The research for this paper was conducted with financial assistance from the Research Support Scheme of the Open Society Institute/Higher Education Support Program, grant number 372/1997, and the Regional Scholar Exchange Program of the American Councils for International Education: ACTR/ACCELS. The author expresses sincere gratitude to the staff of the Russian and East European Center and the Slavic Library at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, for their assistance in writing this paper.

1 See, for example, Avrekh, A. la., Tsarizm v TV Duma, 1912-1914 (Moscow, 1981);Google Scholar Diakin, V. S., Burzhuaziia, dvorianstvo i tsarizm v 1911–1914 gg.: Razlozhenie tret'eiiun’skoi sistemy (Leningrad, 1988);Google Scholar Anan'ich, B. V., Ganelin, R. Sh., and Paneiakh, V. M., eds., Vlast’ i reformy: Ot samodenhavnoi k sovetskoi Rossii (St. Petersburg, 1996);Google Scholar Hosking, Geoffrey A., The Russian Constitutional Experiment: Government and Duma, 1907–1914 (Cambridge, Eng., 1973);Google Scholar Manning, Roberta T., The Crisis of the Old Order in Russia: Gentry and Government (Princeton, 1982);Google Scholar Waldron, Peter, Between Two Revolutions: Stolypin and IhePolitics of Renewal in Russia (DeKalb, 1998).Google Scholar

2 See Manning, Crisis of the Old Order in Russia, 325–71; Wcislo, Francis W., Reforming Rural Russia: State, Local Society and National Politics, 1855–1914 (Princeton, 1990), 243–304.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 See Korros, Alexandra S., “Legislative Chamber History Overlooked: The State Council of the Russian Empire, 1906–1917,” in Geifman, Anna, ed., Russia under the Last Tsar: Opposition and Subversion (Oxford, 1999), 241–68;Google Scholar Borodin, A. P., Gosudarstvennyi Sovet Rossii (1906–1917) (Kirov, 1999), 169–234.Google Scholar

4 This term normally refers to the new configuration of political institutions developed under the influence of revolution and reform.

5 See, for example, Edelman, Robert, Gentry Politics on the Eve of the Russian Revolution: The Nationalist Party, 1907–1917 (New Brunswick, 1980), 200–201;Google Scholar McDonald, David M., “The Durnovo Memorandum in Context: Official Conservatism and the Crisis of Autocracy,” Jahrbucherfur Geschichte Osteuropas 44, no. 4 (1996): 481–502;Google Scholar Solov'ev, Iu. B., Samoderzhaviei dvorianstvo v 1907–1914 gg. (Leningrad, 1990), 152–70.Google Scholar

6 Tikhomirov, L. A., “Nuzhny li printsipy?” in Tikhomirov, , Kreforme obnovlennoi Rossii (stat'i 1909, 1910, 1911 gg.) (Moscow, 1912), 69.Google Scholar

7 See, for example, Huntington, Samuel, “Conservatism as Ideology,” American Political Science Review 51, no. 2 (1957): 454–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8 An interpretation of conservatism as an ideology of preserving the status quo may lead to the allegation that champions of so-called real socialism were direct descendants of Edmund Burke. See, for example, Tannsjo, Torbjorn, Conservatism for Our Time (London, 1990).Google Scholar The thesis that conservatism cannot be reduced to a simple defense of the status quo and opposition to change is widespread in contemporary historical and sociological literature. See, for example, Honderich, Ted, Conservatism (London, 1990);Google Scholar Quinton, A., “Conservatism,” in Goodwin, Robert E. and Pettit, Philip, eds., A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford, 1993), 244–68;Google Scholar Muller, Jerry Z., “What Is Conservative Social and Political Thought?” in Muller, Jerry Z., ed., Conservatism: An Anthology of Social and Political Thought from David Hume to the Present (Princeton, 1997), 3–31.Google Scholar Of special interest in this regard is D. Allen’s judgment concerning the conservative’s natural alienation from the status quo. Without this alienation, the transformation from nonreflecting traditionalism to conservatism as a particular ideological construction would be inconceivable. See Allen, D., “Modern Conservatism: The Problem of Definition,” Review of Politics 43, no. 4 (1981): 583–603.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

9 Analogous to this is the credo presented in the Fourth Duma by the Center group headed by P. N. Krupenskii, which included many influential politicians who were former members of Russian national factions. The chairman of the group, V. N. L'vov, formulated its credo as follows: “monarchic authority, Russian nationality [narodnost’], the orthodox church.” See Gosudarstvennaia Duma: Stenograficheskie otchety, sozyv chetvertyi, sessiia I, ch. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1913), stb. 359.

