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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 January 2017
At the close of the nineteenth century, the tsarist government faced an increasingly restive reading public, well-informed on a variety of issues through the proliferation of mass-circulation newspapers. A punitive censorship served as the basis for the autocracy's policies toward the press, but by 1900 it had long outgrown the requirements for dealing with a society undergoing modernization. As public opinion tacitly began to be recognized as a factor in national development, some officials realized that they must adapt to the changing journalistic demands of Russia's readers. Hoping to gain public support for the government, they knew that the prohibition of certain controversial topics would not generate the backing they sought. Following the example of successful commercial publishers, they argued that the government should take an active lead in supplying news.
The International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) and the Fulbright-Hays Committee provided generous funding to research this article. I thank Donald J. Raleigh and two anonymous reviewers at Slavic Review for comments on an earlier draft.
1. By 1900 the two capitals boasted several newspapers each with circulations approximating 50, 000 and better. I deal with this topic more fully in “News and Society : Russkoe slovo and the Development of a Mass-Circulation Press in Late Imperial Russia” (Ph.d. diss., University of Chicago, 1984).
2. From 1873, the minister of internal afairs had the right to “remove from discussion or publication questions of state importance “; Lemke, M. E., “V mire usmotrenii,” Vestnik prava, 35, no. 7 (1905) : 98 Google Scholar. See, also, Tikhomirov, Lev, Russia, Political and Social, trans. Aveling, Edward, 2 vols. (London, 1988) 2 : 279–284 Google Scholar.
3. Kaufman, A. E., “Cherti iz zhizni S. Iu. Witte,” lstoricheskii vestnik 140, no. 1 (1915) : 226.Google Scholar
4. Witte also claimed to be a silent founding partner of Kievskoe slovo in 1887; Witte, S. Iu., Vospominaniia, 2 vols. (Moscow : Izd. Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi literatury, 1960) 1 : 167–172, 527 Google Scholar; and Anan'ich, B. A. and Ganelin, R. S., “I. A. Vyshnegradskii i S. Iu. Witte—korrespondenty Moskovskie vedomosti” in Problemy obshchestvennoi mysly i ekonomicheskaia politika IXI-XX vekov, ed., Sladkevich, N. G. (Leningrad : Izd. LGU), 12–34 Google Scholar.
5. Theodore von Laue noted Witte's sensitivity to the press in his Sergei Witte and the Industrialization of Russia (New York : Atheneum, 1973), 117. See, also, Kaufman, A. E., “Iz zhurnal'nykh vospominanii,” Istoricheskii vestnik 130 (1912) : 170–172 Google Scholar. Witte and Propper later had a falling out when Witte accused Propper of “impertinence” at a press conference called to explain the October Manifesto (Witte 3 : 60-64). Witte maintained personal ties for professional reasons with such journalistic luminaries as A. V. Rumanov, head of the Petersburg bureau of Russkoe slovo (TsGALI f. 1694, op. 1, d. 2, 11. 1-2).
6. Evg. Tarle, “S. Iu. Witte, frantsuzskaia pressa i russkie zaemy,” Krasnyi arkhiv 3, 10 (1925) : 36-40. V. N. Kokovtsov, Witte's successor as minister of finance, discussed Witte's 1901 purchase of the French press in his memoirs, Out of My Past, ed., Fisher, H. H. and trans. Matveev, Laura (Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University Press, 1935), 119–122 Google Scholar. See, also, “Reptil'nyi fond 1914-1916,” Krasnyi arkhiv 3, 10 (1925) : 333.
7. Graham Storey, Reuters’ Century (London, 1951), 53.
8. B. 1. Esin, “K istorii telegrafnykh agenstv v Rossii XIX veka,” Vestnik MGU, seriia filologiia i zhurnalistika, no. 1 (1960) : 61-62; and, for more on the early experiences of the first Russian news agencies, see Rantanen, Tehri, “A Historical Study of News Agencies—the Beginning of News Agency Activity in Russia,” Nordicom-Information, no. 1 (1985) : 7–12.Google Scholar
9. The archive for the St. Petersburg Telegraph Agency is in the Central State Historical Archive (TsGIA) in Leningrad, fond 1358. This communique is in op. 1, d. 1, 1. 9.
10. ibid., l. 121.
11. Ibid., op. l, d. 1, 11. 59-60, 77-100.
12. Von Laue, Witte and the Industrialization of Russia, 256-259.
13. TsGIA, op. 1, d. 2, 1. 79, and op. 1488, d. 46, 1. 2.
14. Ibid., op. l, d. 1043, 11. 19, 17-18.
15. Ibid., d. 1010, 11. 5-8.
16. Ibid., d. 1043, 1. 89.
17. Ibid., d. 107, 11. 182, 233.
18. Ibid-, 1. 106.
19. L'vov, L. M. (Kliachko), Za kulisami starogo rezhima (Leningrad, 1926), 108–109 Google Scholar.
20. The flow of complaints from Reuters is in TsGI A, f. 1358, op. l, d. 1043, 11.33, 53-54, 90-92, et passim.
21. Ibid., 1. 176.
22. For more on the unsettled 1905-1907 period see, for example, Manning, Roberta, The Crisis of the Old Order (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1982)Google Scholar; Bushnell, John, Mutiny amid Repression (Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 1985 Google Scholar; and Bonnell, Victoria E., Roots of Rebellion : Workers’ Politics and Organizations in St. Petersburg and Moscow, 1900-1914 (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1983 Google Scholar.
23. Conroy, Mary Schaeffer, Peter Arkad'evich Stolypin (Boulder, Colo. : Westview Press, 1976), 7 Google Scholar. Roberta Manning observed that “from the beginning of his political career, Stolypin laid great stress on public relations,” but he was never a glad-hander like the redoubtable count. Manning, Crisis of the Old Order, 268.
