The author wishes to express his appreciation for the support received from the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council as well as the Humanities Institute of the University of California and the Center for International Studies, Berkeley.

1 According to the official figures issued by the Polish government in 1939, 68.9 percent of the inhabitants were considered to be “Polish.” This classification was based on what people reported to be their native language (JQzyk ojczysty). On the basis of religion the survey reported that 64.8 percent of the population was Roman Catholic. It is interesting to note that the survey identified as Jewish 8.6 percent of the population when classified by language, but 9.8 percent when classified by religion. Rocznik polityczny i gospodarczy (Warsaw, 1939), p. 16. Representatives of the ethnic minorities in the Polish parliaments generally discounted official estimates; from numerous references it would appear that from 1919 on they more often believed the minorities to constitute 40 and occasionally even 45 percent of the total, rather than the 30 to 36 percent the government survey indicates. See, for example, Sejm, Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne, 295th session, Dec. 12, 1925, p. 89, declaration by the Ukrainian deputy Chrucki on behalf of all the minority groupings. Among other sources giving high estimates see Aleksander, Skrzynski, Polska a Pokej (Warsaw, 1923), pp. 46–50 and 57Google Scholar. Cf. Stephan, Horak, Poland and Her National Minorities, 1919-1939 (New York, 1961), p. 1961 Google Scholar. (The names of non- Polish deputies referred to in this article are in Polish transliteration, as they appear in the record of the parliamentary debates.)

2 Among Dmowski's most influential works, all heavily preoccupied with ethnic issues, were My Hi nowoczesnego Polaka, 1903, and Upadek Myśi Konserwatywnej, 1913.

3 See my “Proportional Representation in Prewar Poland,” Slavic Review, XXIII, No. 1 (Mar. 1964), 103-16. The Nationalists won pluralities in twenty-five out of forty-three districts in which popular elections to the Constituent Sejm were held in 1919-20, and majorities in twenty of these twenty-five. In 1922 a three-party Nationalist alliance won pluralities in thirtyfour out of sixty-four electoral districts for the Sejm and ten out of seventeen for the Senate.

4 For a summary of the Nationalist programs between 1897 and 1925 see Alicja, Belcikowska, Stronnictwa i Zwi(\zki Polityczne w Polsce (Warsaw, 1925), pp. 61–88 Google Scholar. See also Wilhelm, Feldman, Stronnictwa i Programy Polityczne w Galicyi, 1846-1906 (Kraków, 1907), II, 196–99 and 226Google Scholar, on racist aspects of the nationalist orientation.

5 Ibid., p. 164. Cf. Dmowski, Myśi, pp. 89 and 100; see also his Niemcy, Rosya i Kwestja Polski (Lw6w, 1908), pp. 24-34; and S. Kozicki, Sprawa Granic Polski na Konferencji Pokojowej w Paryzu (Warsaw, 1921), pp. 20-21. In its October 27, 1 gig, program the ZLN declared that all its energies were directed toward the objective of including within Poland's frontiers all those lands where Polish population predominated either numerically or by the quality of its civilization. Belcikowska, Stronnictwa, p. 83.

6 See Dmowski, Myśi, pp. 70 and 102, for example.

7 See my “Parliament and the Electoral System in Poland, 1918-1935” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, i960), Chap. 1.

8 Belcikowska, Stronnictwa, p. 87.

9 Projekty Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Warsaw, 1920), pp. 63-80.

10 See, for example, Sejm, 216th session, Mar. 8, 1921, pp. 21-37, speech by the Rev. K. Lutoslawski, chief ZLN spokesman on minority questions in the Constituent Sejm. Lutoslawski called the Minorities Treaty an insult to Poland and said it was obtained through a campaign of calumny against her by “certain citizens of our state,” insisting that the “Polish constitution will accord all rights to minorities regardless of the demands by the mighty of this world” (p. 30). More generally see L. Zieleniewski, “Zagadnienie mniejszos'ci narodowych w Konstytucji,” Sprawy Narodowokiowe, IX, No. 1/2 (Jan.-Apr. 1935), 1—37.

11 In October 1921 the Council of the League of Nations formally settled the last segments of the boundary between Poland and Germany. On May 15, 1922, the two countries concluded a convention with respect to each other's rights and interests in Silesia. See Raymond L. Buell, Poland : Key to Europe (New York, 1939), p. 72. The complete, formal settlement of Poland's frontiers can probably be dated from March 1923 when the Conference of Ambassadors representing France, Britain, Italy, and Japan recognized Poland's sovereignty over her de facto holdings. See Titus Komarnicki, Rebirth of the Polish Republic (London, 1957), pp. 740-41.

