1. Henryk, Batowski, “Zarys dziejów Sfowacji w ostatnim dwudziestoleciu, 1918- 1937,” in Semkowicz, Wladysław, ed., Slowacja & Slowacy, 2 (Kraków, 1938): 133–34.Google Scholar

2. The Slovaks representing the major Slovak national parties at Turčianský Svätý Martin were not aware that the National Council in Prague declared a Czecho-Slovak republic on October 28. The action of the Slovak National Council in effect ratified the proclamation of a Czecho-Slovak republic. Only four Slovaks were members of the National Council in Prague: Vavro Šrobár, Ivan Dérer, Anton Štefánek, and Pavel Blaho. Lipták, L'ubomir, Slovensko v 20 storočí (Bratislava, 1968), p. 77 Google Scholar; Batowski, “Zarys dziejów Slowacji, ” p. 136.

3. The ideas of Tomáš G. Masaryk seemed to be triumphant. As early as 1882 Masaryk argued with members of the Old Czech Party that Czechs ought to work for a political union with the Slovaks. At the same time he tried to convince the Slovaks to abandon their sentimental attitude toward Russia as the sole possible source of deliverance from the Magyars and instead look “to the Czechs as the closest and strongest ally in the Hapsburg Empire.” Masaryk had the tendency to identify the Slovaks with the Czechs. In a speech to the Austrian Parliament late in 1907 he said, “In Hungary, we have two million Slovaks who belong to our nationality. A people of eight million will not, without further ado, leave two million of its co-nationals to the tender mercies of Magyar jingoism.” Cf. Thomas D. Marzik, “T. G. Masaryk and the Slovaks, 1882- 1914, ” in Cordier, Andrew W., ed., Columbia Essays in International Affairs: The Dean's Papers, 1965 (New York, 1966), p. 156–74.Google Scholar

4. Father Hlinka, as a result of his activities before World War I, which even led to his imprisonment by Hungarian authorities, became a symbol of Slovak resistance to Magyarization. Seton-Watson, R. W., Racial Problems in Hungary (London, 1908), p. 332–39.Google Scholar There can be no doubt that Father Hlinka was initially jubilant about the TurčianskýSvätý Martin gathering. Ferdynand, Machay, Mojo droga do Polski: Pamietnik (Krakow, 1938), p. 130.Google Scholar His enthusiastic support of the October 30 declaration swung many hesitant Slovaks toward the Czechs. It must not be forgotten that Father Hlinka's moral prestige and authority among the Slovak peasant masses and the Slovak Catholic lower clergy were very high. Batowski, “Zarys dziejów Slowacji, ” p. 138.

5. It would be beyond the scope of this article to discuss reasons for the disillusionment. But it appears that Father Hlinka thought that he and his Council of Priests, organized on November 27, 1918, would have positions of pre-eminence in the Slovak part of the new republic. Instead they were generally ignored, and Vavro Šrobár, once Hlinka's political ally but later his rival and bitter foe, was appointed minister plenipotentiary in charge of Slovak affairs on December 11, 1918. Macartney, C. A., Hungary and Her Successors (New York, 1937), pp. 110–12 Google Scholar; Jozef, Lettrich, History of Modern Slovakia (New York, 1955), p. 68.Google Scholar Šrobár was undoubtedly appointed because of his strong Czechophile orientation and his close ties with Masaryk. As early as the 1890s Šrobár, then a medical student in Prague, came under the influence of Masaryk and became his most devoted Slovak disciple. Marzik, “T. G. Masaryk and the Slovaks, ” p. 162. R. W. Seton-Watson, who made an on-the-spot investigation of conditions in Slovakia after the Great War, wrote in 1924: “It seems almost incredible that any executive body for Slovak affairs should have been formed without his [Hlinka's] inclusion. … The rivalry of Šrobár and Hlinka, transferred from the petty platform of Ružomberok to the wider stages of Bratislava and of Prague, contributed as much as any single factor towards envenoming the situation in Slovakia.” Seton-Watson, R. W., The New Slovakia (Prague, 1924), p. 40–41.Google Scholar Father Hlinka's disillusionment grew as he observed Šrobár going about the difficult task of de-Magyarization, and of reorganizing the administration, the educational system, and especially the Catholic Church in Slovakia with the help of Czechs while he was getting rid of many Slovaks who, rightly or wrongly, were suspected of being Magyarones (Mad'aróni). Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, pp. 112-18.

