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The Economic Origins of Soviet Autarky 1927/28-1934

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2017

Michael R. Dohan
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Forty years ago the USSR was rushing toward a degree of economic isolation unparalleled by any industrial economy at peace. The autarkic position reached by the Soviet economy in the mid-1930s seemed to be a fundamental characteristic of Soviet policy. In the past two decades, however, Soviet foreign trade has grown rapidly. Thus, it is of both current and historical interest to understand and reassess the circumstances under which the USSR sharply curtailed economic relations with the world capitalist economies in the 1930s. Conventional interpretation stresses that Stalin, during the First and Second Five-Year Plans (1928/29-1932, 1933-37), deliberately pursued economic autarky—a policy intended to reduce Soviet foreign trade as quickly as possible to a “tolerable minimum” and without regard to the possible economic gains from higher levels of foreign trade. According to this explanation, the initial expansion of trade between 1927/28 and 1931 is interpreted as a policy of “imports of machinery intended to end imports” and the subsequent cutback in imports is cited as evidence of its success. In the following analysis of the policies and events that culminated in Stalin’s “autarkic policy,” it is argued that the collapse and stagnation of Soviet foreign trade after 1931 were unforeseen and caused by events beyond the control of Soviet planners.

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Slavic Review , Volume 35 , Issue 4 , December 1976 , pp. 603 - 635
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Copyright © Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies. 1976

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References

1. Soviet foreign trade data are from Ministerstvo Vneshnei Torgovli SSSR, Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR sa 1918-1940 gg.: Statistichcskii obsor (Moscow, 1960) unless otherwise noted. Data for 1913 refer to imperial Russia. Split year refers to economic year, October 1 to September 30. All values for foreign trade are in terms of gold rubles and reflect world trade prices converted into rubles at the parity exchange rate. Weights are in metric tons. Volume and price indexes for total imports and exports and selected commodity groups are from Michael Dohan, “Volume, Price, and Terms of Trade Indices of Soviet Foreign Trade 1913-1938, ” in Michael Dohan and Edward, Hewett, Tzvo Studies in Soviet Terms of Trade 1918-1940 (Bloomington, Ind., 1973)Google Scholar (hereafter Dohan 1973).

2. This interpretation is oversimplified but reflects the essence of most Western discussion of Soviet foreign trade during the early Five-Year Plans. See Holzman's, Franklyn “Foreign Trade,” in Economic Trends in the Soviet Union, eds. Bergson, Abram and Kuznets, Simon (Cambridge, Mass., 1963) (hereafter Holzman 1963), pp. 301–6.Google Scholar

3. Robert, Campbell, Soviet-type Economies (Boston, 1974), pp. 132–33, 157Google Scholar; and Holzman (1963), p. 302.

4. In his excellent survey Franklyn Holzman (Holzman, 1963) also raised the possibility that the Soviets were forced into a greater degree of autarky than they wanted for some but not all the reasons I cite in this paper. He notes, in particular, the sharp decline in the terms of trade and the high financing costs of short-term debt, but he does not assign as much weight to these and other economic causes for Soviet autarky as I do.

5. See the oft-cited Mishustin, D. D., Vneshniaia torgovlia i industrializatsiia SSSR (Moscow, 1938)Google Scholar and references in notes 90-96 below.

6. Alexander, Gerschenkron, Economic Relations zvith the USSR (New York, 1945), p. 140.Google Scholar

7. In fact, military and economic benefits of trade would have argued for an expansion of trade to accelerate the building of war industries and to stockpile raw materials.

8. Leon, Herman, “The Promise of Economic Self-Sufficiency under Soviet Socialism,” in The Development of the Soviet Economy, ed. Treml, Vladimir (New York, 1968), p. 213–48.Google Scholar

9. See Holzman (1963), pp. 304-S; and Howard, Sherman, The Soviet Economy (Boston, 1969), p. 188.Google Scholar

10. Herbert, Levine, “The Effects of Foreign Trade on Soviet Planning Practices,” in International Trade and Central Planning, eds. Brown, Alan and Neuberger, Egon (Berkeley, 1968), p. 255–76.Google Scholar

11. This section is based primarily on my Ph.D. dissertation, “Soviet Foreign Trade in the NEP Economy and Soviet Industrialization Policy” (M.I.T., 1969) (hereafter Dohan 1969).

