1 I would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers, as well as Mark D. Steinberg, Mario Carretero, Marie-Christine Doran, Lubomyr Hajda, Oleksandr Mel'nyk, and Harris Mylonas for their comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this article. For analysis of the OUN, its ideology, the geography of its operations, and its subsequent split into two factions and die complex nature of the link between the “original“ OUN, its two successors, and the UPA, see Motyl, Alexander J, The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919–1929(Boulder, Colo., 1980);Google Scholar Armstrong, John A, Ukrainian Nationalism(New York, 1963);Google Scholar Hrechyna, L. A and Dubych, L. V, eds., Problema OUN-UPA: Zvit robochoi hrupy istorykiv pry UriadoviDkomisii z vyvchennia diial'nosti OUN i UPA. Osnovni tezy z problemy OUN-UPA (IstorychnyDvysnovok) (Kiev, 2004).Google Scholar

2 Encarnacion, Omar G, “Reconciliation after Democratization: Coping with the Past in Spain,” Political Science Quarterly 123, no. 3 (Fall 2008):Google Scholar 445; Xosé-Manoel Núáez, “New Interpretations of the Spanish Civil War,”Contemporary European History13, no. 4 (November 2004): 520.

3 The 2007 Spanish law, quoted after Encarnacion, “Reconciliation after Democratization,“ 452.

4 Aguilar, Paloma, ‘Justice, Politics, and Memory in the Spanish Transition,” in Barahona de Brito, Alexandra, Gonzalez Enriquez, Carmen, and Aguilar Fernández, Paloma, eds.,The Politics of Memory: Transitional Justice in Democratizing Societies(Oxford, 2001)Google Scholar

5 Ibid.; Encarnacion, “Reconciliation after Democratization“; Sebastiaan Faber, “The Price of Peace: Historical Memory in Post-Franco Spain. A Review Article,”Revista Hispdnica Moderna58, nos. 1–2 (June-December 2005): 205–19; Judith Keene, “Review Article: Turning Memories into History in the Spanish Year of HistoricalMemory,” Journal of Contemporary History42, no. 4 (October 2007): 661–71.

6 Aguilar, ‘Justice, Politics, and Memory in the Spanish Transition,” 102–5.

7 Encarnación, “Reconciliation after Democratization,” 435–36.

8 Aguilar, ‘Justice, Politics, and Memory in the Spanish Transition,” 96.

9 Encarnación, “Reconciliation after Democratization,” 439.

10 Aguilar, ‘Justice, Politics, and Memory in the Spanish Transition,” 96; Faber, “Price of Peace,” 214; Madeleine Davis, “Is Spain Recovering Its Memory? Breaking the Pacto del Olvido,”Human Rights Quarterly27, no. 3 (August 2005): 867; Rafael Vails, “The Spanish Civil War and the Franco Dictatorship: The Challenges of Representing a Conflictive Past in Secondary Schools,” in Cole, Elizabeth A, ed.,Teaching the Violent Past: History Education and. Reconciliation(Lanham, Md., 2007), 170.Google Scholar

11 Faber, “Price of Peace,” 213–14; Encarnación, “Reconciliation after Democratization,“ 458–59.

12 Richards, Michael, “From War Culture to Civil Society: Francoism, Social Change and Memories of the Spanish Civil War,” History and Memory 14, no. 1–2 (Fall 2002): 111;Google Scholar Encarnación, “Reconciliation after Democratization,” 446.

13 Richards, “From War Culture to Civil Society,” 111.

14 Paloma Aguilar Fernández and Carsten Humlebæk, “Collective Memory and National Identity in the Spanish Democracy: The Legacies of Francoism and the Civil War,“History and Memory14, no. 1–2 (Fall 2002): 151; Carsten Humlebæk, “Creating a New Cohesive National Discourse in Spain after Franco,” in Luis Martin-Estudillo and Roberto Ampuero, eds.,Post-Authoritarian Cultures: Spain and Latin America's Southern Cone(Nashville, 2008), 196–217.

