This article benefitted enormously from comments on earlier drafts by Zareen Ahmad, Margarita Balmaceda, Mark Beissinger, Jason Brownlee, Valerie Bunce, Jennifer Gandhi, Ken Greene, Vsevold Gunitskiy, Robert Moser, Oxana Shevel, Susan Solomon, Mark D. Steinberg, four anonymous reviewers, as well as the participants in the Danyliw Research Seminar in Contemporary Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa, and seminars at the University of Texas, Austin, and Cornell University.

1. Notable exceptions include Robert H.Jackson and Carl Gustav Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant (Berkeley, 1982); Bienen, Henry and Walle, Nicolas van de, Of Time and Political Power: Leadership Duration in the Modern World (Stanford, 1991)Google Scholar; Vitali Silitski, “Preempting Democracy: The Case of Belarus,“/owraa/ of Democracy 16, no. 4 (October 2005): 83-97; Beissinger, Mark R., “Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/TulipRevolutions,“ Perspectives on Politics, 5 no. 2 (June 2007): 259-76CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bunce, Valerie L. and Wolchik, Sharon J., Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries (New York, 2011).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2. For a similar definition, see Bell, David S., Hargrove, Erwin C., and Theakston, Kevin, “Skill in Context: A Comparison of Politicians,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 29, no. 3 (September 1999): 529.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3. Bienen and van de Walle, Of Time and Political Power, 7.

4. Holger Albrecht and Oliver Schlumberger, ‘“Waiting for Godot': Regime Change without Democratization in the Middle East,” International Political Science Review / Revue international de science politique 25, no. 4 (October 2004): 378.

5. Bienen and van de Walle note that it is hard “to isolate leaders’ skills and to determine how important these have been for a leader's ability to maintain himself in power.“ See Bienen and van de Walle, Of Time and Political Power, 5.

6. For example, Fred Greenstein's comparative study of presidential leadership from Franklin Roosevelt to Barack Obama offers no systematic treatment of the radically different economic, international, and political constraints that have confronted different presidents since 1933. See Greenstein, Fred, The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Barack Obama (Princeton, 2009).Google Scholar

7. See Vladimir Litvin, Ukraina: Politika, Politiki, Vlast’ na fone politicheskogo portreta L. Kravchuka (Kiev, 1997), 280.

8. See Bienen and van de Walle, Of Time and Political Power.

9. O'Donnell, Guillermo A. and Schmitter, Philippe C., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore, 1986)Google Scholar; Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies (Berkeley, 1990).

10. See, for example, Silitski, “Preempting Democracy“; Beissinger, “Structure and Example“; Bunce and Wolchik, Defeating Authoritarian Leaders.

11. Silitski, “Preempting Democracy.” See also Beissinger, “Structure and Example“; Bunce and Wolchik, Defeating Authoritarian Leaders; Karrie Koesel, Valerie Bunce, and Sharon Wolchik, “Stopping the Diffusion of Popular Challenges to Authoritarian Rule” (paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Conference, Seattle, 1-4 September 2011).

12. This idea is broadly similar to O'Donnell and Schmitter's argument that the interests of actors will be uncertain during periods of transition. See O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule.

13. Tversky, Amos and Kahneman, Daniel, ‘Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,” Science 185 (1974): 1124-31CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; Kahneman, Daniel, Thinking Fast and Slow (Toronto, 2011).Google Scholar For a cogent application of these theories to political transition, see Weyland, Kurt, “The Diffusion of Revolution: ‘1848’ in Europe and Latin America,” International Organization 63, no. 3 (Summer 2009): 391–423.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

14. The phenomena described here are similar to what Arthur Stinchcomb referred to in another context as a “liability of newness,” which causes disproportionate failure early in an organization's lifespan. See Stinchcombe, Arthur, “Social Structure and Organizations,“ in March, James G., ed., Handbook of Organizations (Chicago, 1965), 142-93.Google Scholar

15. See Diamond, Larry, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore, 1999).Google Scholar

16. Callaghy, Thomas, “Africa and the World Economy: Caught Between a Rock and a Hard Place,” in Harbeson, John W. and Rothchild, Donald S., eds., Africa in World Politics (Boulder, Colo., 1991).Google Scholar

17. Diamond, Developing Democracy, 55-56; Lawson, Letitia, “External Democracy Promotion in Africa: Another False Start?” Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 37, no. 1 (1999): 1–30 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Levitsky, Steven and Way, Lucan A., Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War (New York, 2010).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

18. Levitsky, Steven and Way, Lucan A., “The Rise of Competitive Audioritarianism,“ Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (April 2002): 51–65 Google Scholar; Schedler, Andreas, ed., Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition (Boulder, Colo., 2006)Google Scholar; Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism.

