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Lyricism and Philosophy in Brodsky's Elegiac Verse
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 January 2017
Abstract
In this article Aaron Beaver analyzes two elegies written by Joseph Brodsky—one for his father (“Pamiati ottsa: Avstraliia“) and one for his mother (“Mysl’ o tebe udaliaetsia …“). The point of departure is Brodsky's appropriation of the genre from his Silver Age predecessors (Anna Akhmatova, Osip Mandel'shtam, Marina Tsvetaeva), as made evident in a number of Brodsky's well-known essays. Beaver's central thesis is that Brodsky reshapes the elegy by centering it not on the death of the loved one but on time. Brodsky is inspired in this endeavor by his Silver Age forebears, but he extends their poetic practice into more philosophical territory. Specifically, close reading of Brodsky's two elegies exposes a model of time consistent with the temporal idealism elaborated by Jean- Paul Sartre in Being and Nothingness. Based on this exegesis Beaver ventures to generalize about the nature of lyricism in Brodsky's verse, arguing that it is inseparable from his philosophical assumptions.
- Type
- On the Borders of the Silver Age
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- Copyright
- Copyright © Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies. 2008
References
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6. There are, of course, numerous shades of similarity and difference between Brodsky's verse and that of his Silver Age predecessors. A full examination of them lies beyond the scope of this article, but the following generalization may be ventured here: in Brodsky's own terms he practiced “good acoustics” in his attempt to be a “cupola for his predecessors,” so that echoes can be discerned that do not drown out his own voice. Brodsky, , Less Than One, 132 Google Scholar. Also one may say generally that Brodsky seems more dazzled by Tsvetaeva and less willing or able to echo her than Mandel'shtam and Akhmatova, whose acmeist practice he extends into a bona fide post-acmeism. In any case, this article will be concerned with how Brodsky positions himself as a Silver Age successor rather than with interrogating that tactical positioning.
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17. Willem G. Weststeijn in his article on this poem notes this reversal, and it leads him to make a claim superficially similar to mine: “The word net denies the first simile, which is probably based on an association the speaker has when he thinks of the ‘ y o u ‘ and replaces it with another simile (based on another association). At the same time, net can be read as a denial of the statement that 1.1 contains: the thought of the ‘you' does not disappear at all. In fact, the entire poem, being dedicated to the memory of the 'you,’ testifies to that.” Weststeijn, , “The Thought of You Is Going Away … ,” in [Losev], Lev Loseff and Polukhina, Valentina, eds., Joseph Brodsky: The Art of a Poem (New York, 1999), 180-81Google Scholar. Weststeijn's claim, however, is epistemological (that the thought of the elegized does not disappear) where mine will be ontological (that the elegized herself does not cease to be).
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20. Ibid., 174. The reference to Sartre's participation in Brodsky's fate is an allusion to the letter Sartre sent to Anastas Mikoian (then chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet) in 1965 on Brodsky's behalf. See Losev, Iosif Brodskii, 124-26. The only other direct claim Losev makes about Brodsky's relationship to Sartre's thought is that “in the well-known argument about humanism, which was conducted by Sartre (more of a philosopher than a writer) and Camus (more of a writer than a philosopher), Brodsky was on the side of Camus.” Ibid., 176-77.
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64. I am aware that this definition is not unlike Bakhtin's definition of the novel (a case he builds pardy based on a reductive definition of poetry). The definition I am proposing here could be called, in Bakhtin's terms, the novelization of die lyric.
65. Though it lies beyond the scope of this article, I would argue that Brodsky adopts different models of time as various individual poems (or types of poems) call for it. This would then require that philosophers other than Sartre be used to aid in poetic exegesis.
66. Compare Mikhail Kreps's idea of the “ladder of meaning” in Brodsky's poetry. Kreps describes a similar but less rigorous movement from idea to idea within Brodsky's poems. Kreps, , O poezii Iosifa Brodskogo, 53–54 Google Scholar.
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