1 Since the present article is designed to cover a neglected chapter in the political career of Lenin and history of the Russian Social Democratic movement, a certain familiarity with the historical background will be presupposed. For necessary information the reader may consult the well-known works of Donald W. Treadgold, Leopold Haimson, Bertram Wolfe, and J. L. H. Keep.

2 One of the seventeen, M. A. Silvin, obviously understood it in this sense and suggests that others did as well. See his () (Moscow, 1958), pp. 168 ff. Silvin's valuable memoirs, edited posthumously, represent one of the few useful contributions of Soviet scholarship in the last three decades to early party history. See also () (Leningrad, 1925), Chap. 5.

3 (), op. cit., p. 104 and passim.

4 Numerous memoirists who were active in southern industrial centers in this period mention his visits to their committees or their visits to Poltava for information on the new enterprise. See for example, () (Moscow, 1928), pp. 10 ff., and numerous references in the memoir fragments of I. Polonsky, A. M. Ginzburg, and others in the collection edited by M. A. () (Ekaterinoslav ,1923)

5 Martov's sudden shift in opinion drew upon him sharp reproaches from Leon Goldman (Akim), who agreed to set up a secret press for Iskra in Russia but as a loyal southerner was very proud of Iuzhnyi rabochii. See (), op. cit.﹜ p. 23.

6 From The Catechism of a Revolutionist written jointly by Bakunin and Nechaev. For the Russian text see (), Nos. 1-2, 1924, pp. 268-72.

7 For Martov's account see () (Moscow, 1934), pp. 75-79. Supposedly, cooperation with “economists,” real or suspected, would have alienated Plekhanov, who had just taken up the cudgels against them in his () (Geneva, 1900).

8 See B. ᐴ. (), (3rd ed.; 30 vols.; Moscow, 1928-37), XXVIII, 57-60. The official émigré organization behind Rabochee delo was the Union (Soiuz) of Russian Social Democrats Abroad. Plekhanov's group had officially withdrawn from it the previous year, bitterly denouncing it for its supposed Bernsteinian heresies.

9 Letter to A. A. Iakubova, Oct. 26, 1900, ibid., pp. 64-65.

10 Ibid., IV, 39-40.

11 That workers, sometimes even unpropagandized workers., eagerly read Iskra there is ample testimony. For example, see H. дpoxanoB (a worker), «Ha aape» in Py6aq, op. cit., p. 255. They did not necessarily follow Iskra's leadership in organizational matters, however, as is discussed below.

12 (), IV, 111-12. Since adequate quotations are available in the works of the authors mentioned above, we will forgo further references from Lenin's published works of this period.

13 Letter to S. O. Tsederbaum of July, 1901, ibid., XXVIII, 121. Ezhov, initiated into Iskra plans by his brother Martov in Poltava, had been settled in Vilna to arrange for the smuggling of Iskra across the border.

14 See () (Moscow, 1926), p. 63.

15 See letters to N. E. Bauman of May 24 and July 26, 1901, Couuneuun, XXVIII, 113-14 and 120.

16 Letter to V. A. Noskov, Aug. 4, 1902, ibid., p. 99.

17 See (), No. 14 (1923), pp. 108-67.

18 (), op. cit., p. 22.

19 Letter to I. G. Smidovich, Dec. 18, 1901, Conunenun, XXVIII, 129.

20 See (), op. cit., p. 38.

21 Letter to Goldman and Ezhov-Tsederbaum, Aug., 1901, (), VIII, 196.

22 See letter to Krokhmal, n.d. (Oct.-Nov., 1901), ibid., pp. 203-4.

23 (), op. cit., pp. 37-38. Present at the conference were Smidovich, Krokhmal, Galperin (from the Caucasus), Basovsky, and Goldman. Goldman claims that L. N. Radchenko and Bauman, though absent, sympathized with their fellow Iskra praktiki. Zakharova from Odessa was not invited, probably because she was known to be overly loyal to the editors.

24 See CHJIBBHH, op. cit., pp. 241-42.

25 For a record of this meeting see (), VIII, 223.

26 Quoted in () … . p. 578. Although some of the Iskra correspondence does not identify the author, it is fairly safe to assume Lenin's authorship or Krupskaia's under his close supervision.