12. Dohan (1969), pp. 118-48; and Holzman (1963), pp. 29S-98.

13. Groman, V. C., “Khlebnaia produktsiia i khlebnyi eksport SSSR,” in Entsiklopediia sovetskogo eksporta, ed. Belen'skii, B. S. et al., 2nd ed., vol. 1 (Moscow, 1928) (hereafter Ensoveks), pp. 220–38Google Scholar and the many articles on grain trade in the same volume.

14. Dohan (1969), pp. 182-469, describes the NEP foreign trade plans and the difficulties in their implementation. For procurement difficulties in 1927/28 see Sovetskaia torgovlia, 3, no. 45/46 (1928); and Gosplan, SSSR, Kontrol'nye tsifry narodnogo khosiaistva SSSR na 1928/29 god (Moscow, 1929) (hereafter Gosplan 1929), p. 489.Google Scholar

15. L. Z., Zalkind, “K kontrol'nym tsifram tovarnooborota na 1927/28 g.,” Sovetskaia torgovlia, 2, no. 24 (1927): 3 Google Scholar; Sovetskaia torgovlia, 3, no. 45/46 (1928): 31-42; and Gosplan (1929), pp. 175, 201-2.

16. Gosplan (1929), p. 173.

17. Richard, Day, Leon Trotsky and the Politics of Economic Isolation (Cambridge, Mass., 1973), pp. 118–25Google Scholar; and Alexander, Erlich, The Soviet Industrialization Debate (Cambridge, Mass., 1960)Google Scholar.

18. See, for example, A. Mikoian, “Znachenie eksporta v narodnom khoziaistve SSSR, ” in Ensoveks, p. 16.

19. This section is based on Gosplan SSSR, Piatilctnii plan narodno-khoziaistvennogo stroitel'stva SSSR (Moscow, 1929), pp. 9-12, 99-102; Geller, G. and Sovalov, A., “Osnovnye problemy razvitiia vneshnei torgovli v piatiletie 1928/29-1932/33,” Voprosy torgovli, 1928, no. 12, pp. 37–49Google Scholar; Kaufman, M, “Eksport i narodnoe khoziaistvo,” Voprosy torgovli, 1929, no. 1, pp. 25–35Google Scholar; a series of articles on the final variant of the Narodnyi Komissariat Torgovli's foreign trade plan for the First Five-Year Plan, published in Voprosy torgovli, 1929, no. 5, pp. 89-136; M. Kaufman, “Itogi i perspektivy vneshnei torgovli, ” Planovoe khoziaistvo, 1929, no. 4, pp. 90-93; and “Der Fiinfjahresplan des Aussenhandels, ” Sowjetivirtschajt und Aussenhandel (hereafter Soiv. aits.), 7, no. 13 (1929): 20-34. This journal published by the Soviet trade delegation to Germany was titled Die Volksivirtschaft dcr Union der Sozializtischen Sozvjct Rcspubliken prior to 1931. Dohan (1969), pp. 512-59, describes these plans in detail.

20. A. Mikoian, Isvestiia, March 24, 1929.

21. Kaufman, M, “Import und Volkswirtschaft der Sowjetunion,” Sow. aus., 8, no. 11/12 (1929): 17–18.Google Scholar

22. On the contrary, many economists projected that overall imports would increase even though some items would decrease. See “Industrialisierung und Sowjetimport, ” Sow. aus., 9, no. 18 (1930): 9-11.

23. Rudolf, Anders, “Zum Fünfjahresplan des Aussenhandels der UdSSR,” Sow. aus., 8, no. 9 (1929): 3.Google Scholar

24. Michael Dohan, “Foreign Trade Specialization in the Post-War Soviet Economy 1950-1970, ” in Economic Development in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, vol. 2, ed. Z. Fallenbuchl (New York, 1976), pp. 90-132.