6. Batowski, “Zarys dziejów Slowacji, ” pp. 143, 150.

7. The Slovak American delegation, armed with photostatic copies of the Pittsburgh Agreement, left for Slovakia on March 7, 1919. Upon returning to the United States, Jozef Hušek reported on May 29, 1919, “We were received with joy in Ružomberok Hlinka's kingdom. So was our Pittsburgh document… . The government people in Bratislava oppose autonomy, they favor instead a central parliament, a central government, and they hold that the Czechs and Slovaks constitute one nation, the Slovak language being only a Czech dialect… . We were not well received in Bratislava, nor was our Pittsburgh Agreement agreeable to them.” Karol, Sidor, “The Slovak League of America and the Slovak Nation's Struggle for Autonomy,” Slovakia, 17 (1967): 49.Google Scholar Cf. also Čulen, Konštantin, Pittsburghská Dohoda (Bratislava, 1937), p. 239–40.Google Scholar

8. The Pittsburgh Agreement has become a controversial document in the political history of Czechoslovakia. Father Hlinka and his supporters argued that the Czechoslovak state had assumed an obligation to grant Slovakia autonomy when the Constituent Assembly in Prague on November 12, 1918, approved and ratified all agreements and undertakings made by Masaryk during his struggle to achieve Czech freedom. Masaryk, on the other hand, considered it (the Pittsburgh Agreement) a local understanding between American Czechs and Slovaks. Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, pp. 97, 117.

Professor Victor S. Mamatey, whose father (Albert Mamatey) was president of the Slovak League of America, has pointed out that “a caligraphic copy of the Pittsburgh Convention … was signed by Masaryk on November 14, 1918, the day of his election to the presidency of Czechoslovakia.” He further notes that the “Pittsburgh program deserves notice, since it was designed, in part, to influence American policy” to support the Czechoslovak cause. Legally, the Slovak Autonomists’ case was not very sound, but they did at least have a strong moral case. Mamatey, Victor S., The United States and East Central Europe, 1914-1918 (Princeton, 1957), p. 283; Čulen, Pittsburghská Dohoda, pp. 177-94.Google Scholar

The Slovak Americans, however, including such influential leaders as Jozef Hušek and Albert Mamatey, sided with Šrobár and Milan Hodža and decided against making a drive for Slovak autonomy on the grounds that it would only aid the Magyar cause and hurt the new Czechoslovak Republic. Sidor, “The Slovak League of America, ” pp. 49, 59.

9. Juraj, Kramer, Slovenské autonomistické hnutie v rokoch 1918-1929 (Bratislava, 1962), p. 80–81.Google Scholar Photographic reproductions of the Pittsburgh Agreement were widely distributed among the Slovak intelligentsia. Polish authorities in Nowy Targ had a copy of it by September 1919. Report no. 8, Aug. 16 to Sept. 15, 1919, written for the Committee for the Defense of Spišz, Orawa, and Czadca in Nowy Targ; Archiwum Muzeum Tatrzańskiego, Zakopane, Miscellanea (hereafter cited as AMT-Miscellanea

10. The Slovak Parliamentary Club was by and large under Šrobár's influence. The Slovaks were allotted forty, and later fifty-five, seats in the National Assembly in Prague. Before the first elections were held in April 1920, they were appointed at the recommendation of Ladislav Lipscher, Dr. Šrobár, “Klub Slovenských Poslancov v rokoch 1918-1920,” Historicitý časopis, 16, no. 2 (1968): 134–35.Google Scholar

11. The Polish authorities in Nowy Targ, led by Jan Bednarski, managed to have contacts with Father Hlinka through such intermediaries as Father Józef Buroń. As early as May 1919 Father Hlinka expressed a desire for cooperation with Poland. He was quoted as saying, “The Slovak nation has no representative in Paris… . Those who are there from Slovakia like Father Blaha are Czech hirelings and absolute followers of the Czechs.” Report no. 2, May 8, 1919, for the Committee for the Defense of Spišz, Orawa, and Czadca in Nowy Targ, AMT-Miscellanea.

12. Within the disputed Silesian Duchy of Teschen (Cieszyn in Polish, Těšin in Czech) there is also a city of the same name. Teschen, the German name, will be used in this article.

13. Father J. Londzin to I. J. Paderewski, president of the Council of Ministers, Aug. 28, 1919. Archiwum Akt Nowych, Warsaw, Akta I. J. Paderewskiego, vol. 354 (hereafter Archiwum Akt Nowych is cited as AAN).