10 See Weeks, Theodore R., Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863-1914 (DeKalb, 1996), 195.Google Scholar

11 On the problem of the correlation between imperial interests and the interests of the Russian population of the empire, see Hosking, Geoffrey, “Empire and Nation- Building in Late Imperial Russia,” in Hosking, Geoffrey and Service, Robert, eds., Russian Nationalism: Past and Present (New York, 1998), 19–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar During the course of 1912–1913, several practical steps were taken toward the formation of a conservative political group on the foregoing platform. See Diakin, Burzhuaziia, dvorianstvo i tsarizm v 1911–1914 gg., 54–55, 169–70.

12 “Gosudarstvennyi skandal,” Pis'ma k blizhnim, 1909, no. 3:214.

13 V. P. Meshcherskii, “Dnevniki,” Grazhdanin, 1911, no. 15:15.

14 In the opinion of A. N. Bokhanov, “a reverent attitude toward the autocracy is the only reliable criterion for determining whether specific individuals or concrete groups belong to the conservative segment.” “Russkii konservatizm: Problemy, podkhody, mneniia,“ Otechestvennaia istoriia, 2001, no. 3:113.

15 Gringmut, V. A., “Chto pro nas govoriat,” in Gringmut, , Sobranie statei (Moscow, 1910), 4:391.Google Scholar

16 Gosudarstvennaia Duma: Stenograficheskie otchety, sozyvtretii, sessiial, ch. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1908), stb. 156.

17 Ibid., sessiia II, ch. 2 (St. Petersburg, 1909), stb. 461–62. Many other conservatives also spoke out against characterizing the Russian autocrat as an absolute monarch. See, for example, Gringmut, V. A., Istoriia narodovlastiia (Moscow, 1908), 9;Google Scholar Sharapov, S. F., Samoderzhavie Hi konstitutsiia? (Pervye shagi 3–i “Dumy solidnoi bestolochi“) (St. Petersburg, 1908), 22–23.Google Scholar

18 [N. D. Obleukhov], P. Ukhtubuzhskii, “Neogranichennaia monarkhiia, a ne konstitutsionnaia,” Priamoi put', 27 March 1910, 676.Google Scholar

19 Kazanskii, P. E., Vlast’ Vserossiiskogo Imperatora: Ocherki deistvuiushchego russkogo prava (Odessa, 1913), 135.Google Scholar Of conservative politicians, N. E. Markov spoke out more often than others on the immutability of the essence of tsarist power. See, for example, Gosudarstvennaia Duma: Stenograficheskie otchety, sozyv tretii, sessiia II, ch. 2 (St. Petersburg, 1909), stb. 2354–55.

20 See Kazanskii, Vlast’ Vserossiiskogo Imperatora; Gringmut, Istoriia narodovlastiia, 68; L. A. Tikhomirov, “Narodnoe predstavitel’stvo v zakonodatel'nom dele,” in Tikhomirov, K reforme obnovlennoi Rossii (stat'i 1909, 1910, 1911 gg.), 263. The model of the monarch’s action on 3 June 1907 is often cited as an important argument supporting this claim. For conservatives, the events of the third of June created a precedent, an additional basis for analogous action in the future. According to them, in this case, this right went hand in hand with political practice. See, for example, V. A. Gringmut, “S nami bog! S nami tsar! Rech', proiznesennaia 17 iiunia 1907 g. na Obshchem Sobranii Riazanskogo Otdela Soiuza Russkogo Naroda,” in Gringmut, Sobranie statei, 4:360.

21 Diary of Bogdanovich, A. V., entry for 3 October 1907, in Bogdanovich, Tri poslednikh samoderzhtsa (Moscow, 1924), 429.Google Scholar

22 Diary of A. A. Kireev, entry for 22 December 1908. Otdel rukopisei Rossiiskoi Gosudarstvennoi Biblioteki (OR RGB), f. 126, k. 14,1. 343ob. A. S. Stishinskii also noted the tsar’s “weakness of character.” See Bogdanovich’s diary entry for 8 June 1908, in Bogdanovich, Tri poslednikh samoderzhtsa, 447. See also Suvorin’s, A. S. diary entry for 23 July 1907, in Suvorin, Dnevnik (Moscow, 1992), 448.Google Scholar

23 Diary of B. V Nikol’skii, entry for 1 July 1912. Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv (RGIA), f. 1006, op. 1, d. 4b, 1. 254.

24 Borodin, Gosudarstvennyi sovet Rossii, 59.

25 See references to this in Bogdanovich’s diary, entries for 10 June 1908, 21 November 1908, and 31 August 1909. Bogdanovich, Tri poslednikh samoderzhtsa, 447, 454, 466.

