^{page 1 note 1} This paper is a revised version of a paper originally presented to the Philosophical Apologetics Study Group of the Graduates' Fellowship. It owes a great deal to the constructive criticisms of the other members of the group; my thanks go to all of them, and particularly to the Chairman, Professor Donald Mackay, whose gentle but persistent prompting encouraged me to far greater efforts of rethinking and recasting than I would otherwise have been capable of.

^{page 3 note 1} Hockett, C. F., A Course in Modern Linguistics (Macmillan, New York, 1958), Ch. 64, esp. pp. 570–80.Google Scholar

^{page 3 note 2} Linguists of all persuasions see this property as vitally important—alongside empiricists like Hockett may be cited rationalists such as Chomsky (see, e.g., Chomsky, N., Language and Mind [Harcourt Brace, New York, 1968], p. 6).Google Scholar

^{page 3 note 3} For a convenient summary see Geschwind, N. ‘The development of the brain and the evolution of language’, in C.I.J.M., Stuart (ed.), Report of the Fifteenth Annual (First International) Round Table Meeting on Linguistics and Language Studies, Monograph Series on Languages and Linguistics, 17 (Georgetown Univ. Press, Washington, 1964), pp. 155–69.Google Scholar

^{page 4 note 1} This does not imply that the love of which man alone is capable is wholly other than sexual attraction or maternal feelings: these are used in Scripture as analogies (Song of Solomon; Matt. 23.37).

^{page 5 note 1} Imitation has, of course, a much more important role allotted to it in empiricist theories of language acquisition than in rationalist theories; however, it is everywhere recognised as being an essential part of the process—cf. N. Chomsky, review of B. F. Skinner's Verbal Behavior, pp. 42–44, in Language 35 (1959), pp. 26–58.

^{page 6 note 1} Phonemes are those abstract elements in the structure of a language which correspond roughly with letters in the written representation of the language (see, e.g., Lyons, J. (ed.), New Horizons in Linguistics [Penguin Books, 1970], pp. 76ff.).Google Scholar

^{page 8 note 1} See Barr, J., The Semantics of Biblical Language (Oxford Univ. Press, London, 1961), ch. VIII, esp. pp. 210–11.Google Scholar

^{page 9 note 1} For the distinction between ‘application’ and ‘reference’ see Lyons, J., An Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics (Cambridge Univ. Press, London, 1968), p. 434.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 9 note 2} See Lees, R. B., The Grammar of English Nominalizations (Mouton, The Hague, 1960). PP. 53–58.Google Scholar

^{page 11 note 1} See e.g., Gleason, H. A., An Introduction to Descriptive Linguistics (Holt Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1955), pp. 4–5Google Scholar; also J. Lyons, op. cit. (1968), pp. 56–58.

^{page 12 note 1} Finlayson, R. A., ‘Contemporary ideas of inspiration’, p. 222, in Henry, C. F. H. (ed.), Revelation and the Bible (Tyndale Press, London, 1959), pp. 221–34.Google Scholar

^{page 16 note 1} For the notion of ‘competence’ see Chomsky, N., Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1965), pp. 3–9.Google Scholar

^{page 17 note 1} Bultmann, R., ‘The concept of revelation in the New Testament’, pp. 78–79, in Ogden, S. M. (ed.) Existence and Faith (Meridian Books, New York, 1960, and Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1961), pp. 58–91Google Scholar. It should be stressed that the arguments in section III of our paper are not intended as a comprehensive critique of Bultmann's views on revelation and myth; they are simply an examination of certain points which are germane to the issues we have raised, and which happen to be made rather clearly in the passages quoted from Bultmann.

^{page 18 note 1} R. Bultmann, op. cit., p. 301.

^{page 20 note 1} For the notion of ‘synonymy in a certain context’ see J. Lyons, op. cit. (1968), pp. 452–3.

^{page 21 note 1} The current term propositional revelation (implying that God has revealed truths in linguistic form which it is important for men to accept as such) is perhaps ill-chosen, since it is assertions, and not propositions, that have a truth-value. We will therefore follow P. Helm (‘Revealed propositions and timeless truths’, presented to the Philosophical Apologetics Study Group of the Graduates' Fellowship, 1970) and speak of‘assertions’ rather than ‘propositions’ in this connexion; on the other hand, for expository reasons we have followed current usage in the Introduction (above).

^{page 21 note 2} On this point see D. M. Mackay, ‘Language, meaning and God’, section 4 (presented to the Philosophical Apologetics Study Group of the Graduates Fellowship, 1969).

^{page 22 note 1} R. Bultmann, op. cit., pp. 62–63.