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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 September 2019
Augustine's identification of the Stoic therapy of passions (apatheia) as moderation (metriopatheia) has long been a focus of controversy. This article examines the theoretical foundation for Augustine's comments on the relationship between apatheia and metriopatheia in the Stoic and the Peripatetic contexts, with particular focus on whether Augustine misrepresents his predecessors’ doctrines. Based upon a critical examination of recent research and a systematic analysis of Augustine's position in various phases of his writing, this article argues for a dynamic scheme of the psychotherapy of passions in Augustine's late thought, in which he deliberately deviates from philosophical traditions by adopting new criteria to re-evaluate the quality of emotions from the perspective of theological anthropology. This dynamic theological vantage point contributes to Augustine's insight into passions as well as his new use of the philosophical terms in refuting the Stoic pride.
1 In his writings, Augustine does not distinguish among the Platonic, Peripatetic and the Neoplatonic positions on the psychology of passions. When he mentions either the ‘Platonic’ ‘Peripatetic’, or “Neoplatonic” notion of passions, Augustine refers to their coinciding views as an eclectic alternative to Stoicism. As he explains in De civitate Dei 9.4: ‘There are two opinions among the philosophers as to those motions of the mind which the Greeks call pathe … Certain philosophers, then, say that these disturbances or affections or passions assail even the wise man, though moderated and controlled by reason in that he imposes laws upon them by the mastery of his mind, by which they are reduced to their necessary limits. This is what the Platonists think, and the Aristotelians also, since Aristotle, who founded the Peripatetic school, was a pupil of Plato. Others, however, like the Stoics, believe that the wise man is not subject to passions of this kind.’ I accordingly do not differentiate between the terms ‘Platonic’, ‘Neoplatonic’ and ‘Peripatetic’ when referring to Augustine's (Neo)platonic-Peripatetic eclectic views. For a discussion of a Platonic-Peripatetic position in Augustine's context, see Van Riel, Gerd, ‘MENS INMOTA MOTA MANE: Neoplatonic Tendencies in Augustine's Theory of the Passions’, Augustiniana 54 (2004), pp. 507–31Google Scholar; King, Peter, ‘Dispassionate Passions’, in Pickavé, Martin and Shapiro, Lisa (eds), Emotion and Cognitive Life in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy (Oxford: OUP, 2012), pp. 9–31CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
2 Augustine accepted the Stoic and the Neoplatonic ideas of passions in his early years and blamed himself for his uncontrollable emotions on the death of his mother, Monica. In Confessiones 9.12, he asks, ‘Did I blame the weakness of my passion, and refrain my flood of grieving?’ (increpabam mollitiam affectus mei, et constringebam fluxum maeroris, cedebatque mini paululum). For the influence of Stoicism and Neoplatonism on Augustine's psychology of passions, see Sorabji, Richard, Emotion and Peace of Mind (New York: OUP, 2000), pp. 1–13Google Scholar. Cf. Knuuttila, Simo, Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), pp. 152–72CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Byers, Sarah Catherine, Perception, Sensibility, and Moral Motivation in Augustine: A Stoic-Platonic Synthesis (Cambridge: CUP, 2013), pp. 60–69Google Scholar.
3 De civitate Dei 9.4: ‘It seems to me, therefore, that here also, when it is asked whether the passions of the mind affect the wise man or whether he is entirely a stranger to them, the controversy arises out of words rather than things. For I consider that, as far as the pith of the matter is concerned, rather than the mere sound of words, the view which the Stoics hold is no different from that of the Platonists and Peripatetics.’ In the present article, the English translations of Augustine's De civitate Dei and Confessiones are, if not otherwise stated, from The City of God A gainst the Pagans, ed. and trans. R. W. Dyson (Cambridge: CUP, 1998); Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: OUP, 1991).
4 Sorabji states in the following: ‘It has often been said that the dispute on apatheia and the other disputes … are merely verbal. On the whole, I believe the opposite is the case … sometimes the idea that the dispute is merely verbal rests, I believe, on misunderstanding the distinctions that I have been analyzing … what is going on here, I think, is not a verbal dispute at all, but an attempt to disguise a substantive dispute as if it were merely verbal.’ See Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind, pp. 207, 209.
