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The Rumanian Campaign of 1916: Its Impact on the Belligerents

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2017

Glenn E. Torrey
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Extract

As the First World War entered its third year in August 1916, an equilibrium of sorts had been established. Bloody battles at Verdun, the Somme, and the Isonzo, and the offensive of Brusilov had amply demonstrated that neither group of belligerents had the capability of delivering a “knockout blow” to the enemy, to use Lloyd George's phrase. It was for this reason that so much importance was attached to the impending intervention of Rumania, strategically located astride the flanks of both warring coalitions and possessing an army of six hundred thousand men. It was widely believed that Rumania's adherence to the Entente would have a decisive impact on this stalemate. Paul von Hindenburg captured this conviction when he wrote: “Judging by the military situation, it was to be expected that Rumania had only to advance … to decide the world war… .“

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Articles
Information
Slavic Review , Volume 39 , Issue 1 , March 1980 , pp. 27 - 43
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies. 1980

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References

1. On Rumania's intervention, see Torrey, Glenn E., “Rumania's Decision to Intervene: Brătainu and the Entente, June-July, 1916,” Rumanian Studies, vol. 2, 1972-73 (Leiden, 1975), pp. 3–29 Google Scholar.

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9. Ibid.

10. Calder, Kenneth J., Britain and the Origins of the New Europe 1914-1918 (Cambridge, 1976), pp. 108–10 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Fest, Wilfried, Peace or Partition: The Habsburg Monarchy and British Policy 1914-1918 (London, 1978), p. 37 Google Scholar.

11. The Transylvanian-Rumanians posed a threat to Hungary because of their numbers (over three million) and their history of rising against their Magyar rulers (in 1848).

12. Valiani, End of Austria-Hungary, p. 165.

13. Ibid., p. 133.

14. Hohenlohe (Berlin) to Burićn, September 7, 1916, H.H.St.A., P.A. I/S20; Valiani, End of Austria-Hungary, p. 165.

15. Gonda, Imre, “Über das Verhältnis Deutschlands zu Österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchic in der Kriegsjahren 1916 bis 1917,” in Klein, Fritz, ed., Österreich-Ungam in der Weltpolitik 1900-1918 (Berlin, 1965), pp. 166–69 Google Scholar.

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20. Gonda, “Über das Verhältnis Deutschlands zu üsterreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie,” pp. 166 ff.; Gonda, Imre, V erf all der Kaiserreiche in Mitteleuropa: Der Zweibund in den Letsten Kriegsjahren 1916-1918 (Budapest, 1977), pp. 323 and 329Google Scholar. See also Zeman, Z. A. B., The Breakup of the Habsburg Empire 1914-1918 (London, 1961)Google Scholar, chapter 4; Kitchen, Silent Dictatorship, pp. 90 ff.; Deutschland im Ersten Weltkrieg, p. 490.

21. The studies by Calder (Origins of the New Europe) and Fest (Peace or Partition) are extremely interesting on this point.

22. The A.O.K. was not far away at Teschen, in Austrian Silesia.

23. von Müller, Georg Alexander, The Kaiser and His Court, ed. Gülitz, Walter (New York, 1964), p. 198 Google Scholar. The kaiser was not the only one temporarily depressed by the Rumanian action. Apparently Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg and Finance Minister Karl Helfferich believed, for a few days at least, that the war on land was lost and that Austria- Hungary's collapse had to be reckoned with (see Ritter, Gerhard, The Sword and the Scepter: The Problem of Militarism in Germany, vol. 3 [Coral Gables, Fla., 1972], p. 267 Google Scholar).

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25. Jarausch, Konrad, The Enigmatic Chancellor (New Haven, 1973), p. 1973 Google Scholar.

26. Fischer, Fritz, Germany's Aims in the First World War (New York, 1967), p. 1967 Google Scholar.

27. Jarausch, Enigmatic Chancellor, p. 323. The first O.H.L. was Moltke's (August- September 1914), the second Falkenhayn's.

28. Ritter, Sword and Scepter, p. 205. As Jarausch puts it: “In pursuit of its vast strategic aims in East and West, the third OHL demanded the mobilization of all material and human resources in a gigantic step toward total war” (Jarausch, Enigmatic Chancellor, p. 323).