26 Diary of Nikol’skii, entries for 1 July 1912 and 28 October 1913. RGIA, f. 1006, op. 1, d. 4b, 11. 254 and 325ob.

27 A. S. Viazigin to M. M. Borodkin, 11 January 1913. Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF), f. 102, op. 265, d. 916, 1. 68. The reasons for the conservatives' unrest were obvious: rumors compromising the royal line were taken as a threat to monarchical ideals. About the role of similar types of rumors in the desacralization of the monarchy, see Figes, Orlando and Kolonitskii, Boris, Interpreting the Russian Revolution: The Language and Symbols of 1917 (New Haven, 1999), 9–29.Google Scholar

28 Diary of Nikol’skii, entry for 28 October 1913. RGIA, f. 1006, op. 1, d. 4b, 1. 325ob. According to testimony of a memoirist, “in the most conservative circles … one found that it would be a great act of good fortune if Rasputin were to die.” Dzhunkovskii, V. F., Vospominaniia (Moscow, 1997), 2:335.Google Scholar

29 “Sovremennoe pravosudie,” Dym otechestva, 1914, no. 22:1–2.

30 See, for example, “Materialy dlia kharakteristiki kontrrevoliutsii v 1905 g. Iz perepiski Borisa Nikol’skogo s Antoniem Volynskim,”Byloe, 1923, no. 21:156–86; Ignat'ev, A. A., Piat'desiat let v stroiu (Moscow, 1953), 1:22;Google Scholar Naumov, A. N., Iz utselevshikh vospominanii, 1868–1917 (New York, 1955), bk. 2, p. 217.Google Scholar

31 M. M. Andronnikov to A. A. Orlov, 12 September 1907. RGIA, f. 1617, op. 1, d. 75, 1. 3. In 1913, A. I. Guchkov gave an analogous description to the position of the Octobrists: “We must defend the monarchy against those who are natural defenders of a monarchic principle.” Cited from Miliukov, P. N., Vospominaniia (Moscow, 1990), 2:141.Google Scholar

32 For general characteristics of the political views of Nicholas II, see Steinberg, Mark D. and Khrustalev, Vladimir M., The Fall of the Romanovs: Political Dreams and Personal Struggles in a Time of Revolution (New Haven, 1995), 1–37.Google Scholar To all appearances, the tsar was close to those conservatives who wished to bring to naught the results of die political transformations of die revolutionary years. According to Richard Wortman, Nicholas II viewed die electoral law of 3 June 1907 as just the first step toward a renewal of autocratic power. Wortman, Richard, Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy (Princeton, 2000), 2:527.Google Scholar

33 Naumov, Iz utselevshikh vospominanii, bk. 2, p. 214. The writings of V M. Purishkevich also attest to such attitudes. In late 1917, having been arrested on charges of participating in a plot against the Bolsheviks, Purishkevich resolutely rejected any suspicion of an intention to reinstate the Romanov dynasty. Even if his striving to divest himself of any blame in die monarchic plot can easily be blamed on the situation, the argumentation deserves more serious consideration. Preparing to speak in court, Purishkevich oudined theses that can be taken as a direct continuation of the reasoning of prewar conservatives: “I am a monarchist, but, alas, now merely an ideologue of monarchism. 1. For I have no candidate. 2. It would be ridiculous, having formed a plot, to secure a monarchy without naming a tsar. 3. Whom? Nicholas II? The sick heir and regency of Aleksandra Fedorovna, a woman whose name I cannot stand to hear? Mikhail Aleksandrovich, who has said openly that he is awaiting the will of the Constituent Assembly. Whom? Whom? Tell me, judges, for I do not know anyone.” Purishkevich, “‘;27 fevralia my mogli stat'grazhdanami’: Tiuremnye zapisi V M. Purishkevicha, dekabr’ 1917-mart 1918 gg.,” Istoricheskii arkhiv, 1996, no. 5/6:126.

34 R. Uortman [R. Wortman], “Nicholas II i obraz samoderzhaviia,” Istoriia SSSR, 1991, no. 2:127.

35 Moskovskie vedomosti, 27 September 1911. Three days earlier, the semiofficial Rossiia had come out with analogous reasoning. See Rossiia, 24 September 1911.

36 Russkii monarkhicheskii soiuz i rasshirenie ego deiatel'nosti po osnovam Vysochaishego reskripta 30 ianvaria 1914 g. (Moscow, 1914), 1.

