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German Policy in the Eastern Baltic Sea in 1918: Expansion or Anti-Bolshevik Crusade?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2017

Holger H. Herwig
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Extract

The Bolshevik Revolution in November 1917 offered Germany the first serious prospect of ending the two-front war dilemma. General Erich Ludendorff, anticipating resultant cessation of major military operations in the East, decided to seek a military victory in the West. But the ensuing peace negotiations with the Bolsheviks at Brest-Litovsk revealed basic policy differences within the German camp. Richard Kühlmann, state secretary of the Foreign Office, felt that the Bolshevik victory had sufficiently crippled Russia's armed might and had thereby eased the military burden in the East. Kühlmann as well as his successor, Admiral Paul von Hintze, successfully opposed all proposals to oust the Bolsheviks. Because they both believed that Bolshevik rule would assure long-term chaos in Russia, they sought a compromise peace in the East. The Foreign Office, through the first German ambassadors to Moscow, Count Wilhelm von Mirbach-Harff and Karl Helfferich, even extended financial aid to the Bolsheviks in order to keep them out of the Entente camp. In short, Germany's diplomats possessed a clear conception of their policies regarding the Bolsheviks and were consistent in them, desiring no armed conflict in the East but rather a concentration of military might in the West. The Army Supreme Command, and especially Ludendorff, rejected any compromise formula in the East, despite the decision of November 1917 to seek a military victory in the West. Ludendorff sought to end the war with either victory or defeat. Nonetheless, in the summer of 1918 he proved willing temporarily to accept the plan of the Foreign Office to cooperate with the Bolsheviks and “use” them to attain German goals, a decision that paralleled his original agreement in April 1917 to transport the Bolshevik leaders in Switzerland to Russia.

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Articles
Information
Slavic Review , Volume 32 , Issue 2 , June 1973 , pp. 339 - 357
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies. 1973

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References

1. The Kaiser hoped to join the Baltic states to Prussia under personal union as well as to place one of his sons (Oskar) on the throne of Finland. The latter plan was thwarted by the German kings and princes who forced Wilhelm to agree to Prince Karl von Hessen as the official candidate. Friedrich Karl was, in fact, elected king by the Finnish Parliament on October 9, 1918, but the unfavorable outcome of the war forced him to decline the invitation. See Winfried, Baumgart, Deutsche Ostpolitik, 1918 : Von Brest-Litowsk bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges (Vienna and Munich, 1966), p. Munich.Google Scholar

2. Cited ibid., pp. 24-27.

3. Bukharin, Kamenev, and Zinoviev led the fight against acceptance of the Brest- Litovsk treaty because of what R. V. Daniels calls the “conscience of the revolution.“ The Bolshevik Left believed that the existing level of revolutionary élan made it unnecessary to concede to the Germans what the latter had held since 1915 : Russian Poland and Courland-Lithuania.

4. Cited in Baumgart, Deutsche Ostpolitik, p. 68.

5. An analysis of German-Finnish relations in this period is beyond the scope of this paper. See especially Baumgart, Deutsche Ostpolitik, and the following works : Der Krieg zur See, 1914-1918 (Frankfurt, 1964), vol. Ostsee III (this is the official German naval history of World War I edited by Rear Admiral Eberhard von Mantey); Walther, Hubatsch, “Finnland in der deutschen Ostseepolitik, 1917/18,” Ostdeutsche Wissenschaft, 2 (1956) : 55 ff.Google Scholar; Fritz, Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht : Die Kriegszielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland, 1914/1918 (Düsseldorf, 1964), pp. 606–84Google Scholar; Smith, C. Jay, Jr., Finland and the Russian Revolution, 1917-1922 (Athens, Georgia, 1958)Google Scholar; Gustav, Mannerheim, Erinnerungen (Zurich and Freiburg, 1952)Google Scholar; Rudolf, Nadolny, Mein Beitrag (Wiesbaden, 1955)Google Scholar; Edvard, Hjelt, Från handelserikaar, 2 vols. (Helsingfors, 1919)Google Scholar; and Rüdiger Count von der Goltz, Meine Sendung in Finnland und im Baltikum (Leipzig, 1920), which appeared in altered form during the Nazi era in a new edition.