25. The 1929/30 export plan did not mention grain. See “Kontrol'nye tsifry po vneshnei torgovle, ” Sovetskaia torgovlia, 4, no. 28 (1929): 1-3.

26. Kaufman, M, “Maksimal'noe vnimanie eksportnomu planu,” Sovetskaia torgovlia, 4, no. 36 (1929): 1–2Google Scholar; and Paul Czechowicz, “Die Exportpolitik und das Problem der Exportfähigkeit der UdSSR, ” Weltivirtschaftliches Archiv, no. 35 (1932), p. 484.

27. Narkomtorg stressed secondary exports to overcome export difficulties in 1929 and 1930. See, for example, Sovetskaia torgovlia, 5, no. 7 (1930).

28. [E. N. Shenkman], The Balance of Payments and the Foreign Debt of the USSR [published as memorandum no. 4 of the Birmingham Bureau of Research on Russian Economic Conditions, University of Birmingham] (Birmingham, 1932) (hereafter Shenkman 1932a), pp. 2-3.

29. Eugene, Zaleski, Planning for Economic Growth in the Soviet Union 1918-1932 (Chapel Hill, 1971), pp. 78, 97, 139Google Scholar passim; R. Anders, “Der Aussenhandel der UdSSR im ersten Halbjahr 1931, ” Sow. ans., 10, no. 16 (1931): 10.

30. USSR State Planning Commission, Summary of the Fulfillment of the First Five-Year Plan (Moscow, 1933) (hereafter Summary 1933), pp. 8 and 139.

31. W., Nutter, Growth of Industrial Production in the Soviet Union (Princeton, 1962), pp. 71–72, 431, 455Google Scholar; and Zaleski, Planning for Economic Growth, pp. 142-43, 160-61.

32. Zaleski, Planning for Economic Growth, p. 106; and V. Kasyanenko, How Soviet Economy Won Technical Independence (Moscow, 1966) published originally as Kak byla zavoevana tckhniko-ckonomicheskaia samostoiatel'nosf SSSR (Moscow, 1964), pp. 130-32.

33 This section draws from Naum, Jasny, The Socialised Agriculture of the USSR: Plans and Performance (Stanford, 1949)Google Scholar. See also Jerzy, Karcz, “From Stalin to Brezhnev: Soviet Agricultural Policy in Historical Perspective,” in The Soviet Rural Community, ed. Millar, James R. (Urbana, III., 1971), pp. 36–70Google Scholar. Data on output, acreage, yields, and herds from Johnson, D. Gale and Kahan, Arcadius, “Soviet Agriculture: Structure and Growth,” U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Comparisons of the United States and Soviet Economies (Washington, D.C., 1959), pp. 201–37.Google Scholar

34. Use of motor fuel (mainly kerosene) in agriculture rose from 0.1 million tons in 1927/28 to 1.1 million tons in 1932 (about 52 percent of kerosene output in 1932) and to about S million tons in 1938 (Jasny, Socialised Agriculture, pp. 769-70).

35. Tractor imports planned for 1929/30 were 12, 000 units; actual imports for agriculture in 1930 were 23, 000 units. See Economic Review of the Soviet Union (hereafter ERSU), October 15, 1929, p. 370; Zaleski, Planning for Economic Growth, p. 332; Sotsialisticheskoe stroitel'stvo SSSR: Statisticheskii ezhegodnik 1934 (Moscow, 1935), p. 303; and Sow. aus., 9, no. 7 (1930): 4.

36. See Zaleski, Planning for Economic Growth, pp. 92, 118-19, 149, 308, 333, for revised tractor output targets. Equipment imports for the three tractor factories cost 69 million rubles ( David, Granick, Soviet Metal-Fabricating and Economic Development [Madison, 1967], pp. 167–69, 186Google Scholar).

