1. The scores are the averages of the ratings on “political rights” and “civil liberties,” with 1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest. The survey methodology captures electoral rights and the meaningfulness of elections, associational rights, and communicative and speech rights—that is, the factors that constitute the core of Robert Dahl's celebrated definition of polyarchy. Since it accounts for the rights that make elections meaningful (e.g., freedom of association), the Freedom House survey, like Dahl's definition, avoids the pure “electoralism” found in some minimalist conceptions, such as in Joseph Schumpeter's celebrated definition. In the survey, countries that score 2.5 or better are rated “free”; those that rank 3–5 “partly free”; and those that receive 5.5 or worse “not free.” Countries in the first category may be regarded as democracies. “Semidemocracy” or “partial democracy” best fits those in the second category, though some observers might classify countries that rate a 3 as full-blown democracies and those that rate a 5 as autocracies. Polities in the final class are best characterized as autocracies or authoritarian regimes. See Freedom House, “Annual Survey of Freedom, Country Scores, 1972–73 to 1998–99,” at http:\\www.freedomhouse.org (consulted April 1999); the survey methodology section of any recent volume of Freedom House, The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties (New York, various years); Dahl, Robert A., Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy versus Control (New Haven, 1982), 11 Google Scholar; and Schmitter, Philippe C. and Karl, Terry L., “What Democracy Is … and Is Not,” in Diamond, Larry and Planner, Marc F., eds., The Global Resurgence of Democracy (Baltimore, 1996), 49–62 Google Scholar. See also Karatnycky, Adrian, Motyl, Alexander, and Shor, Boris, eds., Nations in Transit 1997: Civil Society, Democracy and Markets in East Central Europe and the Newly Independent States (New Brunswick, N.J., 1997)Google Scholar.

2. Fish, M. Steven, “Democratization's Requisites: The Postcommunist Experience,” Post-Soviet Affairs 14, no. 3 (July-September 1998): 212–47Google Scholar; on ethnic composition and democratization, see 223–25, 228, 229–30; on economic development and democratization, see 218–19, 225, 226, 229–30; on cultural traditions and democratization, see 221–23, 229–30. This study, which includes multivariate statistical analysis of the predictors of democratization, does find that predominantly Muslim countries rank lower than predominantly Christian countries, though the widely held notion that western Christian (Catholic and Protestant) societies fare better than Orthodox ones within the Christian world does not find support in the multivariate analysis. What is more, given the overlap between religious tradition, geographical location, and the history of imperial tutelage, it is impossible to separate out the possible weight of these factors. The analysis cannot answer, for example, whether a legacy of Ottoman-versus-Habsburg imperial rule is more or less important as a determinant of democratization than is the Christian-versus-Muslim distinction; see 232–33. For discussions that argue in favor of a close link between geography and the possibilities for democratization, see Janos, Andrew, “Continuity and Change in Eastern Europe: Strategies of Post-Communist Politics,” in Crawford, Beverly, ed., Markets, States, and Democracy: The Political Economy of Post-Communist ‘Transformation (Boulder, Colo., 1995), 167–71Google Scholar; and Hanson, Stephen E., “The Leninist Legacy and Institutional Change,” Comparative Political Studies 28, no. 2 (July 1995): 306–14CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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9. In the standard account, which indeed holds for most southern European and Latin American cases during the 1970s and 1980s, liberalization, seen as redefining and extending civil rights, predictably precedes democratization, understood as extending the principles of citizenship to realms where it previously did not apply, the most concrete and important manifestation of which is the assertion of popular control over the state via free elections for rulers. O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 6–11.

10. Urban, Michael, The Rebirth of Politics in Russia (Cambridge, Eng., 1997), 65–71 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bunce, Valerie, “Regional Differences in Democratization: The East versus the South,” Post-Soviet Affairs 14, no. 3 (July-September 1998): 187–211 Google Scholar.

11. Karl, Terry Lynn and Schmitter, Philippe C., “Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe,” International Social Science Journal, no. 43 (May 1991): 269–84Google Scholar.

12. For example, Linz, Juan J. and Stepan, Alfred, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore, 1996)Google Scholar; O'Donnell, Guillermo, “Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies, “Journal of Democracy 9, no. 3 (July 1998): 112–26CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

13. For a promising comparative study that does treat human actors as prime movers, see Samuels, Richard J., Leadership in Italian and Japanese History (Ithaca, forthcoming)Google Scholar.

