by Deutscher, Prophet Armed, p. 467.
25. Microfilmed records of the Auswärtiges Amt, Abteilung A, Geheime Akten bctreffcnd das Verh'dltnis Deutschland au Russland, Deutschland Nr. 131 (Geheim), Bd. 20. St. Antony's Collection, Reel 33, document AS261, memorandum of February 9, 1920, unsigned.
26. Auswärtiges Amt, St. Antony's Collection, Reel 33, document AS272b, unsigned memorandum of February 11, 1920.
27. Höltje, Ostlocamo-Problem, p. 60.
28. Report by the delegation from Mecklenburg-Schwerin at the Reichsrat, February 18, 1920, in Sovetsko-germanskie otnosheniia ot peregovorov v Brest-Litovske do podpisaniia Rapall'skogo dogovora: Sbornik dokumentov (hereafter cited as SGO), 2 vols. (Moscow, 1968-72), 2: 166-68. See also Höltje, Ostlocarno-Problem, p. 24.
29. About these, see Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, pp. 163-93.
30. S. S. Kamenev to V. M. Gittis, April 8, 1920, Direktivy Glavnogo Komandovaniia, pp. 629-30.
31. Auswartiges Amt (hereafter AA), Geheimakten, Verhandlungen mit Sowjetrussland ﹛Graf Mirbach, Ostschutz), 1920. Memorandum by Maltzan, April 16, 1920. Microfilm, serial K281/reel 3925/frames 095851-853. Henceforth, in citing documents from the archives of the AA, the file title will be given in full upon its first usage, and the document will be identified by the serial number assigned the file, the microfilm reel number, and the specific frame number on each page.
32. A A, Abteilung IV a, Russland, Wirtschajt, Politische Besiehungen Russlands m Deutschland, 1920-21. Memorandum by Maltzan, May 15, 1920. L625/4775/198941.
33. See Höltje, Ostlocarno-Problem, p. 25.
34. Concerning these negotiations, see Himmer, “German-Soviet Economic Relations, ” pp. 196-98.
35. For Seeckt's views, see particularly Korbel, Poland between East and West, pp. 73-74; and Carsten, Reichswehr, pp. 67-68. Seeckt's position was consistent with a decision by the Reichsrat on April 28 which refused aid to the Poles and overt aid to the Russians, and directed restraint by Germany until a Soviet victory created an opportunity for a change in Germany's eastern borders. See Giinther, Meinhardt, “Deutschland und Westpreussen im russisch-polnischen Krieg von 1920,” JVestpreussen Jahrbuch, 20 (1970): 17.Google Scholar
36. DVP, 2: 582-83. The reference to “cultural connections” is suggestive. The term was later used to refer covertly to possible joint German-Soviet action against Poland. See, for example, AA, Brockdorff-Rantzau Nachlass, Rantzau to Maltzan, July 5, 1923, 9101/3431/225466-476. Whether this usage was practiced in 1920, however, is problematic.
37. Maltzan to Kopp, June 23, 1920, DVP, 2: 583. I. K., Kobliakov, “Bor'ba sovetskogo gosudarstva za normalizatsiiu otnoshenii s Germaniei v 1919-1921 gg.,” Istoriia SSSR, 2 (March-April 1971): 27 Google Scholar, exaggerates the negative aspect of the German reply.
38. Concerning these matters, see Himmer, “German-Soviet Economic Relations, ” pp. 202-3 and 162-70 respectively.
39. AA, Simons to Rudolf Nadolny, July 5, 1920, K281/3925/09S860.
40. According to Blücher, Wipert von, Deutschlands Weg nach Rapallo: Erinnerurigen eines Mannes aus dem sweiten Gliede (Wiesbaden, 1951), p. 101 Google Scholar, the Legal Department of the Ministry forced consideration of the Mirbach question.
41. Helbig, Träger, p. 46.
42. This is implicitly also the view of Helbig (ibid., p. 44).
43. Memorandum by Maltzan, July 1920, in the Political Archives of the AA, Bonn, quoted by Linke, Deutsch-sowjetische Besiehungen, p. 107.
44. AA, memorandum by Maltzan, July 19, 1920, K281/392S/095869-872. Kopp described the deal he had offered to Simons in vaguer terms in a report to Chicherin on July 21, cited in Kobliakov, “Bor'ba, ” pp. 27-28.
45. Alte Reichskanzlei, Inhaltsangaben von Kabinettsprotokollen 1919-23, Sitsungen des Reichsministeriums (Protokolle), 1919-21. Protocol of Cabinet session of July 20, 1920, 3438/1669/745171.
46. Ibid. Protocol of session of July 23, 1920, 3438/1669/745183.
47. Text in AA, Biiro des Reichsministers, Akten betreffend Russland, 1920-1926, 2860/1404/551564-566. All subsequent citations from the letter are from this text.
48. Simons's position on the Mirbach affair may have been a significant concession on his part. He pointed out in the letter to Chicherin that he felt the capture and punishment of Mirbach's murderers “will by now be next to impossible.” He may have known, however, that the apprehension of one of the assassins, Bliumkin, would indeed have been possible, because Bliumkin was a student at the academy of the Red Army. Hilger reported this to Maltzan sometime in 1920, but whether the report was made before July 22 and whether Simons was informed about it are not known. See Hilger and Meyer, Incompatible Allies, pp. 8-9.
