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Zinoviev's Revolutionary Tactics in 1917

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2017

Myron W. Hedlin
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Extract

In October 1917 the Bolsheviks under Lenin's leadership succeeded in gaining control over the chaotic city of Petrograd. Undoubtedly it was a great triumph for what early in 1917 had been a small, isolated group whose leaders were in exile either abroad or in Siberia. In analyzing the October Revolution, both participants and historians have given major credit to Lenin's brilliant planning and the disciplined, centralized party he had insisted upon as early as 1902. Thus those who opposed Lenin in October 1917 have usually been •branded as weak and indecisive with no positive program and no understanding of the real condition of Russia in 1917. As is often the case with the defeated, the opposition's program has received much criticism but little study. One of the revolutionaries so treated is Grigorii Zinoviev.

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Articles
Information
Slavic Review , Volume 34 , Issue 1 , March 1975 , pp. 19 - 43
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies. 1975

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References

1. Lilina, Z. I., comp., Velikii uchitel': Leninskaia khrestomatiia (Leningrad, 1924), p. 75 Google Scholar. Lilina (1882-1929) was Zinoviev's wife. All dates are Old Style.

2. Zinoviev’s closeness to Lenin prior to 1917 contrasts markedly with Stalin's position. As late as 1915 Lenin did not even know Stalin’s real name. Lenin, V. I., Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 5th ed., 55 vols. (Moscow, 1958-65), 49: 101, 161.Google Scholar

3. See New York Times, Feb. 3, 1924, sec. IV, p. 8; Trotsky, Lev, The History of the Russian Revolution, 3 vols, in 1 (Ann Arbor, 1957), 1: 157 Google Scholar; Carr, E. H., Socialism in One Country, Penguin, ed. (Baltimore, 1970), 1: 172.Google Scholar

4. Schapiro, Leonard, The Origin of the Communist Autocracy, Praeger, ed. (New York, 1965), p. 1965 Google Scholar0; Ulam, Adam, The Bolsheviks: The Intellectual and Political History of the Triumph of Communism in Russia (New York, 1965), p. 1965 Google Scholar; Deutscher, Isaac, The Prophet Unarmed, Trotsky: 1921-1929 (New York, 1965), pp. 77–78 Google Scholar; Trotsky, History of the Russian Revolution, 2: 45-47.

5. Trotsky, Lev, My Life (New York, 1960), p. 1960 Google Scholar. Trotsky’s statement here is extremely misleading at best. In the context in which it is set it is as though Sverdlov said this in October 1919. Sverdlov, however, had died several months before the assault on Petrograd.

6. See Temkin, la. G., Lenin i mezhdunarodnaia sotsial-demokratiia, 1914-1917 (Moscow, 1968), pp. 383, 385, 427, 443, 447.Google Scholar

7. Lenin, PSS, 34: 540.

8. Medvedev, Roy A., Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism, trans. Taylor, Colleen (New York, 1971), pp. 185–86.Google Scholar

9. Daniels, Robert V., Red October: The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 (New York, 1967), pp. 215–16.Google Scholar

10. Deiateli Soiuza Sovctskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik i Oktiabr'skoi Revoliutsii (n.p., 1927?), pt. 1, cols. 143-49, provides the best information on Zinoviev’s early life.

11. Avrich, Paul, Kronstadt, 1921 (Princeton, 1970), pp. 50, 142.Google Scholar

12. Trotsky, My Life, p. 427.

13. See, for example, Zinoviev’s realistic but calm speech to the Petrograd Soviet on the day when the attack on Petrograd was at its peak, October 19, in Bor'ba za Petrograd: 15 oktiabria-6 noiabria 1919 goda (Petrograd, 1920), pp. 200-209.

14. Grigorii E. Zinov'ev, Sochineniia, 16 vols, (incomplete) (Leningrad, 1923-29), 7(l): 63-65, 34-37.

15. Ibid., pp. 94-95, 43-46.

16. Ibid., 7(2): 66.

17. Ibid., 7(l): 34-37, 96-99.

18. Ibid., pp. 31-32, 131; 7(2): 44-45, 50-51, 88; 7(l): 131-32.

19. See Rabinowitch, Alexander, Prelude to Revolution: The Petrograd Bolsheviks and the July 1917 Uprising (Bloomington, 1968)Google Scholar, for a thorough and perceptive discussion of the June demonstration and the July Days.

20. Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Rossii v mae-iiune 1917 g.: Iiun'skaia demonstratsiia (Moscow, 1959), pp. 485-88. Zinoviev’s comments are paraphrased and abbreviated but clearly indicate his opposition to the demonstration.

21. Rabinowitch, Prelude to Revolution, pp. 72-74; Zinov'ev, Sochineniia, 7(1): 143-44.

22. Zinov'ev, Sochineniia, 7(1): 144-47. The decision was made by five members of the Central Committee: Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Nogin for the resolution that ended the demonstration, and Lenin and Sverdlov abstaining. Lenin, however, apparently backed away from the confrontation as well. See Rabinowitch, Prelude to Revolution, p. 77.

23. Zinov'ev, Sochineniia, 7(1): 143-44.

24. Abramovitch, Raphael R., The.Soviet Revolution, 1917-1939 (New York, 1962), pp. 53–54.Google Scholar

25. Zinov'ev, Sochineniia, 7(2): 298-99.

26. Ibid., 7(l): 202-5.

27. Ibid., pp. 201-11; Raskol'nikov, F., “V iiul'skie dni,” Proletarskaia revoliutsiia, 1923, no. 5(17), pp. 58–59.Google Scholar

28. Zinov'ev, Sochincniia, 7(1): 188, 201-2.

29. Trotsky, History of the Russian Revolution, 2: 45-57. On July 4 Zinoviev was also the sole Bolshevik representative at a joint session of the executive committees of the workers’ and soldiers’ and peasants’ deputies. See Shliapnikov, A., “Iiul'skie dni v Petrograde,” Proletarskaia revoliutsiia, 1926, no. 5(52), pp. 5–17.Google Scholar

30. Zinov'ev, Sochineniia, 7(1): 211-12.

31. Ibid., pp. 201-15.

32. Ibid., p. 213.

33. Ibid., p. 227.

34. Ulam, The Bolsheviks, p. 348.

35. Alliluev, S. la., “Kak skryvalis' tov. Lenin i tov. Zinov'ev v iiul'skie dni 1917 goda,” Krasnaia letopis', 1924, no. 9, pp. 13–17.Google Scholar

36. Sukhanov, N. N., The Russian Revolution, 1917, ed. and trans. Carmichael, Joel (New York, 1955), pp. 460–61.Google Scholar

37. Zinov'ev, Grigorii, “Lenin i iiul'skie dni,” Proletarskaia revoliutsiia, 1927, no. 8-9 (67–68), p. 64.Google Scholar

38. Sverdlova, K. T., Iakov M. Sverdlov (Moscow, 1957), p. 320.Google Scholar

39. Sukhanov, Russian Revolution, pp. 462-68.

40. Lenin, PSS, 34: 10-17. Zinoviev seems to have accepted the temporary impossibility of supporting the slogan of power to the Soviets, but he was reported to be in disagreement with Lenin on “several points,” possibly opposing Lenin's call for the party to prepare for “armed uprising.” See Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Rossii v iiule 1917 g.: Iiul'skii krizis (Moscow, 1959), pp. 186 and 452, n. 1. Further substantiation of Zinoviev's greater caution is given in Zhenevsky, Alexander, “Rukopis' V. I. Lenina ‘O konstitutsionnykh illiuziiakh, ’” Krasnaia Ietopis', 1925, no. 3(14), p. 193.Google Scholar

41. Zinov'ev, Sochincniia, 7(l): 283-84, 289-92, 267-68. Zinoviev and Lenin hid in Sergei Alliluev’s apartment at least from July 7 to July 9 before N. Emelianov moved them out of the city to their hut. There they stayed until August 8, when Zinoviev went back to Petrograd and Lenin to Finland. To Zinoviev ten years later, his political hopes in near total collapse, these were glorious days. See Zinov'ev, “Lenin i iiul'skie dni,” pp. 66-69. It is interesting that although Zinoviev stayed in the more dangerous Petrograd, Lenin went into hiding in Finland. Originally the Central Committee had sought accommodations in Finland for both men. See Gustav Rovio, “Kak tov. Lenin skryvalsia u gel'singforskogo ‘politseimeistera, ’ ” Krasnaia letopis', 1923, no. 5, pp. 303-10.