19. Bratton, Michael and van de Walle, Nicolas, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective (New York, 1997), 182-83CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Levitsky and Way Competitive Authoritarianism.

20. “It was in the initial period of uncertainty, when donors appeared to be most serious about tying aid to democracy that the most dramatic regime transitions occurred.“ Lawson, “External Democracy Promotion,” 5.

21. In particular, a widespread assumption persisted from the Soviet era that simple saturation of exposure on television was sufficient to control public opinion. See Mickiewicz, Ellen, Changing Channels: Television and the Struggle for Power in Russia (Oxford, 1999), 27–28.Google Scholar

22. Gleb Pavlovskii quoted in Wilson, Andrew, Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World (New Haven, 2005), 39.Google Scholar

23. Tversky and Kahneman, ‘Judgment under Uncertainty“; Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow. They refer to this as the “availability heuristic.“

24. See Huntington, Samuel P., The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, 1991), 100–106 Google Scholar; Beissinger, “Structure and Example,” 263. For an extensive discussion of how cognitive heuristics affect diffusion, see Weyland, “Diffusion of Revolution.” Also see Vsevold Gunitskiy, “From Shocks to Waves: Hegemonic Transitions and Domestic Reforms in the Twentieth Century” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2011).

25. Jorge Dominguez has written of “spectacular leadership errors” by leaders in Chile and the Philippines in which “rulers confident that they had substantial public support called a national election, which they promptly lost.” See Jorge I. Dominguez, “The Secrets of Castro's Staying Power,” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 2 (Spring 1993): 99.1 should stress that I am not arguing that such mistakes were the primary reason for transitions in these countries. Rather, overconfidence likely contributed to the timing and speed of transitions in these countries.

26. Thus, the argument here is that both fatalism about the opposition's success, on the one hand, and extreme overconfidence in an incumbent victory, on the other, was likely to lead to democratic concessions in the post-Cold War international context. By contrast, situations in which incumbents do not believe diat opposition victory is inevitable but still think opponents have a good chance of winning would seem to discourage democratic concessions.

27. See Mwanakatwe, John M., End of the Kaunda Era (Lusaka, 1994), 260 Google Scholar; Ihonvbere, Julius Omozuanvbo, Economic Crisis, Civil Society, and Democratization: The Case of Zambia (Trenton, N.J., 1996), 100.Google Scholar

28. See Bratton and van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa, 181.

29. As most students of the color revolutions argue, for example, structural weaknesses— in addition to demonstration effects—were key to authoritarian failure in the early 2000s. Beissinger, “Structure and Example“; Bunce and Wolchik, Defeating Authoritarian Leaders.

30. On Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, and Zambia, see Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, chaps. 5 and 6.

31. Learning is defined here as a change in beliefs about causal relationships in the light of experience. See Meseguer, Covadonga, “Policy Learning, Policy Diffusion, and the Making of a New Order,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, no. 598 (March 2005): 67–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For discussion of learning in the context of regime change, see Nancy Bermeo, “Democracy and the Lessons of Dictatorship,” Comparative Politics 24, no. 3 (April 1992): 273-91.

32. See Silitski, “Preempting Democracy“; Beissinger, “Structure and Example,” 269; Bunce and Wolchik, Defeating Authoritarian Leaders.

33. Michael Bratton and Daniel Posner, “A First Look at Second Elections in Africa, with Illustrations from Zambia,” in Richard A.Joseph, ed., State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa (Boulder, Colo., 1999), 387. Similarly, Richard Joseph has argued that “while the 1990-91 period could be described as ‘stunning’ because of the way long-entrenched regimes were swept away, since 1992 the struggle has become more evenly matched as African leaders constantly devise new ways to submit without succumbing.” Joseph, Richard, “Democratization in Africa after 1989: Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives,“ Comparative Politics 29, no. 3 (April 1997): 376.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

34. Of course, the opposition may also learn from past mistakes. In a context where structural conditions favor audioritarianism, however, such learning is likely to be insufficient to maintain robust political competition.

35. Joseph, Richard, “Overview: The Reconfiguration of Power in Late Twentieth-Century Africa,” in Joseph, , ed., State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa, 61.Google Scholar Often “elections that fell far short of ‘free and fair’ were systematically accepted by international donors.“ Lawson, “External Democracy Promotion,” 6.