27 Just how I. I. Radchenko came to enjoy his new position of special confidence is not clear from the sources, but he was disaffected from the southern group in the early fall of 1902. See (), op. cit., pp. 30-32.

28 See letter of Dan to Iskra, n.d. (Mar.-Apr., 1902), (), No. 101 (June, 1930), pp. 139-40. The partisans of Rabochee delo had hoped to organize a party congress from which Iskra partisans were to be excluded; Lenin dispatched Dan to Russia to find out when and where the congress was meeting and to insist it be declared an unofficial conference. After much wandering his mission was accomplished.

29 CHJTBBHH, op. cit., p. 257.

30 Letter of May 25, 1902, (), No. 77-78 (June-July, 1928), p. 149.

31 (), op. cit., pp. 123-24.

32 The mentioning of iavki and passwords in secret correspondence was a gross violation of the rules of conspiracy, and this is about the only instance the author has encountered of such a lapse in the Iskra correspondence; it was particularly unnecessary in this case because the same information was communicated through Dan. The source of the apparent omniscience of the police was long a mystery to the Iskra-ites and caused no little mutual suspicion and dismay. See the Iskra correspondence with the Samara bureau for March-May, 1902, () pp. 140-50.

33 In addition to the formal instructions of the editors, Lenin provided Dan with special instructions which he kept secret from his colleagues (in all probability touching tactical maneuvers to turn the conference to Iskra's purposes). V. Kozhevnikova, who seems to have been Lenin's special confidante at this time, related how distractedly Lenin behaved at the editors’ meeting. He left the meeting to help her “fix tea.” Although she did not yet grasp the issues, she guessed the reason for his peculiar behavior: “ ‘That means I'm right—you disagree with them, but have no intention of taking their views into account or expressing yours. Then later tonight you'll have a talk with comrade G. [Dan] and explain to him all your views, load him up with your own thoughts so that the instructions of the editors’ conference will evaporate, but your viewpoint will stick in his memory and that's the position he will defend at the [Belostok] Conference.’ ‘Yes, you guessed it,’ Lenin admitted, ‘but is it my fault that they don't understand? … Tell Dan to meet me at 9:00’ “ ((), No. 3 [26] [Mar., 1924], p. 140).

34 Letter to F. L. Lengnik of May 23, 1902, Conuneutui, XXVIII, 138.

35 Letter to I. I. Radchenko of June 22, 1903, ibid., p. 140.

36 See letter of Martov to Akselrod, Aug. 2, 1902, in () (Berlin, 1924), pp. 69-71, especially editor's information on p. 71, n. 5. From the information in this correspondence it is obvious that the Iskra editors were deliberately dragging out these negotiations to prevent the formation of an organizing committee not subject to their control.

37 For Lenin's furious reaction to these plans see his letter to Krupskaia of J u l y 16, 1902, CoHuneuuA, XXVIII, 92-94. It should be kept in mind that this was immediately after the serious controversies within the Iskra collegium over the agrarian program and the removal of Iskra headquarters to London; Lenin was threatened, therefore, with complete isolation and a common front of oppositional elements within the Iskra camp. Martov alone at this time remained a loyal ally.

38 See letter of Aug. 4, 1902, ibid., pp. 98-101.

39 Letter of Aug. 12, 1902, (), VIII, 271. For a detailed outline of Lenin's strategy see also following letter of Aug. 16, ibid., pp. 272-73.

40 Lenin shot off another of his blistering reprimands: “Was the departure of Kasian [Radchenko] and Spilka [Krasikov] really all it took to render the [St. Petersburg] Iskraites incapable of action? Iskra-ites will bring eternal dishonor on themselves if they do not answer this with determined and desperate war” (letter to Krasnukh and Stasova of Sept. 24, 1902, Conuneuua, XXVIII, 147-48). It seems that Radchenko had achieved his coup simply by having himself and several other “firm” Iskra-ites temporarily co-opted into the committee.

