1. Diane Koenker and William G. Rosenberg “Skilled Workers and the Strike Movement in Revolutionary Russia,” Journal of Social History 19, 4 (1986): 605-29. Slavic Review 53, no. 1 (Spring 1994).

2. Our thumbnail sketch glosses over an important division in the “peasant“ school concerning exactly how ties to the countryside affected labor militance. Some scholars, reminiscent of the mensheviks, hold that it was the rootlessness and anomie of recently arrived peasant-workers that led to labor unrest. See Haimson, Leopold, “The Problem of Social Stability in Urban Russia, 1905-1917 (Part One),” Slavic Review 23 (1964): 619–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and “The Problem of Social Stability in Urban Russia, 1905-1917 (Part Two),” Slavic Review 23 (1965): 1-56. (Incidentally, Haimson later disavowed this interpretation and was a major force behind the development of what we refer to below as “American revisionism.“) Other historians, reminiscent of the narodniki, hold that peasant workers actually developed strong ties in the city, mainly through friendly societies of persons coming from the same area (zemliachestva). Presumably, such societies helped create labor solidarity and discipline among recent arrivals. See Johnson, Robert Eugene, Peasant and Proletarian: The Working Class of Moscow in the Late Nineteenth Century (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1979)Google Scholar. For recent debate on this topic see Brower, Daniel, “Labor Violence in Russia in the Late Nineteenth Century, “ Slavic Review 41, 3 (1982): 417–31CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Johnson, Robert, “Primitive Rebels? Reflections on Collective Violence in Imperial Russia,” Slavic Review 41, 3 (1982): 432–35CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Suny, Ronald Grigor, “Violence and Class Consciousness in the Russian Working Class,” Slavic Review 41, 3 (1982): 436–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Koenker, Diane, “Collective Action and Collective Violence in the Russian Labor Movement,” Slavic Review 41, 3 (1982): 443–48CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Brower, Daniel, “Labor Violence—A Reply,” Slavic Review 41, 3 (1982): 449–53CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3. See especially Haimson, Leopold, “The Problem of Social Identities in Early Twentieth Century Russia,” Slavic Review 47, 1 (1988): 1–20 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Leopold Haimson and Éric Brian, “Changements démographiques et grèves ouvrières à Saint-Petersbourg, 1905-1914,” Annates ESC 4 (1985): 781-803; Koenker, Diane, Moscow Workers and the 1917 Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981 Google Scholar; Diane Koenker and William G. Rosenberg, op. cit.; Bonnell, Victoria R., Roots of Rebellion: Workers, Politics and Organization in St. Petersburg and Moscow, 1900-1914 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983 Google Scholar).

4. Having one's passport registered in a particular locale did not mean that one was born there. 90 % of Russian workers were still registered as members of the peasant estate at the turn of the century, even though some of them had fathers and grandfathers who had been employed in industry ( Liashenko, P. I., Istoriia narodnogo khoziastva SSSR, 3rd ed. [Moscow: Gos. izd-vo polit. lit-ry, 1952], 2: 165 Google Scholar).

5. Fond 150, Peterburgskogo Obshchestva Zavodchikov i Fabrikantov, contains these blacklists which were circulated among members in order to inform factory administrations about the identity of potential troublemakers. This source contains a total of approximately 10, 000 male and female workers for the period from August to December 1913.

6. We discuss the effect of volost1 population size on level of militance below.

7. Central State Historical Archive of Moscow (TsGIAM), Fond Departamenta Politsii, 1912 g., d. 61, ch. 2, t. 1, 11. 34 ob., 93; Ionov, A, “Klassovye boi piterskikh metallistov,” Sovetskie profsoiuzy 9 (1957): 59 Google Scholar; Kruze, E. E., Peterburgskie rabochie v 1912- 1914 godakh (Moscow-Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk, 1961), 255, 261 Google Scholar; Tomchevich, I. G., “Znamia Oktiabria Ocherk istorii zavoda (Leningrad, 1972), 12 Google Scholar.