29. Fischer, Fritz, Griff nach der Weltmacht (Diisseldorf, 1961), p. 303 Google Scholar.

30. Deutschland im Ersten Weltkrieg, pp. 461-62, 507-8. See also Feldman, Gerald D., Army, Industry, and Labor in Germany 1914-1918 (Princeton, 1966), pp. 149 Google Scholar ff.; and Hardach, Gerd, The First World War 1914-1918 (Berkeley, 1977), pp. 63 ffGoogle Scholar.

31. Ritter, , Sword and Scepter, p. 206 Google Scholar. East German Marxist historiography attacks Ritter's emphasis on the advent of the third O.H.L. as a new epoch in German history, labeling it an attempt to absolve Bethmann Hollweg of responsibility for German annexationism and imperialism (see Deutschland im Ersten Weltkrieg, pp. 458-59).

32. Birnbaum, Karl, Peace Moves and U-boat Warfare (Stockholm, 1958), p. 135 Google Scholar; May, Ernest R., The World War and American Isolation 1914-1917 (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), p. 294 Google Scholar; Scherer and Grunewald, L'Allemagne et les problèmes de la paix, p. 463.

33. On the Rumanian campaign of 1916, see Cupsa, Ion, Armata română in campaniile din anii 1916-1917 (Bucharest, 1967 Google Scholar), for a Rumanian viewpoint. For an account based on Russian and Austrian sources, see Stone, Norman, The Eastern Front 1914-1917 (New York, 1975)Google Scholar, chapter 12.

34. Müller, The Kaiser, pp. 201-3. See also Parkinson's comment: “News of the victory against Rumania brought an almost hysterical reaction in depressed Berlin and boosted Ludendorff's spirits” ( Parkinson, Roger, Tormented Warrior: Ludendorff and the Supreme Command [London, 1978], p. 122 Google Scholar).

35. Birnbaum, Peace Moves, pp. 173-75.

36. Ibid., pp. 175-78.

37. Falkenhayn, Erich von, Campania armatei 9-A impotriva românilor şi ruşilor 1916- 1917, 2nd ed. (Bucharest, 1937 Google Scholar), parts 1 and 2.

38. In addition to the works cited in footnote 33, see Torrey, Glenn E., “The Entente and the Rumanian Campaign of 1916,” Rumanian Studies, vol. 4, 1976-79 (Leiden, 1979), pp. 174–91 Google Scholar.

39. Farrar, L. L. Jr., “'This Unfathomable Sphinx': German Efforts during 1916 to Conclude a Separate Peace with Russia,” New Review of East European History, 15, no. 1-2 (June 1975): 75 Google Scholar.

40. Birnbaum, Peace Moves, pp. 128-30, 152.

41. Ibid., p. 188.

42. Farrar, “ ‘Unfathomable Sphinx,’ ” pp. 76-82.

43. On November 5, the Central Powers issued a public declaration of their intention to create an “independent” Poland (see Gonda, , V erf all der Kaiserreiche in Mitteleuropa, pp. 322–23Google Scholar). On the policy of the Central Powers, see also Ritter, Sword and Scepter, chapter 7; Zeman, Habsburg Empire, pp. 100-109, 151-56; and Kitchen, Silent Dictatorship, pp. 89-93.

44. Bethmann also noted that the conquest of Rumania strengthened the position of the Central Powers because it reopened Rumanian granaries and offered “hopes for our food supply” (see Scherer and Grunewald, L'Allemagne et les problèmes de la paix, pp. 532-33). As early as October, when it became clear that the tide of the Rumanian campaign had turned in favor of the Central Powers, the Habsburg leaders began to lay detailed plans for exploiting Rumanian foodstuffs to relieve the expected near famine that faced the Dual Monarchy (see Komjáthy, Protokolle, pp. 417 and 421).

45. Birnbaum, Peace Moves, pp. 229, 235-37; Farrar, ‘ “Unfathomable Sphinx,” ’ p. 84.

46. Müller, The Kaiser, p. 222. The Mackensen was launched in 1917.

47. Kitchen, Silent Dictatorship, p. 116.

48. Birnbaum, Peace Moves, pp. 283-87; Kitchen, Silent Dictatorship, pp. 118-21.

49. Ritter agrees that this decision, ratified by the kaiser on January 9, “meant the formal capitulation of political authority to the military in the most critical issue of the First World War by far” (Ritter, Sword and Scepter, p. 31).