5 Sorabji contends that the reason for Augustine's misunderstanding the Stoic apatheia is that he first misinterprets their notion of first movements and then falsely conceives that the Stoics cannot attain apatheia because they have first movements. Sorabji writes, ‘emotions are not seen in the Stoic way as necessarily having the permission of reason. This can help to explain how in City of God 9.4 Augustine can so ignore the Stoic position as to claim that the wise man has emotions’ (Emotion, p. 383); ‘We saw him [Augustine] in the City of God defending his belief in moderate emotion for humans in this life by claiming (erroneously) that even the Stoics would allow a little fear in a storm at sea. That was how he (mis)-interpreted the Stoic recognition of first movements … If we take Stoic apatheia to involve freedom from love and gladness, he says, it is not desirable at any time’ (Emotion, pp. 397–8).
6 ‘But their [Stoic] seeing emotions in terms of disease represents a substantive disagreement’. Sorabji, Emotion, p. 207.
7 Sorabji argues that Chrysippus is the main contributor of the Stoic view of apatheia, rather than Zeno, Panaetius or Posidonius. Chrysippus is a classical representative of the Stoics, who contends apatheia and regards passions as false judgements. Sorabji, Emotion, pp. 206–7.
8 De civitate Dei 9.4: de verbis eos potius quam de rebus facere controversiam.
9 Sorabji, Emotion, p. 382.
10 Sorabji addresses the influence of Galen upon Augustine in the following: ‘The wittiest verbal legislation along these lines is that of Galen, who says: It is no longer so clear whether being moderately disturbed in mind at a great loss of money or esteem belongs to the class of path ē, and similarly for being rather out of control in eating cakes’. Emotion, p. 209.
11 Cicero, Tusculanae disputationes 4.6.12–14.
12 Sorabji, Emotion, pp. 208–9.
13 Irwin, Terence H., ‘Augustine's Criticisms of the Stoic Theory of Passions’, Faith and Philosophy 20/4 (2003), p. 437CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
14 ‘Both Peripatetics and Stoics believe that passions explain actions; people go wrong because they live in accordance with their passions.’ Ibid., p. 438.
15 Ibid., p. 439.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid., p. 440.
18 See e.g. the section of ‘Augustine's adherence to core Stoic psychological principles’ in Byers, Sarah C., Perception, Sensibility, and Moral Motivation in Augustine: A Stoic-Platonic Synthesis (Cambridge: CUP, 2013), pp. 60–9Google Scholar.
19 Ibid., pp. 68–9.
20 Ibid., pp. 45, 100–101.
21 Ibid., pp. 68–9.
22 Ibid., pp. 52–3.
23 The dividing points of Augustine's writings are based upon his altering ideas of passions during various stages of his life. For the dividing years, we adopt Peter Brown's suggestions in Augustine of Hippo: A Biography (Berkeley-Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000), pp. 177–81, 279–83. However, such a threefold periodisation of Augustine's writings is neither exclusive nor arbitrary. For a discussion of Brown's divisions, see also Kolbet, Paul R., Augustine and the Cure of Souls: Revising a Classical Ideal (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009), pp. 14–16Google Scholar.
24 For the date of Augustine's writings, see Fitzgerald, Allan D. (ed.), Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1999)Google Scholar, pp. xliii–il.
25 De ordine 2.5.17–2.6.19: Nam definitionem meam tu probasti…cum quo mentem sapientis manere immobilem me, quantum assequi ualeo, docere uoluistis… inquit, corpus illud de loco in locum transitum facere, sed mentem ipsam nego, cui nomen sapientis inpositum est. The English translation comes from Divine Providence and the Problem of Evil: A Translation of St. Augustine's De ordine, trans. Robert P. Russell (Whitefish, MT: Kessinger, 2010), p. 58.
26 De musica 6.16.55: tu negabis in illa perfectione ac beatitate animam constitutam, et conspicere ueritatem, et immaculatam manere, et nihil molestiae pati posse? … Haec ergo contemplatio, sanctificatio, impassibilitas, ordinatio eius, aut illae sunt quattuor uirtutes perfectae atque consummatae, aut, ne de nominibus, cum res conueniant, frustra laboremus, pro istis uirtutibus, quibus constituta in laboribus utitur anima, tales quaedam potentiae in aeterna ei uita sperandae sunt. For the English translation, see Jacobsson, Martin, AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS.DE MUSICA VI: A Critical Edition with a Translation and an Introduction (Stockholm: Institutionen för klassiska språk, 2002), p. 109Google Scholar.
27 De musica 6.16.53 (ET, p. 107): Magister: Cum ergo id agit, ne ulterius id delectet aliquando, nonne tibi uidetur amorem suum figere in Deo, et ab omni inquinamento temperatissime et cautissime et securissime uiuere? Discipulus: Videtur sane.
