1. Kuhn, Heinrich, Der Kommunismus in der Tschechoslowakei (Cologne, 1965), pp. 13 ff.Google Scholar

2. Carr, Edward H., Socialism in One Country, 1924-1926, 3 vols. (London, 1958-64), 3: 92–94, 374CrossRefGoogle Scholar (vol. 7 in A History of Soviet Russia).

3. Report by Dmitrii Z. Manuilsky at the fifth congress of the Cominform. Inprecorr, Aug. 9, 1924.

4. šmeral was not re-elected as party chairman at the third KSč congress in 1925. In a sidewise shift he became a member of the executive committee of the Comintern and later was active in its apparatus in Mongolia, Berlin, France, Prague, and Moscow, where he died in 1941. KSč, ústav dějin, Přίručnί slovnίk k dějinám KSč (Prague, 1964), 2: 892.Google Scholar

5. Kuhn, Kommunismus, pp. 37ff.; Korbel, Josef, The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia, 1938-1948: The Failure of Coexistence (Princeton, 1959), pp. 27–29 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Zdenšk Eliáš and Jaromír Netík, “Czechoslovakia,” in Griffith, William E., ed., Communism in Europe: Continuity, Change, and the Sino-Soviet Dispute, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1964-66), 2: 169–74.Google Scholar

6. ústav déjin KSč, “Materiály z vědeckě konference věnované 50. výroči československé republiky” (Prague, 1968), 1: 117—38. These are mimeographed reports

7. Hrbata, F. and Niklíček, L., “Na cestě k VII. kongresu Kominterny,” československý časopis historický, 12, no. 5 (1965): 656.Google Scholar Also see Braunthal, Julius, Geschichte der Internationale, 2 vols. (Hannover, 1961-63), 2: 491 ff.Google Scholar; McKenzie, Kermit E., Comintern and World Revolution, 1928-1943: The Shaping of the Doctrine (London and New York, 1964), pp. 140 ff.Google Scholar; Nollau, Günther, Die Internationale: Wurzeln und Erscheinungsformen des proletarischen Internationalismus (Cologne, 1959), pp. 102 ff.Google Scholar

8. The KSč polled 10.3 percent of the votes in the election of 1935. Taborsky, Edward, Communism in Czechoslovakia, 1948-1960 (Princeton, 1961), p. 6 CrossRefGoogle Scholar

9. Hugh Seton-Watson correctly stressed the “period of resistance” as “an extremely important one in the development of international communism,” in The Pattern of Communist Revolution (London, 1953), p. 212.

10. See Josef Novotný in the mimeographed bulletin published by the Czechoslovak Commission for the History of the Anti-Fascist Resistance, “Odboj a revoluce,” 4, no. 4 (1966): 75 ff.

11. Ibid., p. 81.

12. Ibid., p. 87. Gottwald left Prague on November 9, 1938. From 1935 he had been a full member of the ECCI political secretariat.

13. Ibid., pp. 87-88.

14. Ibid., pp. 84-85.

15. For more information on the illegal KSč apparatus—the so-called AG apparatus— in the years 1930-38, see Stanislav Kyjovský, in “Odboj a revoluce,” supplement, 4 (1966): 13-27. KSč membership in the republic numbered 52, 760 persons on October 1, 1937. The estimate for the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was about 30, 000. Alena Hájková, ibid., p. 123.

16. Novotný, p. 90.

17. Until its decimation in 1940-41, the original illegal party structure simply took over the old framework of the central, regional, district, local, and factory cells. The illegal KSčresembled much more a party than a resistance movement, and this was one of the reasons for its frightful losses during the Nazi occupation. For example, the Prague regional organization went underground without implementing any substantial change in its legal organizational structure. Kyjovský, p. 23. The gradual devastation of the Communist cadres in 1940-42 severely strained the capacity of the Communist resistance. In 1944 the resisters trying to pick up the pieces of the crippled Communist underground were mostly nonparty members. Hájková, pp. 139-40.

18. “Odboj a revoluce,” supplement, 4 (1966): 33-34. The Communist Party of Germany in particular was vocal in its criticism of the KSč. Novotny, p. 94.

19. For the talks between the leaders of the illegal party and the Moscow center in the spring of 1939, see Křen, Jan, Do emigrace (Prague, 1963), pp. 486 ff.Google Scholar Jan šverma, a member of the KSč Politburo, maintained contacts with Beneš. The ECCI May Day manifesto in 1939 viewed fascism as the main enemy and backed the Czechoslovak struggle for liberation. Degras, Jane, ed., The Communist International, 1919-1943: Documents, 3 vols. (New York and London, 1956-65), 3: 438 Google Scholar

20. In contrast to the Communists, intelligence activities played an important role in the democratic resistance. However, the illegal KSč felt obligated to supply cadres for the Soviet espionage ring in the Protectorate. Hájková, pp. 124, 132.

