1. For a discussion of the pre–1995 period, see Jones, Stephen, “Georgia: A Failed Democratic Transition,” in Bremmer, Ian and Taras, Ray, eds., New States, New Politics: Building the Post–Soviet Nations (Cambridge, Eng., 1997), 505–.Google Scholar

2. Przeworski, Adam, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge, Eng., 1991), esp. chaps. 3 and 4.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Przeworski concludes that one of the important conditions for democratic consolidation in postcommunist societies is the minimization of social costs during the transition. In his view, “bitter pill” policies are more likely to lead to disillusionment, vacillation in economic policies, and destabilization.

3. For an important and often neglected discussion of the relationship of global forces to the establishment and sustainability of democracies at home, see Held, David, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (Stanford, 1995)Google Scholar. Held argues that “national democracies require an international cosmopolitan democracy if they are to be sustained and developed in the contemporary era” (23).

4. In a 1998 survey by Georgian Opinion Research Business International for the World Bank and the United States Agency for International Development, the Georgian public viewed parliament, provincial authorities, local municipalities, and the presidential apparatus as the top four most corrupt institutions. On a scale of 1–5 with 1 being very honest and 5 very dishonest, parliament scored 3.63, provincial authorities 3.6, local municipalities 3.58, and the presidential apparatus 3.45. Religious institutions were perceived as the most honest at 2.36. In the same survey, public officials estimated that more than onethird of customs inspectors and between 27 and 30 percent of tax inspectors and police paid for their positions. The author has a copy of the preliminary results of this survey.

5. Stephen Holmes “What Russia Teaches Us Now: How Weak States Threaten Freedom,” The American Prospect 30, no. 33 (July-August 1997): 30–39.

6. Galbraith is cited in Held, Democracy and the Global Order, 253rel. In a society where so much economic activity is unrecorded and where statistical information is unreliable, 65 percent may not be completely accurate. A detailed report based on a survey of 1, 205 households and conducted by the European Community Humanitarian Office in 1996 suggested that 71.5 percent of households in urban areas and 41.9 percent in rural areas were below the official poverty line. See Dersham, Larry, Gzirishvili, David, de Roos, Anna, and Venekamp, Deneke, Food, Nutrition, Health and Nonfood Vulnerability in Georgia, 1996: A Household Assessment (Tbilisi, June 1996)Google Scholar. In 1996, the World Bank, using a lower physical survival minimum than the Georgian government, estimated that 35 percent of households were at or below the poverty line. Human Development Report: Georgia 1997 (Tbilisi, 1997), 17.

7. For Mann's explanation of the difference between infrastructural and despotic power, see Mann, Michael, States, War and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology (Oxford, 1988), chap. 1.Google Scholar

8. Held, Democracy and the Global Order, 250.

9. The debates on the appropriate institutional, economic, and legislative forms of transition to the market and political democracy have been raging for years. Holmes, Held, and Przeworski are important contributors to the debate. See also Huntington, Samuel P., The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, 1991)Google Scholar; Palma, Giuseppe di, To Craft Democracies: An Essay onDemocratic Transitions (Berkeley, 1990)Google Scholar; O'Donnell, Guillermo, Schmitter, Philippe C., and Whitehead, Laurence, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy (Baltimore, 1986)Google Scholar; Diamond, Larry and Plattner, Marc F., eds., The Global Resurgence of Democracy (Baltimore, 1993)Google Scholar; Fischer, Mary Ellen, ed., Establishing Democracies (Boulder, Colo., 1996)Google Scholar; Tismaneanu, Vladimir, ed., Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia (Armonk, N.Y, 1995).Google Scholar

10. For an interesting challenge to western academic conventions on civil society and its relationship to the state and democracy, see David Rieff, “The False Dawn of Civil Society,” The Nation, 22 February 1999, 11–16.

11. For a description of these criteria, see the statement of Thomas Dine, assistant administrator of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) for Europe and the New Independent States, “USAID's Mission in the NIS: Building an Environment for Prosperity,” Briefing on U.S. Assistance to Central and Eastern Europe and the NIS, an Assessment: February 17, 1995: A Briefing of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Washington, D.C., 1995), 33–46.