8. See, for example, TsGIAM, Fond Departamenta Politsii 00, 1913 g., d. 341, pr. 2, 11. 218-20.

9. Heather Hogan, “Scientific Management and the Changing Nature of Work in the St. Petersburg Metalworking Industry, 1900-1914,” in Haimson, Leopold H. and Tilly, Charles, eds., Strikes, Wars and Revolutions in an International Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 368–69 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

10. Ibid., 369.

11. Leopold Haimson, “Structural Processes of Change and Changing Patterns of Labor Unrest: The Case of the Metal-processing Industry in Imperial Russia (1890- 1914),” ibid., 388-90.

12. For a list of all the factories striking, the number of workers involved and the reasons behind each strike in 1913 in St. Petersburg, see Rabochee dvizhenie v Petrograde v 1912-1917 gg: Dokumenty i materialy (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1958), 559-64.

13. Leopold Haimson, “Structural processes…,” 396-97.

14. The zemstvo sources we used are housed in the Saltykov-Schedrin Library in St. Petersburg: Promysly krest'ianskogo naseleniia Pskovskoi gubernii i polozhenie ikh v 1895- 97 gg. (Pskov: Izdanie Pskovskoi Gubernskoi Upravy, 1898); and Pskovskaia guberniia (Svod dannykh otsenochno.-statisticheskago issledovaniia). Tom IX. Pogubernskii svod. Vyp. II. Chast’ ekonomicheskaia (Pskov: Tipografiia Gubernskago Zemstva, 1913). These sources contain information for all volosti of Pskov guberniia for the mid-1890s and, perhaps because otkhod was a relatively new phenomenon in Pskov province, they are quite thorough on this question. The quality of our data is thus superior to the quality of data for provinces where the local zemstva did not conduct statistical surveys of the population for a fixed point in time, or did not pose questions about otkhod and nonagricultural work in general. A further advantage of our data is that they are a generation removed from the strike wave of 1913, which gives us insight into the processes of urbanization at work well before the Stolypin land reform is said (by supporters of the menshevik interpretation) to have resulted in a mass influx of raw recruits into St. Petersburg. We are thus not forced to contend with the complex task of divining the province's history of otkhod to the capital on the basis of data accumulated during the implementation of the land reform.

15. We are thus not committing the so-called “ecological fallacy” of inferring individual behaviour from grouped data and we are therefore not obliged to conduct ecological regression analysis which has some pitfalls. See Langbein, Laura Irwin and Lichtman, Allan J., Ecological Inference (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1978 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Huston, James L., “Weighting, Confidence Intervals, and Ecological Regression,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 21, 4 (1991): 631–54CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

16. Jerzy G. Gliksman, “The Russian Urban Worker: From Serf to Proletarian, “ in Cyril E. Black, ed., The Transformation of Russian Society: Aspects of Social Change Since 1861 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), 316.

17. Stepanov, V. V., ed., Sankt-Peterburg po perepisi 10 dekabria 1869 g. (St. Petersburg: Izdanie Tsentral'nago Statisticheskago Komiteta, M.V.D., 1872), 1: 118 Google Scholar; Stepanov, V. V., ed., Petrograd po perepisi 15 dekabria 1910 goda. Naselenie, Pt. 1 (Petrograd: Izdanie Gorodskoi Upravy, 1914), 290 Google Scholar.

18. On various aspects of the implementation of the Stolypin legislation in Pskov province, see Obsledovanie zemleustroennykh khoziaistv, proizvedennoe v 1913 godu v 12 uezdakh evropeiskoi Rossii (Petrograd: Izdanie Glavnago Upravleniia Zemledeliia i Zemleustroistva, 1915); Izgoev, A. S., “Iz obshchiny na khutora,” Moskovskii ezhenedel'nik 3 (16 January 1910): 15–17 Google Scholar; Pershin, P. N., Zemel'noe ustroistvo dorevoliutsionnoi derevni (Moscow: Nauchno-issledovatel'skii institut zemleustroistva i pereseleniia i Voronezhskii sel'skokhoziaistvennyi institut, 1928), 281–399, 402-19Google Scholar; G. M. Deich, Krest'ianstvo Pskovskoi gubernii vo vtoroi polovine XIX i nachale XX w. Avtoreferat dissertatsii (Leningrad: Tipografiia Leningradskogo Gosudarstvenogo Universiteta, 1962), 22-8; Obzor deiatel'nosti uezdnykh kommisii (1907-1909gg.) (St. Petersburg: Izdanie Glavnago Upravleniia Zemleustroistva i Zemledelia, 1911); and “Delo s kopieiu vsepoddanneishago otcheta o Pskovskoi gub., za 1910,” TsGIA SSSR, f. 1284 (Fond Soveta Ministrov), op. 194, d. 82.

