Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 January 2017
Contemporary political events in Poland provoke many questions concerning the old Polish intelligentsia. Has it survived the historical storms of the last thirty years? How potent is the value system of this stratum today? Has its dominating influence on the other strata remained, or does Poland now have a new value system derived from the goals and morals of a different class? The Polish intelligentsia can be analyzed from several standpoints–from the historical or the current perspective, in the light of its national function or its own structure, or as revealed in its aspirations and values. It is the conviction of the author that the value system determines the structure of both the spiritual and the material culture in every social class and stratum.
1. Some of the most important contributions in the prewar discussions are bicki, Zdzislaw Klemens Dę, Krysys inteligencji polskiej (Warsaw, 1919)Google Scholar; Czeslaw Znamierowski, “Elita i demokracja,” Prsegląd Socjologicsny (1928); Kazimierz, Zakrzewski, “Zagadnienie inteligencji,” Droga, 11 (1929): 333–43Google Scholar; Aleksander, Hertz, “Spór o inteligencję,” in his Ludsie i idee (Warsaw, 1931)Google Scholar and “Inteligencja wobec mas,” in Pod snakiem odpowiedsialności i pracy (Warsaw, 1937); Zygmunt, Lempicki, “Problemat inteligencji” Marchoit, vol. 1 (1935)Google Scholar, “Kryzys inteligencji a potrzeby zycia,” Drogi Polski, 1937, no. 10, and “Kryzys inteligencji zawodowej w Polsce,” Drogi Polski, 1937, no. 11-12; Adam Prechnik, “Problem inteligencji,” Sygnaly, Mar. 1, 1937; Jałowiecki, Andrzej, “Mit narodowy,” Prsegląd Wspóícsesny, 1939, no. 201.Google Scholar
2. Chatasiński, Józef, Spolecsna genealogia inteligencji polskiej (Łódź, 1946)Google Scholar and Przeszłość i prsyszłość inteligencji polskiej (Rzym, 1947; Warsaw, 1958).
3. Szczepański, Jan, “Struktura inteligencji w Polsce,” Kultura i Społeczeństwo, 4, no. 1-2 (1960)Google Scholar. The main articles considered here are Stefan, Kieniewicz, “Rodowód inteligencji polskiej,” Tygodnik Powszechny, 1946, no. 15 Google Scholar; Karol Wiktor Zawodziński, “Socjologiczna typizacja a rzeczwisty skład inteligencji polskiej,” Kuinica, 1946, no. 29; Litwin, A, “O spotecznej genealogii inteligencji polskiej,” Kuźnica, 1946, no. 29 Google Scholar; Stefan Zółkiewski, “Obecna sjrtuacja inteligencji polskiej,” Więź, 1947, no. 29 Google Scholar; Sierkierska, J, “O manowcach elitaryzmu i drogach kultury,” Nowa Kultura, 1950, no. 9 Google Scholar; Leszek, Kofakowski, “Intelektualiści a ruch komunistyczny,” Nowe Drogi, 1945, no. 9 Google Scholar; Andrzej, Werblan, “Inteligencja czy nowa warstwa społeczna,” Polityka, 1959, no. 7.Google Scholar
4. Żarnowski, Janusz, Struktura spoleczna inteligencji w Polsce w latach 1918-1939 (Warsaw, 1964).Google Scholar
5. “Inteligencja polska wczoraj i dziś” (a record of the discussion organized by Miesięcznik Literacki, Jan. 23, 1969), Miesięcznik Literacki, 1969, no. 5, pp. 114—25.
6. Lednicki, Wacław, “The Role of the Polish Intellectual in America,” Polish Review, 12, no. 2 (Spring 1967): 40.Google Scholar
7. Łepkowski, Tadeusz, Polska: Narodsiny nowocsesnego narodu, 1764-1870 (Warsaw, 1967).Google Scholar
8. In Russia the term intelligentsia was closely linked with political affiliation. Thus the Russians were more likely to recognize Mensheviks as members of the intelligentsia than even the best-educated Bolsheviks. Seton-Watson, Hugh in A Dictionary of the Social Sciences, ed. Gould, Julius and Kolb, William L. (New York, 1964)Google Scholar, writing mainly on the Russian intelligentsia, noted: “The distinctive and modern culture which such an intelligentsia enjoys separates its members from the rest of society. This sense of isolation, and the vast contrast between the realities of its own society and the modern ideas with which its education has made it familiar, are powerful factors leading first towards uncritical acceptance of revolutionary ideas, and later to leadership and organization of revolutionary action” (p. 341).
We should add that “Westernization” was not synonymous with a friendly attitude toward the West. Even the most “Westernized” Russian usually looked very critically on Western political, social, and economic institutions. Benjamin Schwartz made an interesting comment on this attitude of the Russian intelligentsia: “(it) may spring in part from their implicit awareness that, in a sense, the Petrine state with its bureaucratic, military, and police machine was the most ‘modern’ and ‘rationalized’ sector of Russian society“ (“The Intelligentsia in Communist China: A Tentative Comparison,” in The Russian Intelligentsia, ed. Richard Pipes [New York, 1961], p. 181, n. 3).