12 Cf., for example, Buell, Poland, p. 88; Robert, Machray, The Poland of Piłsudski, 1914-1936 (London, 1936), pp. 165–67 Google Scholar; Simon, Segal, The New Poland and the Jews (New York, 1938), pp. 35–36 Google Scholar; Joseph, Rothschild, Pilsudsfci's Coup d'Etat (New York, 1966), pp. 8–9 Google Scholar; F., Zweig, Poland Between Two Wars (London, 1944), pp. 36, 46.Google Scholar

13 This statement was issued on December 10, 1922, by the parliamentary representatives of the three parties then composing the Polish Nationalist Right : the ZLN, the Christian Nationalists, and the Christian Democrats. The signatories included such luminaries as Stanislaw Glatainski, Stanislaw Grabski, Marian Seyda, Wojciech Korfanty, Edward Dubanowicz, and Stanislaw Stronski. See Gabriel Narutowicz, Ksigga Pamiqtkowa (Warsaw, 1925), pp. 277-78.

14 For some examples from contemporaneous accounts see ibid., pp. 285-301.

15 See Proces Eligiusza Niewiadomskiego, 30 grudnia 1922 (Warsaw, 1922), and his Kartki z Wi$zienia (Poznan, 1923).

16 See, for example, the account by Bernard Singer in Od Witosa do Slawka (Paris, 1962), p. 120. Singer served as a parliamentary correspondent for the Jewish newspaper Nasz Prztglqd for almost two decades.

17 See, for example, Sejm, 9th session, Jan. 22, 1923, p. 12, for the charge of conspiracy by Stanislaw Thugutt.

18 For Piłsudski's public comments see his Pisma Zbiorowe, VI (Warsaw, 1931), 3-7 (interview with editor of Kurjer Polski, Dec. 31, 1922); pp. 39-55 for his speech at the Bristol Hotel, Warsaw, in July 1923; and also Piłsudski's Wspomnienia 0 Gabrjelu Narutowicz^ (Warsaw, 1923). It is appropriate to note that when Piłsudski was first interviewed on the Narutowicz assassination in December 1922, his refusal to challenge the Nationalist position still had a certain rationale. He was, after all, chief of the General Staff, and as an officer on active duty he may well have felt it improper to issue political pronouncements. But this was no longer the case in 1923. When he wrote the monograph about Narutowicz, Piłsudski was already in retirement at his country home in Sulejówek.

19 Cf. Wladyslaw Pobóg-Malinowski, Najnowsza Historja Polityczna Polski, 1864-1943, II (London, 1956), 421-23 and 422n.

20 See appraisals of Wojciechowski by Ploski, Józef, Dzieje Obozu Narodowego do igi4 roku (London, 1953), p. 9 Google Scholar, and Leon, Wasilewski, Józef Piłsudski jakimgo znalem (Warsaw, 1935), pp. 166–67 Google Scholar. Wojciechowski was apparentiy regarded by the deputies of the ethnic minorities and by the Socialists merely as better than the Nationalist candidate. There were no illusions about him personally, according to Adam Pragier, PPS (Polish Socialist Party) leader, who took part in his election (interview with this writer, London, May 16, 1966).

21 Moje Wspomnienia, Vol. I (Lwów, 1938). Wojciechowski wrote that as far back as 1905 he had begun to consider Jews “harmful” in business and politics (p. 171).

22 See his Mowy Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Warsaw, 1924), pp. 17-24.

23 Sejm, 7th session, Jan. 19, 1923, pp. 6-23.

24 Sejm, ioth session, Jan. 22, 1923, pp. 85-94.

25 Ibid., pp. 88-90. The implicit Sikorski doctrine—“first show us you're loyal, then you can enjoy equal rights“—enjoyed a long if disreputable history under succeeding regimes. This doctrine should not be confused with the legitimate enough assertion that illegal or wrongful acts ought to be punished by the state, a far cry from the proposition that the rights of any citizen—even a criminal—may be denied him at any time or under any circumstances. To make the rights of, say, Ukrainians generally contingent on the “misbehavior” or “disloyalty” of some, a few, or even most Ukrainians is to abandon the constitutional foundations of equality. See Ludwik Ehrlich, “Zasada czystych rak w prawie mniejszościowym,” Ruch Prawniczy, 1930, zeszyt 1, pp. 47-56. What makes the attitudes of Wojciechowski and Sikorski particularly significant is that they were both Piłsudski's personal choices in 1922. Cf. his Wspomnienia cited in Pisma Zbiorowe, VI, 84; Rothschild, Piłsudski's Coup, p. 12; Machray, Poland of Piłsudski, p. 166. Cf. Adam Próchnik, Pierwsz’ pitnastolecie Polski niepodleglej (Warsaw, 1957), p. 158.