37 Gosudarstvennaia Duma: Stenograficheskie otchety, sozyv tretii, sessiia I, ch. 1, stb. 314.

38 Kuzmin, S., Pod gnetom svobod (Zapiski natsionalista) (St. Petersburg, 1910), 1:170.Google Scholar

39 A. A. Kireev to D. F. Samarin, 8 October 1907. OR RGB, f. 265, k.156, d. 10, 1. 106ob.

40 This does not mean that the right liked none of the ministers, of course. The issue here concerns attitudes toward the government as a whole. At the same time, conservatives tended to exaggerate the solidarity of members of the ministry. However, historians disagree substantially about die coordination of actions undertaken by the heads of individual departments. See, for example, M. F. Florinskii, “Kabinet P. A. Stolypina i problema edinstva gosudarstvennogo upravleniia v 1906–1911 gg.,” Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta, seriia 2, istoriia, iazykoznanie, literaturovedenie, no. 2 (1993), 34; Korros, “Legislative Chamber History Overlooked,” 258.

41 Paskhalov, K. N., “Slova i dela,” in Paskhalov, , Sbornik statei, vozzvannii, zapisok, rechei, pisem. iproch. (Moscow, 1909), 2:358.Google Scholar

42 B. M. Iuzefovich to B. V. Nikol’skii, 7 August 1907. GARF, f. 588, op. 1, d. 910a, 11. 90–90ob. Emphasis in the original.

43 A. A. Rimskii-Korsakov to A. P. Rogovich, 8 June 1907. GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 213,1. 56.

44 Gosudarstvennaia Duma: Stenograficheskie otchety, sozyv tretii, sessiiall, ch. 2, stb. 1499. This declaration was given special significance by the fact that the Ministry of Internal Affairs actively supported V M. Purishkevich and his allies I. I. Vostorgov and N. E. Markov in their aspiration to make the Russian right more moderate, pushing back A. I. Dubrovin and B. V. Nikol’skii from the leadership of the Union of the Russian People. For more detail, see Stepanov, S. A., Chernaia sotnia v Rossii (1905–1914gg.) (Moscow, 1992), 162–213.Google Scholar

45 S. F. Sharapov to M. M. Andronnikov, 6 October 1910. RGIA, f. 1617, op. 1, d. 682,1. 20.

46 For more detail about these events, see Avrekh, A. la., “Vopros o zapadnom zemstve i bankrotstvo Stolypina,” Istoricheskie zapiski, vol. 70 (Moscow, 1961), 61–112;Google Scholar Avrekh, A. la., Stolypin i tret'iaDuma (Moscow, 1968), 318–66;Google Scholar Diakin, V S., Samoderzhavie, burzhuaziia i dvorianstvo v 1907-1911 gg. (Leningrad, 1978), 212–41.Google Scholar

47 “This law was passed without the knowledge of the State Duma, without the State Council, and as a loyal subject I submit, I do not dare now debate the law or its benefits or harm. I find that promulgating this law in this manner is a triumph of our principles, principles of unlimited tsarist autocracy, and as such I welcome the passing of this law, independent of how it was passed, according to article 87, 89, or 91; it was passed, ‘therefore is,’ in the words of the sovereign emperor, and that is enough for me,” he announced. Gosudarstvennaia Duma: Stenograficheskie otchety, sozyv tretii, sessiia IV, ch. 3 (St. Petersburg, 1911), stb. 786 and 787-89.

48 Gosudarstvennyi Sovet: Stenograficheskie otchety, sessiia VI (St. Petersburg, 1911), stb. 1452.

49 S. D. Sheremetev to Mariia Fedorovna Romanova, 23 March 1911. Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv drevnikh aktov (RGADA), f. 1287, op. 1, d. 5056,1. 56ob.

50 Novoe uremia, 18 March 1911.

51 D. A. Khomiakov to K. N. Paskhalov, 10 February 1912. GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 560,1. 483. In the eyes of A. I. Sobolevskii, a follower of A. I. Dubrovin, Stolypin’s death at the hands of a murderer would have been “lawful revenge.” See A. I. Sobolevskii tolu. A. Kulakovskii, 9 September 1911. GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 507,1. 38.

52 Russkoe znamia, 8 September 1911; Priamoi put', October 1911, 7. The reprint of the article in Priamoi put'was accompanied by an important proviso: “Although we do not agree with the harshness of the following article, printed in the newspaper Rusfskoe] Zn[amia], we wholeheartedly subscribe to the appraisal of the personality and activity of the late P. A. Stolypin.” Interestingly, in the next issue of Priamoi put', followers of Dubrovin were called “partners and accomplices of Mordka Bogrov.” See Priamoi put', November 1911, 82–86.

53 D. A. Khomiakov also called Kokovtsov a ‘Yid-lover” (zhidofiV). See D. A. Khomiakov to T. M. Averin, 4January 1913. GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 916,1. 27.