37. See, for example, the more than fifty articles concerning “Soviet dumping” which appeared in the Neiv York Times between August 4, 1930 and April 3, 1931.

38. France and Belgium established special licensing procedures for several Soviet products in October 1930 (New York Times, October 4 and 26, 1930). The United States imposed temporary embargoes on lumber, matches, asbestos, manganese, apatite, and coal, required proof of no convict labor on timber products, and special sanitary measures on sausage casing and fodder at various times during 1930 and 1931. Other countries imposing discriminatory restrictions against Soviet products included Rumania (December 1930), Canada (February 1931), Yugoslavia and Hungary (March 1931), and Austria (April 1931). See Peter, Filene, Americans and the Soviet Experiment 1917-1933 (Cambridge, 1967), pp. 229–36 Google Scholar; American-Russian Chamber of Commerce, Handbook of the Soviet Union (New York, 1936), pp. 327, 355-60, 341, 333Google Scholar, and Izvestiia, March 2 and 5, 1931 and April 19, 1931.

39. New York Times, November 12, 1930.

40. As acknowledged even by the German press. See Soviet analysis in Sow. aus., 9, no. 10 (1930): 8 and 10, no. 8 (1931): 2-5.

41. This concern is reflected in the more than forty articles on the anti-Soviet export campaign published in Izvcstiia from late July 1930 to mid-April 1931, in Litvinov's lengthy defense of Soviet export policies in his opening speech to the European Commission at Geneva in May 1931 ﹛Izvestiia, May 20, 1931), in the numerous articles replying to specific charges of dumping in Germany and elsewhere in Soiv. aus. and ERSU (the journals of the Soviet trade delegations), and in N. Lin, “Pokhod protiv sovetskogo eksporta, ” Sovctskaia torgovlia, 5, no. 32 (1930): 11.

42. Izvestiia, October 21, 1930. Purchases were also shifted from the United States ﹛Handbook of the Soviet Union, 1936, pp. 3SS-56).

43. V. Molotov's speech to the Sixth All-Union Soviet Congress on March 8, 1931 ﹛Izvestiia, March 11, 1931).

44. Soiv. aus., 10, no. 4 (1931): 5-6; Zaleski, Planning for Economic Growth, pp. 149-58, 199-204; and Naum, Jasny, Soviet Industrialization 1928-1952 (Chicago, 1961), p. 73–80.Google Scholar

45. H., Liepmann, Tariff Levels and the Economic Unity of Europe (New York, 1938), pp. 103–10, 354Google Scholar; Vneshniaia torgovlia, 3, no. 6 (February 1933): 1-4; Joseph, Jones, Tariff Retaliation (Philadelphia, 1934), p. 141 ff.Google Scholar

46. Jones, Tariff Retaliation, pp. 224-31; and W. Liebman, Sozv. aus., 10, no. 18/19 (1931): 19.

47 “Novyi pod” em agrarnogo protektsionizma v Germanii, ” Sovetskaia torgovlia, 4, no. 30 (1929): 1-2; Sow. aus., 10, no. 8 (1931): 2-4; and Liepmann, Tariff Levels, pp. 59-65, 119.

48. “Die Sowjetischen-deutschen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen der UdSSR, ” Sow. aus., 10, no. 23 (1931): 2-4.

49. New York Times, December 24, 1931; ERSU, February 1, 1932, p. 63. Cf. Sow. aus., 11, no. 9 (1932): 2-4, and no. 17 (1932): 2-3.

50. Sergejevv, A, “Zur Frage der Zahlungsbilanz zwischen der UdSSR und England,” Sow. aus., 9, no. 23 (1932): 7–13.Google Scholar

51. Loss of “import capacity” is calculated as the percent decline in the terms of trade with current year weights (table 3) times the value of exports in 1927/28 prices (table 1). Dohan (1973), pp. S0-5S. Also see table 5.