12. Robert Putnam, in his study of Italian political culture, suggests that, rather than a middle class generating civil society, elements of civil society generate an effective business environment, which in turn creates the basis for democratic growth. See Putnam, Robert D. with Leonardi, Robert and Nanetti, Raffaela Y., Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, 1993), esp. chap. 5.Google Scholar

13. For an excellent assessment of World Bank activities over the last few years and its shift toward civic building projects, see Williams, David and Young, Tom, “Governance, the World Bank and Liberal Theory,” Political Studies 42, no. 1 (March 1994): 84–100.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

14. Schmitter, Philippe, “Still the Century of Corporatism?” in Pike, Frederick and Stritch, Thomas, eds., The New Corporatism: Social–Political Structures in the Iberian World (Notre Dame, 1974), 85–131.Google Scholar

15. A good example, perhaps, is the Russian government's recent decision (in June 1998) to create a special council of the most successful businessmen to advise on the government's economic policy. See RFE/RL Newsline 2, no. 117, pt. 1 (19 June 1998). For a discussion of the works of “plural elitists,” such as Mancur Olson and Grant McConnell, who believed that the special interests of a few organized groups controlled policy making in their particular spheres of activity, see McFarland, Andrew S., “Interest Groups and the Policymaking Process: Sources of Countervailing Power in America,” in Petracca, Mark P., ed., The Politics of Interests: Interest Groups Transformed (Boulder, Colo., 1992), 58–.Google Scholar

16. By traditional interests, I mean noninstitutional ones such as family, kin, and clan. These are common in established liberal democracies, too, though less prevalent.

17. For a discussion of the variety, see Petracca, Marc P., “The Rediscovery of Interest Group Politics,” in Petracca, , ed., Politics of Interests, 3–31 Google Scholar. See also the classic work by Maurice, Duverger, Party Politics and Pressure Groups: A Comparative Introduction (New York, 1972)Google Scholar; Cigler, Allan J. and Loomis, Burdett A., eds., Interest Group Politics, 4th ed. (Washington D.C., 1995)Google Scholar; and Cammisa, Anne Marie, Governments as Interest Groups: Intergovernmental Lobbying and the Federal System (Westport, 1995).Google Scholar

18. Jeffrey M. Berry refers to an interest group as “an organized body of individuals who share some goals and who try to influence public policy.” See Berry, , The Interest Group Society (Boston, 1984), 5 Google Scholar. My definition is broader for it includes unorganized or semiorganized associations. For a good discussion of the ambiguity of interest groups, see Yishai, Yael, “Interest Parties: The Thin Line between Groups and Parties in the Israeli Electoral Process,” in Lawson, Kay, ed., How Political Parties Work: Perspectives from Within (Westport, 1994), 197–225.Google Scholar

19. See, for example, the accusation of the Georgian Labor Party that the IMF is undermining Georgian sovereignty by destroying its domestic industry. Parlament'is Uts'qebani, no. 3–4 (5 February 1997), 3.

20. The constitution can be found in Annex 1 of United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report: Georgia 1996 (Tbilisi, 1996). Article 26 deals specifically with the right to join associations, form trade unions, and create political parties. Some of the ideas expressed in this section can be found in my article “Georgia's Return from Chaos,” Current History 95, no. 603 (October 1996): 340–45.

21. The 1995 electoral law created a dual system of party lists and first past the post (150 elected by the former and 85 by the latter). In addition to the three major parties, there are a few representatives from parties elected by the first–past–the–post system. The Socialist party (which leads the Majoritarian faction) and the Labor party have parliamentary groups of 10 and 15, respectively. There are nine official “factions” in parliament, though only four or five could be described as oppositionist. Even combined, these factions cannot summon enough votes to seriously challenge the ruling party, the Citizens’ Union of Georgia (CUG). The October 1999 elections, of course, will lead to changes in parliamentary composition.

22. For a report on the November 1995 elections, see Darrell Slider, “Georgian Elections,” Caspian Crossroads, no. 4 (Winter 1995–1996): 15–17. The 5 percent barrier meant 62 percent of voters voting for party lists were unrepresented in parliament.