21. To develop a momentum of its own in Western Europe, the KSč leadership in Moscow set up a special secretariat in Paris in the spring of 1939. This was dissolved in the fall of the same year. Křen, Do emigrace, p. 486. See also ústav dějin KSč, Za svobodu českého a slovenského národa (Prague, 1956), p. 84–103.Google Scholar

22. Novotný, pp. 96-97; Janeček, O. et al., eds., Odboj a revoluce (Prague, 1965), p. 65–66.Google Scholar Unlike the leaders at home, the Moscow center tended to view the possible agreement as a means of preventing the war. The attitude of the home movement reflected the atmosphere in the Protectorate, where the preponderant majority of the Czechs desired an early outbreak of the war as the surest means of bringing about the Nazi defeat. The chapter on the Czechoslovak resistance in the proceedings of the Second International Conference on the History of the Resistance Movement is biased. European Resistance Movements, 1939-45 (Oxford, London, New York, and Paris, 1964), 2: 224-47.

23. Za svobodu, p. 104. For similar reactions of other Communist parties, see Degras, Communist International, 3: 439-43.

24. On September 8-10, 1939. Bareš, Gustav, ed.( “Depeše mezi Prahou a Moskvou, 1939-1941,” Přispěvky k dějinსm KSč, 7 (1967): 375–433.Google Scholar Secret radio contact between the illegal party and Moscow was maintained from the late spring of 1939 until the smashing of the radio group by the Gestapo on February 3, 1941. This single radio contact with Moscow was restricted to an exchange of political information. It is of interest to note that while the secret transmitters of the democratic resistance sent and received over 26, 000 cables in 1940-41, the corresponding figure for the Communist radio contact was 100 cables. Compare “Depeše,” and Vladimir Krajina, “La Résistance tchécoslovaque,” Caiders d'histoire de la guerre (February 1950), p. 58.

25. Cable of the ECCI, Sept. 8, 1939, in “Depeše,” p. 390.

26. On Oct. 16, 1939, ibid., p. 396. See also Borkenau, Franz, European Communism (New York, 1953), p. 1953 Google Scholar; KSč, ústav dějin, Dějiny Komunistické strany československa (Prague, 1961), pp. 406 ff.Google Scholar

27. Janeček, Odboj a revoluce, pp. 94 ff.; Novotný, pp. 103, 108.

28. Novotný, pp. 108-9.

29. “Depeše,” passim.

30. Ibid., p. 411. František Janáček's quotation differs:”… England and France as aggressors,” in “Odboj a revoluce,” 4 (1966): 41.

31. For the joint declaration of the Communist parties of Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia, see “Odboj a revoluce,” p. 50; Janeček, Odboj a revoluce, pp. 97-98. During the discussion on the joint proclamation, the German Communists proposed a fusion of the three parties. Novotný, p. 110. This striking proposition implied full recognition of Nazi aggression against Austria and Czechoslovakia by the Communist Party of Germany. Despite the conviction of some Comintern leaders that the Czechoslovak state would not be restored, the KSč retained its status as an independent unit. “Materiály z vědecké konference,” p. 143.

32. “Odboj a revoluce,” 5, no. 1 (1967): 41, 53, 57-58. It is of interest to note that neither the KSč leadership in Moscow nor its individual members made any public appearances or declarations during the period of Soviet-Nazi cooperation, from 1939 to 1941. This cautious approach lasted almost until 1943. “Materiály z vědecké konference,” p. 143.

33. “Depeše,” pp. 419, 433; Janáček, pp. 40-46.

34. Pavel Stahl in “Odboj a revoluce,” 5, no. 1 (1967): 41.

35. Memoirs of Dr. Eduard Beneš: From Munich to New War and New Victory, trans. Godfrey Lias (Boston, 1954), p. 160; Korbel, Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia, pp. 43-44; Gordon Skilling, H., “The Czechoslovak Struggle for National Liberation in World War II,” Slavonic and East European Review, 39 (December 1960): 182.Google Scholar

36. Kural, Jan Křen and Václav, “Ke stykum mezi čs. odbojem a SSSR,” Historie a vojenství, 5 (1967): 731 ff.Google Scholar

37. Novotný, pp. 112-14; Hájková, pp. 127 ff.

38. Janeček, Odboj a revoluce, p. 136. In view of the new development in the Balkans during the spring of 1941, the KSč appeared to move away from its rigid line. See the CC resolution of April 1941 in Za svobodu, pp. 151 ff.