26 Sejm, 10th session, Jan. 22, 1923, p. 65. The demands presented by Ukrainian and Belorussian spokesmen in the Polish Sejm were publicly formulated in a joint program of List No. 16 combining the several minorities into an electoral alliance in the elections of November 1922. See Belcikowska, Stronnictwa, pp. 529-33; cf. Sejm, 9th session, Jan. 22, 1923, pp. 28-40, for a fourteen-point Belorussian version, and pp. 57-63 for a twenty-four-point Ukrainian version.

27 Sejm, 8th session, Jan. 20, 1923, p. 20.

28 Sejm, 9th session, Jan. 22, 1923, pp. 23-25. Witos, who was to become premier in a coalition government with the Nationalists in May 1923, simply denied that the state bureaucracy treated minorities worse than Poles. He professed the view that it was desirable for Poles to match the achievements already made by Jews in trade and finance, where Poles were, in fact, “underprivileged.“

29 See, for example, Thugutt speech of May 23, 1923, Sejm, 40th session, pp. 46-47. Cf. 48th session, J u n e 19, 1923, pp. 13-14. On June 2, 1923, Moraczewski, then a Socialist deputy and Piłsudskiist, made a speech accusing the Nationalists of being “the warmest defenders of Jews” because of their unqualified support of capitalism; presumably the PPS was more effectively anti-Semitic by virtue of its anticapitalism (Sejm, 42nd session, pp. 25-26).

30 See, for example, I. Grunbaum's significant and extensive speech reproaching the Left for its failure to defend minority rights and interests, Sejm, 42nd session, pp. 42-49. He asserted that since 1907 the Polish Left had grown progressively more terrorized and intimidated by Nationalist, xenophobic, and anti-Semitic propaganda, and that anti-Semitism had been allowed to become an unbeatable weapon in Polish politics. In 1930, long after Piłsudski's seizure of power, the Ukrainian deputy Studynskyj similarly reproached the Polish Left (Sejm, 74th session, Feb. 6, 1930, pp. 114-15).

31 See Wincenty, Witos, Moje Wspomnienia, III (Paris, 1965), 36–37.Google Scholar

32 Ibid., pp. 36-42. See Segal, The New Poland, pp. 37-39, and for the most thorough account, Joseph Gitman, “The Jews and Jewish Problems in the Polish Parliament, 1919- 1939” (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1963), pp. 82-95. Cf. the conclusions of Pob6g-Malinowski, Najnowsza Historja, II, 441, n. 73, on Grabski's role.

33 This was a role in which he was pictured by Premier Wladyslaw Grabski, in whose cabinet Thugutt served (Dec. 1923-Nov. 1925); see Dwa Lata pracy u podstaw panstwowosci naszej (Warsaw, 1927), pp. 87, 141. Cf. Singer, “Obywatel Thugutt,” in Od Witosa do Slawka, pp. 71-74.

34 The PPS justified its participation in a coalition with the Nationalists on the grounds that it was necessary to save the state, the economy, and the workers from an impending catastrophe and that desirable reforms had to be deferred for the sake of the more immediate objective. See the speech by Barlicki, Sejm, 255th session, Nov. 25, 1925, pp. 18-19; see subsequent justifications by deputies Marek, 285th session, Apr. 26, 1926, pp. 7-20, and Diamand, 286th session, Apr. 28, 1926, p. 16.

35 The bitterness toward Grabski stemmed largely from his role as promoter and founder of the so-called bilingual school law of July 31, 1924, supplemented by his directive of April 23, 1925, requiring at least some instruction in Polish in minority public and private schools. For examples of minority reactions to Grabski's measures and PPS acquiescence to them see in particular Sejm, 295th session, Dec. 12, 1925, statement by Chrucki on behalf of all minority representatives, pp. 88-91. Cf. Belorussians’ Woloszyn, 255th session, Nov. 25, 1925, pp. 27- 31; Jews’ Reich, 256th session, Nov. 26, 1925, pp. 5-6; Germans’ Karau, 256th session, pp. 17-19; Ukrainians’ Kozubski, 256th session, pp. 27-29.