36. Ukraine continued to be one of the highest per capita recipients of U.S. assistance in 2000 following highly fraudulent presidential elections in 1999. In Russia following Boris El'tsin's violent crackdown on the legislature in 1993, U.S. aid increased from $1.5 billion in 1993 to f 1.9 billion in 1994. See U.S. Department of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs Fact Sheets, “Foreign Operations Appropriated Assistance” for various countries at http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/ (last accessed 6 June 2012).

37. Wilson, Virtual Politics, 49-72. “Black PR” refers to the distribution of damaging and mosdy false information and rumors about the opposition. For example, the victory of pro-governmental forces in the 1999 parliamentary elections in Russia is widely credited to the government's targeted and well-orchestrated negative campaign against supporters of the opposition Fatherland-All Russia party. See Colton, Timodiy J. and McFaul, Michael, Popular Choice and Managed Democracy: The Russian Elections of 1999 and 2000 (Washington, D.C., 2003)Google Scholar; Hale, Henry E., Why Not Parties in Russia? Democracy, Federalism, and the State (New York, 2005), 223.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

38. See Silitski, “Preempting Democracy.“

39. ‘Just as the Soviet economic elite was at first direatened by free prices and privatization, the Soviet political elite has learned how to use and manipulate elections to maintain political power.” Michael McFaul and Nikolai Petrov, “What the Elections Tell Us,“ Journal of Democracy 15, no. 3 (July 2004): 28.

40. They note that leaders such as Daniel arap Moi in Kenya and Leonid Brezhnev in the Soviet Union were vasdy underestimated before they came to power. Bienen and van de Walle, Of Time and Political Power, 6.

41. It is true that in Central Asia, many leaders—Saparmurat Niiazov, Islam Karimov, Nursultan Nazarbaev—survived despite having risen under the old system. Yet, in these cases, international democratizing pressure was weaker and the political institutions changed to a much less significant degree than in republics closer to the European border. As a result, disorientation was likely less severe.

42. Kopstein, Jeffrey and Reilly, David A., “Geographic Diffusion and the Transformation of the Postcommunist World,” World Politics 53, no. 1 (October 2000): 1–37 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, chap. 5.

43. Vachudova, Milada, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage and Integration after Communism (Oxford, 2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, chap. 5.

44. International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), Pre-Election Technical Assessment of the Parliamentary Elections in Belarus (Washington, D.C., 1994), 20.

45. Scholars have long argued that state control over the economy facilitates autocratic control. See Steven Fish, M., Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics (New York, 2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; McMann, Kelly M., Autonomy and Democracy: Hybrid Regimes in Russia and Kyrgyzstan (New York, 2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Greene, Kenneth F., Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico's Democratization in Comparative Perspective (New York, 2007).CrossRefGoogle Scholar In Belarus in 1994 just 15 percent of the gross domestic product was produced by the private sector—compared to 40 percent in Ukraine, 50 percent in Russia, and 55 percent in Estonia in that same year. Estimates from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, “Structural and Institutional Change Indicators, Private Sector Share in GDP (in per cent),” at http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/economics/data/macro.shtml#ti (last accessed 6 June 2012).

46. According to Liudmilla Alexeyeva and Valery Chalidze's comprehensive examination of mass unrest in the USSR from 1953 to 1983, “the only political demonstration known in Byelorussia” occurred in Minsk in 1970 when a group of students openly protested the killing of a high school student. Liudmilla Alexeyeva and Valery Chalidze, “Mass Unrest in the USSR” (Report No. 19, Office of Net Assessment of the Department of Defense, August 1985), 129. For the Gorbachev period, see, for example, Beissinger, Mark R., Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State (New York, 2002), 254.CrossRefGoogle Scholar To an important extent, this was due to the relative weakness of an anti-Soviet national identity that was used to mobilize against incumbent regimes in neighboring republics. As of the late 1980s, “the Belarusian national idea was represented by a group of well-meaning intellectuals unconnected with the vast majority of Belarusians, unable to coopt a single member of the ruling elite.” Andrei Savchenko, “Belarus: A Perpetual Borderland” (unpublished manuscript, 2008), 212.

47. Beissinger, Nationalist Mobilization, 254. One partial exception were the significant anticommunist strikes in April 1991 that fizzled after demands to call an emergency session of the Supreme Soviet were not met. See RFE/RL Newsline, 11, 24, 29 April 1991.