14. Political parties and other independent societal organizations are lumped together here under the category of civil society, though parties are sometimes separated from other organizations in the literature on regime change. See Fish, M. Steven, “Russia's Fourth Transition, “Journal of Democracy 5, no. 3 (July 1994): 41nlCrossRefGoogle Scholar. In a related but separate matter, it merits note that the Freedom House scores do not include the overall development or maturity of political parties or other societal organizations as determinants of their “freedom ratings.” Part of the scoring in the “civil liberties” portion of the rating does take note of whether or not autonomous organizations exist. But the emphasis is on governments’ de facto tolerance of free association and expression, not on the actual extent of development of the organizations of civil society, nor for that matter on governments’ stated policies and de jure expressions of rights. See the survey methodology section of any recent volume of Freedom House, Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties.

15. Among politicians, such a view is associated with Vaclav Klaus and Margaret Thatcher. For scholarly treatments see, for example, Olson, Mancur, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities (New Haven, 1982)Google Scholar. Samuel Huntington, while showing an acute appreciation of the supreme role of political parties in democracy and democratization, has also consistently demonstrated suspicion of nonparty forms of societal organization, and especially social movements. See his Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, 1968)Google Scholar. See also Crozier, Michel J., Huntington, Samuel P., and Watanuki, joji, The Crisis of Democracy (New York, 1975)Google Scholar.

16. This notion is asserted and developed in Berman, Sheri, “Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic,” World Politics 49, no. 3 (April 1997): 401–29CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Hanson, Stephen E. and Kopstein, Jeffrey S., “The Weimar/ Russia Comparison,” Post-Soviet Affairs 13, no. 3 (July-September 1997): 252–83Google Scholar.

17. While the notion of “semidemocracy” cannot be fully explicated here, in general terms it may be regarded as applying to countries that fall into the “partly free” category in the Freedom House ratings. See the explanation of these categories provided above.

18. See Fish, M. Steven, “Moving Backwards: The Dynamics of Democratic Erosion and Reversal in the Postcommunist World” (Working Paper 2.67, Center for German and European Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1998)Google Scholar.

19. Durkheim, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, 98–109.

20. Interview with Virginia Kiriakova, Sofia, 3 January 1998. On the UDF, see Ragaru, Nadége, “L'Union des forces démocratiques en campagne ou la lente consolidation d'un parti politique en régime post-communiste (mars-avril 1997),” Cahiers Analole Leroy-Beaulieu, 1998, no. 2:51–60 Google Scholar.

21. The generalizations offered here are based in part on personal observation and field research during 1997 and 1998. Supporting information from published sources is found in Stanchev, Krassen, “Democrats Strike Back,” Institute for Market Economics Newsletter (Sofia) 4, no. 4 (April 1997)Google Scholar; Dainov, Evgenii et al., Vlastla i khorata: Konfliktite na Bulgarskoto obshchestvo (Sofia, 1997)Google Scholar; Fish, M. Steven, “Mongolia: Democracy without Prerequisites,” Journal of Democracy 9, no. 3 (July 1998): 134–38CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ginsburg, Tom, “Mongolia in 1997: Deepening Democracy,” Asian Survey 38, no. 1 (January 1998): 64–68 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ilya Prizel, “Ukraine between Proto-Democracy and ‘Soft’ Authoritarianism,” and William Crowther, “The Politics of Democratization in Postcommunist Moldova,” both in Dawisha, Karen and Parrott, Bruce, eds., Democratic Changes and Authoritarian Reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova (Cambridge, Eng., 1997), 330–69, 282–329CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

22. Fish, M. Steven, “The Predicament of Russian Liberalism: Evidence from the December 1995 Parliamentary Elections,” Europe-Asia Studies 49, no. 2 (1997): 191–220 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

23. For evidence on and explication of the generalizations that appear here, see Fish, “Moving Backwards.”

24. For example, Linz, Juan J. and Valenzuela, Arturo, eds., The Failure of Presidential Democracy (Baltimore, 1994)Google Scholar.

25. See Sharon L. Wolchik, “The Czech Republic,” and Patrick H. O'Neil, “Hungary,” both in Taras, Ray, ed., Postcommunist Presidents (Cambridge, Eng., 1997), 168–94, 195–224Google Scholar; and Fish, M. Steven, “The End of Meciarism,” East European Constitutional Review 8, nos. 1/2 (Winter-Spring 1999): 47–55 Google Scholar.