52. See Dohan (1973), pp. 74-75, for commodity group price indexes.

53. Kasyanenko, Soviet Economy, pp. 116-28; Summary (1933), pp. 7-8; and Mishustin, Vneshniaia torgovlia, passim.

54. D. Gale Johnson, “Agricultural Production, ” in Economic Trends in the Soviet Union, eds. Abram Bergson and Simon Kuznets (1963), p. 218.

55. Between 1927/28 and 1932, “real costs of production of machinery” are estimated to have fallen about 68 percent for the 1937 product mix ( R., Moorsteen, Prices and Production of Machinery in the Soviet Union: 1928-1958 [Cambridge, 1962], p. 138 Google Scholar).

56. Holzman (1963), pp. 322-25, discusses the dynamic shifts in Soviet comparative advantage resulting from industrialization.

57. This section draws on Frei, L. et al., Finansirovanic vneshnei torgovli (Moscow, 1938), pp. 254–84 Google Scholar; E. M., Shenkman, “Russlands Zahlungsbilanz und Zahlungsverkehr mit dem Ausland,” Welhvirtschajtliches Archiv, no. 36 (1932), pp. 530–57Google Scholar (hereafter Shenkman 1932b); Shenkman (1932a); Wiles, P. D. J., Communist International Economics (New York, 1969), pp. 97–103 Google Scholar; Dohan (1969), pp. 643-46. Shenkman was employed by the Narkomfin during the NEP.

58. The sparse data on Soviet foreign indebtedness published in Soviet sources are confusing because of varying definitions of debt. The term “zadolzhennost” ’ as used publicly after 1932 probably included real debt incurred for imports delivered, for borrowing against exports not yet shipped and contingent liabilities for credits secured by Soviet exports warehoused abroad, and for orders placed but not delivered (as defined in Shenkman, 1932a); A. Rozengol'ts clearly uses the term in this meaning in 1933 ( “Monopoliia vneshnei torgovli SSSR i kapitalisticheskie strany, ” speech on April 23, 1933 in Ianson, la., Vncshniaia torcjovlia SSSR k XVII s “cadu VKP(b) [Moscow, 1935], p. 12 Google Scholar). The Soviet figure of ” 1, 400 million rubles at the end of 1931” probably includes about 400 million rubles of contingent liabilities and about 1, 000 million rubles of real debt (Shenkman, 1932b, p. 547). A large part of the reported increase in Soviet debt between 1928 and 1931 was contingent liabilities from the growing volume of machinery imports ordered but not delivered and from Soviet borrowing against the growing quantity of Soviet exports shipped unsold to warehouses abroad. Wiles, Communist International Economics, p. 103; and Frei et al., Finansirovanic vneshnei torgovli, pp. 245-65.

59. For terms of various credit agreements see Frei et al., Finansirovanie vneshnei torgovli, pp. 267-78; and Documentation Relating to Foreign Economic Relations of the USSR (Monetary and Economic Conference in London, June 1933) (Moscow, 1933). For British credits, see ERSU, June 1, 1931, p. 257 and October 15, 1931, p. 471. For Italian credits for 1930 and 1931, see ERSU, May 15, 1931, p. 220. German credits are discussed extensively in Sow. aus., 10, no. 17 (1931) and 11, no. 5 and no. 6 (1932).

60. “300 Mark-Aktion 1931, ” Sow. aus., 10, no. 17 (1931): 2-8; and Sow. atts., 11, no. S (1932): 2-5, and no. 6 (1932): 2-3.

61. Paul, Berkenkopf, “Zur Frage der deutsch-russischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen,” Wirtschoftsdienst, no. 18 (May 6, 1932), p. 605.Google Scholar Estimates of liabilities falling due in 1932 range as high as 582 million rubles (Current History, 36 [April 1932]: 125).

62. Vneshniaia torgovlia, 5, no. 21-22 (1935): 9.

63. Kasyanenko, Soviet Economy, p. 128; Sow. aus., 12, no. 2 (1933): 12; and Vneshniaia torgovlia, 3, no. 1 (January 1933): 1-3.