23. The Greens, and in particular the party's leading figure, Zurab Zhvania, were instrumental in creating the CUG in 1993. This party supports Edvard Shevardnadze and is currently the largest party in parliament. A list of parliamentarians and biographies of parliamentary committee members can be found at http://www.parliament.ge (consulted 11 November 1999). For an excellent analysis of the current parliamentary structure in Georgia and party representation, see also Nodia, Ghia, ed., Sakartvelos polit'ik'uri sist'ema (Tbilisi, 1998), 66–119.Google Scholar

24. For an analysis of Mkhedrioni's role in Georgian politics, see Jones, Stephen, “Adventurers or Commanders? Civil–Military Relations in Georgia since Independence,” in Danopoulos, Constantine P. and Zirker, Daniel, eds., Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet and Yugoslav Successor States (Boulder, Colo., 1996), 35–.Google Scholar

25. A nationwide unpublished survey conducted by the World Bank's Economic Development Institute and Tbilisi State University's Department of Geography (EDI–TSU) in August 1996 entitled “Public Opinion about the Social–Economic Situation in Georgia,” found that only 18.4 percent of the population had a very or somewhat favorable view of parliament, 44 percent had a somewhat unfavorable or unfavorable attitude, and the remainder either claimed insufficient knowledge or answered that they had neither a favorable nor an unfavorable view (the author has a copy of the survey). The large turnout may be partly explained by a sympathy vote for Shevardnadze and his party, the CUG, in the aftermath of the August assassination attempt. An unpublished manuscript by Vicki Hesli and Merab Pachulia based on their own public opinion survey suggests that during the period following the assassination attempt, support for the CUG increased, while it decreased for the three still divided communist parties that were participating in the elections. See Hesli and Pachulia, “Party Strength as a Function of Political and Social Crisis in Georgia” (unpublished manuscript in author's possession). Merab Pachulia was chairman of the board of the Georgian Institute of Public Opinion, now the Georgian Opinion Research Business International. He was interviewed by the author for this project, Tbilisi, July 1996.

26. This view was reiterated to me by P'aat'a Sakverilidze, chief of the NDP party apparatus, in an interview, Tbilisi, August 1998. His assertion is reflected by the party's membership, which has an average age of 30–35, but whether that pattern is repeated in the population at large is still unclear.

27. In an interview with the author (Tbilisi, May 1996), Lana Ghoghoberidze, chairman of the majority group in parliament (CUG, Imedi, and Mamuli factions, not the same as the “Majoritarian” faction) mentioned a figure of 100, 000 for the CUG, although this is obviously a broad definition of membership. Beso Jugheli, an NDP representative, claimed 6, 000 for his party in an interview, Tbilisi, July 1996. Sakverilidze claimed 10, 000 in the interview cited above, although he admitted only 4, 500 could be considered “real” members who regularly paid their dues. Vakht'ang Rcheulishvili, leader of the Socialist party, claimed 50, 000 members in an interview, Tbilisi, August 1998.

28. See, for example, the political platform of the Labor party parliamentary faction at http://server.parliament.ge/GOVERNANCE/parl/L_A/S_P/FAC/fac3.html and the Majoritarian faction at http://server.parliament.ge/GOVERNANCE/parl/L_A/S_P/FAC/major2.html (consulted 11 November 1999). Despite considerable similarities in the party programs (for example, all stress the importance of a prosperous middle class, a free market, and the inviolability of private property), the Socialist and Labor parties are beginning to differentiate themselves from the NDP and CUG by stressing active government intervention in the economy, a more egalitarian policy on wages, better employment, and an immediate improvement in living standards. See Sotsialist'uri p'art'ia: Dziritadi p'rinitsip'ebi (Tbilisi, n.d.). This is a draft version of the Socialist party program given to me by its chairman, Vakht'ang Rcheulishvili. In an interview with me (Tbilisi, August 1998), Rcheulishvili blamed Shevardnadze for poor Georgian–Russian relations and subservience to the IMF. Rcheulishvili advocates a “semi–protectionist” industrial policy for Georgia and a fairer redistribution of wealth.

