The Handelian oratorio Judas Maccabaeus was produced in 1746 as a compliment to the Duke of Cumberland for suppressing the Jacobite rebellion. The librettist, Thomas Morell, based his text largely on 1 Maccabees, but whereas he followed the biblical text relatively closely in Parts II and III of the libretto, he diverged from it significantly in Part I. The divergences correspond to ideas that Morell outlined in a sermon in 1739/40, which shows victory in war as inextricably linked with divine favour. Hence, Morell's version of 1 Maccabees portrays the Maccabaean campaign, and therefore the anti-Jacobite campaign which it represents, as having unequivocal divine favour.

This paper is concerned with how we should understand the distinctive contribution of music to Christian worship. It considers two contrasting views that have powerfully influenced contemporary church music – the pursuit of musical excellence by highly competent performers on the one hand, and the adoption of simpler, popular and more inclusive musical forms on the other. This contrast is explored against the background of a biblical understanding of prayer and sacrifice, and in the light of some philosophical issues surrounding both the idea of divine service and the nature of music.

This article exemplifies a theological hermeneutic where the concerns of systematic theology shape the way a NT text is read. It intends to show that the unfolding testimony of Acts 1–2 (1) continues the process begun in Luke 24 of moving its audience towardan incipiently triune portrait of Yahweh; (2) provides public testimony to the truth of God's lordship by narrating its embodiment in a restored Israel; (3) enlarges a trinitarian reader's imagination with regard to the nature of the triune life of God when that imagination is stimulated by Luke's portrait of the embodied risen and ascended Son.

The essay suggests that three main approaches have been taken toward Christ's resurrection in recent theology. One view focuses on the question of existential meaningfulness. While it may or may not affirm the resurrection as a statement about Jesus' particular eternal destiny, it takes his resurrection primarily as a symbol of spiritual regeneration. A second view affirms precisely what the first rejects, namely, that Christ's resurrection is grounded in an actual historical occurrence. Knowledge of his resurrection is mediated by modern critical research and confirmed by it. Whether this mediation is necessary under the conditions of modernity or merely a matter of apologetic ground-clearing remains various within the type. Finally, there are those who argue that questions of meaningfulness and historicity, though important, are secondary, because determined by the nature of the resurrection event – which is necessarily unique in kind. Its meaningfulness and historicity are themselves correspondingly unique. Whereas the first type is seen as emphasizing transcendence at the expense of historicity, the second does the reverse by elevating historicity at the expense of transcendence. The mysterious conjunction of historicity and transcendence is what the third type regards as essential to understanding other relevant questions. The first type is represented by Schleiermacher, Bultmann and Tillich; the second by Pannenberg and Wright; the third by Moltmann, Frei and Barth.

The future of Cambridge University is discussed in the context of the current British and global situation of universities, the main focus being on what the core concerns of a major university should be at this time. After raising issues related to core intellectual values (truth-seeking, rationality in argument, balanced judgement, integrity, linguistic precision and critical questioning) and the sustaining of a long-term social and intellectual ecology, four main challenges are identified: uniting teaching and research fruitfully; interrelating fields of knowledge appropriately across a wide range of disciplines; contributing to society in ways that are responsible towards the long-term flourishing of our world; and sustaining and reinventing collegiality so that the university can be a place where intensive, disciplined conversations within and across generations can flourish. The latter leads into questions of polity, governance and management. Finally, the inseparability of teaching, research and knowledge from questions of meaning, value, ethics, collegiality and transgenerational responsibility leads to proposing ‘wisdom’ as an integrating concept. The relevant sources of wisdom available are both religious and secular, and in a world that is complexly both religious and secular we need universities that can be places where both are done justice. Given the seriousness and long-term nature of the conflicts associated with religious and secular forces in our world, it is especially desirable that universities in their education of future generations contribute to the healing of such divisions.

This paper raises the truth question to explore the possibility of constructing a system of systematic theology in the contemporary context. By using Schleiermacher's thought as a constructive resource, two dimensions of truth are discussed in dialogue with Kathryn Tanner's book Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity: A Brief Systematic Theology: coherence and correspondence. Addressed in the first section is coherence, along with its auxiliary, comprehensiveness, as a requirement for system. The whole of the Christian world view is grasped by a principle of coherence that reflects both a subjective component of authorial individuality and an objective component of an individual grasp of the ‘spirit of the age’. Furthermore, consensus regarding systematic coherence in Western Christian thought agrees on a metanarrative structuring doctrines from creation to apocalypse. In Tanner's work, the principle of coherence is gift-giving that is traced from an inner-trinitarian narrative to its outer-trinitarian expressions in creation, the incarnation, eschatology, as well as in ethical response. Thematized in the second section is the tricky issue of theological correspondence between claims of redemption on the one hand and the sin, evil, and tragedy of the world on the other. Tanner's book offers one solution to this problem: analogical correspondence that situates doctrinal patterns of gift-giving (such as the incarnation, creation) as concentric circles in varying degrees of correspondence to their inner-trinitarian center. In view of this solution, this paper questions the relation between systematic coherence and the reality of both life's brokenness and the depths of divine self-giving pathos.

This review explores the incipient ecclesiology of Kathryn Tanner's brief systematic theology, Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity. Gift is the central concept around which Tanner's articulation of the divine life and the incarnation revolves. The lack of ecclesial definition in Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity creates tension between Tanner's theology of gift and her insistence elsewhere on the church as a ‘genuine community of argument’. Her brief appeal to a ‘community of mutual fulfillment’ needs more elaboration to head off worrisome interpretations of her vision of divine and human economies. An ecclesiological extrapolation from Tanner's Christology in Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity suggests that the church needs to be at once a community in which God's gifts are received and shared and a community of argument in which problems and shortcomings in the church's life can be faced and negotiated.

I am very grateful to Amy Pauw for the careful and forceful way in which she has applied her considerable theological acumen, and the fruits of her long engagement with the church, to an interpretation and cautionary commentary on my book. Her remarks are a gift to me even as they chasten and redirect my efforts to expand the arguments of this book into a larger one. As I mention in an aside at the end of Chapter 3, the give and take of intellectual life, at its best, is an intimation of the community of mutual fulfillment which I believe the gospel calls us to realize everywhere. In writing the book I could only hope that faults in my arguments would be remedied and their good points developed, beyond anything I could achieve alone, by fine theologians such as Pauw taking up those arguments and offering them back to me transformed. This very exchange reflects the way a community of mutual fulfillment need not be community at a remove from disagreement, conflict, and the temptation to hubris among fallible, morally weak individuals (such as myself). In a fallen world of finite creatures, a community of mutual fulfillment often just is in this way a community of argument (of the sort I discuss in Theories of Culture) – a community that is agonistic, prone to deep disagreement about matters of shared concern, but a community held together nonetheless by the shared admission of fault and the consequent recognition that the true and the good can be had by anyone only through open engagement with all.