1. “Mart-mai 1917 g.,” Krasnyi arkhiv, 15 (1926) : 35. Throughout this article comments about peasant actions and views are based on substantial examination of the situation in the villages in 1917 undertaken while preparing my Ph.D. dissertation at the University of London. The single richest source on developments in the countryside is the reports of local events sent to the militia headquarters throughout the year which are reprinted in K. G. Kotel'nikov and V. A. Meller, eds., Kresfianskoe dvizhenie v 1917 godu (Moscow, 1927). Resolutions of peasant meetings can be found in many documentary selections, including the series edited by L. S. Gaponenko and by D. A. Chugaev, some of the volumes of which are referred to below, as well as in Shestakov, A. V., ed., Sovety krest'ianskikh deputatov i drugie kresfianskie organisatsii (Moscow, 1929)Google Scholar. All references to Russian administrative regions have been Anglicized, with district, county, and province used to- refer to volost, uezd, and guberniia, respectively.

2. According to one authority, in February the fronts (excluding the Caucasian front) had only 42.3 percent and the cities 29.6 percent of the planned supplies of grain produce, while in March the corresponding figures were 58 percent and 41 percent (see S., Lozinskii, Ekonomicheskaia politika vremennogo praviteV stva [Leningrad, 1929], pp. 9 and 124Google Scholar). For examples of peasants donating grain, see Vestnik Vremennogo Pravitel’stva, March 12, March 17, and March 21, 1917.

3. For example, see Gaponenko, L. S. et al., eds., Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Rossii posle sversheniia samoderzhaviia : Dokumenty i materialy (Moscow, 1957), p. 674 Google Scholar; and “Agrarnoe dvizhenie v 1917 godu po dokumentam glavnogo zemel'nogo komiteta,” Krasnyi arkhiv, 14 (1926) : 205-15.

4. Marc, Ferro, La Revolution de 1917 (Paris, 1967), pp. 410–11 Google Scholar. While the establishment of rental rates was by no means the single most important form of land seizure in March, during that month it did constitute a far higher proportion of all instances of land seizure than it would do at any time later in the year.

5. For example, see Gaponenko et al., Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie, p. 670; and “Mart-mai, “ p. 57, respectively.

6. Gaponenko et al., Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie, p. 383. All dates are given Old Style.

7. This is a major problem in using the resolutions of peasant meetings as an accurate guide to the sentiments of those at the meetings. The very high level of illiteracy among the peasants meant that in most cases the decisions of peasant meetings were transcribed by people who did not live permanently in the village in question, but by agitators or others coming from the towns. Such people normally were politically partisan, with the result that peasant resolutions almost invariably were framed in the rhetoric and phraseology of political conflict in the capital.

8. Gaponenko et al., Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie, p. 670.

9. Vestnik Vremennago Pravitel'stva, March 23, 1917.

10. Gaponenko et al., Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie, p. 422.

11. Ibid., p. 440.

12. Vestnik Vremennago Pravitel'stva, March 29, 1917.

13. Ibid., May 25, 1917.

14. Reports of the elections can be found in Delo naroda, September 23, 1917.

15. See a peasant call for the annulment of the decision of March S, in Gaponenko et al., Revoliutsionnoe dvishenie, pp. 678-79.

16. See Vestnik Vremennago Pravitel'stva, April 23, 1917. The government was so concerned about rural unrest that by October seven agencies had been given the responsibility for .handling rural affairs : government commissar, district zemstvo, district committee, militia, land committee, food committee, and a special committee established in some provinces in September solely to combat rural unrest.

17. For some examples of government statements, see Gaponenko, L. S. et al., eds., Revoliutsionnoe dvishenie v Rossii v aprele 1917 g., Aprel'skii krisis : Dokumenty i materialy (Moscow, 1968), p. 306 Google Scholar; and Kotel'nikov and Meller, Kresfianskoe dvishenie, pp. 420-21.

18. Respectively, Kazinkin, I. la. and Sobolev, P. N., “Bor'ba krest'ian za zemliu nakanune oktiabr'skoi revoliutsii,” Voprosy istorii, 1957, no. 6, p. 21 Google Scholar; and Shestakov, A. V., Ocherki po sel'skomu khoziaistvu i kresfianskomu dvisheniiu v gody voiny i pered oktiabrem 1917 g. (Leningrad, 1927), p. 161 Google Scholar. These figures cannot be accepted as completely accurate, but they do indicate that the use of armed force was limited, especially in relation to the extent of rural unrest and the physical size of Russia. Pershin, P. N. (Agrarnaia revoliutsiia v Rossii : Istoriko-ekonomicheskoe issledovanie, Ot reformy k revoliutsii [Moscow, 1966], p. 291 Google Scholar and chapter 8) cites some examples of its use. However, the use of armed force was neither as widespread nor as automatic as Pershin implies.