29. See “The Obstacle Course—The Citizens’ Union Has Failed to Become a Governing Party,” Georgian Profile (a monthly analytical media digest) 1, no. 6 (June 1996): 10–11.

30. “The Chronicle,” Georgian Profile, 1, no. 6 (June 1996): 4. The regional members of parliament were particularly concerned that appointed governors had the power to replace local officials with representatives from their own networks, often from Tbilisi, who had little local knowledge.

31. For example, the recent judicial reform ofjune 1997 (law on general courts) designed to increase the autonomy of judges with strict new examinations (except for those already in the Supreme Court) and the battle over the appointment of new ministers following a mass ministerial purge in July 1998 caused considerable divisions within the CUG and resentment among conservatives over the reformers’ growing influence.

32. The local government law, which was supported by the CUG, does its best to ensure continued CUG dominance. Most district and regional governors are appointed by Shevardnadze, many of whom are drawn from the CUG, and there is a 5 percent hurdle for all locally elected councils (sakrebulo) in areas with a population greater than 20, 000. This is going to make it hard for new challengers to the CUG, which appointed Nik'o Lek'ishvili, former state minister and a rich businessman with extensive connections to the regions, as chief fund–raiser and election coordinator.

33. All figures in this section and in the rest of the article, unless otherwise indicated, refer to the 1995–99 parliament. New elections took place on 31 October 1999. Preliminary results suggest the CUG has increased its majority. In 1995, 23 percent of the voters supported the CUG. In 1999, it is estimated that 42 percent did so. Even before the runoffs scheduled for 21 November, the CUG has secured an absolute majority of the 235 seats. RFE/RL Caucasus Report 2, no. 44 (5 November 1999).

34. The CUG failed to gain an absolute majority in half of the electoral districts and lost the important cities of Tbilisi, Kutaisi, Rustavi, and Senaki to opposition coalitions.

35. Currently, Georgia consists of twelve large administrative regions, including the former Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia and the Autonomous Republic of Ach'ara (Adzharia). Based on historical units of the Middle Ages, there are significant economic and cultural differences between them. The Samegrelo–Zemo Svaneti region, for example, contains mostly Svans and Mingrelians who speak their own languages at home as well as Georgian. Although ethnically Georgian, Ach'ara is up to 50 percent Muslim. Historically, there has been a divide between the eastern and western districts of the country. Before the nineteenth century, when Russia began to annex Georgian territories, both western and eastern Georgia were influenced by Byzantium; in the west, the Ottoman world had significant influence, too, but in the east, Iran was stronger.

36. Much of the data on the Union is based on interviews with prominent members such as Gogi Topadze (Tbilisi, July 1996), Beso Jugheli (Tbilisi, July 1996), Zurab Tqmeladze (Tbilisi, July 1996), and officials or parliamentarians who have dealings with them, such as Lado P'ap'ava, minister of the economy (Tbilisi, July 1996); Davit Onoprishvili, chairman of the parliamentary Committee on Economic Policy and Reforms (Tbilisi, July 1996 and August 1998); and other informants in Georgian administrative structures. Topadze's claims concerning 15–20 parliamentary representatives were contradicted by both Davit Onoprishvili and Beso Jugheli (president of the Union) who put the number at 5–10 and 3, respectively.

37. Beso Jugheli, member of parliament and Union member, confirmed that the Union financed his electoral campaign. Interview with Beso Jugheli, Tbilisi, July 1996.

38. In 1996, Shadman–Valavi was division chief of the European Department 2, Southern Division.

39. For assessments of this meeting by union members and their opponents, see “A Country, Capitalist in Form, Socialist in Content,” “Concessions Will Kill Georgia's Economy,” and “A Tax Cut—That's What We Want,” three Georgian newspaper articles reprinted in Georgian Profile 1, no. 5 (May 1996): 12–15.

40. I interviewed the directors of two of the largest manufacturing combines: Nik'o Tskhak'aia of Samto–Kimia (chemical production) in Tbilisi, August 1996; Vakht'ang Ch'eishvili of the Rustavi Metallurgical combine in Rustavi, August 1996; and Avtandil Lobshanidze, deputy commercial director of Azot (a sulfur and ammonia producing concern in Rustavi) in Rustavi, August 1996.