36 See Rothschild, Piłsudski's Coup, p. 201.

37 See, for example, Stanislaw Estreicher, Dziesi$ciolecie Polski Odrodzonej (Kraków, 1928), pp. 218 and 215-18 passim.

38 Bezpartyjny Blok Wspelpracy z Rz^dem (Nonpartisan Bloc for Cooperation with the Government) was the electoral and parliamentary representation of regime supporters organized in 1928.

39 See Felicjan Slawoj-Skladkowski, Strezšpy Meldunków (2nd ed.; Warsaw, 1936), p. 223, and also pp. 85, 145, 147, and 210, for his observations as minister of the interior on Piłsudski's running of the Cabinet in 1927-29. See pp. 333 and 450 on still other aspects of Piłsudski's personal leadership in the Cabinet, all minimizing the exchanges of information and opinions between him and his de facto subordinates. Cf. Pobóg-Malinowski, Najnowsza Historja, II, 573-74. See also Stanislaw Stronski, “Dzialalność gen. Sikorskiego i udzial Polski w II Wojnie Swiatowej” (London : Sikorski Institute, unpubl. MS), pp. 22-23, on the marshal's methods of work.

40 See, for example, Symmons-Symonolewicz, K., “Polish Political Thought and the Problem of the Eastern Borderlands of Poland, 1918-1939,” Polish Review , VI, No. 1/2 (Winter 1959), 65–61.Google Scholar

41 See his “Narodowości Rzeczypospolitej wobec zgonu Józefa Piteudskiego,” Sprawy Narodowośiowe, IV, No. 3/4 (May-Aug. 1935), 199. Cf. Adam Skwarczyński, Myili 0 nowej Polsce (2nd ed.; Warsaw, 1934), pp. 27-28, on Piłsudski's “planlessness.“

42 See Sprawy Narodowościowe, III, No. 1 (Jan.-Feb. 1929), 77. See also Deputy Thon of the Jewish Circle in the Sejm for a summary of Jewish disappointments and a denunciation of the regime's prolonged utter indifference toward Jewish problems, Sejm, 85th session, Feb. 13, 1933. PP. 31-32.

43 Sejm, 61st session, Feb. 26, 1932, pp. 85-86.

44 Among many examples, see Komarnicki, Sejm, 59th session, Mar. 4, 1929, p. 31; Kornecki, 108th session, Jan. 26, 1934, p. 34.

45 See, for example, the speech by Bagiński of Wyzwolenie, Sejm, 38th session, Jan. 15, 1929, p. 21; and Zulawski of the PPS, 41st session, Jan. 28, 1929, pp. 13, 18; Dabski, Peasant Party (Stronnictwo Chlopskie), ibid., p. 25.

46 One such case was that of Tadeusz Holówko, a militant Socialist and enemy of nationalism at the time of the Narutowicz crisis, who became disillusioned with parliamentary democracy, followed Pibudski even after Brześć, and somehow transmuted his earlier liberalism into a belief about a Polish mission in the east and the specially pernicious role of Jews in Poland's ethnic woes. See Wincenty Rzymowski, W Walce i Burzy : Tadeusz Holówko na tie epoki (Warsaw, 933). particularly pp. 329-30.

47 See, for example, Sprawa Brzeska (London, 1941), pp. 12 and 24. Among the seventeen deputies arrested on the night of September 9, 1930, only one, Aleksander Dbski, was a Nationalist. Six Socialist and four Ukrainian deputies were arrested by the regime. After a few months D^bski was released, and unlike the Socialists, he was never brought to trial. Of the eleven men brought to trial on October 26, 1931, in Warsaw, only two (Witos and Kiernik) did not represent either the Socialist Party or the left wing of the peasant movement (p. 25).

48 Cf. Prechnik, Pierwsze piqtnastolecie Polski niepodleglej, pp. 439-40. On economic issues Witos and Rataj moved toward the Left.

49 Obez Zjednoczenia Narodowego (The Camp of National Unity) was the electoral and parliamentary successor of the BBWR, organized in 1937.