15 Paloma Aguilar and Katherine Hite, “Historical Memory and Authoritarian Legacies in Processes of Political Change: Spain and Chile,” in Hite, Katherine and Cesarini, Paola, eds.,Authoritarian Legacies and Democracy in Latin America and Southern Europe(Notre Dame, 2004), 195.Google Scholar

16 Aguilar, ‘Justice, Politics, and Memory in the Spanish Transition,” 98; Aguilar Fernández, Paloma,Memory and Amnesia: The Role of the Spanish Civil War in the Transition to Democracy(New York, 2002), xviii.Google Scholar

17 Encarnación, “Reconciliation after Democratization,” 442.

18 Aguilar and Hite, “Historical Memory and Authoritarian Legacies,” 195.

19 Encarnación, “Reconciliation after Democratization,” 446. Of some 580,000 people killed during the civil war, 120,000 were civilians killed behind the front lines, and the left was responsible for only some 20,000 of these deaths. Aguilar, ‘Justice, Politics, and Memory in the Spanish Transition,” 106w36. After the Francoist victory, about 200,000 “red” prisoners died of execution, disease, and hunger in the prisons, concentration camps, and forced labor battalions established by the Franco regime between 1939 and 1943. Encarnación, “Reconciliation after Democratization,” 439, 442.

20 Davis, “Is Spain Recovering Its Memory?” 867.

21 Aguilar Fernández,Memory and Amnesia xx.

22 At the level of civil society, on the other hand, the recovery of officially suppressed memory was actively taking place, as reflected in the appearance of scores of best-selling novels, memoirs, feature films, television programs, and exhibits about the less-publicized aspects of the civil war and Francoism. Faber, “Price of Peace“; also Aguilar Fernández,Memory and Amnesia.

23 Náúez, “New Interpretations of the Spanish Civil War,” 518. Also Aguilar Fernández and Humlebæk, “Collective Memory and National Identity,” 132.

24 Encarnación, “Reconciliation after Democratization,” 441.

25 Aguilar Fernández and Humlebæk, “Collective Memory and National Identity,“ 152.

26 Encarnación, “Reconciliation after Democratization,” 441.

27 Ibid., 452.

28 Faber, “Price of Peace,” 206.

29 For example, Spain's former prime minister from the conservative Partido Popular, José María Aznar, criticized the law and accused Zapatero of trying to rewrite history. Keene, “Review Article: Turning Memories into History,” 664.

30 The main provisions of the law are summarized in Encarnacion, “Reconciliation after Democratization,” 452.

31 Victoria Burnett, “Bill in Spanish Parliament Aims to End ‘Amnesia’ about Civil War Victims,”New York Times,28 October 2007.

32 Encarnacion, “Reconciliation after Democratization,” 458.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.; Davis, “Is Spain Recovering Its Memory?” 879.

35 Translation of the preamble of the law, quoted after Encarnaci?n, “Reconciliation after Democratization,” 452. 36. Exceptions were made for buildings of “historical or cultural significance.“

37 Boyd, Carolyn P, “The Politics of History and Memory in Democratic Spain,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 617 (May 2008): 146.Google Scholar

38 Encarnacion, “Reconciliation after Democratization,” 459.

39 Ibid., 459.

40 Ibid., 458. According to a 1990 poll, just 3 percent of Spaniards said that they considered Spain better off during the Republican years. Nearly three times as many (8 percent) preferred the Francoist period, while the overwhelming majority (76 percent) favored the current democracy. Poll results in Aguilar Fernández and Humlebæk, “Collective Memory and National Identity,” 145.

41 Faber, “Price of Peace,” 214–15.

42 Aguilar Fernández and Humlebæk, “Collective Memory and National Identity,“ 135.

43 Nunez, “New Interpretations of the Spanish Civil War,” 520; Vails, “Spanish Civil War and the Franco Dictatorship,” 169; Aguilar Fernandez and Humlebaek, “Collective Memory and National Identity,” 133-34, 139.

44 In the World Values Surveys conducted between 1981 and 2000, 88.9 percent of Spaniards report feeling either very or quite proud of being Spanish. The survey data are available at www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ (last accessed 3 December 2010). Also see Aguilar Fernandez and Humlebæk, “Collective Memory and National Identity,” 140.