54 K. N. Paskhalov to D. A. Khomiakov, 3 October 1911. GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 507,1.91.

55 The “Memorandum from the national-monarchical organization” presented to Kokovtsov consisted, in essence, of a list of demands concerning the national question ('Jewish,” “Finnish,” “Polish“). See Priamoi put', October 1911, 8-18. The leader of the nationalists, P. N. Balashov, told Kokovtsov directly that the nationalists would support him only under the condition that he continue Stolypin’s nationality policy. See Kokovtsov, V. N., Iz moegoproshlogo: Vospominaniia, 1903–1919, 2 vols. (Moscow, 1992), 1:413.Google Scholar

56 A. S. Viazigin to T. I. Viazigina, 21 February 1912. GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 562, 1. 610.

57 L. Ch., “Deklaratsionnaia dekadz,” Priamoi put', 1913, no. 1:228. V M. Purishkevich announced in the Duma that the government “is systematically distancing [otshibaet] the right factions from itself.” See Gosudarstvennaia Duma: Stenograficheskie otcheti, sozyv chetvertyi, sessiia I, ch. 1, stb. 302.

58 Gosudarstvennaia Duma: Stenograficheskie otcheti, sozyv chetvertyi, sessiia I, ch. 3 (St. Petersburg, 1913), stb. 66.

59 Contemporaries expressed contradictory opinions concerning the appropriateness of the “ministerial strike,” as a response to Markov’s outburst. See, for example, Kokovtsov, Iz moego proshlogo, 2:136-40; Gurko, V. I., Features andFigures of the Past: Government and Opinion in the Reign of Nicholas II (New York, 1970), 527–28.Google Scholar

60 A. I. Sobolevskii to T. D. Florinskii, 25 February 1912. GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 562,1. 654ob. Nikol’skii provided analogous accusations directed against A. A. Makarov. See Nikol’skii’s diary entry for 4July 1912. RGIA, f. 1006, op. 1, d. 4b, 11. 255–255ob.

61 Gosudarstvennaia Duma: Stenograficheskie otchety, sozyv chetvertyi, sessiia 1, ch. 1, stb. 407-20.

62 Ibid., stb. 408.

63 Ibid., stb. 552.

64 “Doneseniia L. K. Kumanina iz ministerskogo pavil'ona Gosudarstvennoi Dumy, dekabr’ 1911-fevral’ 1917 g.,” Voprosy istorii, 1999, no. 2:28.

65 “Upadok doveriia,” Pis'ma k blizhnim, 1913, no. 5:337. In this article, the author alluded to the fact that die demonstration against Kokovtsov from the right had consisted of coordinated actions of nationalists and rightists. He called N. E. Markov’s May speech “brilliant” (338).

66 “Novaia era,” Pis'ma k blizhnim, 1914, no. 2:79.

67 A. I. Savenko to N. K. Savenko, 26 March 1913. GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 922, 1. 621. A short time earlier, the same author asserted that “Kokovtsov is destroying Russia. “ See A. I. Savenko to N. K. Savenko, 6 March 1913. GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 920,1. 469.

68 For the grounds for its position, see, for example, V. N. L'vov’s speech during discussion of the government’s declaration during the course of the first session of die Fourth Duma. Gosudarstvennaia Duma: Stenograficheskie otchety, sozyv chetvertyi, sessiia I, ch. 1, stb. 356–59.

69 “Kokoty, kokodeki, kokodessy.” Those who used such names were evidendy playing upon the assonance of the abbreviation “ko-ko” (constitutionalist-conservatives, as the adherents to the Center called diemselves), as well as the family name of the head of the ministry.

70 “Doneseniia L. K. Kumanina iz ministerskogo pavil'ona Gosudarstvennoi Dumy, dekabr’ 1911-fevral’ 1917 g.,” Voprosy istorii, 1999, no. 6:30–31.

71 “It cannot get worse, but could get better,” wrote a newspaper concerning the change in government on 1 February 1914. A note on the report about Goremykin’s appointment as premier attests to Goremykin’s reputation: “M. Goremykin is [an] old, lazy reactionary.” See Public Record Office FO 371, v. 2091, p. 89. Buchanan to Grey, 11 February 1914, Minutes.

72 D. A. Khomiakov to K N. Paskhalov, 18 March 1914. GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 985, 1. 404.

73 K. N. Paskhalov to D. A. Khomiakov, 10 May 1914. GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 987, 1. 668.

74 GosudarstvennaiaDuma: Stenograficheskii otchet, sozyv chetvertyi, sessiia II, ch. 3 (St. Petersburg, 1914), stb. 1006-21; Kievlianin, 4 May 1914.