6. Cited in Winfried, Baumgart, “Unternehmen ‘SchluBstein' : Zur militärisch-politischen Geschichte des Ersten Weltkrieges,” Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 19 (1969) : 220 Google Scholar. On February 8, 1918, the German military attaché reported : “It is not only in our interest that the Finnish war of independence be successfully completed, but also that the Red tide, which from Finland threatens Sweden and then Germany, be shored up. A victory by the Red Guards in Finland strengthens the process of disintegration at home. … [German] rule in Finland offers us the added tremendous military advantage of being near the gates of Petersburg, a situation that offers great military possibilities” (Hubatsch, “Finnland in der deutschen Ostseepolitik,” p. 55). I have throughout retained the German “Petersburg” in direct quotations.

7. Ludendorff feared that “a new Russia hostile to Germany could arise” Russia would constitute a threat in the future regardless of her form of government. See BAMA, F 163/PG 75677, Laufende Marinepolitik : protocol of May 14, 1918, discussion between Ludendorff, Holtzendorff, General Paul von Bartenwerffer, Rear Admiral Walter Baron von Keyserlingk, and Captain Wilhelm von Bülow. The documents cited in this article, unless otherwise noted, are deposited at the Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv (BAMA) in Freiburg, West Germany.

8. Cited in Baumgart, “Unternehmen ‘Schluβstein, '” p. 221. Bartenwerffer to General Rüdiger von der Goltz.

9. BA-MA, F 4055, Kommando der Hochseestreitkräfte : KTB. See the entry for February 27, 1918, containing Trotha’s memorandum on the meeting with Admiral von Holtzendorff concerning German naval policy in the Baltic region. The navy had driven the Russian Baltic Fleet out of the Moon Sound Islands in October 1917, and out of Reval (Tallinn) in February 1918. Both admirals were well aware that most of the Russian Baltic Fleet was still based in Finnish ports, especially at its main base, Sveåborg Island, just off downtown Helsinki. Consequently they rightly surmised that the German navy would have to play a major role in the prospective operations against Finland.

10. Ostsee III, pp. 349-56. See also Smith, Finland and the Russian Revolution, pp. 64-65.

11. Ostsee III, p. 433. Mannerheim, a former Russian army officer, was decidedly anti-German.

12. Cited in Baumgart, Deutsche Ostpolitik, p. 98.

13. Rear Admiral Meurer left Danzig on April 1 with the battleships Westfalen, Rheinland, and Posen, the cruisers Kolberg, Stralsund, and Nautilus, the auxiliary cruiser Möve, and numerous supporting craft. He arrived in Hanko three days later, and on April 5 landed 9, 000 men and supplies of the Baltic Division. Between April 5 and 11 the navy transported the 3, 000-man brigade of Colonel Baron von Brandenstein from Reval to Valkom, about one hundred miles east of Helsinki. The navy also supported military operations on the islands of Utö, Korpo, and Nagu as well as in the coastal cities of Kimito, Ekenäs, and Åbo (Turku)—all located in the southwest corner of Finland. On April 11 the battleship Rheinland ran upon rock formations in the Baltic Sea and was lost for the rest of the war. See Ostsee III, pp. 380-91.

14. On April S Meurer negotiated the Hanko Agreement with the Soviet Russians whereby the latter agreed not to destroy port facilities or ships in Helsinki and to disarm all Russian vessels in that harbor. The Germans, in turn, allowed the Soviet Russians to move their ships to Kronstadt, if they could get them there through the ice. See Ostsee III, pp. 386-89. The Bolshevik naval forces in Helsinki consisted of four battleships, thirteen destroyers, thirty-nine torpedo boats, and sixteen submarines; there were also four British submarines in Helsingfors. See Smith, Finland and the Russian Revolution, pp. 75-76.