28 De moribus ecclesiae 1.27.53: quis non concedat ab omni miseria liberum esse debere sapientem … etiamsi id faciat mente tranquilla, nullis aculeis doloris instinctus, sed adductus officio bonitatis, misericors tamen uocandus est. huic enim nihil obest nomen, cum absit miseria. For the English citation, see The Catholic and Manichaean Ways of Life, trans. Gallagher, Donald A. and Gallagher, Idella J. (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1966), p. 42Google Scholar.
29 Contra Academicos 1.4.11: Uiximus enim magna mentis tranquillitate ab omni corporis labe animum uindicantes et a cupiditatium facibus longissime remoti, dantes, quantum homini licet, operam rationi, hoc est secundum diuinam illam partem animi uiuentes, quam beatam esse uitam hesterna inter nos definitione conuenit. For the English citation, see Against the Academicians: The Teacher, ed. and trans. King, Peter (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1995), pp. 13–14Google Scholar.
30 Augustine's view of compassion (or pity) in case (d) is in accordance with the Stoics, who believe that compassion is a form of mental pain and mistaken judgement of the mind which should be extirpated as well. For the Stoic teaching of compassion, see Inwood, Brad, ‘Why do Fools Fall in Love?’, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies 41 (1997), p. 63CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
31 See Ambrose's De officiis 1.47.228–32; 1.48.233–9. Both Ambrose and Augustine refer to emotions as perturbations and harmful phenomena, stressing that the reason should supervise the soul like a watchman in order to avoid any harassment (boni speculatoris est ita praetendere animo). In addition, both Ambrose and Augustine state emphatically that impassibility may help to attain mental tranquillity and happiness when the focus of one's contemplation is fixed on God. Ambrose and Augustine also share many significant concepts, such as the four virtues (iustitia, prudentia, temperantia and fortitudo) as well as the theory of emotional impulses (motus animi or impetus). For Augustine paralleling Ambrose's view on apatheia, see Colish, Marcia, The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages (II) (Leiden: Brill, 1985), p. 222Google Scholar.
32 Augustine mentions that he obtained some Neoplatonic books from a man who puffed up with pride. Conf. 7.9.13: procurasti mihi per quendam hominem, inmanissimo typho turgidum, quosdam Platonicorum libros ex graeca lingua in latinum versos. Peter Brown states that ‘they [these books] seem to have included many treatises of Plotinus, in the Latin translation of Marius Victorinus, and, possibly, one work at least, now lost, by Porphyry’. Brown, Augustine of Hippo, p. 85.
33 Augustine mentions that when he read Cicero's Hortensius at the age of 18, his feelings were changed and he was deeply influenced by Stoic teachings of happiness, immortality and wisdom. He realised the vanity of the lower desires. Conf. 3.4.7: liber ille ipsius exhortationem continet ad philosophiam et uocatur Hortensius. Ille uero liber mutauit affectum meum et ad te ipsum … uiluit mihi repente omnis uana spes et immortalitatem sapientiae concupiscebam aestu cordis incredibili et surgere coeperam, ut ad te redirem. See comments in Chadwick, Confessions, pp. 38–9; cf. Knuuttila, Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, p. 164.
34 Conf. 9.12.33: et libuit flere in conspectu tuo de illa et pro illa, de me et pro me. et dimisi lacrimas, quas continebam, ut effluerent quantum uellent, substernens eas cordi meo: et requieuit in eis, quoniam ibi erant aures tuae, non cuiusquam hominis superbe interpretantis ploratum meum.
35 Conf. 4.5.10: ut dicas mihi, cur fletus dulcis sit miseris?… sed tantum dolebam et flebam. miser enim eram et amiseram gaudium meum. an et fletus res amara est et prae fastidio rerum, quibus prius fruebamur, et tunc ab eis abhorremus, delectat?
36 Conf. 8.5.11: sed tamen consuetudo adversus me pugnacior ex me facta erat, quoniam volens quo nollem perveneram. Cf. De sermone Domini in monte 12.34. See Knuuttila Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, p. 169. For the power of habit in Augustine, see Rist, John M., Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized (Cambridge: CUP, 1994), pp. 175–86CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
37 Conf. 8.5.12: Ita certum habebam esse melius tuae caritati me dedere quam meae cupiditati cedere; sed illud placebat et uincebat, hoc libebat et uinciebat … lex enim peccati est uiolentia consuetudinis, qua trahitur et tenetur etiam inuitus animus eo merito, quo in eam uolens inlabitur.