19. Danilov, N. A., Zubakov, R. A. and Lesnenko, V. K., Geografiia Pskovskoi oblasti (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1966 Google Scholar; Ob“iasnitel'naia zapiska kproektu novoi tabeli Zakonnoi Otsenki zemel’ po guberniiam (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia P.P. Soikina, 1913), 284-98.

20. Obzor Pskovskoi gubernii. Vyp. 1-i. Estestvennyia i proizvoditel'nyia sily gub. i ekonomicheshaia deiatei'nosV eia naseleniia. 1900 god (Pskov: Tipografiia Gubernskago Pravleniia, 1901). Even as late as 1914, only 92, 000 people, or 6.5% of the provincial total, lived in the towns of Pskov, Porkhov, Opochetsk, Ostrov, Velikie Luki, Toropets, Kholm and Novorzhev. See Pskovskii krai v istorii SSSR: Ocherki Istorii (Pskov, 1970), 177-78.

21. For a general examination of the post-Emancipation removal of many of the mechanisms which had artificially sustained large households, see Isaev, A. A., “Znachenie semeinykh razdelov krest'ian,” Vestnik Evropy, Book 7 (1883): 333–49Google Scholar; Vorontsov, V. P., “Semeinye razdely i krest'inaskoe khoziaistvo,” Otechestvennyia zapiski, Series 3, 266, 1 (1883): 1–23, and 2 (1883): 137-61Google Scholar. For a recent account, see Frierson, Cathy A., “Razdel: The Peasant Family Divided,” The Russian Review 46 (1987): 35–52 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

22. For a discussion of the struggle between “fathers” and “sons” in peasant families, and on the salvation from the economic rule of the “fathers” that otkhod represented for many “sons,” see K voprosu o xmezemledel'cheskom otkhode krest'ianskago naseleniia (St. Petersburg: Izdanie Vol'nago Ekonomicheskago Obshchestva, 1899), 29- 31; M. Tugan-Baranovskii suggested that youths were not “torn” from their villages but rather eagerly traveled to jobs in the big city ( Tugan-Baranovskii, M., Russkaia fabrika v proshlom i nastoiashchem [Moscow: Sotsial'no-ekon. izd-vo, 1922], 388 Google Scholar).

23. K voprosu o vnezemledel'cheskom otkhode, 25.

24. Pskovskii krai, 178.

25. B. Lenskii, “Otkhozhie nezemledel'cheskie promysly v Rossii,” Otechestvennyia zapiski 12 (1877): 207-58.

26. Ibid., 212-13.

27. Ibid., 212. For a similar evaluation of Pskovskie, see also Zapiska ob otkhozhikh (zemledel'cheskikh i nezemledel'cheskikh) promyslakh i o peredvizhenii rabochikh partii po zheleznym dorogam (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Shtaba Voisk Gvardii i Peterburgskago Voennago Okruga, 1897), 21.

28. G. M. Deich, Krest'ianstvo Pskovskoi, 7.

29. For the classic work on Emancipation and the relation of land values to obligations, see Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Otmena krepostnogo prava v Rossii, 3rd ed. (Moscow: Prosveshchenie, 1968), especially 301–2Google Scholar. See also Gerschenkron, Alexander, Continuity in History and Other Essays (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), 174–85 Google Scholar.