48. Narodnaia hazeta, 26 January 1991, 2.

49. Alexander Lukashuk, “Yesterday as Tomorrow: Why It Works in Belarus,” East European Constitutional Review1?', no. 3 (Summer 1998), at http://wwwl.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol7num3/special/belarus.html (last accessed 6 June 2012). Of course, the opposition also lacked extensive experience with competitive politics. Yet in contrast to members of the government— almost all of whom had been appointed prior to the introduction of competitive elections—opposition figures were self-selected by their political abilities. They had gained prominence because of their abilities to speak in public, mobilize support, and organize demonstrations.

50. In Ukraine, Kravchuk was chosen to replace the departing Vladimir Ivashko as head of the legislature because of his perceived success in debating Ukrainian nationalists. Krawchenko, Bohdan, “Ukraine: The Politics of Independence,” in Bremmer, Ian and Taras, Ray, eds., Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States (Cambridge, Eng., 1993), 77.Google Scholar In Moldova, Snegur was able to hold onto the chairmanship of parliament in 1990 by making a deal with the Moldovan Popular Front. And in Russia, El'tsin of course gained power on the basis of popular antipathy to the communist system.

51. Urban, Michael, An Algebra of Soviet Power: Elite Circulation in the Belorussian Republic, 1966-86 (Cambridge, Eng., 1989), 122.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

52. For a detailed description of the intra-elite dynamics that apparently led to Kebich's selection, see Kebich, Viacheslav, Iskushenie vlast'iu: It zhizni premier-ministra (Minsk, 2008), 44–50.Google Scholar

53. Feduta, Aleksandr I., Lukashenko: Politicheskaia biografiia (Moscow, 2005), 128.Google Scholar

54. Ibid., 166.

55. Andrei Sannikau, former official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interview, Minsk, 3 July 2004.

56. Kryshtanovskaya, Olga and White, Stephen, “From Soviet Nomenklatura to Russian Elite,“Europe-Asia Studies AS, no. 5 (July 1996): 711-33CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kryshtanovskaia, Ol'ga, Anatomiia rossiiskoi elity (Moscow, 2005).Google Scholar

57. Thus, in contrast to some other authoritarian single-party states in Africa or Latin America, the Communist Party did not face even nominal political competition from other parties and officials did not compete openly for party nomination.

58. Between 1953 and 1983, there were only 45 nonstate mass actions (including riots at sports events) of a thousand or more participants. Shelley, Louise I., Policing Soviet Society: The Evolution of State Control (New York, 1996), 181-82.Google Scholar

59. Kryshtanovskaya and White, “From Soviet Nomenklatura,” 714.

60. For studies emphasizing the personalistic character of late communist rule, see, for example, Kenneth Jowitt's discussion of communist neotraditionalism. Jowitt, , New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction (Berkeley, 1992).Google Scholar Also Pakulski, Jan, “Bureaucracy and the Soviet System,” Studies in Comparative Communism 19, no. 1 (Spring 1986): 3–24 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Urban, An Algebra of Soviet Power.

61. Kryshtanovskaya and White, “From Soviet Nomenklatura,” 714. Michael Urban's monumental study of elite circulation in Belarus from 1966 to 1986 documents some important exceptions to the hierarchical system of career advancement. Urban, An Algebra of Soviet Power, 32-34. Nevertheless, his study shows “considerable … similarity” between actual career trajectories and the “hierarchy based on the formal rank positions” (35).

62. Kebich, Iskushenie, 43.

63. Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford, 1996), 162. Further, until the mid- 1980s, the system was characterized by a high degree of stability in personnel—often referred to as “trust in cadres.” Thus by the late 1970s, turNovérs among republican-level party leaders decreased by half in comparison to the Khrushchev era. Blackwell, Robert E. Jr., “Cadres Policy in the Brezhnev Era,” Problems of Communism 28, no. 2 (1979): 33–35.Google Scholar Officials became “practically unremovable.” Jowitt, New World Disorder, 142-43. “Having received high rank, an official hung on to it until his very death.” Kryshtanovskaia, Anatomiia, 178.

64. Narodnaia hazeta, 26 January 1991, 2. This author gives figures of 170 from the Communists (49 percent); “Soiuz” (Union) faction 30 (9 percent); Industrialialists 35 (10 percent); Agrarians 40 (12 percent); BPF 27 (8 percent). At the same time, partisan allegiances at the time were often undefined and uncertain. Ivan Gerasiuk estimates about a hundred “democratic” deputies—a figure that is often cited in discussions of the period. Gerasiuk, , Agoniia nomenklatura (Minsk, 1991), 41.Google Scholar Many of these deputies were members of multiple and ideologically conflicting factions.