38 Conf. 9.12.33: ‘Let anyone who wishes read and interpret as he pleases. If he finds fault that I wept for my mother for a fraction of an hour, the mother who had died before my eyes, who had wept for me that I might live before your eyes, let him not mock me …’
39 De civitate Dei 9.4: H as ergo perturbationes si v e affectiones si v e passiones quidam philosophi dicunt etiam in sapientem cadere, sed moderatas rationique subiectas, ut eis leges quodam modo, quibus ad necessarium redigantur modum, dominatio mentis inponat. H oc qui sentiunt, P latonici sunt si v e A ristotelici … A liis autem, sicut S toicis, cadere ullas omnino huiusce modi passiones in sapientem non placet … H aec autem isti simpliciter et ex communi loquendi consuetudine appellant bona; sed in comparatione v irtutis, qua recte v i v itur, par v a et exigua … N am et ipsos nihil hinc aliud quam P latonicos et P eripateticos sentire existimo, quantum ad v im rerum adtinet, non ad v ocabulorum sonum.
40 De civitate Dei 9.4: Q uae si ita sunt, aut nihil aut paene nihil distat inter S toicorum aliorumque philosophorum opinionem de passionibus et perturbationibus animorum; utrique enim mentem rationemque sapientis ab earum dominatione defendunt.
41 Augustine stresses that the Stoic philosophers’ trembling and growing pale with fear should be regarded as passions, just as they are among the Peripatetics. Their dispute is concerned with mere terminology rather than fact, because they both pursue virtue and justice, arguing that passions should yield to reason and the mind (see De civitate Dei 9.4). The Stoics do not refer to the objects of the affects as good, but as advantages. In Augustine's opinion, this is merely playing with words. For a detailed discussion, see Dodaro, R., Christ and the Just Society in the Thought of Augustine (Cambridge: CUP, 2004), pp. 58–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
42 In commenting on the Stoic eupatheia of will, Augustine states: ‘But a distinction is to be made between the depravity of an evil will and the will of which the angels spoke when they proclaimed “On earth peace, good will toward men.” The addition of the word “good” here is redundant if will can only be good … Such an indiscriminate use of these terms is seen also among secular literature authors.’ See De civitate Dei 14.8.
43 De civitate Dei 9.5: ‘Scripture, indeed, places the mind itself under the governance and help of God, and the passions under the mind, so that they may be moderated and bridled and turned to righteous use.’
44 Ibid., 14.6: Interest autem qualis sit voluntas hominis; quia si perversa est, perversos habebit hos motus; si autem recta est, non solum inculpabiles, verum etiam laudabiles erunt … Quapropter homo, qui secundum Deum, non secundum hominem vivit, oportet ut sit amator boni; unde fit consequens ut malum oderit.
45 Ibid., 14.7: ‘Love striving to possess what it loves is desire; love possessing and enjoying what it loves is joy; love fleeing what is adverse to it is fear; and love undergoing such adversity when it occurs is grief. Accordingly, these feelings are bad if the love is bad, and good if it is good.’
46 Conf. 13.9.10: ‘A body by its weight tends to move towards its proper place … My weight is my love. Wherever I am carried, my love is carrying me. By your gift we are set on fire and carried upwards: we grow red hot and ascend … Lit by your fire, your good fire, we grow red-hot and ascend, as we move upwards “to the peace of Jerusalem”.’ Cf. De civitate Dei 13.5: ‘we cannot love or take delight in true righteousness unless with the aid of divine grace’.
47 Augustine applies the notion of pondus voluntatis et amoris in many places in his late writings, such as De civitate Dei 11.16; 13.18; 19.12; 22.11, etc. He also mentions it in his earlier works such as Mus. 6.11.29, Gen. litt. 4.3.7–4.5.12; 4.4.8; 4.18.34, De Trinitate 6.10.12; 11.11.18, Conf. 13.9.10; 4.15.27; 7.17.23. For a detailed discussion of the concept of ‘the weight of will and love’, see Ruokanen, Miikka, Theology of Social Life in Augustine's De civitate Dei (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993), pp. 48–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
48 De civitate Dei 14.13: ‘For it is a perverse kind of elevation indeed to forsake the foundation upon which the mind should rest, and to become and remain, as it were, one's own foundation. This occurs when a man is too well pleased with himself; and he is too well pleased with himself when he falls away from that immutable good with which he ought rather to have been pleased than with himself … For if the will had remained unshaken in its love of that higher and immutable Good by Which is bestowed upon it the light by which it can see and the fire by which it can love, it would not have turned aside from this Good to follow its own pleasure … This is why, according to Holy Scripture, the proud are called by another name: they are called “self-willed”. For it is good to lift up your hearts; not to self, however, which is pride, but to the Lord. This is obedience, which can belong only to the humble.’