42. Lenin, PSS, 34: 16; Zinov'ev, Sochineniia, 7(l): 301-3.

43. Zinov'ev, Sochineniia, 7(1): 309-11.

44. Lenin, PSS, 34: 137-39

45. Zinov'ev, Sochincniia, 7(1): 347-50.

46. Lenin, PSS, 34: 239-41.

47. Zinov'ev, Sochineniia, 7(1): 357-59. As late as October 6 Zinoviev was warning that the Kornilovshchina had righted itself and was preparing another assault (ibid., p. 421).

48. Ibid., p. 322.

49. Ibid., pp. 343-44.

50. One internationalist Menshevik, Raphael Abramovitch, recorded that he was so sure the Provisional Government could handle any attempted Bolshevik insurrection that he warned one official against excesses in the suppression of the anticipated uprising (Abramovitch, Soviet Revolution, p. 90).

51. Zinov'ev, Sochineniia, 7(1): 351-54; Daniels, Robert V., The Conscience of the Revolution (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), p. 58 Google Scholar; Protokoly Tscntral'nogo komiteta RSDRP (b), avgust 1917-fevral' 1918 (Moscow, 1958), pp. 46-47, hereafter Protokoly TsK. The Democratic Conference, called by the Mensheviks and S.R.’s, was supposed to be a broad assembly of the left that would lead to the construction of a socialist cabinet, excluding the Kadets.

52. Protokoly TsK, pp. 32, 65. The Central Committee at least twice refused to allow Zinoviev, despite his requests, to emerge before Lenin could also surface.

53. Zinov'ev, Sochineniia, 7(1): 365-67.

54. Ibid., pp. 365-69; see also p. 375. It is interesting to note that throughout the fall of 1917, including October 25, Zinoviev had his harshest words for the Mensheviks and S.R.’s in his unsigned articles (ibid., pp. 120-23, 313-15, 381, 426-30; 7(2): 153, 158-59, 171-75, 183). He apparently did not want to damage his relations with the two groups unnecessarily.

55. Ibid., 7(1): 409-10, 414-16; 7(2): 201-6; 7(l): 431-35.

56. Lenin, PSS, 31: 147.

57. Ibid., 34: 287-339.

58. The letter is in Zinov'ev, Sochineniia, 7(1): 547-51. The following discussion, except as noted, is based on this letter.

59. Vladimir Nevsky in 1922 recalled a meeting he had with Zinoviev in 1917 (probably October 17) during which he was amazed at how well informed Zinoviev was, how he was able to diagnose weaknesses that others missed in the party organizations and preparations, and how accurately he gauged the mood of the masses despite his isolation. Nevsky, V, “Dve vstrechi,” Krasnaia letopis', 1922, no. 4, pp. 142–44.Google Scholar

60. Fifteen years later Trotsky confirmed that their judgment on the workers’ mood was “not unfounded: there was a certain depression in the Petrograd proletariat” (Trotsky, History of the Russian Revolution, 3: 181).

61. Zinoviev and Kamenev correctly diagnosed the opposition of both the postaltelegraph workers and the railway workers. See Daniels, Robert V., ed., The Russian Revolution (Englewood Cliffs, 1972), pp. 127–28Google Scholar; Zinov'ev, Sochineniia, 7(l): 45l-52.

62. Zinov'ev, Sochineniia, 1: 9.

63. Protokoly TsK, pp. 98-99.

64. Ibid., pp. 103-4. Thirty-nine years after the events of 1917, Margarita Fofanova, in whose apartment Lenin hid in October 1917, related that Lenin and Zinoviev continued their dispute prior to the revolution by letter. She recalled one instance when Lenin received a letter from Zinoviev and, before finishing it, hurled it on the table and exclaimed, “He has burst into tears like a slobbery old woman! If necessary, then we will exclude him from the party.” See M. V. Fofanova, “Poslednee podpol'e V. I. Lenina,” Istoricheskii arkhiv, 1956, no. 4, pp. 166-72. The four decades that intervened between the events themselves and the writing of the memoirs leave the reliability of these recollections in doubt.