24. Conroy, Stolypin, 16-17.
25. This conclusion is based on my own reading of Novoe vremia and the fact that his biographers (Manning, Conroy, and A. la. Avrekh) have not connected the brothers in any significant journalistic way.
26. Stolypin was often ridiculed for this clumsy journalistic endeavor to show how successful his policies were in the countryside. See, for example, Izgoev, A. S., “Nash offitsioz,” Russkaia mysl', no. 11 (1908) : 162–177; Witte 3 : 316–317 Google Scholar; and V. M. Doroshevich's satire “Pechat “’ in Russkoe slovo no. 5 (8 January 1914).
27. TsGIA, f. 1358, op. 1488, d. 46, 1. 22. E. V. Lentenkov, “K istorii pravitel'stvennykh informatsionnykh tsentrov v Rossii (1906-1917),” Vestnik LGU, no. 20 (1973) : 80.
28. TsGIA, f. 1358, op. 1488, d. 46, 1. 22.
29. Ibid., op. 1, d. 1043, 11. 231-283 are the communications about the administrative overhaul of the PTA.
30. Ibid., op. 1, d. 38, is the file on coverage of the election to the Third Duma.
31. Ibid., op. 1488, d. 46, 11. 30-33.
32. Ibid., 1.34.
33. Pal'gunov, N. G., Osnovy informatsii v gazete. TASS i ego rol’ (Moscow : Izd. MGU, 1955), 26 Google Scholar.
34. TsGIA, f. 1358, op. 1, d. 1043, 1. 205.
35. Ibid., 11. 148, 157, 169, 188, et passim.
36. For an example of restrained coverage of the goldfield strike, see the article “Kto vinovat?” in Russkoe slovo, no. 81 (7 April 1912). Beringer is in TsGIA, f. 1358, op. 1, d. 1043.11. 190-192. Beringer's Russian counterpart in London was no easier for Reuters to deal with. One day he marched into the office with news from “God Almighty,” demanding that it be dispatched immediately to the waiting world. The PTA replaced him shortly thereafter (TsGIA, f. 1358, op. 1, d. 1044, 11. 9-10).
37. TsGIA, f. 1358, op. 1, d. 1043, 1. 254; and op. 1, d. 1069, contain the renegotiations about the contracts.
38. Ibid., op. l, d. 1044, 1. 226. In addition to gathering and selling news to subscribers, the PTA was empowered to collect information for a selected “A” list of officials (ibid., op. 1488, d. 46, 1. 4, 15-20).
39. Editors were permitted to reprint news but not feature articles free, so long as they gave the proper citation for their sources (D. L., “O gazetnykh perepechatakh,” Russkoe bogatstvo, no. 2 [1902] : 1-14).
40. TsGIA, f. 1358, op. l, d. 1, 11. 1-8, 20.
41. TsGAIA, f. 595, op. 1, d. 13, 11. 26-28.
42. TsGIA, f. 1358, op. 1, d. 74, 1. 216.
43. Kostrikova, E. G., “Organizatsiia sluzhby zarubezhnoi informatsii Peterburgskogo telegrafnogo agentstva,” Vestnik MGU, seriia istoriia, no. 4 (1981) : 56 Google Scholar. This correspondent's frustrations resulted in his giving information to the private competitor, for which the latter likely paid under the table (ibid., 57).
44. Ibid., 58; and TsGIA, f. 1358, op. 1, d. 1044, 1. 62.
45. TsGIA, f. 1358, op. 1, d. 74, 11. 56, 58, 119, 144-145, 147, 158, 193; d. 1046, 1.61; d. 1047, 1. 150. Letenkov, “K istorii pravitel’ stvennykh informatsionnykh tsentrov,” 86, details the alteration of the leftist members’ speeches. See also a PTA correspondent's frustrated recollections of his job during the war in Kruglak, T. E., The Two Faces ofTASS (Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, 1962), 17 Google Scholar.
46. TsGIA, f. 1358, op. 1, d. 4, contains a variety of press clippings about this congress.
47. In the past, the ministries of both foreign and internal affairs had helped to assume the costs of salaries and of sending bulletins. The Provisional Government still demanded that its bureaucrats receive free bulletins and retained its say in the hiring and firing of correspondents but would not pay for any of these political privileges (ibid., 11. 136-140 and d. 5, 1. 45; and Kostrikova, “Organizatsiia sluzhby zarubezhnoi informatsii,” 5). Loviagin turned the PTA into an economically profitable enterprise, even though he had to triple subscription rates to absorb costs (TsGIA, d. 4, 11. 84-85, and d. 5, 11. 95, 117, 139-140).
48. TsGIA, d. 5, 1. 1, and d. 4, 1. 112. See also the article defending PTA in Russkoe slovo, 30 May 1917, no. 121.
49. TsGIA, op. 1, d. 4, 11. 3-4, 50-51, 73-80. The Russian government was certainly not the only one to try to manipulate news during this (or any other) war. As Hiram Johnson said in a later conflict, truth is the first casualty in time of war.
50. Ibid., d. 1046, 1. 185, 11. 186-187.
51. Ibid., d. 5, 1. 42.
52. Ibid., d. 5, 1. 58.
53. Ibid., 11. 64-65, 221-223, 243-254, contain much information on the dealings between the PTA and the Soviets. I
54. Ibid., 11. 30, 121.
55. Bryliakov, N. A., Rossiiskoe telegrafnoe agenstvo (Moscow : Mysl', 1976), 14–16 Google Scholar.