49 Ibid., 14.9: ‘If these emotions and affections, which come from love of the good and from holy charity, are to be called vices, then let us allow that real vices should be called virtues.’ For the pride of philosophers, see Irwin, ‘Augustine's Criticisms’, pp. 418–27.
50 For Augustine's citation of Virgil's values of passions, see Van Riel, ‘MENS INMOTA’, pp. 507–31.
51 De civitate Dei 9.5: Quod passiones quae Christianos animos afficiunt non in vitium trahant, sed virtutem exerceant.
52 Ibid., 9.5: Denique in disciplina nostra non tam quaeritur utrum pius animus irascatur, sed quare irascatur; nec utrum sit tristis, sed unde sit tristis; nec utrum timeat, sed quid timeat. Irasci enim peccanti ut corrigatur, contristari pro adflicto ut liberetur, timere periclitanti ne pereat nescio utrum quisquam sana consideratione reprehendat. Nam et misericordiam Stoicorum est solere culpare; sed quanto honestius ille Stoicus misericordia perturbaretur hominis liberandi quam timore naufragii.
53 For Augustine's objections to the Stoic values of compassions, see also Irwin, ‘Augustine's Criticisms’, pp. 405–6.
54 De civitate Dei 9.5: Quid est autem misericordia nisi alienae miseriae quaedam in nostro corde compassio, qua utique si possumus subvenire compellimur? Servit autem motus iste rationi, quando ita praebetur misericordia, ut iustitia conservetur, sive cum indigenti tribuitur, sive cum ignoscitur paenitenti.
55 Ibid., 14.9: ‘We must, then, lead a righteous life if we are to attain a life of blessedness; and such a righteous life will exhibit all these emotions righteously, whereas a perverse life exhibits them perversely.’
56 For the role of Christ as the mediator and the saviour, see Kelly, J. N. D., Early Christian Doctrines, 5th edn (London: A&C Black, 1977), pp. 386–94Google Scholar.
57 De civitate Dei 9.6: sicut iste Platonicus confitetur, salo perturbationum fluctuat. Subiecta est ergo mens daemonum passionibus libidinum formidinum irarum atque huiusmodi ceteris … cum eorum mens passionum vitiis subiugata et oppressa, quidquid rationis naturaliter habet, ad fallendum et decipiendum tanto acrius intendat, quanto eam magis possidet nocendi cupiditas?
58 Augustine demonstrates these three principles ibid., 9.17: sed tali, qui nobis infimis ex corporis mortalitate coaptatus inmortali spiritus iustitia, per quam non locorum distantia, sed similitudinis excellentia mansit in summis, mundandis liberandisque nobis vere divinum praebeat adiutorium. Qui profecto incontaminabilis Deus absit ut contaminationem timeret ex homine quo indutus est, aut ex hominibus inter quos in homine conversatus est.
59 Ibid., 9.13: Ipsa est autem illa daemonum misera aeternitas vel aeterna miseria. Qui enim ait ‘ animo passiva’, etiam ‘ misera’ dixisset, nisi eorum cultoribus erubuisset. Porro quia providentia summi Dei, sicut etiam ipsi fatentur, non fortuita temeritate regitur mundus, numquam esset istorum aeterna miseria, nisi esset magna malitia.
60 The research for this article is funded by China's Ministry of Education National-Level project ‘The Maritime Silk Road: A Study of the First Latin Translations of the Confucian Classics in the Western World’ (19YJC720012). I would like to express my heartfelt thanks to my two supervisors, Professor Simo Knuuttila and Professor Miikka Ruokanen, who gave me careful direction during the first draft of this article. I am equally grateful to Lucy Melville who has generously offered the permission to use original sources from my work ‘Freedom from Passions in Augustine’ (2017). With their support, I could make further explorations and rethink Augustine's varying positions on the issue of metriopatheia and apatheia. Finally, I wish express my deep gratitude to the anonymous readers. Their comments and suggestions are very insightful and helpful. Certainly, all remaining errors are my own.