65. In 1988, Gorbachev drastically reduced the party's formal power over the economy and made parliament the highest government institution. See Brown, Gorbachev Factor.

66. Through mid-1991, most deputies and government officials were party members and the party had cells distributed throughout the country.

67. TASS, 18 January 1991; Narodnaia hazeta, 19 January 1991, 1; Narodnaia hazeta, 10 April 1991,1.

68. For example, an effort by communist leader Anatol Malafeeu to introduce martial law in the early summer of 1991 went nowhere. Narodnaia hazeta, 8 June 1991, 1.

69. Kebich, Iskushenie, 65, 168.

70. Central Committee archives of the Belarusian Communist Party, Kalendarnyi plan podgotovki nar. deputatov kommunitov k sessii VR BSSR dlia organizatsiii prakticheskoi rabot. Dekret Ts K KPB V. Tikhinia—7-24 91.

71. Aliaksandar Dabravolski, deputy USSR Congress of People's Deputies; deputy Belarusian parliament 13th convocation, Vice Chairman United Civil Party, interview, Minsk, 21 June 2004. Also see, Kebich, Iskushenie, 65.

72. Gerasiuk, Agoniia nomenklatury, 53; Kebich, Iskushenie, 65-66, 93.

73. Quote from party activist at a Minsk party meeting in January 1991. “Kriticheskiie zamechanie i predlozhenii vyskazanikh kommunista v khode otchete vyborov v Minskoi gorodskoi partiinoi organizatsii,” 9 Ianv. 91 #00076, Central Committee archives of the Belarusian Communist Party. Longtime party officials faced severe difficulties maintaining order at parliamentary sessions. Kebich, Iskushenie, 66, 100.

74. Party leaders, according to Kebich, acted as though “someone had deprived them of consciousness and paralyzed their will.” Kebich, Iskushenie, 140. During the coup itself, key ministers in the government—Kebich and Minister of Interior Vladimir Egorov— chose to remain at their dachas—apparently unsure whether the coup would succeed. See Kebich, Iskushenie, 135-36.

75. Feduta, Lukashenko, 32; see also Narodnaia hazeta, 28 August 1991, 1.

76. Narodnaia hazeta, 27 August 1991,1, 3.

77. Ibid. Another opposition activist noted, “we obtained freedom widiout ever getting a chance to fight for it.” Quoted in Ioffe, Grigory, “Understanding Belarus: Belarusian Identity,” Europe-Asia Studies 55, no. 8 (December 2003): 1257.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

78. Pavel Kazlauski, minister of defense under Kebich, interview, Minsk, 23 June 2004; Leanid Kozik, chairman, Federation of Trade Unions of Belarus, deputy Belarusian parliament 12di and 13di convocations, interview, Minsk, 8 July 2004. Kebich, Iskushenie, 103. According to Kazlauski, “Pazniak was very powerful. If he had not been such a fool, he could have taken charge.” Kazlauski, interview, Minsk, 23 June 2004.

79. Narodnaia hazeta, 19 September 1991,1. Quote from Narodnaia hazeta, 5-7 February 1994, 2.

80. Liavon Barshcheuskii, deputy Belarusian parliament 12th convocation, BPF leader, interview, Minsk, 30June 2004.

81. Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Soviet Union, 4 December 1992, 35. Stanislau Shushkevich, head of Belarusian parliament 12th convocation, interview, Minsk, 23 June 2004. According to Kebich, the “real levers of power over the economy were with the prime minister… . The Supreme Soviet did not even have its own automobiles. Such dependence on me was exceptionally unpleasant for [Shushkevich].” Kebich, Iskushenie, 228, 188. At the same time, Shushkevich did continue to have influence in international relations as the official representative of Belarus who met with El'tsin as well as President Bill Clinton when he visited Belarus in early 1994.

82. According to World Bank numbers, the Belarusian economy declined by 19 percent between 1990 and 1993. Economic performance is a widely cited and important factor shaping regime stability. See, for example, Huntington, Third Wave, 50-58.

83. Armenia's president Levon Ter Petrosian survived in power in the face of an economic decline of 63 percent from 1991 to 1993; while El'tsin clung to power in the face of a downturn of 50 percent from 1991 to 1996.