49. Erickson, Soviet High Command, p. 687, errs in stating that “the original suggestion [to attach a German liaison officer to the Red Army came] from Chicherin in a communication to the German government … dated for the German file 22nd July.” Erickson refers to K281/095996-999, which is actually a copy of Simons's letter to Chicherin and a copy of the receipt for the letter signed by Kopp.
50. Verhandlungen des Reichstages: Stenographische Berichte, vol. 344 (Berlin, 1921), p. 262.
51. AA, memorandum entitled “Die militär-politische Lage im Osten und Schlussfolgerungen, ” July 31, 1920, 2860/1404/551567-573.
52. Höltje, Ostlocarno-Problem, pp. 29-30.
53. Ibid., p. 28.
54. See the plan for the offensive against Warsaw, July 10, 1920, in N. E., Kakurin and V. A., Melikov, Voina s belopoliakami 1920 g. (Moscow, 1925), p. 202 Google Scholar; S. S. Kamenev's directive to Soviet forces in Poland, July 23, 1920, ibid., p. 212; and the notes of a conversation between Kamenev and M. N. Tukhachevskii, August 10, 1920, Direktivy Glavnogo Komandovaniia, pp. 650-52. Kamenev's instructions of July 23 even directed that the “former [emphasis added] borders of East Prussia” be respected, which might be significant in view of the Kopp-Simons discussions of July 19-22.
55. See particularly Höltje, Ostlocarno-Problem, p. 26; Meinhardt, “Deutschland und Westpreussen, ” pp. 22-24; and Rolf, Brandt, “With the Soviet Army,” Living Age, 307 (October 2, 1920): 28–30.Google Scholar
56. Kopp to Chicherin, July 21, 1920, SGO, 2: 195-96. See also Kobliakov, “Bor'ba, ” pp. 27-28.
57. Chicherin to Kopp, July 22, 1920, SGO, 2: 197.
58. Note by Trotsky, August 15, 1920, Trotsky Papers, 2: 250-51.
59. Trotsky to Lenin, Krestinskii, and Chicherin, August 4, 1920, ibid., 2: 242-45.
60. Text in DVP, 3: 75-77.
61. AA, memorandum by Maltzan, August 12, 1920, K281/3925/095946-9S0. The claim of Kurt Rosenbaum, Community of Fate: German-Soviet Diplomatic Relations, 1922-1928 (Syracuse, N.Y., 1965), p. IS, that a German liaison officer “established contact with the Red Army, ” appears to be erroneous in view of Kopp's statement.
62. Kakurin and Melikov, Voina, pp. 204-5.
63. AA, Maltzan memorandum of August 12, 1920, K281/3925/095947-948.
64. Ibid.
65. AA, memorandum by Maltzan, August 13, 1920, K281/3925/09S963-96S; Simons to Haniel, August 14, 1920, K281/392S/096044; and memorandum, unsigned, August 20, 1920, K281/3925/096030-031.
66. AA, memorandum of August 20, 1920, K281/392S/096030-031; and Schüler to Chicherin, August 20, 1920, K281/3925/096034-038.
67. DVP, 3: 141-42.
68. AA, memorandum by Maltzan, September 1, 1920, K281/392S/096086.
69. SGO, 2: 233-34.
70. AA, Maltzan memorandum of September 1, 1920, K281/392S/096086.
71. SGO, 2: 234-35.
72. The end of the discussions was not the result of a cooled German attitude, as stated by Freund, Unholy Alliance, p. 78. Simons was still speaking in terms most favorable to Soviet Russia on September 1. See Leo, Stern, “Die aktuelle Bedeutung des Rapallo-Vertrages und der Kampf der DDR fur friedliche Koexistenz der beiden deutschen Staaten,” in Rapallo und die friedliche Koexistenz, ed. Anderle, Alfred (Berlin, 1963), p. 20.Google Scholar
73. Lerner, “Poland in 1920, ” p. 407. A radically different assessment of Trotsky's position during the Russo-Polish War than that advanced in the present article is presented in N. Davies, “The Missing Revolutionary War, ” especially pp. 187-92. Davies sees Trotsky as the leader of a “Bolshevik Left” in 1920 which allegedly outdid Lenin in its enthusiasm for revolution in Poland and Germany.
74. It was on the basis of Polish troop movements from the German border to the Russian front that the Politburo concluded on June 4 that Germany was conspiring with Poland. See Jan Meijer's editorial comments in Trotsky Papers, 2: 210-13.
75. See especially his speech of August 7, 1920, in Der zweite Kongress der Kommunist Internationale, pp. 681-83.
76. See particularly Trotsky's telegram to Chicherin and Lenin, June 4, 1920, with marginal comments by Lenin, Trotsky Papers, 2: 208-11 (cited also by Deutscher, Prophet Armed, pp. 461-63); and the account of the debate in the Soviet leadership over policy toward Britain in Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, pp. 161-70.
77. With regard to England, see M. V., Glenny, “The Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement, March 1921,” Journal of Contemporary History, 5, no. 2 (1970): 78–79Google Scholar; in general and with specific regard to Germany, see Himmer, “German-Soviet Economic Relations, ” pp. 251-58 and 266-69. On the first tangible fruit of this shift see Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord.