41. Many of these firms would go bankrupt without government credit. Salary debts of the 15 largest enterprises were $10 million in 1996.

42. This was the argument of Nik'o Tskhak'aia, director of Samto–Kimia, a major chemical concern in Tbilisi.

43. Despite such opposition, at a meeting of the President's Economic Council on 8 December 1996 it was decided to halve the excise rate on alcoholic beverages; the tax on jewelry was reduced three times. This suggests that the union's campaign paid off. See Economy Reforms Information Center at the State Chancellery of Georgia, 12 December weekly information bulletin, at http: //www.sanet.ge/ecoinf/index/html (consulted December 1997). For more detailed figures on Georgia's revenue collection problems, see Human Development Report: Georgia 1996, 50–53, and Georgian Economic Trends, TACIS Policy and Legal Advice Program (Tbilisi, first quarter 1996), 10–36. Covering only 3–4 percent of its gross domestic product in taxes in 1996 made Georgia one of the least efficient tax collectors in the world. By 1997, this was up to 7.5 percent. Georgian Economic Trends (Tbilisi, fourth quarter 1997), 13.

44. Strictly speaking, the party calls itself a “political movement.” For the guiding principles of this movement, see its program, Polit ‘ik ‘uri modzraoba: Mrets ‘veloba gadaarchens sakartvelos. Dziritadi sap'rogramop'rintsip'ebi (Tbilisi, 1999), esp. 4–7.

45. Interview with Zviad Koridze, editor of Shvidi Dghe, Tbilisi, July 1996.

46. Interview with Vasik'o Maghlaperidze, editor of K'avk'asioni, Tbilisi, June 1999.

47. See “Annotated Digest” in Georgian Profile 1, no. 6 (June 1996): 22.

48. Interview with Vasik'o Maghlaperidze, Tbilisi, June 1999.

49. See, for example, Conference on Conflicts in Transcaucasia and the Role of the Mass Media in Kobuleti (Ach'ara) and Baku, , Report on the U.S. Helsinki Commission Delegation to Georgia and Azerbaijan, April 22–29, 1996 (Washington D.C., June 1996).Google Scholar

50. In “Public Opinion about the Social–Economic Situation in Georgia,” the survey conducted by Tbilisi State University's Department of Geography and the World Bank's Economic Development Institute in August 1996, 88.6 percent declared they used Georgian television as a regular source of information. Newspapers were a regular source of information for 53 percent of the respondents.

51. For an assessment of why Rustavi Two was banned, see Elizabeth Fuller, “Georgia's Remotely Controlled Television,” Transition 2, no. 21 (October 1996): 73. Rustavi Two was still operating in June 1999. The news programs of Rustavi Two and Sakartvelos Khma, the two most prominent independent stations, are generally more popular than the official news reports of the two state channels.

52. See “A Little Belated Coverage of an Important Matter,” Georgian Profile 1, no. 2 (February 1996): 16–17. Tamaz Lobshanidze also provided information on this issue. Interview with Tamaz Lobshanidze, deputy director of Iverbanki, Tbilisi, July 1996.

53. For figures on the Soviet industrial workforce in Georgia in the 1980s, see Narodnoe khoziaistvo gruzinskoi SSR v 1985 godu: Statisticheskii ezhegodnik (Tbilisi, 1986), 170–78.

54. Between 1988 and 1994, Georgia's total material product (total production excluding services) declined by 80 percent, and in 1994 economic activity in the republic had declined to one–third of its 1990 level. In 1995, the government laid off one–third of its employees.

55. Vakht'ang Ch'eishvili, director of the Rustavi Metallurgical factory, estimated that of his 9, 500 employees, approximately 5 percent actually work. For the IMF's optimistic prognoses for the Georgian economy, see “From the Executive Board: Georgia: ESAF,” IMF Survey, 19 March 1996, 97–99, and Marta de Castello Branco, “Georgia: From Hyperinflation to Growth,” IMF Survey, 23 September 1996, 310–12.