84. IFES, Pre-Election Technical Assessment, 28-29; Kebich, Iskushenie, 251-57.

85. Egorov, Vladimir, Zvezdy i terni Vladimira Egowva (Minsk, 2003)Google Scholar; Kebich, Iskushenie, 364-69.

86. Feduta, Lukashenko, 157. In his memoirs, Kebich expresses opposition to the violent suppression of protesters and repression of key cultural figures during the Soviet period. Kebich, Iskushenie, 219, 276. But he is unapologetic about his support for greater controls over the media: “During the transition, the government needs propaganda support. If the Bolsheviks had not shut down the opposition press in 1917, they would not have been able to hold onto power.” Kebich, Iskushenie, 416. He expresses regret that in 1994 he did not use the “administrative resources as they function [Belarus today], in Russia and other countries.” Kebich, Iskushenie, 20. He reports that he supported the aims of the failed coup in 1991 but notes that he was unsure whether the organizers were sufficiendy prepared to pull it off successfully. Kebich, Iskushenie, 134-35. For examples of democratic abuse under Kebich, see Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, chap. 5.

87. In 1993, 66 percent of periodicals in Belarus were controlled by the government or government-controlled entities. Savchenko, “Belarus,” 241. Vladimir Alekseevich Reznikau, KGB official, interview, Minsk, 13 July 2004; Narodnaia hazeta, 14 September 1991, 3.

88. Kravchuk in Ukraine subsequently lost power on exactly the same day—10 July 1994—as Kebich. In Azerbaijan, President Ayaz Mutalibov lost power in a military coup in 1992.

89. According to a 1994 IFES report, “government officials … admitted that they [felt] no pressure from Western democracies to hold early elections.” IFES, Pre-Election Technical Assessment, 20.

90. According to existing laws, elections were not supposed to take place until 1995. Kebich put tremendous effort into assuring that the legislature passed a new constitution instituting presidential rule in the spring of 1994. Narodnaia hazeta, 16 March 1994, 1. For example, one government advisor reports that Kebich even brought to Minsk several Belarusian legislators elected in 1990 who had since taken Russian citizenship in order to get them to vote for the presidential constitution. Siarhei Leushunou constitutional expert active in preparation of 1994 constitution in parliament, interview, Minsk, 24 June 2004. Kebich states in his memoirs that, while he was not “absolutely sure” of his victory, he “believed [he] would win.” Kebich, Iskushenie, 408, 8.

91. Feduta, Lukashenko, 77.

92. David Rotman, director of the Belarusian State University Centre for Sociological and Political Research and pollster for the Kebich presidential campaign, interview, Minsk, 17 June 2004.

93. Ibid. As Mechyslau Hryb, a Kebich ally and head of parliament, noted, “at that point, we paid litde attention to polls. We had no experience and were not used to such things.” Mechyslau Hryb, interview, Minsk, 24 June 2004. Polls were often seen as simply a propaganda tool used by competing sides to convince the public diat their side would win. Indeed, some of Kebich's own people may have provided false numbers suggesting stronger than actual support for the prime minister—a fact that further encouraged Kebich's overconfidence. Kebich, Iskushenie, 11-12; Rotman, interview, Minsk, 17 June 2004.

94. Kebich, Iskushenie, 404.

95. Feduta, Lukashenko, 71, 119-20. Following Lukashenka's victory, Kebich complained that the sociologists had failed to gauge the “real mood of people.” Kebich, Iskushenie, 11.

96. This may be pardy attributable to the fact that Kebich had, in fact, run against (and defeated) Lukashenka in elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies in 1989. Thus, for Kebich, tile results of the 1994 election were “unexpected” and something he had “not imagined even in [his] nightmares.” Kebich, Iskushenie, 432, 428. After Lukashenka was elected in June 1994, Kebich's supporters “were obviously completely shocked; for them Lukashenka was just some clown, who was never a direat.” Vaclau Areshka, social scientist and activist in the Shushkevich presidential campaign, interview, Minsk, 6 July 2004. See also Feduta, Lukashenko, 149-51. Kebich insists that he took Lukashenka seriously—in part because of his previous experience batding Lukashenka in 1989. Kebich, Iskushenie, 410. But from his memoirs, it is not clear when in 1994 he began to see Lukashenka as a serious direat (just before the election as most observers suggest or earlier). Kebich's claim is contradicted body by the actions of his campaign and by Kebich's own expressions of surprise at Lukashenka's victory.