14. Minutes of meeting held by National Committee for the Defense of Spišz, Orawa, and Czadca on September 6, 1919, in Nowy Targ, AMT-Miscellanea.

15. Ibid. Father Machay was born in Upper Orava (Orawa in Polish), a district that was disputed by Poles and Slovaks. Until 1910 he considered himself a Slovak, but then, under Bednarski's influence, he became convinced that he and his fellow “Orawiacy, ” as well as the inhabitants of Northern Spiš (Spišz in Polish), were ethnically Poles. After the Great War, Father Machay became a passionate champion of Poland's ethnographic and historical claims to these two districts. His zeal in this matter was so intense that he managed personally to bring the Spiš-Orava question to the attention of President Woodrow Wilson on April 11, 1919, during the Paris Peace Conference. Father Machay, however, was always careful to emphasize that his activities were not anti-Slovak but pro-Polish. Machay, Moja droga do Polski, pp. 40-53, 208-29.

16. Jehlička, František, Father Hlinka's Struggle for Slovak Freedom (London, 1938), p. 21.Google Scholar

17. Szklarska-Lohmanowa, Alina, Polsko-Csechosłowackie stosunki dyplomatycsne w latach 1918-1925 (Wroclaw, 1967), p. 122.Google Scholar

18. Gąsiorowski, Zygmunt J., “Polish-Czechoslovak Relations, 1918-1922,” Slavonic and Eastern European Review, 35 (December 1956): 180.Google Scholar

19. Szklarska-Lohmanowa, Alina, “Polska wobec sprawy słowackiej w latach 1919- 1921,” in Studia z najnowssych dsiejów powssechnych, vol. 5, ed. Knebel, Jerzy and Lapter, Karol (Warsaw, 1963), p. 29.Google Scholar Some Polish circles advocated Polish armed intervention in Slovakia. Report of Dr. Jan Bednarski, head of the Civil Administration in Nowy Targ, Apr. 30, 1919, AMT-Miscellanea.

20. Deputy Foreign Minister Wróblewski to the Polish National Committee in Paris, Mar. 31, 1919. “Stosunki polsko-wggierskie w 1919 r.: Materiaty archiwalne, ” ed. Jarostaw Jurkiewicz, in Zessyty historycsne, vol. 5 (Warsaw, 1957), p. 23.

21. Jehlička, Father Hlinka's Struggle, p. 21; Szklarska-Lohmanowa, Polsko- Czechosłowackie stostmki dyploniatyczne, p. 123. The Slovaks were stopped in Italy because they had no Italian visas. Father Jehlička, however, managed to get to the Polish Legation in Rome on September 17, 1919, which contacted Count Carlo Sforza in the Italian Foreign Ministry. Italian visas were then issued the very same day. Polish Legation in Rome to the Polish Foreign Minister, Sept. 20, 1919, AAN, Akta I. J. Paderewskiego, vol. 354.

22. Paderewski was deeply annoyed when he learned that Polish passports had been issued to the Slovaks. On September 25, 1019, he cabled Pitsudski that “against my will and contrary to instructions someone issued Polish passports to a few Slovaks. The one responsible should be severely punished.” Paderewski to Piłsudski, Sept. 25, 1919, ibid.

23. Beneš was quickly informed about the Polish support of the Hlinka mission. Immediately he let it be known that he considered this an unfriendly act, and he threatened to bring the entire matter to the attention of the Great Powers. Indeed he later complained to the American delegation that Poland was intriguing against the integrity of the Czechoslovak state. Jaroslav, Valenta, “Polská politika a Slovensko v roce 1919,” historický časopis, 13, no. 3 (1965): 406–7Google Scholar; see also D., Perman, The Shaping of the Czechoslovak State (Leiden, 1962), p. 252.Google Scholar

24. The memorandum is an extraordinary document. It invoked the Pittsburgh Agreement and repudiated the “Czechoslovak thesis” of the TurčianskýSvätý Martin Declaration of October 30, 1918. It asked the Peace Conference “to envision us [Slovaks] as a minority different from the Czechs and to protect our interests by guaranteeing us the greatest possible political autonomy… . We are not Czechs, nor Czecho-Slovaks; but Slovaks, and we wish to remain Slovaks forever. A glance at Slovak history shows that the Czechs and Slovaks are different nations… . To show to the Peace Conference that all that we have just said is pure truth, we dare ask for Slovakia a plebiscite which will disclose the real feeling of the Slovak nation.” Mikus, Joseph A., Slovakia: A Political History, 1918-1950 (Milwaukee, 1964), p. 331–40.Google Scholar

25. While in Paris, Father Hlinka and Father Jehlička received a “loan” of 10, 000 francs from Gustav Szura, a Polish expert on the Teschen question attached to the Polish delegation. A receipt signed by both men acknowledging the loan is found in AANAkta I. J. Paderewskiego, vol. 354. Cf.’ Szklarska-Lohmanowa, Polsko-Czechosłowackie stosunki dyplomatyczne, pp. 123-24, and Valenta, “Polska politika, ” p. 407.