56. Much of the information on the association comes from two interviews with its elected chairman, Irakli Tughushi, Tbilisi, July 1996 and June 1999. The order (brdzanebuloba) is “Propesiuli k'avshirebis uplebata gankhortsielibisatvis khelshemts'qobis shesakheb,” Sakartvelos President'is brdzanebuloba, no. 41 (31 January 1999). A copy was given to me by Irakli Tughushi.

57. For the general agreement, see Generaluri shetankhmeba sakartvelos respublik'is ministrta k'abinet'sa da sakartvelos p'rop'esiuli k'avshirebis gaertianebas shoris (Tbilisi, 1995).

58. This case is now in the Supreme Court (1999). Soso Katsitadze has claimed trade union property for his own breakaway trade union federation—the Amalgamation of Georgian Trade Unions.

59. A survey of popular attitudes toward trade unions entitled “Trade Unions, Strike Activities and Social Security Issues in the Republic of Georgia,” conducted in 1994 by the Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy, and Development, using a sample of 500 drawn from a wide variety of employees, concluded: “The polled confirmed that official trade unions do not play any important role in the life of society. Thirty four per cent of the poll said they were not members of any trade union, while 22% confessed they did not exactly know whether they were members of any trade union organization. Forty two per cent considered themselves to be trade union members, but only few of them have succeeded in giving the exact name of the organization they belong to.” This is an unpublished survey conducted by Guram Svanidze, for the Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy, and Development, Tbilisi, Georgia. The author has a copy. The survey “Public Opinion about the Social–Economic Situation in Georgia,” suggests that only 4.9 percent of the population had a favorable attitude toward trade union leaders, 13.4 percent unfavorable, 16.5 percent neutral, and the rest, 65.3 percent, had never heard of the leaders.

60. Interview with Bak'ur Gulua, minister of agriculture, Tbilisi, July 1996. By contrast, Georgian Economic Trends (Tbilisi, third quarter 1996), 4, suggests that the state still owns 76 percent of agricultural land and 89 percent of all land. These low private ownership figures can be partly explained by the fact that agricultural land comprises only 43 percent of Georgia's total area and that Abkhazia and South Ossetia have remained outside the privatization program.

61. Human Development Report: Georgia 1995 (Tbilisi, 1995), 63. Agricultural output rose 9.5 percent in 1997.

62. Non–Georgian minorities have always presented the Georgian government with problems. In the 1970s, for example, during Shevardnadze's tenure as Georgia's communist party boss, the Abkhazians pressured the Georgian government into numerous concessions on language instruction, educational rights, and representation within Abkhazia's executive and legislative bodies. For a discussion of this period, see Suny, Ronald, “Georgia and Soviet Nationality Policy,” in Cohen, Stephen F., Rabinowitch, Alexander, and Sharlet, Robert, eds., The Soviet Union since Stalin (London, 1980), 200–226CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Jones, Stephen, “Revolutions in Revolution within Revolution: Minorities in the Georgian Republic,” in Gitelman, Zvi, ed., The Politics of Nationality and the Erosion of the USSR: Selected Papers from the Fourth World Congress for Soviet and East European Studies, Harrogate, 1990 (New York, 1992), 77–101.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

63. The CUG is the party that is most sensitive to minority support; in 1995 it held a Minorities Congress.

64. For example, the Armenian community secured a concession concerning the Law on the Referendum. For the first five years after the bill was passed, any referendum could be in the local language, but thereafter, by which time ethnic minorities should have learned Georgian, referendums could be in the state language only. Mouradian claimed the Armenian community had considerable input on the bill on national minorities, which has not yet been passed. Interview with Genrikh Mouradian, Tbilisi, July 1996.

65. The Russian presence here, which has created a local ruble economy in Akhalkalaki and employs most of the local male Armenian population, has forced the Georgian government to adopt a particularly cautious policy. Some newspapers in the Armenian Republic have called for Akhalkalaki to be annexed to Armenia, a reminder to the Georgian government that tactless Georgianization policies could lead to another secessionist conflict.

66. On the Azeri community in Georgia, see Fuller, Elizabeth, “The Azeris in Georgia and the Ingilos: Ethnic Minorities in the Limelight,” Central Asian Survey 3, no. 2 (1984): 75–86.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

67. Adilpasha Rostomogli of Birlik, the Azeri Cultural and Charitable Society in Georgia, was particularly helpful in articulating the Azeri point of view.