45 Aguilar Fernandez and Humlebaek, “Collective Memory and National Identity,“ 141.

46 Encarnacion, “Reconciliation after Democratization,” 447; also Boyd, “Politics of History and Memory in Democratic Spain“; Davis, “Is Spain Recovering Its Memory?“; Keene, “Review Article: Turning Memories into History.“

47 Humlebaek, “Creating a New Cohesive National Discourse in Spain after Franco,“ 211.

48 Will Kymlicka,Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights(New York, 1995), 188.

49 Smith, Anthony D, “Memory and Modernity: Reflections on Ernest Gellner's Theory of Nationalism,” Nations and Nationalism 2, no. 3 (November 1996): 383.Google Scholar

50 Smith, Rogers M,Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Membership (New York, 2003), 102.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

51 John Rawl's idea of political liberalism as summarized in Christian Joppke,Citizenship and Immigration(Cambridge, Eng., 2010), 114–15.

52 Ibid.

53 The concept of constitutional patriotism is taken from Jurgen Habermas. The essence of this principle is discussed in Joppke,Citizenship and Immigration115–16, and in Arash Abizadeh, “Liberal Nationalism versus Postnational Social Integration: On the Nation's Ethno–Cultural Particularity and ‘Concreteness,'”Nations and Nationalism10, no. 3 (July 2004): 231–50.

54 On the fallacy of “reproducing at the level of socialtheory[what] routinely occurs at the level of socialpractice,”see Abizadeh, “Liberal Nationalism versus Postnational Social Integration,” 242 (emphasis in the original).

55 Joppke,Citizenship and Immigration,117; Abizadeh, “Liberal Nationalism versus Postnational Social Integration,” 241-42 (emphasis in the original).

56 Xosé-Manoel Núáez, “What Is Spanish Nationalism Today? From Legitimacy Crisis to Unfulfilled Renovation (1975–2000),”Ethnic and Racial Studies24, no. 5 (2001): 738. According to Núáez, two parallel and overlapping tendencies have emerged within Spanish nationalist discourse: “One is towards emphasizing universal values (individual rights, etc.) as a new basis of legitimizing Spanish patriotism. The other strategy… is to look back in history for respectable forerunners of Spanish progressive liberal nationalism, preferably in the period prior to 1931” (725).

57 As quoted in Keene, “Review Article: Turning Memories into History,” 661.

58 Encarnación, “Reconciliation after Democratization,” 455.

59 Vails, “Spanish Civil War and the Franco Dictatorship,” 161, 168. See alsojoppke,Citizenship and Immigration,chap. 4.

60 In 1989–1990, Gorbachev restarted the rehabilitation process for those who had undergone Stalinist repression that had begun under Nikita Krushchev but had stalled under Leonid Brezhnev. For a review of these late Soviet-era policies, see Nanci Adler, “In Search of Identity: The Collapse of the Soviet Union and the Recreation of Russia,” in Brito, Enríquez, and Fernández, eds.,The Politics of Memory,275–302.

61 Hrechyna and Dubych, eds.,Problema OUN-UPA,82.

62 Statistics as given in an explanatory note to the draft law “On amending the law of Ukraine ‘On the rehabilitation of victims of political repressions in Ukraine’ (about giving UPA fighters status as victims of political repressions).” The Ukrainian National Institute of Strategic Studies, Center for Legislative Support of the Activity of the President of Ukraine, undated 2008 document, available atwww.niss.gov.ua/centr_npz/Work/zapisl .htm (last accessed 3 December 2010).

63 Carsten Humlebaek, “Revisiting the So-Called ‘Pacto de Olvido'” (paper presented at the conference, “New Perspectives on the Spanish Transition,” King's College, London, 18–19 May 2007), 5.

64 On this three-fold division of the political spectrum in Ukraine, see Wilson, Andrew,The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation(New Haven, 2000), chap. 9.Google Scholar

65 Ibid., 191.

66 Ibid., 185.

67 Some of the UPA members committed crimes against civilians during the war. In particular, future UPA members who had previously been in the auxiliary Ukrainian police participated in the German-led extermination of the Jews in 1941–1942, and in 1943 the UPA murdered tens of thousands of ethnic Poles in Volyhn. Timothy Snyder,The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999(New Haven, 2003), chap. 8. In the postwar period, when the UPA fought with the Soviet forces, it also victimized civilians, but the brutality against civilians in western Ukraine committed by the Soviet side was on a much larger scale. Soviet losses during 1944–1953 in west Ukraine totaled 30,676, of which half (15,355) were peasants; 678 NKVD-KGB staff; 1,864 Ministry of Interior staff; 3,199 armed forces and border guards servicemen; 2,590 extermination squad fighters; 2,732 officials of Soviet government organs; 207 Communist Party officials; 314 heads of collective farms; 676 workers; 1,931 intelligentsia members; 860 children, housewives, and elderly. April 1973 KGB report to the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR, as cited in Hrechyna and Dubych, eds.,Problema OUN-UPA,87. During the same period, up to 500,000 people in western Ukraine were repressed by the Soviet side; of them over 153,000 were killed, 134,000 arrested, and 203,000 deported from Ukraine. 26 May 1953 resolution of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, “On the political and economic situation in western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR,” cited after Hrechyna and Dubych, eds.,Problema OUN-UPA,86.