26. Fish, “Mongolia,” 134–36, 138–39.

27. Montesquieu, , The Spirit of the Laws, trans, and ed. Cohler, Anne M., Miller, Basia Carolyn, and Stone, Harold Samuel (Cambridge, Eng., 1995), 156–66, 325–27Google Scholar; Hamilton, Alexander, Madison, James, and Jay, John, The Federalist Papers (New York, 1961), 308–13, 320–23CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

28. My own argument may be contrasted with the rationalist explanations for the origins of new constitutions found in Roeder, “Failure of Authoritarianism in Post-Soviet Regimes”; Easter, Gerald M., “Preference for Presidentialism: Postcommunist Regime Change in Russia and the NIS,” World Politics 49, no. 2 (January 1997): 184–211 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Anderson, Richard D. and Grofman, Bernard, “Rhetoric and Rationality: A Study of Democratization in the Soviet Union,” Public Choice 93, nos. 3–4 (December 1997): 287–314 Google Scholar.

29. Urban, Rebirth of Politics in Russia, 240–44; Fish, M. Steven, Democracy from Scratch: Opposition and Regime in the New Russian Revolution (Princeton, 1995), 201–15Google Scholar.

30. See Martha Brill Olcott, “Kazakstan,” in Taras, ed., Postcommunist Presidents, 106–29.

For information and insight on Kazakhstan, I am particularly indebted to the following persons whom I interviewed in Almaty, 17–19 August 1998: Konstantin Syroezhkin, Nurlan Abliazov, Viachislav Panfilov, Leonid Solomin, Andrei Chebotarev, Petr Svoik, and several anonymous interviewees.

31. See Fish, “Mongolia,” 132–34. For this information on constitutional choice in Mongolia, I am especially grateful to the following individuals whom I interviewed in Ulan Bator, 16–26 February 1998: Tsedendambyn Batbayar, Bat-Amgalangyn Boldbaatar, Büdragchaagiyn Dashyondon, Baldangiyn Enkhmandakh, and Radnaasümbereliyn Gonchigdorj.

32. Fish, “Democratization's Requisites,” 225–27, 231–33, 235–39. For other analyses that investigate the possibilities of a positive relationship between economic and political reform, see Bunce, Valerie, “Sequencing of Political and Economic Reforms,” in Hardt, John P. and Kaufman, Richard, eds., East-Central European Economies in Transition (Washington, D.C., 1994), 59–60 Google Scholar; Nelson, Joan M., “Linkages between Politics and Economics, “Journal of Democracy 5, no. 4 (October 1994): 49–62 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hellman, Joel S., “Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions,” World Politics 50, no. 2 (January 1998): 203–34CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For clear statements of the trade-offs hypothesis, see Nelson, Daniel N., “Civil Society Endangered,” Social Research 63, no. 2 (Summer 1996): 345–68Google Scholar; Orenstein, Mitchell, “Lawlessness from Above and Below: Economic Radicalism and Political Institutions,” SAIS Review 18, no. 1 (Winter-Spring 1998): 35–50 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Przeworski, Adam, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe, and Latin America (Cambridge, Eng., 1991), 183–87CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Przeworski, Adam, “The Neoliberal Fallacy, “Journal of Democracy 3, no. 3 (July 1992): 45–59 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bresser Pereira, Luis Carlos, Maravall, José María, and Przeworski, Adam, Economic Reforms in New Democracies: A Social-Democratic Approach (Cambridge, Eng., 1993)Google Scholar.

33. Dahl, Robert A., Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven, 1971), 48 Google Scholar.

34. Fish, M. Steven, “The Determinants of Economic Reform in the Post-Communist World,” East European Politics and Societies 12, no. 1 (Winter 1998): 31–78 Google Scholar.

35. For country rankings on the extent of economic reform, see ibid., 35. See also Karatnycky, Motyl, and Shor, eds. Nations in Transit 1997.

36. The argument that successful economic reform during democratic transitions always requires executive decrees is made in Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, 183–84. The postcommunist experience has refuted this contention. See Frye, Timothy, “A Politics of Institutional Choice: Post-Communist Presidencies,” Comparative Political Studies 30, no. 5 (October 1997): 523–52CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Fish, “Determinants of Economic Reform in the Post-Communist World.”

37. Michta, Andrew A., “Democratic Consolidation in Poland after 1989,” in Dawisha, Karen and Parrott, Bruce, eds., The Consolidation of Democracy in East-Central Europe (Cambridge, Eng., 1997), 66–108 Google Scholar. The Polish case is representative, not exceptional. On the positive relationship between the density of civil society and economic reform in the region as a whole, see Fish, “Determinants of Economic Reform in the Post-Communist World,” 63–72.