26. Stephen Bonsal of the American delegation made this point to Father Hlinka: “I assured Father Hlinka that I would listen to what he had to say and report it carefully to Colonel House; but, I said: ‘You haye come late, and for the moment I fear nothing can be done. You see, on the tenth the Treaty of St. Germain was signed.'“ Stephen, Bonsai, Suitors and Suppliants: The Little Nations at Versailles (New York, 1946), p. 158.Google Scholar

27. It appears that the French police received a tip-off from the Czechoslovak delegation at the Paris Peace Conference. Ibid., p. 163.

28. Jehlička, Father Hlinka's Struggle, pp. 31-32.

29. Father Jehlička never returned to Czechoslovakia. Instead he went to Hungary, where he began to work for the establishment of an autonomous Slovakia within the Hungarian state. This program was denounced by both Mnohel’ and Unger. Szklarska- Lohmanowa, “Polska wobec sprawy slowackiej, ” p. 32. Kubala and Rudinský went to the United States to mobilize the American Slovaks behind Father Hlinka. They failed in their mission and after a year returned to Czechoslovakia. Sidor, “The Slovak League of America, ” pp. 53-54.

30. A copy of this memorandum can be found in the Archives of the Tatra Museum in Zakopane, AMT-Miscellanea.

31. Szklarska-Lohmanowa, “Polska wobec sprawy slowackiej, ” p. 34

32. Szklarska-Lohmanowa, Polsko-Czechosłowackie stosunki dyplomatycsne, p. 126.

33. Wandycz, Piotr S., France and Her Eastern Allies, 1919-1925 (Minneapolis, 1962), p. 191.Google Scholar

34. Communiqué of the Ministry of Military Affairs, no. 106, July 9, 1920. Archiwum Akt Nowych w Warszawie, Prezydjum Rady Ministrow, Rektifikaty, 49T.4. It must be remembered that a centralistic constitution was finally approved, on February 29, 1920, that completely ignored the Pittsburgh Agreement. In the preamble Czechoslovakia was declared a “Czechoslovak national state and the domain of the Czechoslovak nation.” Malbone W. Graham, “Constitutional and Political Structure, ” in Kerner, Robert J., ed., Czechoslovakia (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1940), pp. 114–15.Google Scholar

35. In Spi§, Poland's claims amounted to 1, 786 square kilometers and a population of 74, 169. In Orava the Polish claim represented an area of 746 square kilometers and a population of close to 40, 000. Both territories were claimed on ethnographic, historic, and geographic-economic grounds. Commission polonaise des travaux préparatoires au Congrès de la, Paix, Mémoire concernant la delimitation des frontières entre les états polonais et tchéco-slovaque, Silesie de Ciessyn, Orawa et Spišs (Paris, 1919), p. 19.Google Scholar

36. Perman, Shaping of the Czechoslovak State, p. 255.

37. Szklarska-Lohmanowa, “Polska wobec sprawy słowackiej, ” p. 34. The plebiscite, however, was never held. Instead, the Conference of Ambassadors meeting in Spa settled the Teschen and Spiš-Orava disputes on July 28, 1920, on the basis of partition. Poland agreed to the settlement only because she was in desperate straits, struggling against the Bolshevik armies for her very existence. The decision was deeply resented in Poland, because it was believed that the Czechs and Slovaks had taken unfair advantage of Poland. The Czechs and Slovaks were also dissatisfied with the decision. Gasiorowski, “Polish-Czechoslovak Relations, ” p. 183.