30. K voprosu o vnezemledel'cheskom otkhode, 19; Pskovskaia guberniia. Tom IX. Pogubernskii svod. Vyp. II. Chast1 ekonomicheskaia (Naselennost1, zemlevladenie i ekonomicheskii byt' zemledel'cheskago naseleniia) (Pskov: Tipografiia Gubernskago Zemstva, 1913), ix.

31. Iu. E. Ianson, Opyt statisticheskago izsledovaniia o krest'ianskikh nadelakh i platezhakh (St. Petersburg: 1877), 35.

32. B. Lenskii, “Otkhozhie nezemledel'cheskie promysly,” 212.

33. A.S. Zaboenkova, “Stolypinskoe zemleustroistvo v Severo-zapadnykh guberniiakh, “ htoricheskie zapiski 54 (1955): 82.

34. Statistika zemlevladeniia 1905 g.: Pskovskaia guberniia, vyp. 31 (St. Petersburg: Izdanie Tsentral'nago Statisticheskago Komiteta M.V.D., 1906), 47.

35. Obzor Pskovskoi gubernii, 27.

36. “Vsepoddanneishii otchet Pskovskago gubernatora za 1911 god,” TsGIA SSSR, f. 1284 (Fond Soveta Ministrov), op. 17, d. 288, 161.

37. “Svodnyi otchet podatnykh inspektorov po Pskovskoi gub. za 1912 god,” TsGIA SSSR, f. 573 (Departament Okladnykh Sborov), op. 25, d. 951, 24.

38. Obzor Pskovskoi gubernii, 54; S.-Peterburg po perepisi 10 dekabria 1869 goda, vyp. I (St. Petersburg: Izdanie Tsentral'nago Statisticheskago Komiteta M.V.D., 1872), 118; S.- Peterburgpo perepisi 15 dekabria 1881 goda, vol. 1, pt. I (St. Petersburg: Izdanie Gorodskoi Upravy, 1883), 245; S.-Peterburg po perepisi 15 dekabria 1890 goda, pt. I, vyp. I (St. Petersburg: Izdanie Gorodskoi Upravy, 1891), 84; S.-Peterburg po perepisi 15 dekabria 1900 goda, vyp. I (St. Petersburg: Izdanie Gorodskoi Upravy, 1903), 168-71.

39. S. Katsenel'son, “O formirovanii peterburgskogo proletariata,” Propaganda i agitatsiia 23 (15 December 1948): 19Google Scholar. Before industrial production was simplified in many large factories during the first decade of the twentieth century, a high level of skill was required from workers. In the late nineteenth century, in the nine oldest and largest factories in St. Petersburg (Putilov, Baltic, Obukhovskii, Aleksandrovskii, Petersburg Metal, Nevskii, Nobel, San-Galli and Franco-Russian), of a total 22, 000 workers, 15, 000 were highly qualified metallisty. Ibid., 25.

40. For a discussion of the various stages in the transformation of the kustar’ into an otkhodnik, see K voprosu o vnezemledel'cheskom otkhode, 18-20.

41. V. V. Vorovskii, “Vozniknovenie rabochego klassa,” Sochineniia (Moscow: Gos. izdatel'stvo, 1933), 1: 185.

42. Historians who support the menshevik interpretation, on the other hand, argue that industry could draw only a negligible number of recruits from the “small group of urban artisans” and that even the kustari, who were compelled to give up work in their homes under the pressure of competition from factory-produced goods, “formed a relatively small element in the factory labor force compared with the mass of land-tilling peasants who entered it” (Jerzy G. Gliksman, “The Russian Urban Worker,” 315).

43. B. Lenskii, “Otkhozhie nezemledel'cheskie promysly,” 213.

44. Peterburg po perepisi 1869 g., 90-139.

45. S. Katsenel'son, “O formirovanii,” 21; “Svodnye gubernskie tablitsy po otchetam podatnykh inspektorov po Pskovskoi gub. za 1906 g.,” TsGIA SSSR, f. 573 (Departament Okladnykh Sborov), op. 25, d. 945, 39 ob.