97. At times Lukashenka openly aligned himself with the BPF—attending several leadership meetings and even suggesting that he take a leadership role in the party. Feduta, Lukashenko, 50; Vincuk Viachorka, chairman BPF, interview, Minsk, 29 June 2004. In an ironically prescient article published in May 1991, Lukashenka called for more rapid economic reform and warned of the emergence of a new “Belarusian dictatorship.” At the same time, Lukashenka often sided with the Belarusian Communist Party on specific policy questions. As one deputy noted at the time, “I don't get Lukashenka. In the morning he is with the communists, but in the evening he is with the BPF. Which side is he on?” Quoted in Feduta, Lukashenko, 51, 53-54. Considered by many to be a demagogue and populist, Lukashenka refused to align himself strongly widi any group and was known primarily for speaking on a wide variety of topics. Feduta, Lukashenko, 52.

98. Feduta, Lukashenko, 64. “No one expected that such a ‘nobody’ without any government experience coming out of nowhere could ever win such an important election.“ Mikhail Pliskov, independent analyst and former activist in Shushkevich's presidential campaign, interview, Minsk, 25 June 2004; Andrei Vardamacki, director of NOVAK: Research into Market and Public Opinion, interview, Minsk, 6 July 2004.

99. Siarhei Antonchyk, deputy Belarusian parliament 12th convocation, member of BPF, and leader of strikes in April 1991, interview, Minsk, 3July 2004.

100. Brown, Gorbachev Factor, 162.

101 Kebich, Jskushenie, 42.

102. The commission was created at the behest of Shushkevich, Zenon Pazniak, and Antonchyk from the BPF. After Kebich ally Mikhail Marinich turned down the position, Shushkevich proposed diat Lukashenka head the commission. Shushkevich, interview, Minsk, 23 June 2004.

103. Shushkevich, interview, Minsk, 23 June 2004; Hyrb, interview, Minsk, 24 June 2004.

104. Former Kebich associate, interview, Belarus, July 2004; Hryb, interview, Minsk, 24 June 2004.

105. Feduta, Lukashenko, 91; Anatol Liabedzka, deputy Belarusian parliament 12th and 13th convocations, advisor to Lukashenka's presidential campaign in 1994, and current member of the opposition, interview, Minsk, 12 July 2004.

106. According to several KGB sources, the head of the agency at the time fed Lukashenka material aimed at undermining Kebich's reputation. Reznikau, interview, Minsk, 13 July 2004; Siarhei Aniska, KGB official in Kontrrazvedki 1994-1995, interview, Minsk, 14 July 2004.

107. Lukashenka failed to uncover any new corruption and no prosecutions emanated from a final report. Instead, the speech made broad accusations of corruption and focused on actions—such as ministers driving foreign cars—that made officials look bad but were hardly illegal. The absence of specific allegations of illegal activity brought an initial sigh of relief among government leaders and parliamentarians. Feduta, Lukashenko, 99.

108. “Lukashenka gave a speech diat identified the ‘jack-asses’ who steal and are responsible for why the population lives so badly. The speech was discussed by everyone everywhere…. Now, everyone knew him … as the unstoppable fighter for justice against the entire power structure.” Feduta, Lukashenko, 103,113.

109. Savchenko, “Belarus,” 248.

110. Kebich, Iskushenie, 417. Thus, Kebich's campaign never engaged in the kind of strong negative campaign against Lukashenka that Kebich directed against Pazniak. Vardamacki, interview, Minsk, 6 July 2004.

111. Feduta, Lukashenko, 15-17.

112. Ibid., 121-22; Pavel G. Sheremet and Svetlana Kalinkina, Sluchainyi president (St. Petersburg, 2004), 22.

113. Svetlana Gol'dade, head of the Executive Committee of the City of Gomel' 1990-1994, interview, Gomel', 9July 2004; Kozik, interview, Minsk, 8 July 2004.

114. Narodnaia hazeta, 7-9 May 1994, 2 and 12 May 1994, 1. Given Kebich's degree of influence over the state, one commentator suggested that the only way to have a fair election would be for the head of parliament to run for president because “then government workers would have to decide which government leader to obey.” Narodnaia hazeta, 18 May 1994,1.

115. Kebich, Iskushenie, 10.

116. For example, an anti-Kebich mayor in one large city was able to resist Kebich's efforts to fire her in early 1994 simply by refusing to resign in the face of pressure from the Council of Ministers. Gol'dade, interview, Gomel', 9 July 2004.