75 A. I. Savenko to N. K. Savenko, 28 April 1914. GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 987,1. 608. “All factions, without exception, exhibit discontent with the government’s policies to a greater or lesser degree,” reported L. K. Kumanin about attitudes in the Duma during discussions of the budget at the last prewar session of the Duma. Voprosy istorii, 2000, no. 2:26.

76 See, for example, “Predvybornaia trevoga,” Pis'ma k blizhnim, 1912, no. 9:496.

77 M. L. Shakhovskoi to B. M. Iuzefovich, 21 December 1908. GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 361, 1. 13.

78 Kuda vremenshchiki vedut Soinz russkogo naroda (St. Petersburg, 1910), 2.

79 Sharapov, Samoderzhavie Hi konstitutsiia? 43.

80 Trudy TVs“etda upolnomochennykh dvorianskikh obshchestv 32 gubernii (St. Petersburg, 1909), 80.

81 P. Ukhtubuzhskii [N. D. Obleukhov], “Nashi idealy i sovremennost,‘“Priamoi put’, 1912, no. 1:17.

82 “Between the old high-ranking bureaucracy and the newly arisen bureaucracy an alliance is springing up; influential Duma members flatter themselves with the prospect of receiving prominent posts, while the regime’s bureaucrats enlist the cooperation of the gentleman-jugglers of the chamber’s majority.” G. A. Shechkov, “Nesostoiatel'nost’ Gosudarstvennoi Dumy nyne deistvuiushchego zakona,” Mirnyi trud, 1913, no. 3:38.

83 Sbornik Kluba russkikh nalsionalistov (Kiev, 1911), 3:71.

84 In December 1913, in a resolution passed unanimously by the nationalist factions, support of the government was promised only under the condition that “its activity be lawful, and that government policies correspond to the program of the national faction.” See “Doneseniia L. K. Kumanina iz ministerskogo pavil'ona Gosudarstvennoi Dumy, dekabr' 1911-fevral’ 1917 gg.,” Voprosy istorii, 1999, no. 10:16.

85 Gringmut, Istoriia narodovlastiia, 68.

86 A. A. Kireev to F. D. Samarin, 8 November 1907. OR RGB, f. 265, k. 156, d. 10, 1.113.

87 Shcherbatov, A. G., Obnovlennaia Rossiia (Moscow, 1908), 35.Google Scholar

88 See Priamoi put', May 1912, 777. It is worth mentioning that before this, leaders of die right had often spoken about die Duma’s legislative character. See, for example, Gosudarstvennaia Duma: Stenograficheskie otchety, sozyv tretii, sessiia I, ch. 1, stb. 186; Trudy TVs“ezda upolnomochennykh dvorianskikh obshchestv 33 gubernii (St. Petersburg, 1910), 189–90.

89 Russkoe znamia, 6 December 1912.

90 See, for example, Russkoe znamia, 12 December 1912. A call to dissolve die Duma often appeared on die front page of die newspaper, at least outwardly reminiscent of the successful campaign to dissolve the second Duma in spring 1907. For more detail, see Don C. Rawson, Russian Rightists and the Revolution of 1905 (Cambridge, Eng., 1995), 196–200.

91 Natsionalisty v III gosudarstvennoi dume (St. Petersburg, 1912), 154–55.

92 Novoe vremia, 15 October 1910.

93 Kievlianin, 14June 1912.

94 Even Duma rightists noted the “brutality, rudeness of manners, which toward the end had already become part of everyday practice.” See [G. G. Zamyslovskii], G. Iurskii, Pravyi v IIIDume (Khar'kov, 1912), 243–44.Google Scholar

95 The right wing of the State Council “is more and more often appearing in the role of opposition to the government,” claimed an editorial in Novoe vremia not long before the council’s rejection of the bill on the zemstvo in the western krai. Novoe vremia, 23 February 1911.

96 Novoe vremia, 26 April 1912.

97 “Imeniny ‘tsentra,'” Pis'ma k blizhnim, 1909, no. 9:725.

98 V. V Shul'gin to G. E. Reik, 21 September 1912. GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 576, 1. 2044.

99 A. I. Savenko to E. A. Lebedeva, 16 January 1914. GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 981, 1.45.

100 “It was better than its first two predecessors,” admitted the Union of the Archangel Michael in its preelection appeal. Priamoi put', May 1912, 776.