64. Dana, Dalrymple, “The Soviet Famine of 1932-1934,” Soviet Studies, 15, no. 3 (January 1964): 250–84.Google Scholar

65. Rabinovich, I, “Torgovaia politika kapitalisticheskikh stran v 1932 g.,” Vneshniaia torgovlia, 3, no. 7 (March 1933): 2–4 Google Scholar; and “Sowjetmarkt und ausländische Einfuhreinschränkungen, ” Sow. aus., 11, no. 19 (1932): 2-6.

66. Roginskaia, E, “Torgovaia politika Germanii v 1932 godu,” Vneshniaia torgovlia, 3, no. 6 (February 1933)Google Scholar. Germany's protectionism and its impact on Soviet exports were frequently discussed in Sow. aus., 11, no. 11 (1932): 11, and no. 16 (1932): 2-3.

67. Jones, Tariff Retaliation, pp. 232-37; Soiv. aus., 11, no. 19 (1932): 6-7; and Vneshniaia torgovlia, 3, no. 7 (March 1933): 4-9.

68. Sow. aus., 11, no. 5 (1932): 2-4; Berkenkopf, “Deutsch-russischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen, ” p. 605, and notes 74-76 below.

69. Kasyanenko, Soviet Economy, pp. 131-37, noted that this campaign, in contrast with earlier efforts, was intended to decrease imports.

70. Soviet planners at the time emphasized that the reduction in imports was closely tied to the reduction of exports and the need to repay credits. See, for example, Sozv. aus., 11, no. 19 (1932): 6-7, and no. 23 (1932): 5-6. Most Soviet analysts during 1932-35 denied allegations that the new production capabilities were intended to reduce total imports and repeatedly pointed to the unsatisfied demand for machinery and materials in many sectors. But by 1938 the tune had changed. Mishustin argued that the decline of exports did not result from the world crisis which was Trotsky's argument, but, rather, was consistent with the development of domestic capabilities and demand (Mishustin, Vneshniaia torgovlia, pp. 91-92).

71. Jasny, Socialized Agriculture, pp. 506, 510-12, 541.

72. See, for example, “1933 god, ” Vneshniaia torgovlia, 3, no. 1 (January 1933): 1-3.

73 The means used to retire the debt are still uncertain but included: (1) trade surpluses, (2) shipment of precious metals, (3) earnings of foreign currency, shops, (4) decline of contingent liabilities because of the reduction in machinery import orders, (5) net sales of exports warehoused abroad (and repayment of loans secured by these commodities), and (6) devaluation of creditors’ currency (especially Great Britain and the United States). Dohan (1969), pp. 603-12; Prokopovich, S. N., Narodnoe khosiaistvo SSSR (New York, 1940), p. 1940 Google Scholar; I., Aizenberg, Valiutnaiasistema SSSR (Moscow, 1962), pp. 64–66 Google Scholar; and Wiles, Comnnmist International Economics, p. 103.

74. See, for example, Joseph Shapen's major article in the New York Times, December 6, 1931, and Berkenkopf, “Deutsch-russischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen, ” p. 60S. For the Soviet response to the rumors of a possible Soviet debt moratorium in the autumn of 1931, see Isvestiia, October 2, 1931; “The Foreign Obligations of the USSR, ” Bank for Russian Trade Review, 3, no. 10 (October 1931): 5-6; “Gerüchte, ” Sow. aus., 10, no. 18/19 (1931): 3-5; and Sergejew, “Zur Frage der Zahlungsbilanz, ” pp. 7-13.

75. See note 74; Frei et al., Finansirovanie vneshnei torgovli, p. 278; and Nicolas Ruffalovich's letter to the New York Times, January 10, 1932.

76. Malevsky-Malevich, P., Russia USSR: A Complete Handbook (New York, 1933), p. 1933 Google Scholar; Berkenkopf, “Deutsch-russischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen, ” p. 605; and Shapen's article in the December 6, 1931 New York Times. For the impact of the German financial crises of 1931 on availability of credits to the USSR, see Soiv. aus., 11, no. 5 (1932): 2-5.