38. Pitsudski retired from active politics toward the end of 1922 and returned to power in May 1926 following a coup d'etat. In 1927 there were some intrigues involving the Polish General Staff, Vojtech Tuka, vice president of the Slovak People's Party, and František Unger and Father Jehlička, members of the pro-Hungarian Slovak Irredentist movement in Poland. These contacts, however, came to nought. Slovak historian Juraj Kramer uncovered evidence that proves that Vojtech Tuka was at that time a paid Hungarian agent, working to engineer the separation of Slovakia from the Czech lands. Juraj, Kramer, Iredenta a separatizmus v slovenskej politike, 1919-1938 (Bratislava, 1957), pp. 168–71, 276-78.Google Scholar

39. Dębicki, Roman, Foreign Policy of Poland, 1919-1939 (New York, 1962), p. 66–68.Google Scholar

40. Beck, Józef, Dernier Rapport: Politique Polonaise, 1926-1939 (Neuchâtel, 1951), pp. 83, 141.Google Scholar

41. Michael T. Lubieński, Beck's chef de cabinet from 1933 to 1939, gave this information to Macartney, C. A., October Fifteenth: A History of Modem Hungary, 1929-1945, 2 vols. (Edinburgh, 1956-57), 1: 208.Google Scholar Lubieński's testimony is corroborated by the former vice consul to Bratislava from 1933 to 1937. Letter to this writer from Zbigniew Jakubski, Los Angeles, Sept. 27, 1963.

42. Early in 1919 Adrian Diveky, a Hungarian historian, wrote a memorandum to Polish authorities arguing that it would be to Poland's economic and political advantage to make sure that the eight railway lines in Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia remained in Hungarian hands. If the Czechs controlled these territories, Diveky warned, Poland's road to the Adriatic might be cut off. “Adrian Diveky's Memorandum on Polish-Hungarian Relations” (undated but probably written early in 1919); Jurkiewicz, “Stosunki polsko-wegierskie w 1919 r., ” pp. 76-84.

43. These activities are very well described in Kramer, Iredenta a separatismus, passim.

44. Kozeński, Jerzy, Csechoslowacja w Polskiej polityce sagranicsnej w latach 1932-1938 (Poznan, 1964), pp. 127–28 Google Scholar; Jules, Laroche, La Pologne de Pilsudski: Souvenirs d'une ambassade, 1926-1935 (Paris, 1953), p. 144.Google Scholar

45. In 1932, before Polish-German relations were somewhat clarified by the nonaggression declaration of January 1934, Pilsudski made some efforts to bring about a Polish-Czechoslovak rapprochement. Indeed, according to a report written in October 1932 by the Czechoslovak minister in Warsaw, Vaclav Girsa, Pilsudski proposed a virtual alliance between the two countries. Kozeński, Csechosłowacja, pp. 61-62

46. Ibid., p. 69.

47. Minister Grzybowski obviously knew Pilsudski was planning to set a new course for Poland's foreign policy and was anxious to help shape it. Minister Grzybowski's report to MSZ, Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych w Warszawie, Wydział Wschodni, P. Ill, lata 1930-1939, W. 55, T. 7 (hereafter records in the Archives of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Warsaw, Eastern Section, P. III, are cited as AMSZ-PIII).

48. In particular the Tuka Affair of 1928-29 helped to poison relations between Czechs and Slovaks as well as between Slovak Centralists and Slovak Autonomists. Cf. Batowski, “Zarys dziejów Słowacji, ” pp. 175-81.

49. Consul Łaciński's report to Minister Grzybowski, dated April 26, 1933, Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych w Warszawie, Zespół Poselstwa R. P. w Pradze z lat 1930-1939, W. 2, T. 6, pp. 32-33 (hereafter records in the Archives of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Warsaw, Polish Legation in Prague Collection, are cited as AMSZ-Pos. Prag.).

50. Minister Grzybowski's report reached Warsaw at a moment when Piłsudski was preparing to consummate a nonaggression agreement with Germany. The latter was expected to cause distress to the Prague government. Minister Grzybowski's report to MSZ (Section PVI), Dec. 22, 1933, AMSZ-Pos. Prag., W. 3, T. 5, pp. 7-8

51. Stanisławska, Stefania, Wielka i mala polityka Jósef a Becka (Warsaw, 1962), p. 13–14.Google Scholar

52. Consul Malhomme made reference to instructions received in January from Beck to develop an Irredentist movement among the Polish minority in Czechoslovakia and to make contacts with Slovak Autonomists led by Father Hlinka. Consul Malhomme's report to Minister Grzybowski, Mar. 21, 1934, AMSZ-Pos. Prag., W. 3, T. 8.

53. MSZ-Press Section to Minister Grzybowski, Feb. 28, 1934. The document was classified confidential. AMSZ-Pos. Prag., W. 3, T. 5, p. 8.

