Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 January 2017
Winning elections is so vital for Russian leaders that competing viewpoints on national television news channels have been scotched, together with the channels that broadcast them. This study examines the other side of the screen: how participants in focus groups in four Russian cities process national channels' treatments of an important regional electoral campaign. The study was conducted during the last period in which viewpoint diversity was still available via TV-6. Unlike findings about other news stories, election stories appear to have little connection to viewers' experiences and values and deprive them of using familiar heuristics to make sense of the stories. For the public, the election story is a genre apart, framed by the same confusing template no matter what the office or region. Even TV-6, soon to be shuttered, broadcast its combative message using that template, thus extinguishing any opportunity for identifying genuine diversity and leaving the audience unable to distinguish between state and private channels, something they easily did for other types of stories. Election stories only cue other election stories. It is mainly younger, "post-Soviet" participants who bring an alternative frame to watching: norms, acquired through their education, by which election stories in a democracy ought to be constructed.
I would like to thank Leila Vasilieva, Olga Oslon, and Victoria Frolova for their invaluable assistance and the Markle Foundation for partial support of this study.
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27 The full transcript of the news stories may be requested from the author.
28 Channel 1 did not cover the election diat day. In any case, its stories were usually considerably shorter and the government view was better developed on Channel 2.
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38 The points I make here and the reaction of the focus group participants bears a superficial resemblance to American research on negative advertising. Among political scientists in the United States, there is a vigorous debate about negative political advertising and its role in depressing turnout, and the findings are still quite mixed. Thus, even in the U.S. literature, the association between negative ads and voter turnout is still unclear. In addition, it would be a further error to layer onto the Russian electoral scene what is very distant from it: American voting behavior.
39 In the short supplementary questionnaire, I used news of Chechnia for several reasons: the issue is of importance to all regions; Chechnia is geographically much closer to Rostov-on-Don and even Volgograd than to the other two cities, and I wanted to see whether that made a difference in media consumption patterns; it was—and remains— an issue about which views differ significantly. Thus, although Chechnia was not a subject specifically brought up with respect to elections, it was an important cue for information consumption. Moreover, Chechnia did come up spontaneously in conversations about the oil pipeline in terms of its likely vulnerability to terrorism.