50. Farrar, “ ‘Unfathomable Sphinx,’ ” p. 83.

51. Rothwell, V. H., British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy 1914-1918 (Oxford, 1971), pp. 39–40 Google Scholar.

52. Knox to War Office, no. 2, December 28, 1916, in Great Britain, Public Record Office (PRO), War Office Papers (WO), Record Group 106/1084.

53. Deutschland im Ersten Weltkrieg, pp. 507 and 514.

54. Ősterreich-Ungarns letster Krieg, 1914-1918, vol. 5: Das Kriegsjahr 1916, Zweiter Teil (Vienna, 1934), p. 682. On other troop diversions, see ibid., pp. 237 ff. Heavy fighting on the Isonzo front diminished after November 4 (Ninth Battle of the Isonzo), and the Italians enjoyed relative quiet for over six months, which enabled them to rebuild their forces and restore morale (see Whittam, John, Politics of the Italian Army [Hamden, Conn., 1977], p. 201 Google Scholar).

55. Deutschland im Ersten Weltkrieg, p. 524. Russian General Gurko estimated thirty divisions, the Rumanians claim forty (see Gueze, Raul, “La partecipazione della Romania al primo conflitto mondiale” Storia Contemporanea, 7, no. 3 [1976]: 456–57Google Scholar; Kirifescu, Constantin, Istoria războiului pentru Untregirea româniei 1916-1919, vol. 2 [Bucharest, n.d.], p. 331 Google Scholar).

56. See, for example, Kiritescu, Constantin, “The One Hundred and Forty Days of 1916” in Romania: Pages of History, 2, no. 3-4 (1977): 1 Google Scholar; and Basilesco, Nicolae, La Roumanie dans la guerre et dans la paix, vol. 1 (Paris, 1919), p. 173 Google Scholar.

57. Quoted in Deutschland im Ersten Weltkrieg, p. 525.

58. Torrey, Glenn E., “Some Observations on the Sarrail Offensive at Salonika, August, 1916” Revue roumaine d'histoire, 14, no. 1 (1975): 55–67 Google Scholar.

59. Torrey, “The Entente and the Rumanian Campaign of 1916.”

60. Knox to War Office, no. 2, December 28, 1916, PRO WO 106/1084.

61. Les Alliés contre la russie (Paris, 1926), pp. 221-22; Stone, The Eastern Front, pp. 279-80. On the other hand, to claim that the entry of Rumania “conspired” to defeat the Brusilov offensive overlooks the fact that the Russian advance had been halted before Rumania's entry (see Rutherford, Ward, The Russian Army in World War I [London, 1975], p. 217 Google Scholar).

62. Paleologue, Maurice, An Ambassador's Memoirs, vol. 3 (New York, 1972), pp. 72–73, 80, 92, 103-4, 107, 114Google Scholar. See also Pearson's report that “with the adverse change in the military fortunes came a familiar ebbing of government self-confidence and initiative” ( Pearson, Raymond, The Russian Moderates and the Crisis of Tsarism 1914-1917 [New York, 1977], p. 108 CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

63. Morris, L. P., “Russia, the Allies and the War, February-July 1917” Slavonic and East European Review, 50, no. 118 (January 1972): 32–33 Google Scholar.

64. Ibid., p. 31. On the other hand, allusions to Rumania were applauded (Diamandy to Brătianu, no. 3114, November 16, 1916, Arhiva Istorică Centrală Bucureş;ti, Fond Casa Regală 1916/29 [hereafter cited as A.I.C. with appropriate fond]).

65. Jay Smith, C. Jr., The Russian Struggle for Power 1914-1917 (New York, 1956), pp. 439–40 Google Scholar; Gueze, “La partecipazione della Romania,” p. 447.

66. General Alekseev, the Russian chief of staff, was relieved of his duties at the same time, ostensibly because of illness, but rumors had been circulating for some time that he would be replaced for inaction and delay in reinforcing the Rumanian front (Diamandy to Bratianu, no. 2978, October 22, 1916, A.I.C., Fond Casa Regala 1916/29; see also Paleologue, Memoirs, p. 104; General Basil Gourko, War and Revolution in Russia 1914-1917 [New York, 1919], pp. 204 and 210).