77 Zlotnikov, A, “Importnye tseny,” Vneshniaia torgovlia, 5, no. 11 (1935): 10 Google Scholar. See also Shenkman (1932a), p. 20; Fiirbringer, G, “Russland: Der Aussenhandel 1933,” Wirtschaftsdienst, no. 14 (April 6, 1934), pp. 479–80Google Scholar; and Shapen's New York Times article. The Soviet trade delegations, citing their perfect payments record, objected to these practices (Sow. aus., 10, no. 10 [1931]: 2-7) and tried to force suppliers to hold Soviet bills instead of discounting them ( “Zur Frage der Russenwechsel, ” Sow. aus., 11, no. 18 [1932]: 3-4).

78. For Soviet complaints about the “Russian prices” charged by German producers, see Zlotnikov, “Importnye tseny, ” pp. 8-10; Sow. aus., 10, no. 2 (1931): 7-12; and 11, no. 15 (1932): 9-10.

79. See Frei et al., Finansirovanie vneshnei torgovli, pp. 279-80; Rozengol'ts, “Monopodia vneshnei torgovli, ” pp. 8-9; A. Rozengol'ts, “SSSR—samaia kreditosposobnaia strana, ” Vneshniaia torgovlia, 5, no. 19/20 (1935): 5-7; Kasyanenko, Soviet Economy, pp. 120-21; and note 78 above.

80. Rozengol'ts, “Monopoliia vneshnei torgovli, ” pp. 8-9; and Rozengol'ts, “SSSR— samaia kreditosposobnaia strana, ” pp. 5-7. By February 1934 the discount rate on Amtorg bills fell from 27 percent to 10 percent (New York Times, February 11, 1934), and in late 1934 and 193S long-term low-interest loans were offered by Germany and Czechoslovakia (Frei et al., Finansirovanic vneshnei torgovli, pp. 280-83; and B. Borisov, “Kredity i torgovlia SSSR, ” Vncshniaia torgovlia, 5, no. 1/2 [1935]: 13-14).

81. No Soviet analysis of the declining export prices’ effect on the cost of credits has been found. Only Fiirbringer, “Russland: Der Aussenhandel 1933, ” pp. 479-80, mentions this problem.

82. “Angliiskoe embargo na sovetskie torvary, ” Vncshniaia torgovlia, 3, no. 9 (May 1933): 4-5.

83. “O sovetsko-germanskikh khoziaistvennykh otnosheniiakh, ” Vncshniaia torgovlia, 3, no. 15 (1933): 7; and numerous articles in Soiv. aits, in 1933.

84. Federov, I, “Torgovaia politika kapitalisticheskikh stran v 1933 godu,” Vneshniaia torgovlia, 3, no. 21/22 (1933): 5–9.Google Scholar

85. Approximately 625 million rubles fell due in 1933, and of that total about 320 million rubles were owed to Germany (Current History, 39 [October 1933]: 119, and 38 [May 1933]: 161).

86. See New York Times, January 29, 1933; Sow. mis., 12, no. 4/5 (1933): 8, and 13, no. 16 (1934): 8; Fürbringer, “Russland: Der Aussenhandel 1933, ” p. 480; and Rozengol'ts, “SSSR—samaia kreditosposobnaia strana, ” p. 6.

87. See note 73 above; Dohan (1969), pp. 839-40; and A. Z. Arnold, Banks, Credits, and Money in Soviet Russia (New York, 1937), pp. 425-27.

88. Numerous machine types scheduled for import in 1933 were prohibited on February 24, 1933. See Kasyanenko, Soviet Economy, p. 138; and Sow. ans., 12, no. 4/5 (1933): 3.

89. Import shortages are discussed by N. Gassjuk, Soiv. aus., 11, no. 15 (1933): 6-12. For impact of shortages, see Dohan (1969), p. 586; Granick, Soviet Metal- Fabricating, p. 60; Zaleski, Planning for Economic Growth, p. 241; Sotsialisticheskoe stroitel'stvo SSSR: 1934, p. 303; and Kasyanenko, Soviet Economy, p. 57.