68. Putnam with Leonardi and Nanetti, Making Democracy Work.

69. Human Development Report: Georgia 1996, 109.

70. The Svans and Mingrelians are regionally based Georgian groups who have maintained their own languages, which are unintelligible to other Georgians.

71. Interview with the late Temur Pipia, former chief of the President's Service for Local Administration and Regional Politics, Tbilisi, July 1996.

72. Such corrupt networks remain a serious problem even in the most respectable democracies, as the savings and loan scandal of the 1980s in the United States demonstrated.

73. Joseph LaPalombara, Democracy, Italian Style (New Haven, 1987), 210. When reading this book, I was struck by the many similarities between Italian and Georgian politics. This book had an important influence on this article.

74. Held, Democracy and the Global Order, 171. For an excellent discussion of corruption and the challenges it presents to democracy, see Diamond and Plattner, eds., Global Resurgence of Democracy, 193–244.

75. Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, 32.

76. Much of the information gathered on the NGO community comes from interviews with activists such as Michael Clayton, former program manager of ISAR–Caucasus (Tbilisi, July 1996 and June 1997); Nik'o Melikadze, scientific director of the Strategic Research Center (Tbilisi, July 1996); Irakli Okruashvili of the Young Lawyers Association (Tbilisi, July 1996); Irakli Mch'edlishvili, P'aat'a Gurgenidze, and Ghia Nodia of the Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy, and Development (Tbilisi, July 1996); Vakht'ang Khmaladze of the League for the Protection of the Constitution (Tbilisi, July 1996, June 1997, and June 1998); Helen Godfrey of the European Community Humanitarian Office in Georgia (Tbilisijuly 1996); Gaioz Kubaneishvili, director of the Coordination Bureau for International Humanitarian Aid (Tbilisi, July 1996); and others. The indigenous NGO community has begun to produce its own newsletters and conference proceedings. See, for example, Grassroots, which subsequently became New Georgia, a monthly newsletter for NGOs in Georgia, supported by ISAR and the International Telecommunications and Information Center, USAID, and the Eurasia Foundation. I have also used Saakashvili's, Nino Survey of the Success, Problems and Future of the Georgian NGO Sector: An Investigation Conducted on Behalf of the Charity Know–How Consultative Process (Tbilisi, 1996)Google Scholar, and Sakartvelos arasamtavro organizatsiata sach'iroebata k'vlevis shedgebi (Tbilisi, 1998), a USAID sponsored survey of local NGO activity in Georgia. See also Khidasheli's, Tinatin Conference Summary: Legislative Regulation of the Activities of Not–for–Profit Organizations (Tbilisi, October 1996)Google Scholar, and the first five issues of Horizont ‘i (The Magazine for the Third Sector in Georgia), nos. 1–5 (Autumn 1998).

77. Davit Onoprishvili of the Committee on Economic Policy and Reforms and Irakli Okruashvili of the Young Lawyers Association were particularly helpful in guiding me through NGO involvement in these bills.

78. International Society for Fair Elections monitored the November 1995 elections and a November 1996 plebiscite held among internally displaced persons and refugees in Georgia from the Abkhazian conflict of 1992–93. It was not permitted, however, to monitor the September 1996 elections in the Autonomous Republic of Ach'ara, which is still under the tight control of Asian Abashidze. For the society's unfavorable report of Georgian elections, see Parliamentary and Presidential Elections in Georgia (Tbilisi, November 1995). In its final statement on these elections, the society declared, “there were serious violations of the Election [sic] law and democratic principles in a whole range of districts and precincts, which affected the fairness of the elections” (4).

79. Michael Clayton, former program manager of ISAR–Caucasus, who was instrumental in setting up the International Center for the Reformation and Development of the Georgian Economy, reported this to me.

80. See International Telecommunications and Information Center, Georgian NGOs Sector: Contact Information Tbilisi (Tbilisi, October 1996)Google Scholar, a listing of the most active indigenous NGOs in Georgia.