19. Discussion of the changing economic position of the peasants during this period can be found in many places, for example, in Pershin, Agrarnaia revoliutsiia v Rossii, chapters 1, 2, and 4. For the immediate prerevolutionary period, see Ekonomicheskoe polozhenie Rossii nakanune velikoi oktiabr'skoi sotsialisticheskoi revoliutsii : Dokumenty i materialy, vol. 3 (Moscow, 1957), parts 1 and 2. In English the best source remains Robinson, G. T., Rural Russia Under the Old Regime (New York, 1932).Google Scholar

20. The result of the seizure of landowners’ land was that individual farmers in most provinces received less than half a desiatina each (see O zemle, vol. 1 [Moscow, 1921], p. 29). In any case, the peasants’ problem was not only one of land shortage, but of low-level technology and high population growth as well.

21. Vestnik Vremennago Pravitel'stva, June 20, 1917.

22. For example, on July 26 food committees were instructed to use to full capacity those agricultural machines and implements not being used fully by their owners (see ibid., Augusts, 1917).

23. In practice this was modified (see below).

24. The nationalization of imperial lands was an exception to this.

25. Vestnik Vremennago Pravitel'stva, July 14, 1917. This decision made all transfers of land contingent on the approval of the provincial land committee and confirmation by the minister of agriculture.

26. Ibid., April 23, 1917.

27. The deliberations of the committee in full session are reported in Delo naroda, May 20-26, July 2-7, and August 26-31, 1917. Criticism of the committee by a member can be found in Semenov Tian, V. P.'-Shan'skii, , “Glavnyi zemel'nyi komitet,” Arkhiv russkoi revoliutsii, 12 (1923), pp. 291-94Google Scholar. A discussion of its deliberations and actions is contained in Pershin, Agrarnaia revoliutsiia v Rossii, pp. 295 ff.

28. The government ensured that district committees could not be established in all districts by restricting the funds allocated for this purpose. According to Pershin (Agrarnaia revoliutsiia v Rossii, p. 352), funds sufficient for only about 25 percent of all districts were provided. This reflects the government's inability to control committees at these levels.

29. Delo naroda, October 18, 1917.

30. For examples, see ibid., May 3, 1917; and Gaponenko et al., Revoliutsicmnoe dvizhenie, p. 689. A lengthy study of peasant actions, in which the changing peasant attitude is discussed more fully, is currently being completed by the author.

31. The provincial committee consisted of four members elected by the provincial zemstvo assembly, one by the municipal duma of the provincial capital, one from each county land committee, a maximum of three from the economic sections of the provincial zemstvo board, a justice of the circuit court, a justice of the peace, a representative of the Ministry of Agriculture, and experts serving in an advisory capacity. The county committee consisted of four members elected by the county zemstvo assembly, one by the municipal duma, a zemstvo agronomist and statistician, a justice of the peace, and experts serving in an advisory capacity. On the role of party ideology obscuring the perceptions of members of the party which nominally dominated organizations at these levels for much of the year, the S.R.'s, see Radkey, Oliver H., The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism (New York, 1958)Google Scholar. For a succinct outline of one aspect of the view of developments in the villages shared by most major political groups in the decade and a half before the revolution, see T., Shanin, The Awkward Class : Political Sociology of Peasantry in a Developing Society : Russia 1910-1925 (Oxford, 1972), p. 1–2.Google Scholar

32. Even in dealing with disputes over land relations local committees had to wait until the dispute was referred to them by the contending parties.

33. Vestnik Vremennago Pravitel'stva, March 30, 1917.

34. The fixed prices were 60 percent higher than those prevailing in 1916 (see Lozinskii, Ekonomicheskaia politika, p. 137).

35. Vestnik Vremennago Pravttel'stva, March 30, 1917.

36. Ibid., April 14, and July 26, 1917.

37. Ibid., April 14, and May 2, 1917, respectively.

38. Ibid., May 2, 1917. However, it was not until June 6 that details of how this was to be implemented were prescribed (see ibid., June 13, 1917).