68 The 1944 cutoff for laying down arms contained in the veterans’ law is not a mechanism for excluding OUN and UPA members guilty of war crimes from status. Both future UPA members’ participation in the German-led extermination of the Jews, and the UPA-orchestrated killing and ethnic cleansing of Polish civilians took place largelybefore the 1944 cutoff date established in the veterans’ law. OUN and UPA members sentenced for war crimes were not eligible for rehabilitation under the 1991 rehabilitation law and thus were already barred from veterans’ status. In the unlikely event that some OUN and UPA war criminal could slip through the nets of the Soviet repressive apparatus, the 1944 cutoff in the 1993 veterans’ law in fact left a pathway to veterans’ status open to them if they joined the Soviet side by 1944. By contrast, those who joined the UPA after 1943 and fought the Soviet forces after 1944 but did not participate in the killings of Chilians during 1941–1943 were to be excluded automatically.

69 These initiatives were undermined by uncompromising attitudes and a lack of financing. Failed initiatives are detailed in Hrechyna and Dubych, eds.,Problema OUN-UPA, 3–9. Another useful reference is David R. Marples,Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine(Budapest, 2007).

70 The government commission was formed by a Cabinet of Ministers’ decree dated 12 September 1997. This decree, No. 1004, denned the commission's goals as “[to] study questions related to the activities of the OUN and the UPA and prepare historically and legally grounded conclusions on their activities.“

71 The historians researched fourteen of the most controversial questions pertaining to the OUN-UPA (including the history of its founding and its relations with Nazi Germany, the Ukrainian-Polish conflict, the struggle against the Soviet forces after 1944, and the OUN ideology), and produced three documents: the expert opinion, a collection of archival materials on which the opinion was based, and a collection of scholarly articles by the members of the working group on the fourteen topics.

72 “Uriadova komisia skhvalyla fakhovyi vysnovok robochoi hrupy istorykivz vyvchennia dial'nosti OUN i UPA,” 14 October 2005, at www.kmu.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/news_article?art_id=22511532&cat_id=35883 (last accessed 3 December 2010).

73 The electoral support base for Tymoshenko and especially for the socialists was in central Ukraine, where the attitude toward the OUN and the UPA ranges from negative to ambivalent. According to a 2007 opinion poll, while 70 percent of Our Ukraine voters supported official recognition of the OUN-UPA as fighters for Ukrainian independence, only 57 percent of the Tymoshenko Block voters did. According to the same poll, voters in central Ukraine were divided on the issue (38 percent opposed recognition while 38 percent supported it partly or fully). Central Ukraine was also the region with the largest share of undecided voters on this question (25 percent, compared to 18 percent in Ukraine as a whole). The 5-18 December 2007 poll was conducted by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation and the Ukrainian Sociology Service. “Stavlennia naselennia Ukrainy do nadannia voiakam UPA statusu uchasnykiv natsionarno-vyzvol'nykh zmahan,“’ at dif.org.ua/ua/press/8 (last accessed 3 December 2010). The importance of region as a predictor of attitudes towards the OUN and the UPA has been shown to be statistically significant and more significant than ethnicity, language, or age. See Ivan Katchanovski, “Terrorists or National Heroes? Politics of die OUN and the UPA in Ukraine” (paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Canadian Political Science Association, Montreal, 1–3 June 2010).

74 The status of the drafts is included in table 1.

75 Hrechyna and Dubych, eds.,Problema OUN-UPA,27.

76 The Expertise Directorate noted this in its opinion on the presidents’ draft and recommended sending it back for improvement.

77 anukovych zabere u Bandery ‘heroia’ do Dnia Peremohy,” Ukrains'ka pravda, 5 March 2010, at www.pravda.com.ua/news/2010/03/5/4835668 (last accessed 3 December 2010).