101 Iurskii [Zamyslovskii], Pravyi v IIIDume, 14. Emphasis in the original.

102 Ibid., 254.

103 Shechkov, “Nesostoiatel'nost’ Gosudarstvennoi Dumy nyne deistvuiushchego zakona,” 65.

104 K. N. Paskhalov to D. A. Khomiakov, 22 May 1914. GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 988, 1. 732.

105 See, for example, “Dnevnik,” Grazhdanin, 1911, no. 30:13. G. A. Shechkov expressed analogous views concerning the State Duma. See G. A. Shechkov, Gosudarstvennaia duma i nesostoiatel'nost’ nachala bol’shinstva kak printsipa gosudarstuenno-obshchestvennogo stroitel’stva (Khzr'kov, 1912).

106 Sharapov, Samoderzhavie Hi konstitutsiia? 46. Emphasis in the original.

107 See, for example, D. Kh. [D. A. Khomiakov], Kliri GosudarstvennaiaDuma (Tula, 1908), 22.

108 Meshcherskii repeatedly called for such measures in his diary during the period under consideration. See, for example, Grazhdanin, 1907, no. 41–42:23; 1907, no. 43 – 44:13; 1911, no. 30:13. Tikhomirov, L. A., O nedostatkakh konstitutsii 1906g. (Moscow, 1907);Google Scholar Tikhomirov, L. A., Samoderzhavie i narodnoepredstavitel’stvo (Moscow, 1907);Google Scholar Tikhomirov’s articles on this subject made up a sizeable portion of the anthology K reforme obnovlennoi Rossii, including his articles in Moskovskie vedemosti for 1909-1911. Tikhomirov’s proposals received the support of many prominent conservatives. See D. M. Bodisko to L. A. Tikhomirov, 23 June 1912. GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 571,1. 1525; A. A. Golenishchev-Kutuzov to L. A. Tikhomirov, 13January 1912, GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 557,1. 121. P. E. Kazanskii expressed similar reasoning. See Kazanskii, Vlast’ Vserossiiskogo Imperatora. For Paskhalov, see Paskhalov, K. N., Pogreshnosti obnovlennogo 17 oktiabria 1905 goda. Gosudarstvennogo stroia i popytka ikh ustraneniia (Moscow, 1910).Google Scholar For Men’shikov, see, for example, “Peresmotr mashiny,“ Pis'ma k blizhnim, 1908, no. 7:413–16; “Natsional'nyi soiuz,” Pis'ma k blizhnim, 1908, no. 6:351–52; “Duma o Dume,“Pis'ma k blizhnim, 1912, no. 6:406–10.

109 See “Pis'mo Balashova k Stolypinu,” Krasnyi arkhiv 2 (9) (Moscow-Leningrad, 1925): 291–94.

110 Dym otechestva, 1913, no. 10:6–7. Henceforth, these plans were developed by ministers sympathetic to the rightists, and a proposal was even prepared for an imperial edict dissolving the Duma. See Arkheograficheskii ezhegodnik za 1987 god (Moscow, 1988), 309–12. On 1913 attempts to convert the Duma into a consultative institution, see Avrekh, Tsarizm i IVDuma, 1912–1914 gg., 114-17; Anan'ich, B. V., Diakin, V. S., et al. eds., Krizis samoderzhaviia v Rossii (Leningrad, 1984), 518–20, 526-27;Google Scholar Diakin, Burzhuaziia, dvorianstvo i tsarizm v 1911–1914 gg., 158-61.

111 For Dubrovin, , see Pravyepartii:Dokumenly i materialy, vol. 1, 1905-1910gg. (Moscow, 1998), 341.Google Scholar For Meshcherskii, see “Dnevniki,” Qrazhdanin, 1907, no. 41–42:23. For Men’shikov, see “Zhrebii broshen,” Pis'ma k blizhnim, 1907, no. 6:343. For Savenko, see Kievlianin, 4June 1907.

112 S. D. Sheremetev to F. D. Samarin on 8 June 1907. OR RGB, f. 265, k. 208, d. 25, 1. 105.

113 See the diary of A. A. Kireev, entries for 4 and 5 June 1907. OR RGB, f. 126, k. 14,11. 226ob.–227. The author shared the same considerations in a 10 June letter to L. A. Tikhomirov. See GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 214,1. 22.

114 See Tikhomirov, O nedostatkakh konstitutsii 1906 g, 23.

115 “Zhrebii broshen,” Pis'ma k blizhnim, 1907, no. 6:346.

116 S. D. Sheremetev to F. D. Samarin, 4 May 1908. OR RGB, f. 265, k. 208, d. 25, 1. 125. F. D. Samarin’s letters contained the same tone. “I feel that my strength is not what it used to be; but most important, there is no desire, no faith that anything can be achieved,” he wrote to S. D. Sheremetev on 9 September 1908. RGADA, f. 1287, op. 1, d. 5087,1. 55ob.