39. Ibid., September 10, 1917.

40. Ibid., May 7, 1917.

41. For examples, see ibid., June 23, and October 6, 1917.

42. Lozinskii, Ekonomicheskaia politika, pp. 136-38.

43. The provincial committee consisted of three members from the provincial zemstvo assembly, three from the municipal duma of the provincial capital, one from each of the local branches of the All-Russian Union of Zemstvos and Towns, one from the local branch of the War Industry Committee, five from local Soviets of workers’ deputies, five from the local Peasants’ Union, six from local cooperatives, two from provincial agricultural societies, three from the exchange committees, and one each from the zemstvo and municipal statistical organizations and from the agronomic, economic, and public health zemstvo organizations Where these existed. Representatives from county food committees and from the government departments of War, Finance, Trade and Industry, State Control, Transport, Agriculture, and Interior could be present in an advisory capacity. The county committee consisted of three members from the county zemstvo assembly, two from the municipal duma of the county capita], three from local Soviets of workers’ deputies, three from the local branch of the Peasants’ Union, three from county cooperatives, one from the local agricultural society, two from the commercial-industrial class, and one from each cooperative, agronomic, and public health organization of the county zemstvo. Representatives of the district and regional committees and of the government departments of War, Finance, Trade and Industry, State Control, Transport, Agriculture, and Interior could participate in an advisory capacity.

44. They were to consist of three private landowners elected by the county zemstvo assembly, six peasants elected by the district peasant assembly, three from local cooperatives, two from trade unions, one from the local commercial-industrial class, and three from among local zemstvo employees. Representatives from the Ministry of Agriculture could participate in an advisory capacity.

45. Directions were not issued to food committees to commence the census until May 3, six weeks after the committees were formed (see Vestnik Vremennago Pravitel'stva, May 9, 1917).

46. In June provincial commissars were instructed to suspend low-level organs which disobeyed the government (see Delo naroda, June 8, 1917). This was extended in September when these bodies were made formally responsible to the courts and the judicial system (see Vestjiik Vremennago Pravitel'stva, October 4, 1917).

47. Chugaev, D. A. et al., eds., Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Rossii v iiule 1917 g., Hul'skii krisis : Dokumenty i material's (Moscow, 1959), p. 308–9.Google Scholar

48. In the north and northwest of the country the peasants adopted a less negative attitude toward the results of the Stolypin reforms. In these regions the completely enclosed peasant farm, the khutor, was widely allowed to remain intact (see Pershin, P. N., Uchastkovoe zemlepol'sovanie v Rossii [Moscow, 1922], pp. 39-Google Scholar). On the inadvisability of class analysis of developments in the villages, see Shanin, The Awkward Class.

49. No one would suggest that all members of the government were bereft of ideas about the path Russia should take in specific areas of concern (for example, Miliukov and the war), but no one had an overall, coordinated view.

50. For details of the Kadet congresses, see Rosenberg, William G., Liberals in the Russian Revolution (Princeton, 1974), pp. 89, 127–29 Google Scholar. The Kadet program is reprinted in abbreviated form in Browder, R. P. and Kerensky, A. F., eds., The Russian Provisional Government 1917 (Stanford, 1961), p. 605–8.Google Scholar

51. The S.R.'s were never specific about how this would work, probably because they were not sure themselves.

52. Delo naroda, June 7, 1917.

53. For an account of the Third Congress, see Radkey, Agrarian Foes, pp. 212-16.

54. See, for example, Chernov's remarks at the All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Peasants’ Deputies, reprinted in Golder, F. A., ed., Documents of Russian History 1914-1917 (Gloucester, Mass., 1964), pp. 374-75.Google Scholar

55. Chugaev et al., Revoliutsionnoe dvishenie v Rossii v iiule 1917 g., p. 308.

56. Analysis of reports sent from the countryside to the Chief Department for the Militia has produced the following pattern of unrest in European Russia (in terms of proportion of total) : March-1.9, April-7.1, May-11.6, June-16.6, July-17.1, August-13.1, September.

56. O, October -16.6. These figures, which can only be accepted as broad guides, are based on analysis of individual instances of unrest. The militia reports are reprinted in Kotel'nikov and Meller, KresVianskoe dvishenie.

57. V., Chernov, The Great Russian Revolution (New Haven, 1936), p. 242.Google Scholar

58. See Vestnik Vremennago Pravitel'stva, July 18, and July 26, 1917, respectively.

59. Tsereteli, I, “Rossiiskoe krest'ianstvo i V. M. Chernov v 1917 godu,” Novyi zhurnal, 29 (1952) : 231–37.Google Scholar

60. An opinion shared by Lvov (see Golder, Documents of Russian History, pp. 470-71; and Tsereteli, “Rossiiskoe krest'ianstvo,” p. 233).

61. Browder and Kerensky, The Russian Provisional Government, pp. 1402-3.

62. See the discussion of relations between the two in Radkey, Agrarian Foes, pp. 227-33.

63. See the discussion of the committee's membership in Pershin, Agrarnaia revoliutsiia v Rossii, pp. 294-95. The biggest single bloc was the S.R.'s, but most of these came from the party's right wing. A similar situation applied to the executive committee of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants’ Deputies.