38. See Karl, Terry Lynn, “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America,” Comparative Politics 23, no. 1 (October 1990): 6 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

39. Rapaczynski, Andrzej, Nature and Politics: Liberalism in the Philosophies of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau (Ithaca, 1987), 126 Google Scholar.

40. See Treisman, Daniel, “Russia's ‘Ethnic Revival': The Separatist Activism of Regional Leaders in a Postcommunist Order,” World Politics 49, no. 2 (January 1997): 212–49CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

41. For information on Transdniester, I am grateful to many interviewees in Moldova, and particularly to Gheorghe Roman (interview, Chişjnau, 20 May 1998); Sergiu Stati (interview, Chişjnau, 15 May 1998); and Vladimir Solonari (interview, Chişjnau, 18 May 1998).

42. Interview with Alek Mamedov, Baku, 27 December 1995.

43. For insights into the problem, I am grateful to Krassen Stanchev (interview, Sofia, 8 January 1998); Ognyan Minchev (interview, Sofia, 13 January 1998); and Bahri Iumer (interview, Sofia, 7 January 1998). For published work, see Karasimeonov, Georgi, “Sea-Changes in the Bulgarian Party System,” Journal of Communist Studies 9, no. 3 (September 1993): 272–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

44. Interview with Zhelyu Zhelev, Sofia, 14 January 1998.

45. Interview with Gabriel Andreescu, Bucharest, 27 April 1998.

46. For incisive examination of this problem in the postcommunist region, see Tismaneanu, Vladimir, Fantasies of Salvation: Democracy, Nationalism and Myth in Post-Communist Europe (Princeton, 1998)Google Scholar. See also Barany, Zoltan, “Orphans of Transition: Gypsies in Eastern Europe “Journal of Democracy 9, no. 3 (July 1998): 142 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For general theoretical discussion and empirical analysis suggesting that democratization may actually diminish the risk of ethnic conflict, see Rummel, Rudolph J.,” Democracy, Power, Genocide, and Mass Murder: Theory of Democide,“ Journal of Conflict Resolution 39, no. 1 (March 1995): 3–26 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Diamond, Larry, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore, 1999), 6 Google Scholar.

47. See O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 46–47; and Callaghy, Thomas M., “Political Passions and Economic Interests: Economic Reform and Political Structure in Africa,” in Callaghy, Thomas M. and Ravenhill, John, eds., Hemmed In: Responses to Africa's Economic Decline (New York, 1993), 463–519 Google Scholar.

48. See Fish, “Determinants of Economic Reform in the Post-Communist World,” 68–74; Diamond, Larry, “Democracy and Economic Reform,” in Lazear, Edward P., ed., Economic Transition in Eastern Europe and Russia (Stanford, 1995), 107–58Google Scholar; and Kaminski, Bartlomiej, ed., Economic Transition in Russia and the New Slates of Eurasia (Armonk, N.Y., 1996)Google Scholar.

49. On the concept of the “scavenger society,” which I borrow here, see Jowitt, Ken, New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction (Berkeley, 1992), 223–28Google Scholar.

50. Bartlett, David L., “Democracy, Institutional Change, and Stabilisation Policy in Hungary,” Europe-Asia Studies 48, no. 1 (1996): 47–83 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a related argument supported by evidence from other regions, see Cheibub, Jose A., “Political Regimes and the Extractive Capacity of Governments: Taxation in Democracies and Dictatorships,” World Politics 50, no. 3 (April 1998): 349–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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52. Shapiro, Ian, Democracy's Place (Ithaca, 1996), 51, 127 Google Scholar.

53. Durkheim, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, 85–92.

54. Interview with Yonko Grozev, Sofia, 2 January 1998.

55. On a scale of 0–10, with 10 representing total freedom from corruption, the mean “corruption perceptions index” for the seventeen African countries was 3.6; for the twelve postcommunist countries, 3.7. The empirical range among countries is large, varying from 10 (received by Denmark) to 1.4 (received by Cameroon); the 0.1 point difference in mean scores between African and postcommunist countries is minuscule and substantively insignificant. Figures calculated from data provided in “The Transparency International 1998 Corruption Perceptions Index” at www.transparency.de/ documents/cpi/index.html (consulted April 1999).