67. The French military and diplomatic archives are replete with examples: St. Aulaire (Bucharest) to Ministre des Affaires fitrangeres (M.A.E.), nos. 378-379, September 4, 1916, Archives Diplomatiques (Paris), Guerre 1914-1918, vol. 99:2, p. 30; M.U.L. to Margerie, October 3, 1916, ibid., vol. 100, p. 20; and Col. Despres to Ministere de la Guerre, “Compte rendu de mission,” February 4, 1917, Archives de la Guerre, Attache Militaire Roumanie, carton 8.

68. Torrey, “Some Observations on the Sarrail Offensive at Salonika,” pp. 55-56.

69. Tanenbaum, Jan Karl, General Maurice Sarrail 1856-1929 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1974), pp. 128–29 Google Scholar. I wish to acknowledge my debt to this book and to conversations with Professor Tanenbaum himself for insights into the controversy over Sarrail and the Salonika offensive to aid Rumania.

70. Pingaud, Albert, Histoire diplomatique de la France pendant la grande guerre, vol. 2 (Paris, 1938), p. 142 Google Scholar; Tanenbaum, Sarrail, pp. 125-30.

71. Tanenbaum, Sarrail, p. 128.

72. Owen, Frank, Tempestuous Journey: Lloyd George, His Life and Times (New York, 1955), p. 1955 Google Scholar.

73. anenbaum, Sarrail, pp. 128-29.

74. Gooch, John, “Soldiers, Strategy and War Aims in Britain 1914-1918,” in Hunt, Barry and Preston, Adrian, eds., War Aims and Strategic Policy in the Great War 1914- 1918 (London, 1977), p. 28 Google Scholar.

75. Guinn, Paul, British Strategy and Politics 1914-1918 (Oxford, 1965), p. 122 Google Scholar; Tanenbaum, Sarrail, p. 29.

76. Hankey, Lord, The Supreme Command 1914-1918, vol. 2 (London, 1961), p. 555 Google Scholar; Tanenbaum, Sarrail, pp. 129-30.

77. Raymond Poincar

78. Hankey, Supreme Command, p. 536.

79. Tanenbaum, Sarrail, p. 131.

80. Owen, Lloyd George, p. 324; Tanenbaum, Sarrail, pp. 131-32; Hankey, Supreme Command, pp. 554—55.

81. Owen, Lloyd George, pp. 323-24.

82. Rothwell, British War Aims, pp. 122-23. Robertson, however much he might clash with Lloyd George on strategy, was impressed with George's decisiveness and preferred him to Asquith as prime minister (Owen, Lloyd George, p. 330).

83. Ribot, Alexandre, Journal d'Alexandre Ribot et correspondances inedites 1914-1922 (Paris, 1936), p. 35 Google Scholar; King, Jere, Generals and Politicians: Conflict Between France's High Command, Parliament and Government 1914-1918 (Berkeley, 1951), p. 139 Google Scholar. Poincare records in his journal the bad news from Rumania and its impact on the governmental crisis (Poincare, Au service, pp. 23, 28-29).

84. The transcript is available at the Assemblee Nationale, Chambre des Députés, Journal Officiel, Les Comités Secrets 1916-1917, Séance de 28 novembre, 1916. Some of the transcripts have been published in Anale de Istorie, 24, no. 2 (1978): 133 ff. A good discussion of the debate is found in Tanenbaum, Sarrail, pp. 134-37.

85. King, Generals and Politicians, pp. 136-37.

86. Hardach, First World War, p. 27.

87. Hankey, Supreme Command, p. 562.

88. Ibid., p. 565.

89. McEwen, J. M., “The Press and the Fall of Asquith” The Historical Journal, 21, no. 4 (December 1978): 870–7CrossRefGoogle Scholar1; Price, Denis, “The Fall of Asquith: A Matter of Opinion” Contemporary Review, 230, no. 1334 (March 1977): 143–47.Google Scholar

90. Jenkins, Roy, Asquith: Portrait of a Man and an Era (New York, 1964), pp. 444 ffGoogle Scholar.

91. Steiner, Zara, “The Foreign Office and the War,” in Hinsley, F. H., ed., Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey (London, 1977), pp. 529–31Google Scholar.

92. The Germans undertook a major offensive in Rumania in the summer of 1917 designed to eliminate Rumania's Moldavian enclave and roll up the eastern front. The Rumanian army, reorganized under French leadership, surprised the Germans with its heroic resistance and administered a stunning defeat.

93. Pearson, The Russian Moderates, pp. 107-8.

94. A study of Rumania's influence on the peace moves and war aims of the belligerents in 1917-18 is currently in preparation.