65. Protokoly TsK, pp. 115-16. It was this letter that provoked Lenin to the peak of his rage against the “strikebreaking” of Zinoviev and Kamenev. Zinoviev publicly responded to Lenin's polemics by denying that his views on the disputed question resembled those Lenin had attacked and by suggesting that they close ranks pending more favorable circumstances—something that would again have worked to delay the insurrection. To Zinoviev's letter Stalin, acting on his own, appended a note “from the editors” expressing the hope that Zinoviev's note as well as Kamenev’s statement in the Soviet endorsing Trotsky’s denial to the same body of a fixed date for an uprising would end the dispute. Seeking to heal the breach, Stalin concluded: “The sharpness of tone in Lenin's article does not change the fact that fundamentally we remain like-minded people.” See ibid., pp. 114-15. Trotsky’s announcement and Kamenev’s response may be found in appendix 19 of Zinov'ev, Sochineniia, 7(2): 269. What Stalin did not mention was that concluding the argument with Zinoviev’s letter and Trotsky’s and Kamenev’s statements meant ending it largely on the two opponents’ terms.

66. See Daniels, Red October, pp. 81-106.

67. Protokoly TsK, p. 106.

68. Zinov'ev, Sochineniia, 7(l): 426-30, 439-43.

69. Ibid., pp. 439-43.

70. See Sukhanov, Russian Revolution, pp. 655-56. Deutscher credits Kamenev with placing himself “at the service of the insurgents once the action had started.” Deutscher notes that it was Kamenev who proposed that Central Committee members be forbidden to leave the Smolny without permission. See Deutscher, Isaac, The Prophet Armed, Trotsky: 1879-1921 (New York, 1965), p. 307 Google Scholar. See also Protokoly TsK, p. 119. This presumes that Kamenev violated his stand against a seizure of power. Instead, Kamenev was defending the Bolsheviks against Kerensky's attack on the party.

71. For more information on the extremely controversial and confusing struggle within the party and the Central Executive Committee see Protokoly TsK, pp. 125-45, 275-76; Abramovitch, Soviet Revolution, pp. 100-129; Daniels, Red October, pp. 200-213; Deutscher, The Prophet Armed, pp. 331-45; and Istoriia Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza, 6 vols. (Moscow, 1965), 3(l): 343-48.

72. Lenin, PSS, 35: 43.

73. Protokoly TsK, p. 127.

74. See ibid., p. 130, for Central Committee resolution of November 1.

75. Lenin, PSS, 34: 44.

76. Protokoly TsK, pp. 275-76, n. 176.

77. Zinov'ev, Sochineniia, 7(2): 207.

78. Ibid. The resolution Zinoviev was referring to was almost certainly one proposed by Kamenev to the Central Executive Committee sometime on November 2 or early the following morning (Protokoly TsK, pp. 275-76). That resolution, at least in its initial form, allotted half the seats in the government to non-Bolsheviks.

79. Lenin, PSS, 35: 44-46.

80. Ibid., pp. 47-49. Ten Bolsheviks signed this resolution.

81. Protokoly TsK, pp. 135-36, Ivan Teodorovich, commissar of supplies, and Alexander Shliapnikov, commissar of labor, along with the commissar of press affairs, the commissar of printing offices, and the commissar of the Red Guard all resigned their posts in support of the Central Committee minority. They also received the support of Lunacharsky, David Riazanov, and A. Lozovsky, the future Profintern leader. See ibid., pp. 136-37; Deutscher, The Prophet Armed, p. 333; Melgunov, S. P., Bolshevik Seizure of Power, trans. Beaver, James S. (Santa Barbara, 1972), pp. 172–73 Google Scholar. For a new government the resignation of one-third of the original fifteen commissars could hardly be anything but an extreme vote of no confidence. See Istoriia KPSS, 3(1): 335, for the first list of People's Commissars. That all these important and experienced revolutionaries lacked fortitude is scarcely a satisfactory explanation for their resignation.

82. Abramovitch, Soviet Revolution, pp. 124-25. Deutscher recognizes that in the analysis of the situation immediately after the October Revolution “the wrongs and rights of the issue were inextricably confused” and that “Lenin's and Trotsky’s opponents in the party were not quite as wrong as they presently professed” (The Prophet Armed, pp. 334-35).

83. Lenin, PSS, 35: 70-76.

84. Protokoly TsK, pp. 143-45.