56. A bivariate regression of Freedom House freedom ratings for 1998–99 on the Transparency International corruption perceptions index fails to show a statistically significant relationship, even at the least demanding level (p < 0.1). In the regression, t = —1.50; Adj. R² = .10. n = 12. These results should be taken merely as one bit of evidence, but the analysis does at least suggest that greater progress in the realm of democratization has not automatically reduced corruption. Analysis based on data provided in ibid.; and Freedom House, “Annual Survey of Freedom, Country Scores, 1972–73 to 1998–99.”

57. On the war in Chechnia, see Lapidus, Gail W., “Contested Sovereignty: The Tragedy of Chechnya,” International Security 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998): 5–49 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and McFaul, Michael, “Eurasia Letter: Russian Politics after Chechnya, “Foreign Policy 99 (Summer 1995): 149–65CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The question of whether pursuing certain types of economic reform in the face of public resistance serves as a marker of unaccountable government is more controversial, since gauging both resistance and whether or the extent to which reforms actually contradict the interests of the majority is often exceedingly difficult. See Balzer, Harley, “Russia's Middle Classes,” Post-Soviet Affairs 14, no. 2 (April-June 1998): 167–70Google Scholar.

58. On Russia, see Vujacic, Veljko, “Gennadiy Zyuganov and the ‘Third Road,'” Post-Soviet Affairs 12, no. 2 (April-June 1997): 118–54Google Scholar; Ziuganov, G. A., Za gorizontom (Orel, 1995)Google Scholar. Information on Moldova is drawn from observation of and interviews with leaders of the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova, some of whom display a level of paranoia regarding Jewish-Masonic conspiracies and the evils of “bourgeois” democracy that meets or exceeds the formidable standard set by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. Interview with Viktor Zlachevskii, Chişinau, 15 May 1998.

59. Interview with Vlado Gotovac, Zagreb, 19 September 1997; interview with Ivan Grdešić, Zagreb, 22 September 1997; and Cohen, Lenard J., “Embattled Democracy: Postcommunist Croatia in Transition,” in Dawisha, Karen and Parrott, Bruce, eds., Politics, Power, and the Struggle for Democracy in South-East Europe (Cambridge, Eng., 1997), 97–100 Google Scholar.

60. Interview with Asen Agov, Sofia, 13 January 1998.

61. See, for example, Centeno, Miguel Ángel, Democracy within Reason: Technocratic Revolution in Mexico (University Park, Penn., 1994)Google Scholar; Montinola, Gabriella R., “Parties and Accountability in the Philippines, “Journal of Democracy 10, no. 1 (January 1999): 126–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Weyland, Kurt, Democracy without Equity: Failures of Reform in Brazil (Pittsburgh, 1996)Google Scholar.

62. For accounts of the above-mentioned movements, I am grateful to many interviewees, and especially to Gustav Matijek (interview, Bratislava, 18 October 1998); Evgenii Dainov (interview, Sofia, 8 January 1998); Petko Georgiev (interview, Sofia, 11 January 1998); Losolyn Byambajargal (interview, Ulan Bator, 18 February 1998); and Ion Hohan (interview, Bucharest, 28 April 1998).

63. For an effort to illuminate interesting and often overlooked aspects of Schumpeter's democratic theory, see Medearis, John, “Schumpeter, the New Deal, and Democracy,” American Political Science Review 91, no. 4 (December 1997): 819–32CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

64. For relevant sections, see Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 139–42, 269–83, 296–302.

65. Huntington, Samuel P., The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, Okla., 1991), 3–108 Google Scholar.

66. Anderson, Richard D., “The Russian Anomaly and the Theory of Democracy” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, 3–6 September 1998), 3–4 Google Scholar.

67. Huntington, Samuel, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (New York, 1996)Google Scholar. See also Seymour Martin Lipset, “The Centrality of Political Culture,” in Diamond and Planner, eds., Global Resurgence of Democracy, 150–53.

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70. From the introduction to Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, xiv.

71. Ibid., 85–97.

72. Ibid., 42–54, 76–109.

73. Ibid., xxv-xxviii, 55–75, 121–58, 208–20.

74. Durkheim, Émile, The Division of Labor in Society (New York, 1984), 70–71,152–65, 316–20CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Durkheim, Émile, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (New York, 1995), 425–27Google Scholar.

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76. Giddens, Anthony, Durkheim (London, 1986), 30 Google Scholar.

77. See, for example, Durkheim, Division of Labor in Society, 291–341; and Durkheim, Professional Ethics and Civil Morals, 76–109.

78. Durkheim, Elementary Forms of Religious Life, 91.

79. Ibid., 91–92.