^{page 1 note 1} Edwards, Jonathan, Freedom of the Will, ed. Ramsey, Paul (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), pp. 430–431.Google Scholar

^{page 2 note 1} Edwards, op. cit., p. 137.

^{page 2 note 2} ibid., p. 141.

^{page 2 note 3} ibid., p. 181.

^{page 3 note 1} ibid., p. 164.

^{page 3 note 2} ibid., p. 163.

^{page 3 note 3} ‘A Letter on the Sin Against the Holy Ghost’, The Writings of James Arminius, trans. Nichols, James (3 vols.; Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1956), Vol. II, pp. 525–526.Google Scholar

^{page 3 note 4} ‘The Great Christian Doctrine of Original Sin Defended’, The Works of President Edwards (4 vols.; New York: Robert Carter and Brothers, 1881), Vol. II, pp. 476–477.Google Scholar

^{page 4 note 1} Edwards, op. cit., p. 172.

^{page 4 note 2} Miller, Perry, Jonathan Edwards (‘The American Men of Letters Series’; New York: William Sloane Assoc., 1949) p. 258.Google Scholar

^{page 4 note 3} Edwards, op. cit., p. 2O3n.

^{page 5 note 1} Edwards, op. cit., pp. 290–1.

^{page 5 note 2} ibid., p. 253.

^{page 6 note 1} Edwards, op. cit., p. 265.

^{page 6 note 2} ibid., p. 431.

^{page 6 note 3} ibid., p. 357.

^{page 7 note 1} Edwards, op. cit., p. 162.

^{page 9 note 1} Kant laboured in vain to establish that ‘ought implies can’, while Brunner maintains that ‘ought’ implies ‘cannot’. ‘If I feel I ought to do right, it is a sign that I cannot do it. If I could really do it, there would be no question of “ought” about it at all. The sense of “ought” shows me the Good at an infinite, impassable distance from my will.’ Brunner, Emil, The Divine Imperative (trans. Wyon, OlivePhiladelphia: The Westminster Press, 1947), p. 74.Google Scholar

^{page 9 note 2} Edwards, Jonathan, ‘God Glorified in Man's Dependence’, The Development of American Philosophy (ed. Muelder, Walter G. and Sears, Laurence, New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1940), p. 18.Google Scholar

^{page 10 note 1} Romans 9.19–24 (trans. J. B. Phillips). Observe the distinction between the passive participle καγηρτισμ⋯να (negative reprobation) and the active πρoητo⋯μασεν (election)—the vessels of wrath are said to be fitted, as broken pieces, for that destruction which man deserved when he broke with God; whereas God Himself is expressly said to have prepared His chosen vessels of mercy for glory.

^{page 11 note 1} Baillie, Donald M., ‘Philosophers and Theologians on the Freedom of the Will’, Scottish Journal of Theology, IV, No. 2 (June 1951), p. 121.Google Scholar

^{page 11 note 2} The theory of John Locke, that knowledge was based on experience and sensation and not on innate ideas, held a strong fascination for Edwards from early years. His emphasis on experience is well marked in his demand for conversion. Sensation, however, to Edwards was not the same as Locke's idea. The latter taught about the impact of material things upon the senses. To Edwards, sensation was the impact of God upon the soul. (See Edwards' sermon ‘A Divine and Supernatural Light’.)

^{page 11 note 3} Ness, Christopher, An Antidote Against Arminianism (Swengel [‘Union Co.’], Pennsylvania: Bible Truth Depot, 1946), p. 49.Google Scholar

^{page 12 note 1} Boettner, Loraine, The Reformed Doctrine of Predestination (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdrnans Publishing Co., 1934), p. 280.Google Scholar

^{page 13 note 1} Ramm, Bernard, Protestant Biblical Interpretation (Boston: W. A. Wilde Co., 1950), P. 95.Google Scholar