9. Marc, Raeff, Origins of the Russian Intelligentsia: The Eighteenth-Century Nobility (New York, 1966).Google Scholar
10. A. N. Radishchev (1749-1802), a writer and thinker of the Russian Enlightenment, was sentenced to death for the anonymously published Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow (1790), in which he attacked all aspects of Russia's social and political life. He was pardoned by Alexander I in 1801. Criticism of his radical views even by his friends induced him to commit suicide. See Lang, David Marshall, The First Russian Radical: Alexander Radishchev, 1749-1802 (London and New York, 1959).Google Scholar
11. Nicolas, Berdyaev, The Origin of Russian Communism, 2nd ed. (Ann Arbor, 1962), p. 19.Google Scholar (One of the popular ways to the higher stratum led through the clergy seminary. Stalin was a typical example of such social mobility; but he was never treated as a member of this class, because of his personal characteristics—boorish, vulgar, mannerless.)
12. Webster's New International Dictionary (2nd ed.) defines intelligentsia as “Informed intellectual people collectively; the educated or professional group, class, or party; —often derisive.“
13. The contemporary historian Andrzej Wyczańsld has also accepted this view: Polska, Rzecsą Pospolitą sslachecką, 1454-1764 (Warsaw, 1965).
14. Lipset, Seymour Martin and Bendix, Reinhard, Social Mobility in Industrial Society (Berkeley, 1959).Google Scholar
15. The first historical book on this problem was written in Poland by Wawrzyniec, Surowiecki, O upadku prsemyslu i tniast w Polssce (Warsaw, 1810).Google Scholar
16. 1794, Kościuszko Insurrection; 1797, Polish legions in Italy; 1830-31, November Uprising; 1846, Cracow Revolution; 1848, Polish contribution to the Spring of Nations; 1863, January Uprising; 1905, Polish contribution to the Russian Revolution; 1914-18, Polish legions under various names participating in World War I.
17. An excellent work on the situation and changes within the Polish gentry in the period 1764-1863, based mainly on archival materials, was published recently: Jerzy, Jedlicki, Klejnot i bariery spolecsne (Warsaw, 1968).Google Scholar
18. Ibid., pp. 390-91.
19. Ibid., p. 422.
20. See Łepkowski, Polska, pp. 133-34.
21. “Russians are always inclined to take things in a totalitarian sense; the sceptical criticism of Western peoples is alien to them… . Among the Russian radical intelligentsia there existed an idolatrous attitude to science itself. When a member of the Russian intelligentsia became a Darwinist, to him Darwinism was not a biological theory subject to dispute, but a dogma, and anyone who did not accept that dogma (e.g., a disciple of Lamarck) awoke in him an attitude of moral suspicion.” Berdyaev, Origin of Russian Communism, p. 21.
22. The Polish-Soviet War, 1919-21, is usually described by Western historians, as well as by Communists, as an imperialistic attempt of the Polish bourgeoisie. However, it should be realized that even if a group of the Polish aristocratic landowners from the Ukraine wanted to save their estates on the old Polish territories, the year-old Polish Republic was too weak, too small, and too devastated (by the aftermath of World War I, when the front lines rolled twice through the country). The actual situation at that time was openly described by Soviet military historians: “operations in Lithuania, White Russia, and Poland devolved on a special military unit named the ‘Western Army.’ The beginning of the offensive depended upon the readiness of the military forces directed to this task; however, it should have begun no later than the end of December 1918. The aims were stated as follows: (1) occupation of White Russia, (2) movement toward Warsaw, including the Western Bug River. The advance of the Red Army to accomplish the specified aims was very successful because Poland was also involved in fighting on other fronts and therefore its Eastern boundaries were poorly defended.” Grazhdanskaia voina, 1918-1921 (Moscow, 1930), 3: 152-54. Quoted by Wiktor, Sukiennicki, Biata Ksicga (Paris, 1964), p. 33–34.Google Scholar
It is also instructive to note Lenin's comment on the war: “Attacking Poland we were by the same token attacking the Entente. By destroying the Polish army, we were destroying the Versailles Treaty upon which the whole present system of international relations depends.” Sochineniia, 3rd ed., 25 (Moscow, 1929): 402. Quoted by Sukiennicki, Biala Księga, p. 45.
It should also be taken into account that the Ukraine, fighting for independence, was invaded by the Bolshevik army. The leader of the young Polish state Józef Pilsudski supporting Ukrainian Marshal Petlura had in mind the Old Poland idea of a federation and not a conquest.
