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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 February 2009
In recent discussions philosophers have come to some measure JLof agreement as to what they mean by ‘punishment’, although they admit that there can be no sharp line delimiting the use of the term.1 A standard case of punishment (I) must involve the suffering of some unpleasantness by its victim, (2) must be for an offence against rules either legal or moral, (3) must be of a supposed or an actual offender, (4) must be administered by personal beings other than the offender, and (5) must be imposed by the authority upholding the system of rules against which the offence has been committed. We note from this account that punishment so defined necessarily involves suffering. For this reason punishment requires to be justified, for the deliberate infliction of pain is something that Christians would normally refuse to do to others, and something which may be regarded as unjust to its victim, if St. Paul's statement is universally true, ‘I can will what is right, but I cannot do it’ (Rom. 7.18). There may be other ways of dealing with wrongdoers like the Russian correctional colonies intended to provide a largely painless curative treatment for criminals or the approved schools without any corporal punishment desired by a recent Home Secretary, but unless some suffering is involved these are not methods of punishment.
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