46. Leontief, W., Die Baumwolle Industrie in St. Petersburg (Munich: E. Reinhardt, 1906), 90 Google Scholar; TsGIA SSSR, f. 573, op. 25, d. 948, 41; and Obzor Pskovskoi gubernii, 55.

47. Promysly krest'ianskago naseleniia Pskovskoi gub. i polozhenie ikh v 1895-97 gg\ (St. Petersburg: Izdanie Pskovskoi Gubernskoi Upravy, 1898), 3.

48. S. N. Prokopovich, “Krest'ianstvo i poreformennaia fabrika,” in Velikaia Reforma: Russkoe obshchestvo i krest'ianskii vopros v proshlom i nastoiashchem (Moscow: Izd. T-va I.D. Sytina, 1911), VI: 270.

49. “Svodnyi otchet podatnykh inspektorov po Pskovskoi gub. za 1910 g.,” TsGIA SSSR, f. 573 (Departament Okladnykh Sborov), op. 25, d. 949, 71 ob. In this connection Petr Struve noted: “The main evil of otkhod, which contributes to disease and to the corruption of morals, lies in the separation of husband from wife and family. This evil vanishes when chronic, that is, regular, otkhod, becomes emigration, that is when from a person living in two houses, the otkhodnik becomes a person who...'lives like all people live, ’ in one house” ( Struve, P. B., Na raznyiia temy [St. Petersburg, 1902], 73Google Scholar).

50. Obzor Pskovskoi gubernii, 55-56; K voprosu o vnezemledel'cheskom otkhode, 4, where it was noted that “soon otkhod will resemble the situation in the west: emigration ‘once and for all.’ Data show that...now it is not only the strongest, most energetic, elements of the village that are participating in long-term agricultural otkhod, but all: women, children and, finally, entire families.“

51. Obzor Pskovskoi gubernii, 56.

52. “Svodnyia gubernskiia tablitsy za 1906 g.,” 40, 109.

53. “Vsepoddanneishii otchet Pskovskago gubernatora za 1912 g.,” TsGIA SSSR, f. 1276 (Fond Soveta Ministrov), op. 17, d. 200, 188 ob.

54. Interestingly, Theodore Von Laue, who subscribes to the “peasant-proletarian“ argument, noted for the Moscow industrial region that “the bond between field and factory did not help relieve the poverty of the village…where tax arrears increased despite the growing factory employment.” Clearly, Von Laue does not equate this fact with the severing of ties to the land ( Laue, Theodore Von, “Russian Labor Between Field and Factory, 1892-1903,” California Slavic Studies 3 [1964]: 49 Google Scholar).

55. “Svodnyi otchet podatnykh inspektorov po Pskovskoi gub. za 1912 god., “ TsGIA SSSR, f. 573 (Departament Okladnykh Sborov), op. 25, d. 951, 34 ob. Contrast the situation in Pskov to that in Iaroslavl’ and Kostroma provinces. Zemstva in the latter provinces reported that otkhod work was actually good for agriculture because of capital accumulated from money sent home by otkhodniki (Zapiska ob otkhozhikh [zemledel'cheskikh i nezemledel'cheskikh], promyslakh i o peredvizhenii rabochikh partii po zheleznym dorogam [St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Shtaba Voisk Gvardii i Peterburgskago Voennago Okruga, 1897], 17). In general, the otkhodniki in these provinces—particularly those from Iaroslav, who worked primarily as traders (torgovtsy) and monopolized the restaurant business in the capital—were much better off financially than peasants not participating in otkhod work. Despite the fact that Iaroslav province had 133, 500 immigrants (prishlye) in the capital in 1910—second only to Tveriane—only a small minority of laroslavtsy worked in industry. This is reflected in the 1913 worker blacklists, which registered a mere 227 Iaroslavl’ men and 58 women.

56. Pskovskaia guberniia, 116-17, 130-31, 144-45, 156-57, 170-71, 184-85.

57. Ibid.

58. On this point, see, among others, Zelnik, Reginald E., “Essay Review: Russian Workers and the Revolutionary Movement,” Journal of Social History 6 (1972-3): 216–17CrossRefGoogle Scholar; andjerzy G. Gliksman, “The Russian Urban Worker,” 312.