81. A 1997 survey suggested that 90 percent of Georgian NGOs surveyed had received aid from foreign foundations, either in the form of a grant, information, or training (Sdkartvelos arasamtavro organizatsiata). This said, in 1997 the local NGO community is beginning to seek alternative sources of funding. Environmental groups are working with travel agencies (conservation tours) and have been commissioned by the Georgian International Oil Company to study the ecological impact of the oil pipeline from Baku in Azerbaijan to Supsa in Georgia. The route was modified partly as a consequence of this study (I am grateful to Nino Saakashvili, director of ISAR–Georgia, now Horizont'i Foundation, for this information). ISAR–Georgia's State of the Georgian NGO Sector: Brief Summary of Conclusions of the “Needs Assessment Seminar” (Tbilisi, February–April 1997) reported some instances of donations by business and certain ministries (education, environment, justice). The author has a copy of this very useful survey of Georgian NGOs and their activities published in Georgia by ISAR–Georgia.

82. On the NGOs legal environment, see “NGOs and the Law,” New Georgia 1, no. 3 (Tbilisi, February–March 1996): 3. Currently charitable organizations do not pay tax, but the definition of a charitable organization is still unclear. The civil code permits tax free status to foundations, which covers some NGOs.

83. ISAR–Georgia has set up pilot training programs for NGOs in the provincial towns of Ninots'minda and Khashuri. The ISAR–Georgia Data Sheet (August–September 1996) reports it has selected and trained local representatives in the regions of Akhaltsikhe, Gori, Kutaisi, and Chokhat'auri. In 1997 there were seventeen NGOs in the Zugdidi region and twenty–one in Khashuri. In Khashuri, NGOs created “Shida Kartli,” an umbrella organization for local NGOs, which represents the first informational and resource center outside Tbilisi (for an assessment of NGOs in Khashuri, see ISAR–Georgia Needs Assessment Program [Tbilisi, 12 March 1997]). These are significant developments suggesting that NGOs are broadening their geographical base, although provincial NGOs are still at a considerable technical and financial disadvantage compared to Tbilisi. For example, 93.75 percent of Khashuri NGOs have no technical equipment (57 percent in Tbilisi) and only 50 percent received aid from foundations (84 percent in Tbilisi: See ISAR–Georgia s State of the Georgian NGO Sector).

84. In 1996, with the support of Japan and the United States, the Georgian government. set up a Georgian Social Investment Fund that finances projects of economic, social, and environmental rehabilitation. Georgian NGOs are major candidates for such projects.

85. The order (brdzanebuleba) establishing the council declares its primary aim to be “the development of cooperation between the nongovernment and state structures in order to create a civil society.” “Sakartvelos sakhelmtsipo k'antselariastan arsebul arasamtavrobo organizatsiata sakonsultatsia sabch'os,” no. 409, 9 July 1998.

86. “NGOs and the Law,” 1–2.

87. The disillusion with politics may eventually benefit the NGOs, once they are seen as nonpartisan groups that can help solve particular community problems. This was a point made by Michael Clayton in a personal communication. A good example of this is the Varketili Society, a community–based organization set up in one of Tbilisi's more deprived neighborhoods in 1995. It has established a health center and a library, controlled vagrant dogs, and successfully lobbied electrical companies and the government to restore electricity. For a fuller description of its activities, see Horizont'i, no. 3 (Spring 1998): 19–20. For NGO–business relations in Georgia, see ibid., 7–8.

88. Thomas Dine, USAID's assistant administrator for Europe and the NIS, in his statement to the Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe (now Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), declared that part of his organization's purpose was “promoting wholesale structural changes in the political, economic, and social systems.” Briefing on U.S. Assistance to Central and Eastern Europe and the NIS, 39.

89. An example of how international NGOs can affect policy is the report by Dershem, Gzirishvili, de Roos, and Venekamp, Food, Nutrition, Health, and Nonfood Vulnerability in Georgia, sponsored by a group of international NGOs in Georgia. This report radically reassessed vulnerable groups in Georgia and showed a less dramatic, and much more complex, picture of poverty than had previously been assumed. The report raised serious questions among ministers and parliamentarians about the government's social services strategy.