78 “Donets'kyi sud vidibrav u Bandery zvannia heroia,”Ukrains'ka pravda,2 April 2010, at www.pravda.com.ua/news/2010/04/2/4906504/ (last accessed 3 December 2010).

79 Dmytro Hudyma, ‘“Syndrom Bandery': Nepolitychni koreni vidomoi problemy,“Ukrains'ka pravda,25 April 2010, at www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2010/04/25/4961778/ (last accessed 3 December 2010). The Constitutional Court refused to rule on the constitutionality of Iushchenko's decree. Constitutional Court decision No. 19-y/2010 from 6 April 2010.

80 Inaugural speech of the President of Ukraine L. D. Kuchma, National Palace “Ukraine,” 30 November 1999, atwww.brama.com/news/press/991130kuchmainaugural .html (last accessed 3 December 2010).

81 Iushchenko's comments during his appearance on the 8 May 2008 television program,Second World War: Lessons for Ukraine.Transcript at www.president.gov.ua/news/?cat=28 (accessed 5 April 2009; no longer accessible).

82 In other words, it would involve abandoning the logic of the nation-state and an essentially primordial understanding of the nation as an organic entity persisting through time and justifying the existence of “its” state in a modern era.

83 Vera Tolz, “Rethinking Russian-Ukrainian Relations: A New Trend in Nation- Building in Post-Communist Russia?”Nations and Nationalism8, no. 2 (April 2002): 237.

84 Ibid., 246. For an example of the expression of the fear connected to this myth, see remarks by Iulia Zernii, deputy director of the Ukrainian Institute of Strategic Studies, in Iu. O. Zernii, ed.,Istorychna pamiat’ iak pole zmahan’ za identychnisl': Materialy “kruhlogo stolu”(Kiev, 2008), 29–30. The Russian/Soviet historical narrative ultimately “denies the authenticity of Ukrainian and Byelorussian claims to separate nationhood.” Taras Kuzio, “Historiography and National Identity among the Eastern Slavs: Towards a New Framework,“National Identities3, no. 2 (July 2001): 28.

85 Alfred Stepan, “Ukraine: Improbable Democratic ‘Nation-State’ but Possible Democratic ‘State-Nation'?”Post-Soviet Affairs21, no. 4 (October-December 2005): 278.

86 Mark von Hagen, “Does Ukraine Have a History?”Slavic Review54, no. 3 (Fall 1995): 665.

87 Natalia Iakovenko, ed.,Shkil'na istoria ochyma islorykiv-naukovtsiv: Materialy Robochoii narady z monitoringu shkil'nykh pidruchnyniv istorii Ukrainy(Kiev, 2008), 6.

88 Natalia Iakovenko, ‘“Obraz sebe'—'obraz inshoho’ u shkil'nykh pidruchnykah istorii,” in Iakovenko, ed.,Shkil'na istoria ochyma istorykiv-naukovtsiv,114.

89 Among the many problems with self-image, the historians particularly pointed out the anachronistic image of a collective self presented in all the textbooks creates an inferiority complex; promotes acceptance of antisocial behavior and violence by the collective “us“; creates a bipolar worldview of “us” surrounded by “enemy” neighbors; presents an individual as a passive element in a state-political system rather than as an autonomous actor capable of influencing the system; and continues the Soviet educational tradition of transmitting a single correct version of knowledge rather than fostering critical thinking skills. Key criticisms of the working group are summarized in Ukrains'kyi instytiit natsional'noi pamiati,Propozytsii do kontseptsii istorychnoi osvity v Ukraini: Materialy III Robochoi narady z monytorynhu shkil'nykh pidruchnykiv istorii Ukrainy (Kyiv, 18 October 2008)(Kiev, 2009). Also see Iakovenko, ‘“Obraz sebe'—'obraz inshoho.'“

90 Iakovenko, “Obraz sebe'—'obraz inshoho,'” 118.

91 Ibid., 114.

92 Ukrains'kyi instytiit natsional'noi pamiati,Propozytsii do kontseptsii istorychnoi osvity v Ukraini,11.

93 Mari'an Mudryi, “Tenia ‘kolonial'nogo statusu’ Ukrainy u pidruchnykah z istorii,“ in Iakovenko, ed.,Shkil'na istoria ochyma istorykiv-naukovtsiv,39.