23. [Trentowski, B. F.], Wiserunki dussy narodowej s końca ostatniego szesnastolecia (Paris, 1847), p. viii Google Scholar. (There is an anecdote that reflects the spirit of the Polish leftists. One outstanding revolutionist, when he heard the news about the resurrection of Poland in 1918, said, “I will not believe that Poland is free again until I am arrested by a Polish policeman 1“)
24. Even after more than 150 years the Soviets prohibited Poles from celebrating the anniversary of the constitution, one of the greatest national holidays in Poland. On May 3, 1946, Russian tanks in Cracow broke up a meeting of ten thousand students who tried to celebrate this anniversary for the first time after the war.
The invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 somewhat resembles the invasion of Poland by Russia and Prussia in 1792. Reforms in neighboring countries have always created a danger for despotic establishments.
25. Lipset and Bendix, Social Mobility.
26. Alexander, Hertz, “The Case of an Eastern European Intelligentsia,” Journal of Central European Affairs, 11, no. 1 (January-April 1951): 13.Google Scholar
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28. Maurycy, Mochnacki, “O rewolucji spdecznej w Polsce,” in Pisma Wybrane (Warsaw, 1957).Google Scholar
29. Hanna, Malewska, Apokryf Rodzinny (Kraków, 1965).Google Scholar
30. Bertrand, Russell, The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, 3 vols. (Boston, 1967), 1: 320.Google Scholar
31. Aleksander Gella, “Anarchia a wolność,” PrBegląd Kulturalny (1962).
32. Russell, Autobiography. Recently Maria Ossowska wrote a note about Russell's opinion in “Ethos rycersld w legendach Sredniowiecza,” Studio Socjologicsne, 1968, no. 2 (29).
33. Here we should explain what the definition of an intellectual is in contemporary Polish terminology. When Americans speak of intellectuals, they usually mean “all those who create, distribute, and apply culture” ( Lipset, Seymour Martin, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics [Garden City, N.Y., 1970], p. 311 Google Scholar). In Poland the term is not related to profession or occupation but refers to specific mental and cultural capabilities, and neither academic title nor particular social position can justify the appellation. An intellectual is a man with a higher education who has a wide cultural background, participates (or at least is genuinely interested) in literary and cultural life, and can comprehend the philosophical and political implications of his time. Therefore, not every scholar or scientist is considered to be an intellectual. According to this definition, you can find many more intellectuals among writers and, generally speaking, among men of letters than among specialists in science.
34. The number of Polish citizens who were killed by the Nazis is known, but the number who died in Russian concentration camps is still not established, because we have no exact data on the large number of those exiled to Russia in 1939-41 and in 1944-45. Before World War II Poland had 3.5 million Polish citizens of Jewish origin. Also unaccountable is the number of former Polish citizens of Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Lithuanian stock who remained on the territories annexed to the USSR. According to postwar statistics Poland lost 223 out of every 1, 000 persons (the USSR lost 40 persons out of every 1, 000, the United States, 1.4).
35. Boleslaw, Olszewicz, Lista strat kultury polskiej (Wroclaw, 1947).Google Scholar
36. Szczepański, Jan, “The Polish Intelligentsia: Past and Present,” World Politics, 14, no. 3 (April 1962): 414.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
37. Whyte, William H., Jr., The Organisation Man (New York, 1956).Google Scholar
38. Główny Urząd Statystyczny, Rocznik Statystycsny, 1968.
39. Szczepański, Jan, “Inteligencja a pracownicy umysłowi,” Prsegląd Socjologicsny, 13 (1959), no. 2.Google Scholar
40. Translation based on the English version of an underground publication by Górecki, Juliusz (Aleksander Kamiński), Stones for the Rampart (London, 1945).Google Scholar
41. Many of them survived that moment when the Resistance Radio broadcast to the West from dying Warsaw one of its last messages: “This is the stark truth. We were treated worse than Hitler's satellites, worse than Italy, Rumania, Finland. May God, who is just, pass judgment on the terrible injustices suffered by the Polish nation.” Col. Iranek-Osmecki, Kazimierz, “Warsaw Uprising—The Polish View,” in History of the Second World War, vol. 5, no. 13, 3/6 (published by Purnell in 96 weekly parts, London)Google Scholar.
42. Wydarsenia Marcowe (Paris, 1968).
43. The problem was recently undertaken by Suchodolski, B., “Wychowanie pokoleii w okresie 1918-1968,” Miesigcznik Literacki, 1969, no. 3.Google Scholar
44. The vice-premier of the Polish government, three ministers, the last commander in chief of the Polish underground army, the most distinguished representatives of the four main Polish political parties, and leaders of the Polish underground movement were arrested by Russian military authorities. They came to meet Colonel-General Ivanov, representative of the High Command of the First Belorussian Front, on the basis of his written invitation for the purpose of conversations on Polish-Soviet relations, and were given the Russian “officer's word” concerning their security. “Documents Concerning the Sixteen Polish Leaders Arrested and Tried in Moscow,” Republic of Poland Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Confidential, unpublished mimeographed report (London, 1945), no. 5, p. 4.