50 Sejm, 7th session, Jan. 26, 1931, pp. 55-56.

51 Ibid., pp. 65-72.

52 Ibid., pp. 46-55. Cf. Pobóg-Malinowski, Najnowsza Historja, II, 541, on the uniquely forthright position of the PPS.

53 Sejm, 7th session, Jan. 26, 1931, pp. 47-55.

54 According to a Polish source, 1, 739 Ukrainians were arrested between July 1 and November 30, 1930, of whom only 211 were still in prison a year later. M. Felinski, The Ukrainians in Poland (London, 1931), pp. 169-70. According to Horak's highly critical account of Polish policy, in all the years between 1921 and 1938 only 17 death sentences and 27 life sentences were imposed on Ukrainians; he believes that at least 2, 000 were held in concentration camps and that in 1930 some 200, 000 (!) were placed at least briefly under arrest, with 35 deaths resulting from mistreatment (Poland and Her Minorities, pp. 158 and 162). Cf. Oleh, Martovych, Ukrainian Liberation Movement in Modern Times (Edinburgh : Scottish League for European Freedom, n.d.), p. 83 Google Scholar. This author counts 17 death sentences, 27 life sentences, and 3, 777 Ukrainians tried between 1921 and 1938 by Polish courts. Cf. Wasyl, Swystun, Ukraine—The Sorest Spot in Europe (Winnipeg, 1931).Google Scholar

55 Cf. Buell, Poland, pp. 277-78; Clarence A. Manning, Twentieth Century Ukraine (New York, 1950. PP. 111-13.

56 Moje Wspomnienia, III, 402.

57 As Dmowski had often said before, during, and after 1926, “assimilation with a large number of [Jews] would destroy us [zgubiloby nas], replacing with decadent elements those creative foundations upon which we are building the future” (Polityka Polska i Odbudowanie Państwa [2nd ed.; Warsaw, 1926], p. 91).

58 Both the Nationalists and the Populists (SL) negotiated with the representatives of the regime in 1936-38 for the purpose of ending their opposition. According to the Pibudskiist historian Wladyslaw Pobóg-Malinowski, Najnowsza Historja, II, 608-11, they had the least difficulty agreeing on the Jewish question and on the issue of a constitutional order for Poland. Cf. Stanisław Grabski, Myiśi 0 dziejowej drodzfi Polski (Glasgow, 1944), pp. 173-74. It may be noted that already in the 1928 elections, when Wyzwolenie lost most of its non-Polish voters, the Polish Populist movement as a whole, unlike the Socialists, had become dependent almost exclusively on an ethnically Polish clientele. See my “Polish Elections, 1919-1928,” Slavic Review, XXIV, No. 4 (Dec. 1965), 656-57.

59 According to Adam Ciolkosz, the PPS did not maintain regular contacts with minority representatives in the 1930-35 Parliament, partly because many of them (particularly Ukrainians) regarded such contacts as compromising and shunned them, and partly because there was a tendency for “everyone to lick his own wounds” following the regime's Brześć reprisals (interview with this writer, London, Jan. 27, 1966). Ukrainian hostility to the “generalized and imprecise” support given by the PPS is recorded in one of the last speeches of the 1935 Parliament in which parties were still represented. Jaworskyj, Sejm, 135th session, Feb. 14, 1935, p. 9. For material that clearly puts Mieczyslaw Niedzialkowski, the PPS leader on the eve of World War II, among Polish liberals on ethnic issues, see M. Drozdowski and A. Tymieniecka, “Mieczyslaw Niedzialkowski,” Najnowsze dzieje Polski, IX (1965), 40-85.

60 See his Szkice literackie i naukowe, published posthumously (Kraków, 1909), pp. 273-74.

61 Resolution of the Governing Council (Rada Naczelna) OZN (Obez Zjednoczenia Narodowego), May 1938, cited on p. 73, Rocznik Statystyczny, Rocznik polityczny i gospodarczy (see note 1).

62 See Warszawski Dziennik Narodowy : Pamiqci Romana Dmowskiego (Jan. 1939). In his book Przewrot (Warsaw, 1934), which was actually a compendium of newspaper articles Dmowski had written in the 1930s, he specifically praised and endorsed Hitler's anti-Semitism (pp. 489-93). As for his own views, Dmowski summed them up thus : “Even if Jews were morally angels, mentally geniuses, even if they were people of higher kind than we are, the very fact of their existence among us and their close participation in our life is for our society lethal [zabdjczy] and they have to be got rid of [Trzeba si$ ichpozbyc] “(p. 309). For early accounts identifying racism in the ideology of National Democracy, though without specific reference to Dmowski, see Wilhelm Feldman, Rzecz 0 Narodowej Demokracji (Kraków, 1902), pp. 5, 25-26; and his Stronnictwa (see note 4).