15. BA-MA, F 2022/PG 645984, Admiralstab der Marine : Immediatvorträge, vol. 31, p. 99. Meurer had arrived in Helsinki on April 12; four hundred German sailors took part in the street fighting against Red Guards. Meurer reported on April 30 that he was ready to leave Helsinki and return his naval forces to the North Sea. See ibid., pp. 126-27, for the Admiralty Staff’s memorandum of April 25, 1918, for discussion of the Finland operation to be held with Wilhelm II between April 11 and 14.

16. Ibid., p. 99. Decision of April 8, 1918.

17. George F. Kennan, Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920, vol. 2 : The Decision to Intervene (Princeton, 1958), pp. 16-17. For the Allied intervention see also Alfred, Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914-1917 : Being Chiefly Extracts front the Diary of a Military Attaché (London, 1921), vol. 2 Google Scholar; Charles, Maynard, The Murmansk Venture (London, 1928)Google Scholar; Henry, Newbolt, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Naval Operations (London, 1931), vol. 5 Google Scholar; Lockhart, Robert Bruce, Memoirs of a British Agent (London, 1932)Google Scholar; Richard H. Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917-1921, vol. 1 : Intervention and the War (Princeton, 1961); and John, Bradley, Allied Intervention in Russia [1917-1920] (New York, 1968).Google Scholar

18. Baumgart, “Unternehmen ‘Schluβstein, ’” p. 174.,

19. BA-MA, Nachlass Vanselow, F 7608. Captain Reinhold von Fischer-Lossainen to Captain Ernst Vanselow, chief of the political department of the Admiralty Staff.

20. BA-MA, Nachlass Keyserlingk, N 161, vol. 1, p. 8. These reports have been published by Winfried Baumgart, “Die militärpolitischen Berichte des Freiherrn von Keyserlingk aus Petersburg, Januar-Februar 1918,” Vierteljahrshefle für Zeitgeschichte, 15 (1967) : 87-104.

21. BA-MA, Nachlass Keyserlingk, N 161, vol. 1, pp. 21-22.

22. BA-Koblenz, Reichsinstitut für Geschichte des neuen Deutschland, R. 1. Berichte von Holtzendorff, vol. 15. Report of Arndt von Holtzendorff to Albert Ballin, Apr. 24, 1918. These reports to Ballin, head of the Hamburg-America shipping line, were by the brother of Admiral von Holtzendorff. The material is deposited at the federal archive in Koblenz, West Germany.

23. Cited in Baumgart, “Unternehmen ‘Schluβstein, ’ ” p. 222.

24. BA-MA, F 591/PG 69261, Murman. Ludendorff to Holtzendorff, May 24, 1918.

25. Ibid. Holtzendorff’s memoranda for Ludendorff, May 28, 1918, and June 20, 1918.

26. Görlitz, Walter, ed., Regierte der Kaiser? Kriegstagebücher, Aufzeichnungen und Briefe des Chefs des Marine-Kabinetts Admiral Georg Alexander von Milller, 1914-1918 (Göttingen, 1959), p. 377.Google Scholar

27. Cited in Baumgart, “Unternehmen ‘Schluβstein, ’” pp. 226-27 (italics in original).

28. BA-MA, F 7549 A7, Akten des Marinemitgliedes der Ukrainedelegation.

29. BA-MA, F 7877, Asto Oberost. Akten betr. Schluβstein-Operation, vol. 1, p. 1.

30. Cited in Hans W., Gatzke, “Zu den deutsch-russischen Beziehungen im Sommer 1918,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 3 (1955) : 85.Google Scholar

31. Cited ibid., p. 91.

32. Cited in Baumgart, Deutsche Ostpolitik, p. 195.

33. BA-MA, F 7877, vol. 1, pp. 2-3.

34. Ibid., pp. 3-4.

35. “The Soviet regime was in a difficult position, struggling with serious internal problems of famine, economic collapse, and counterrevolution, and simultaneously fighting off external attacks from separatists, White Russians, and Allied forces already in Russia. Six separate offensives were being launched against the Bolsheviks on as many different fronts.” Thompson, John M., Russia, Bolshevism, and the Versailles Peace (Princeton, 1966), p. 87.Google Scholar

36. Cited in Baumgart, Deutsche Ostpolitik, p. 106; and Baumgart, “Unternehmen ȘSchluβstein, ’ ” p. 332 (italics in original).