54. August 1933 marked the 1100th anniversary of the founding of a Christian church in Nitra. Plans were made by the clerical leadership of the Slovak People's Party to celebrate this anniversary and exploit it for political anti-Czech purposes. When the Czechoslovak government got wind of this, it had its representatives take over the celebration. They dissolved the Committee on Preparations and Arrangements headed by Karol Kmet'ko, bishop of Nitra, and in its place a new committee was set up headed by Jozef Orszagh, president of the Slovakian province. The new committee then struck out the names of Father Hlinka and Jozef Škultety from the list of speakers and placed on the program přímé Minister Jan Malypeter, Milan Hodža, and Ivan Dérer

Father Hlinka, however, came in person to Nitra on August 13, 1933, to attend the government-sponsored celebration. When the crowd of eighty thousand people saw him, they shouted down the speakers on the platform and demanded that Father Hlinka be allowed to speak. Father Hlinka then delivered a stirring speech in which he emphasized, “there are no Czechoslovaks… . we want to remain just Slovaks.” Later there were demonstrations which ended in clashes between the Slovak populace and the police. The autonomist press then engaged in a fierce antigovernment campaign. All of which prompted the Czechoslovak authorities to take some repressive measures—for example, censorship of the press was tightened up, and Karol Sidor, editor of the Slovák, was jailed. Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, p. 145; Batowski, “Zarys dziejów Słowacji, ” p. 186.

55. In the fall of 1934 Jaromir Smutný, Czechoslovak chargé d'affaires in Warsaw, reported to his superiors in Prague that the Slovak problem had replaced the Teschen question as the number one issue discussed in the Polish press. Kozeński, Czechosłowacja, p. 152.

56. Consul Łacinski's reports in the Archives of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs easily substantiate this.

57. Kozeński, Csechoslozvacja, p. 195.

58. The former Polish vice consul in Bratislava informed this writer that Sidor did receive a subsidy from the Polish government for election campaigning in 1935. But a short time later Sidor returned the subsidy in order to preserve his independence. Letter to this writer from Zbigniew Jakubski, Los Angeles, California, Sept. 27, 1963; Minister Grzybowski's report to MSZ, n.d., AMSZ-PIII, W. 55, T. 3.

59. According to the testimony of Zbigniew Jakubski, the Polish Consulate in Bratislava gave about one hundred thousand Czech crowns to Ferdinand Ďurčanský for the publication of Nástup from 1935 to April 1937 while he was vice consul. The money was personally picked up and signed for by Ďurčanský. There is no reason to believe that the subvention was withdrawn after Jakubski left Bratislava on April 1, 1937. So it seems that from January 1935 to at least October 1938 the Nástupists received money regularly from Polish officials. Letter to this writer from Zbigniew Jakubski, Los Angeles, California, Sept. 27, 1963.

60. Batowski, “Zarys dziejów Stowacji, ” p. 187; Stanisławska, Wielka i mala polityka Jozefa Becka, p. 66.

61. Consul Łaciński made reference to such instructions on May 12, 1935. Consul Łaciński's report to Minister Grzybowski, May 12, 1935, AMSZ-Pos. Prag., W. 4, T. 1, p. 687.

62. Consul Łaciński's report to Minister Grzybowski, May 9, 1935, AMSZ-Pos. Prag., W. 4, T. 1, pp. 687-88; Consul Łaciński's report to Minister Grzybowski, Jan. 24, 1935, AMSZ-Pos. Prag., W. 4, T. 1, pp. 679-80; Consul Łaciński's report to Minister Grzybowski, classified very urgent, May 11, 1935, AMSZ-Pos. Prag., W. 4, T. 7, p. 5; Letter to this writer from Zbigniew Jakubski, Los Angeles, California, Sept. 27, 1963; Consul Łaciński's report to Minister Grzybowski, Sept. 16, 1935, AMSZ-Pos. Prag., W. 4, T. 1, p. 737; and Consul Łaciński's report to Chargé Chodacki, Nov. 9, 1935, AMSZ-Pos. Prag., W. 4, T. 1, pp. 740-42.

63. Kramer, Iredenta a separatismus, pp. 226-27.

64. During the same conversation Masaryk informed Slávik, a Slovak Centralist and Agrarian, that he was selected to be the new Czechoslovak minister to Warsaw. “A Slovak had a better chance of succeeding in Warsaw than a Czech, ” the aged statesman declared. Juraj Slávik, “Moje poslanie vo Varsave, ” New Yorský Denník, February 1956.

65. Chargé Chodacki's report to Minister Grzybowski, June 4, 1935, AMSZ-PIII, W. 66, T. 3.