90. Prosin, V, “Vneshniaia torgovlia i bor'ba za ekonomicheskuiu nezavisimost' SSSR,” in Eshegodnik vneshnei torgovli sa 1931 g., ed. Badmas, A. et al. (Moscow, 1932), pp. 3–39 Google Scholar; “Monopoliia vneshnei torgovli i bor'ba za ekonomicheskuiu nezavisimost' SSSR, ” Vneshniaia torgovlia, 3, no. 8 (1934): 5-8; and “Bor'ba za tekhniko-ekonomicheskuiu nezavisimost’ na otdel'nykh uchastkakh narodnogo khoziaistva i rol’ vneshnei torgovli, ” in Mishustin, Vneshniaia torgovlia.

91. For example, in the post-1931 literature, a resolution of the Fourteenth Party Congress (1925) “to transform the USSR from a country importing machinery and equipment into a country that manufactures machinery and equipment” is elevated to “the most important directive of the Communist Party” (Summary, 1933, pp. 14 and 65). In 1925, however, it was controversial and only one of several important resolutions (Day, Leon Trotsky, pp. 120-24, 153-58, 167-68).

92. Soviet sources cited by Western economists in support of the conventional view, such as Mishustin, Vneshniaia torgovlia, were usually written (or elevated to prominence) only after 1931. See references in Holzman (1963) and Herman, “The Promise of Economic Self-Sufficiency.”

93. For this distinction, see Isvcstiia, February 19, 1933; and B. R., “Wirtschaftliche Unäbhangigkeit und Autarkic” Soiv. ans., 12, no. 6 (1933): 2-7, who emphasized that economic independence for the USSR basically meant that the USSR could reduce relations with the world economies and still continue growth. P. D. J. Wiles is one of the few Western economists who has made a clear distinction between economic independence and autarky (Communist International Economics, pp. 419-53).

94. Za itidttstrialisatsiiu, February IS, 1932.

95. Rozengol'ts, A., “Ekonomicheskie otnosheniia SSSR s kapitalisticheskimi stranami,” Vneshniaia torgovlia, 4, no. 6 (1934): 2–3.Google Scholar

96. Gassjuk, N, “Der Aussenhandel der UdSSR im ersten Halbjahr des laufenden Jahres,” Sow. CMS., 12, no. 15 (1933): 6–12Google Scholar. After 1933, Soviet writers were forced to draw a fine line between the idea that exports were influenced by the world crisis (a Trotskyite argument) and the need for better conditions as a basis for expanding trade. See M. I. F., “Nash eksport, ” Vneshniaia torgovlia, 4, no. 1/2 (1934): 3-5. Difficulty in supplying exports is rarely mentioned in any Soviet analysis.

97. See, for example, Zabelyshinskii, I, “Polnost'iu osvobodim SSSR ot importa tsvetnykh metallov,” Vneshniaia torgovlia, 7, no. 7 (1937): 21–22Google Scholar; and Mishustin, Vneshniaia torgovlia, pp. 203-16.

98. See, for example, Dolbnia, T, “O nekotorykh voprosakh nashego importa,” Vneshniaia torgovlia, 7, no. 6 (1937): 4–5.Google Scholar

99. See Kasyanenko, Soviet Economy, p. 128; and “Osnovnye zadachi vneshnetorgovogo plana na 1936 god, ” Vneshniaia torgovlia, 6, no. 2 (1936): 1-2.

100. That is, in the absence of unfavorable factors Soviet foreign trade would have been much larger during the 1930s. But how much larger? F. Holzman and others question whether foreign trade under a “normal” Soviet-type economic system and industrialization path would have equaled the trade levels which might be attained at a corresponding level of development under a capitalist system with free trade, or whether there are systemic biases against trade inherent in Soviet-type economies and industrialization strategies. There are too many unspecified parameters for me to speculate here. On this question, see Wiles, Communist International Economics, pp. 419-53.