37. Baumgart, “Unternehmen ‘Schluβstein, ’ ” p. 333.

38. BA-MA, F 4055, Kommando der Hochseestreitkräfte : KTB. Entry for Aug. 5, 1918.

39. BA-MA, F 786/PG 77640, Kommando der Hochseestreitkräfte, Sonderverband “Schluβstein.” Firle to Holtzendorff, Aug. 5, 1918.

40. Colonel Peter Durnov, former General Staff chief of the Guard Cavalry, contacted the Germans in an attempt to restore the monarchy in Russia under Grand Duke Paul Alexandrovich. A. F. Trepov, Russian premier in November/December 1916, sought German assistance in his efforts to elevate Paul Alexandrovich to the Regency with the help of Generals Yudenich or Denikin. A certain naval lieutenant named Alberts also turned to the Germans on behalf of General Yudenich. All asked for financial and military aid on behalf of various monarchist circles. See Baumgart, Deutsche Ostpolitik, pp. 324-26, n. 80.

41. BA-MA, F 7680 A16, Akten des Marinemitgliedes der Ukrainedelegation, pp. 22-23.

42. Baumgart, “Unternehmen ‘Schluβstein, ’ ” pp. 33S-38.

43. BA-MA, F 7877, vol. 1. Holtzendorff to Admiralty Staff, Aug. 6, 1918.

44. Ibid. Holtzendorff to Ludendorff, Aug. 8, 1918.

45. Ibid. Asto Oberost. Akten betr. G. G. Nachrichten “Kronstadt,” vol. la. Agent report no. 1417.

46. Baumgart, Deutsche Ostpolitik, p. 112. Lenin’s order came on August 9, 1918.

47. BA-MA, F 7877, vol. 1, passim. See also BA-MA, Nachlass Hipper, N 162, vol. 8, pp. 25-26.

48. BA-MA, F 4055. Protocol of Aug. 11, 1918, meeting in Kovno.

49. BA-MA, F 786/PG 77640. Weizsäcker to Admiralty Staff in Berlin, Aug. 15, 1918.

50. Ibid. Scheer to Boedicker, Aug. 17, 1918.

51. BA-MA, F 7877, vol. 1, pp. 29-30.

52. Ibid., pp. 27-28.

53. Ibid., pp. 53-60.

54. Ibid., vol. la, p. 26. Major Wachenfeld of the Army Supreme Command to Admiral Scheer (italics in original).

55. Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 32, 34.

56. Ibid. Boedicker to Scheer, Aug. 29, 1918.

57. Nowak, Karl Friedrich, ed., Die Aufzeichnungen des Generalmajors Max Hoffmann, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1929), 1 : 205–6Google Scholar. Entry for Aug. 19, 1918.

58. Baumgart, “Unternehmen ‘Schluβstein, ’ ” p. 352.

59. BA-MA, F 4055/PG 64725. Entry for Sept. 5, 1918.

60. See BA-MA, Nachlass Levetzow, N 239, box 22, vol. 1. See also Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung, pp. 23-24.

61. Baumgart, “Unternehmen ‘Schluβstein, ’ ” p. 354.

62. “The Papers of Ernst von Weizsäcker,” letter of Sept. 12, 1918, to his father Carl von Weizsäcker, minister president of the Kingdom of Württemberg. These papers are being prepared for publication by Professor L. E. Hill of the University of British Columbia, to whom I am indebted for permission to use the material.

63. Baumgart, “Unternehmen ‘Schluβstein, ’” p. 411.

64. BA-MA, Nachlass Levetzow, N 239, box 22, vol. 1, pp. 23-24.

65. Baumgart, “Unternehmen ‘Schluβstein, ’ ” p. 411.

66. See Hubatsch, “Finnland in der deutschen Ostseepolitik,” pp. 76-77. See also note 1 above. General Mannerheim was elected regent in November 1918.

67. Cited in Baumgart, “Unternehmen ‘Schlustein, ’ ” p. 413.