94 Iakoveno, ‘“Obraz sebe'—'obraz inshoho,'” 115–16.

95 The historians completed their work on the conception of history teaching in early March 2010. In addition to a 7-page summary of recommended principles of history teaching, the working group also prepared grade-by-grade proposals for the content of history lessons, including the list of topics, their suggested content, and the number of hours for each topic, for history classes in grades 5 though 12. All documents produced by the working group are available at the Web site of the National Memory Institute at www .memory.gov.ua/ua/announce/detail/91.htm (last accessed 3 December 2010).

96 The history of the working group's creation suggests how such an approval could have been secured, likely not by the government itself taking the initiative, but by the government going along with the historians’ proposal. The idea of revising history textbooks came not from the government but from the historians themselves back in 2006, shortly after the National Memory Institute was created. The lushchenko-appointed head of the institute, respected academician Ihor Iukhnovskyi, unsuccessfully tried to persuade Natalia Iakovenko to become his deputy. Having failed, Iukhnovskyi asked Iakovenko what she would be willing to do instead, and she proposed organizing a group of historians to collaborate on conceptualizing history teaching. Iukhnovskyi used his connections in government circles to secure backing for the historians’ work from the deputy prime minister for humanitarian affairs. Natalia Iakovenko, interview, Kiev, 22 June 2010, and Vladyslav Verstiuk, deputy director of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, interview, Kiev, 21 June 2010.

97 “Tabachnyk pro novu kontseptsiiu pidrychnykiv istorii,”BBC Ukrainian Service, 10 April 2010, at www.bbc.co.uk/ukrainian/ukraine/2010/04/100410_tabachnyk_ie_is.shtml (last accessed 3 December 2010).

98 Andrei Khrustalev, Oksana Bogdanova, Taras Kozub, Valerii Zhevachevskii, and Aleksei Zakharov, “Ministr obrazovaniia Dmitrii Tabachnik: ‘Vse ukrainskie studenty mogut poluchit’ diplom evropeiskogo obraztsa,'”Komsomol'skaia pravda—Ukraina28 May 2010.

99 Ukrains'kyi instytut natsional'noi pamiati and Ministerstvo osvity i nauky Ukrainy,Kontseptsia taprohramy vykladannia istorii Ukrainy v shkoli (proekt): Materialy IV ta V Robochykh narad z monytorynhu shkil'nykh pidruchnykiv istorii Ukrainy(Kiev, 2009), 70–71.

100 “Tabachnik predlagaet ne nazyvat’ Vtoruiu Mirovuiu voinu ‘mirovoi,'”Polit.ru, 12 April 2010, at www.polit.ru/news/2010/04/12/tabachnik.html (last accessed 3 December 2010).

101 Ukrains'kyi instytut natsional'noi pamiati and Ministerstvo osvity i nauky Ukrainy,Kontseptsia ta prohramy vykladannia istorii Ukrainy v shkoli,75–78. Overall, the proposed textbook devotes eleven lessons to World War II, of which one full lesson and parts of two other lessons are devoted to the OUN and the UPA. The last of the eleven war-related lessons is meant as a discussion of contentious issues as noted above. With respect to the facts, the historians recommend, in particular, the history of their founding, the origins of the OUN ideology in the context of trends in interwar eastern Europe, various forms of collaboration and resistance in the occupied territories, the causes and consequences of Ukrainian-Polish conflict during the war, and UPA underground activities in the postwar period.

102 Plokhy, Serhii,Ukraine and Russia: Representations of the Past(Toronto, 2008), 255.Google Scholar

103 Ukrains'kyi instytut natsional'noi pamiati,Propozytsii do kontseptsii istorychnoi osvity v Ukraini,21.

104 In fact, Iakovenko argues that the approach to history teaching developed by the working group could highlight the Ukrainianness of the state more effectively than the current approach since it could explain how in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century the Ukrainian idea was attractive to, and the Ukrainian political nation was formed from, people of different ethnic backgrounds. Natalia Iakovenko, interview, Kiev, 22 June 2010.

105 The characterization of western nationalism as civic and eastern as ethnic is drawn from Kohn, Hans, The Idea of Nationalism, a Study in Its Origins and Background(New York, 1944).Google Scholar

106 Snyder, Timothy, “Introduction,” East European Politics and Societies 24, no. 1 (February 2010): 4.Google Scholar