117. Valery Fadzeyeu, interview, Council of Ministers advisor on local government issues until 1994, on constitutional court 1994-1996, interview, Minsk, 2 June 2004. For example, the deputy mayor of Gomel’ recalled that pro-Kebich leaflets dropped off at the city council were never distributed because of widespread support for Shushkevich. Aliaksandar Karnienka, former USSR deputy, former deputy mayor of Gomel', interview, Minsk, 30 June 2004. Another former local official from Mogilev reported that many from his region would “go to [the capital] and report to Kebich ‘we support you 100 percent'— but then fail to do the most basic activities to support his candidacy.” Uladzimir Navasiad, deputy in Palata predstavitelei, deputy Belarusian parliament 13th convocation, interview, Minsk, 8 July 2004. In his memoirs, Kebich complains of “betrayal” by the state apparatus and asserts that his campaign “did not lift a finger” to get him elected. Kebich, Iskushenie, 18, 14.

118. As Silitski notes, “incumbents had not yet learned the finer points of manipulation and rigging.” Silitski, “Preempting Democracy,” 86.

119. Kebich, Iskushenie, 428.

120. Narodnaia hazeta, 30 June 1994, 1.

121. In contrast to the other major candidates, Lukashenka had virtually no organization that could help him get the word out. Sheremet and Kalinkina, Sluchainyi president, 32. He therefore might easily have remained a marginal figure.

122. For invaluable descriptions of Lukashenka's speaking style and political instincts, see Sheremet and Kalinkina, Sluchainyi prezident, 18; Feduta, Lukashenko, 44, 45, 52, 94, 99.

123. Savchenko, “Belarus,” 279.

124. Mark Blyth, “Structures Do Not Come with an Instruction Sheet: Interests, Ideas, and Progress in Political Science,” Perspectives on Politics 1, no. 4 (December 2003): 695-706.

125. See Sheremet and Kalinkina, Sluchainyi prezident; Feduta, Lukashenko.

126. Interfax, 27 September 1994; Feduta, Lukashenko, 207-8.

127. Narodnaia hazeta, 4 August 1994, 1.

128. Narodnaia hazeta, 21 October 1994, 1.

129. Pavel Daneika, deputy Belarusian parliament 13th convocation, interview, Minsk, 6 July 2004; Rotman, interview, Minsk, 17 June 2004.

130. Sheremet and Kalinkina, Sluchainyi prezident, 37.

131. In November and December 1994, he personally traveled to numerous locales to supervise the replacement of local representatives. Narodnaia hazeta, 29 November 1994,1; 30 November 1994, 1; 2 December 1994, 1; 10-12 December 1994, 1; 14 December 1994, 1. Lukashenka also replaced many in the Cabinet of Ministers and Ministry of Defense. See Narodnaia hazeta, 31 August 1994, 2.

132. Kebich, Iskushenie, 338.

133. Ibid., 339; see also Feduta, Lukashenko, 258. Lukashenka also made a practice of firing high-level ministers—sometimes directly on television. Officials with strong personal ties to the president—including Victor Sheiman—were appointed to key positions in the security and state apparatus. Feduta, Lukashenko, 273.

134. “Earlier there were set procedures for everything. But now [under Lukashenka] that was all destroyed.” Daneika, interview, Minsk, 6 July 2004.

135. Feduta, Lukashenko, 309.

136. Silitski, “Preempting Democracy.“

137. Feduta, Lukashenko, 497.

138. McFaul and Petrov, “What the Elections Tell Us,” 28; Wilson, Virtual Politics. While, as argued above, El'tsin was certainly more skilled at coping with open politics than Kebich, he still faced qualitatively new challenges that contributed to key mistakes early on. See Lucan Way, “The Evolution of Authoritarian Organization in Russia under Yeltsin and Putin” (The Helen Kellogg Institute, Working Paper #352, December 2008).

139. See Freedom House scores 1991-2000 at http://www.freedomhouse.org/reports (accessed September 2008; no longer accessible).

140. Bratton and Posner, “A First Look.“

141. See, most notably, Diamond, Larry, Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies throughout the World (New York, 2008).Google Scholar

142. Diamond, Larry, “The Democratic Rollback: The Resurgence of the Predatory State,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 2 (March-April 2008): 36–48.Google Scholar

143. I thank Mark D. Steinberg for suggesting this parallel.

144. For full text of speech on 10 February 2011, see “Egypt Unrest: Full Text of Hosni Murbarak's Speech, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12427091 (last accessed 6 June 2012).