59. Obzor Pskovskoi gubernii, xxxv. Some scholars suggest that in Pskov leased land was of such poor quality that the otkhodnik simply entered into a private arrangement with the lessee and agreed to pay all allotment (nadel) dues in exchange for permission from the obshchina to renew his passport. In other words, many otkhodniki effectively “gave” their land to peasants in the village (M. and O. [noms de plume], “Tsifry i fakty iz perepisi S.-Peterburga v 1900 godu,” Russkaia mysl’ [Moscow: Tipo-litogr. Tovarishchestva I.N. Kushnerev i Ko., 1902], I: 76).

60. Pskovskaia guberniia, 104-5, 108-9. The large amount of missing data on this subject speaks to the intensity of land-severing. The number of households for which such information was not available, due to the inability of the census-taker to obtain this information from people in the locales, was quite high, ranging from 13% in Velikolutskii uezd to 74% in Opochetskii uezd.

61. Obzor Pskovskoi gubernii, 55.

62. We reached the same conclusion examining the log of male population, for which the correlation was .401.

63. Elsewhere we argue that male and female militance had reciprocal effects on each other and that both were manifestations of the formation of a working class community in St. Petersburg. See Evel Economakis and Robert J. Brym, “Militance and Marriage in a Working Class District of St. Petersburg, 1896-1913,” unpublished manuscript.

64. Consistent with the menshevik position, Haimson in his early work on the subject (“The Problem of Social Stability...“) suggested that the consolidation of land holdings brought about by the Stolypin land reforms drove poor peasants from the land into the ranks of the industrial proletariat. However, we found that the number of households in each volost’ that took advantage of the land reorganization statutes of the Stolypin land reform was not a statistically significant predictor (p > .05) of male labor militance after controls were introduced.

65. Petrograd po perepisi 15 dekabria 1910 goda, Vol. 2, Table 1, 3; Table 10, 150-5 and Table 14, 290. See also Haimson and Brian, “Changements démographiques…, “ 791.

66. We may mention in passing the effects of age and skill as reflected in our data. Consistent with the menshevik position, Haimson (“The Problem of Social Stability. . .“) argued that the most militant workers were young recent recruits from the countryside. Examining fragmentary information on Moscow trade union leaders in the period 1905-1914, Bonnell found no grounds to support Haimson's contention (see Bonnell, Victoria, “Radical Politics and Organized Labor in Pre-Revolutionary Moscow, 1905-1914,” Journal of Social History 12 [1978-79]: 282–300 CrossRefGoogle Scholar). We had data on the age of 586 of the 703 Pskov workers blacklisted in St. Petersburg in 1913. The ages of the men on our list ranged from 15 to 42; the average was nearly 27. This was not especially young compared to the age distribution of the St. Petersburg working class on the eve of World War I. However, we did find a weak correlation in the direction predicted by Haimson (r=— .246) between the number of male militants from each volost’ and the average age of those militants. Inspection of a scatterplot revealed that the correlation was attributable to a dropoff in the number of militants after age 33. Nonetheless, when entered in our multiple regression model, age became a statistically insignificant predictor (p > .05) of male militance. We are thus inclined to agree with Bonnell that there was no tendency for militants to be especially young, net of the causes specified in our model. Our data contain measures of the skill level of male otkhod workers in St. Petersburg in 1896 (coded 0 = non-St. Petersburg otkhod, 1= St. Petersburg chernorabochie, 2 = St. Petersburg nonchernorabochie); and the degree to which male otkhod workers in St. Petersburg were employed in factories in 1896 (coded as 0 = non-St. Petersburg employment, 1 =St. Petersburg non-factory employment, 2= St. Petersburg factory employment). We found low but statistically significant correlations between these two variables and level of male labor militance (r= 0.225 and 0.242, respectively). When entered in our multiple regression equation, however, both variables became statistically insignificant predictors (p > .05).