39. Pawlovicz, Jerzy, “Poznámky k formování strategic PPR a mezinárodního dělnického hnutí za druhé světové valky,” Historie a vojenství, 5 (1964): 736–38.Google Scholar

40. The second illegal CC of the KSč was set up in the spring of 1941 by Jan Zika, the sole member of the first CC still free. Bareš, Gustav, Tři pře J ana Ziky (Prague, 1961), p. 292.Google Scholar There exists a draft of a joint declaration of the CC with the democratic resistance center, but this appears to be a Communist proposal for the final text. See also Korbel, Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia, p. 54.

41. The figure given in Janeček, 10, 227 persons, appears exaggerated. Janeček, Odboj a revoluce, p. 148.

42. For the text of the directive and the action itself, see Vetiška, Rudolf, Skok do tmy (Prague, 1966)Google Scholar; Janeček, Odboj a revoluce, pp. 236 ff.; “Odboj a revoluce,” 4 (1966): 33ff., 170 ff. The text makes clear the almost incredible extent of the Moscow center's ignorance of the situation in the Protectorate.

43. The center of the Communist underground in 1943 has been tagged by the current literature as the third illegal CC. “Odboj a revoluce,” 4 (1967): passim; Janeček, Odboj a revoluce, pp. 236 ff. There is a question whether this group could be considered as forming a central leadership.

44. The Comintern was declared to be dissolved on May 22, 1943.

45. Still indicative of the old illusions about the hostility of the German workers to Hitler was the directive calling for the creation of a Sudeten German liberation front and the urging of the Sudeten Nazis to join it. Vetiška, Skok do tmy, pp. 335 ff. For the question of national committees, see also Eliáš and Netík in Griffith, Communism in Europe, 2: 187-88. Unfortunately the study fails to survey illegal Communist activity in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.

46. Veselý-štainer, Karel, Cestou národního odboje (Prague, 1947), pp. 163, 244 Google Scholar; Klimeš, Miloš et al., eds., Cesta ke květnu (Prague, 1965), vol. 1, passim.Google Scholar

47. Veselý-štainer, Cestou národního odboje, p. 100. The only radio contact of the fourth CC with Moscow was via the Council of the Three, a left-wing oriented democratic resistance organization. As late as March 1945 the CC was still not recognized by the Gottwald group in Moscow. Ibid., pp. 212, 217. The description of the Communist underground by Paul E. Zinner is based, unfortunately, on scanty evidence. Communist Strategy and Tactics in Czechoslovakia, 1918-48 (New York, 1963), pp. 72-75

48. In 1943 the KSč abandoned its long-time program of Soviet-type revolution and set out to evolve a plan for a special Czechoslovak road to socialism.

49. Klimeš, Cesta ke květnu, 1: 328. For the Soviet partisan warfare, see the tendentious volume by Benčik, Antonin et al., Partyzánskeé hnuti v československu za druhé světove války (Prague, 1961)Google Scholar; Doležal, Jiří, Jediná cesta (Prague, 1966)Google Scholar; and Janeček, Odboj a revoluce, pp. 367, 372-73.

50. The use of the Moscow broadcast gave the KSč instant contact with audiences in the Protectorate. For the Předvoj, headed by young Communist students who had never been card-carrying party members, see Mencl, Vojtech and Sládek, Oldřich, Dny odvahy (Prague, 1966)Google Scholar. For the fourth CC, see Klimeš, Cesta ke květnu, 1: 329, 370, 564; Veselý- štainer, Cestou národního odboje, pp. 185 ff.

51. See also Křen, Jan and Kural, Václav, “Ke smyslu českého protifašistického odboje,” Historie a vojenství, 1 (1965): 72ff.Google Scholar

52. Veselý-štainer, Cestou národního odboje, pp. 150, 158, 160, 174, 185, 259. The Council of the Three, the illegal trade unions, and the fourth CC provided the nucleus of the Czech National Council.

53. The coalition government consisted of six parties, two of which were the Czech and Slovak Communist parties controlling the Ministry of the Interior and other key functions.

54. Machotka, Otokar, ed., Pražské povstánί 1945 (Washington, D.C., 1965), pp. 111 ff.Google Scholar; Belda, Josef et al., Na roshranί dvou epoch (Prague, 1968), p. 40–41.Google Scholar By a strange coincidence, the Communist underground almost from the very outset had been infiltrated by German undercover agents who, time and again, destroyed the movement. See also Korbel, Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia, pp. 57-67

55. Dedijer, Vladimir, Tito (New York, 1953), p. 292.Google Scholar

56. Kaplan, Karel, “Zamyšlení nad politickými procesy,” Nová mysl, 22, no. 6 (1968): 767–68, 770-72Google Scholar

57. For example, Smrkovský was arrested in 1951, released four years later, and rehabilitated in 1963. Griffith, Communism in Europe, 2: 225; Přίručni slovnik, 2: 799.

58. In the early 1960s there suddenly appeared a spate of articles evaluating šmeral's past activities positively. A collection of his articles was published in 1961