41 See letter to Radchenko of July 16, 1902, ibid., V, 136-39, and Hcicpa, Nos. 26, 27, and 28 (Oct. 15, Nov. 1 and 15, 1902), pp. 7, 8, and 6 respectively.

42 (), op. cit., p. 127.

43 Ibid., p. 128. The quotation is directly from Lepeshinsky's notes taken down at the time of the meeting.

44 Even Lenin had not expected the co-opting of Iskra-ites without the consent of the Bund, but gave his approval ex post facto “if it doesn't cause unpleasantries” (letter to Krasikov of Nov. 11, 1902, CoHunemui, XXVIII, 151).

45 (), op. cit., p. 128. Quotations are still from Lepeshinsky's notes rather than from his reminiscences.

46 Letter to Levin, Dec. 11, 1902, GoHuneuua, XXVIII, 152-54. Although the open polemic with the Bund over the nationality question first appeared in No. 33 of Iskra (Feb. 1, 1903), Lenin had obviously long since decided that a rupture was inevitable.

47 Letter to the organizing committee, Mar. 5-6, 1902, ibid., p. 175.

48 The pertinent excerpts from Iskra and Poslednye izvestiia are reprinted in Bmopou Cbe3б…, pp. 726-29. In hushing up voices of protest against the organizing committee, Lenin could count on the prevailing desire to reconstitute a unified party and to avoid internal dissension. Moreover, the Bund was anxious not to aggravate the impending dispute over its new position on the “national” question (the claim to exclusive representation of the “Jewish proletariat“).

49 Details are in letter to Martov of Feb. 5, 1903, CoHunenuH, XXVIII, 284-86.

50 See letter to the organizing committee of Apr. 6, 1903, ibid., p. 182.

51 (), No. 6 (June, 1913), p. 34.

52 Letter of Dec. 28, 1902, (), VIII, 308. For Lenin's taking to task of the unhappy St. Petersburg Iskra-ites, see letters to Stasova of Dec. 27, 1902, and Jan. 15, 16, and 28, 1903, Conunenm, XXVIII, 157-58, 161-62, 165-66, and 171-72.

53 The source of worker disaffection is a subject that requires special study beyond the scope of this article, but suffice it to say that it was simply a new and more acute form of a persistent problem in the Russian Social Democratic movement—the struggle between worker and intelligentsia groups for primacy in local leadership. The struggle was aggravated by the prevailing practice of maintaining separate workers’ organizations linked to the committee only by a special intermediary, usually an intelligent. This was felt to be necessary to keep “provocateurs” from penetrating the intelligentsia-dominated committee.

54 () (4 vols.; St. Petersburg, 1909-13), I, 404. Rozanov makes a strikingly similar evaluation: “Thus, the ‘party’ in its original constitution was more like an aristocratic republic on the order of ancient Sparta. The masses were not allowed to participate in matters of high policy and the only full-fledged citizen was the ‘Committee-man… the subjection of the workers to the leadership of the Committee was regarded normal and self-evidently necessary,” op. cit., p. 37.

55 See his () (Moscow, 1924), pp. 62 ff., and P - B (Rozanov), op. cit., pp. 38-39. Gorev magnanimously allowed the dissident anti-Iskra group in St. Petersb u r g (also claiming to be the “Committee“) to send a representative to argue their case before the credentials committee at the Congress. Shotman is the author of interesting memoirs on the Second Congress where he was even prepared to set his fists in motion against Lenin's detractors. See () (Leningrad, 1935).

56 (), p. 731. The oprichniki it will be recalled were the dreaded personal retainers of Ivan the Terrible.

57 See ibid., pp. 458-59.

58 It may be apropos to summon one contemporary witness of this significant consequence of Iskra's triumph. P. A. Garvi was active in the Kiev Committee in 1904 after two years’ absence in Siberia. “Being accustomed to the comparatively mass organizations based on strike funds and craft unions of Odessa in 1900-1902, I was struck by the considerably narrower organizational framework of the period of Iskra's exclusive hegemony. Along with the bath water of Economism they threw out the infant party-trade union organizations of a mass character.” () (New York, 1946), p. 439.