117 See “Iz otcheta o perliustratsii Departamenta politsii za 1908 g.,” Krasnyi arkhiv 2 (28) (Moscow-Leningrad, 1928): 146–47; See also Pravye partii: Dokumenty i materialy, 1905–1917 gg., 1:424-25.

118 “Evoliutsiia vlasti,” Pis'ma k blizhnim, 1909, no. 1:26. Emphasis added.

119 A. I. Savenko to E. A. Dvorzhitskii, 24 May 1913. GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 925, 1. 910. A. I. Savenko to N. K. Savenko, 30 May 1913. Ibid., 1. 936. A. I. Savenko to R V Davydov, 5June 1913. GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 926,1. 1076.

120 M. O. Men’shikov to N. D. Kuznetsov, 1 January 1914. GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 981,1. 2.

121 Diary of B. V Nikol’skii, entry for 7 April 1914. RGIA, f. 1006, op. 1, d. 4b, 1. 333ob.

122 A. I. Dubrovin to N. N. Rodzevich, 25 February 1914. GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 982,1. 272.

123 A. I. Savenko to B. V. Pleskii, 18 May 1914. GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 988,1. 708.

124 See Purishkevich, V. M., Pred grozoiu: Pravitel’stvo i russkaia narodnaia shkola (St. Petersburg, 1914).Google Scholar

125 V. M. Purishkevich to A. I. Orlov, 17 June 1914. GARF, f. 102, op. 265, d. 989, 1. 837.

126 It is hardly necessary to set forth the contents of this document, to which several generations of historians have referred, beginning with E. V Tarle. See E. V. Tarle, “Germanskaia orientatsiia i P. N. Durnovo v 1914 g.,” Byloe, 1922, no. 19:161–76. From the point of view of the problems under examination, David McDonald’s analysis of the memorandum is of greater interest. See McDonald, “The Durnovo Memorandum in Context,“ 481–502.

127 For more detail about the methods of analysis and the results, see Kir'ianov, I. K. and Luk'ianov, M. N., Parlament samoderzhavnoi Rossii: Gosudarstvennaia Duma i ee deputaty, 1906–1917 (Perm', 1995), 89–101.Google Scholar

128 See Rossiia, 1913 god, Statistiko-dokumental'nyi spravochnik (St. Petersburg, 1995), 245–53.

129 It is possible that this circumstance explains the conservatives’ negative reaction to Russian realities from 1881 to 1905. For more detail, see E. R. W. Newstad, “Components of Pessimism in Russian Conservative Thought, 1881–1905” (Ph.D. diss., University of Oklahoma, 1991). As Alexander Martin has suggested, the process of initiating the transformation of society “from above” created serious problems for conservatives in terms of their perception of their country’s realities in the period in which Russian conservatism was being formed. See Martin, Alexander M., Romantics, Reformers, Reactionaries: Russian Conservative Thought and Politics in the Reign of Alexander I (DeKalb, 1997), 4.Google Scholar

130 This conclusion concerning the rightists’ conceptual formulations can be applied to Russian conservatism as a whole. See Lowe, H.-D., “Political Symbols and Rituals of the Russian Political Right, 1900–1914,” Slavonic and East European Review 76, no. 3 (1998): 465.Google Scholar

131 One more proof of this is the lack of any type of influential political movement seeking to restore the third of June system following the fall of the autocracy. Only a month after Nicholas II’s abdication, V. M. Purishkevich announced that “the old regime cannot be resurrected.” Purishkevich, V. M., Bez zabrala (Petrograd, 1917), 1.Google Scholar For more detail on the conservatives’ reaction to the events of 1917, see Kolonitskii, B. I., “Pravoekstremistskie sily v marte-oktiabre 1917 g. (na materialakh petrogradskoi pechati),” Natsional'naia pravaia prezhde i teper’ (St. Petersburg, 1992), pt. 1, pp. 111–24,Google Scholar and P. Sh. Chkhartishvili, “Chernosotentsy v 1917 godu,” Voprosy istorii, 1997, no. 8:133–43. The idea of the restoration of the third of June monarchy was not popular among those in emigration. See Omel'chenko, N. A., Vpoiskakh Rossii: Obshchestvenno-politicheskaia mysl’ russkogo zarubeztiia o revoliutsii 1917 g., o bol’shevizme i budushchikh sud'bakh rossiiskoi gosudarstvennosti (St. Petersburg, 1996);Google Scholar Kiselev, A. F., ed., Politicheskaia istoriia russkoi emigratsii, 1920–1940gg.: Dokumenty i materialy (Moscow, 1999).Google Scholar