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Goodness, gratitude and divine freedom
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 March 2022
Abstract
This essay considers the goodness of God and the psalmists’ gratitude toward God in connection with divine aseity and divine freedom. The plenitude of God's goodness entails that he is fully sufficient and actualised in himself. The psalmists’ gratitude toward God implies that he acts in freedom when he communicates his goodness to creatures. The essay then explores how contemplating this teaching in the Psalter can help us to articulate in a broader dogmatic scope the coherence of God's pure actuality, freedom and constancy.
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References
1 Unless otherwise indicated, biblical quotations are given in the author's own translation.
2 For relevant discussion, see e.g. Stump, Eleonore and Kretzmann, Norman, ‘Absolute Simplicity’, Faith and Philosophy 2 (1985), pp. 362–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ross, James, ‘Comments on Absolute Simplicity’, Faith and Philosophy 2 (1985), pp. 383, 387–8CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rogers, Katherin, ‘The Traditional Doctrine of Divine Simplicity’, Religious Studies 32 (1996), pp. 165–86CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Richards, Jay Wesley, The Untamed God: A Philosophical Exploration of Divine Perfection, Simplicity, and Immutability (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2003), pp. 234–5Google Scholar; Tomaszewski, Christopher, ‘Collapsing the Modal Collapse Argument: On an Invalid Argument Against Divine Simplicity’, Analysis 79 (2019), pp. 275–84CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lenow, Joseph E., ‘Shoring up Divine Simplicity Against Modal Collapse: A Powers Account’, Religious Studies (2021), pp. 10–29CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
3 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, II/2, ed. Geoffrey T. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance (London: T&T Clark, 2009), pp. 63–7, 115.
4 For an excellent treatment of God's goodness in the Psalms, see Christopher R. J. Holmes, The Lord is Good: Seeking the God of the Psalter (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2018).
5 Peter van Mastricht, Theoretico-practica theologia, 2nd edn (Utrecht, 1724), 2.17.5.
6 The meaning of this verse is disputed, but both of the predominant interpretive options indicate that God himself is the supreme good (see below).
7 Compare the KJV's ‘my goodness extendeth not to thee’.
8 John Calvin, Commentarii in librum Psalmorum pars prior, in Ioannis Calvini opera quae supersunt omnia, ed. G. Baum et al. (Brunswick: Schwetschke, 1887), p. 150.
9 So A. A. Anderson, Psalms 1–72, vol. 1 of The Book of Psalms (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1972), p. 142, taking the particle בַּל to be affirmative. Cf. e.g. Peter C. Craigie, Psalms 1–50 (Waco, TX: Word, 1983), pp. 154–5.
10 Hans-Joachim Kraus, Psalms 1–59: A Continental Commentary (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993), p. 493.
11 Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos I–L, ed. E. Dekkers and J. Fraipont, CCSL 38 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1956), 49.17.
12 Augustine, In Ps. 49.19.
13 Jerome, Tractatuum in psalmos series altera, in Tractatus sive homiliae in psalmos, ed. G. Morin et al., CCSL 78 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1958), 15.2.
14 Herman Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei cum hominibus, 2nd edn (Leeuwarden, 1685), 1.1.11, 14.
15 Mastricht, Theoretico-practica theologia, 2.15.33. Here Mastricht contrasts God with the sun, which, of course, cannot choose not to emit its light and heat.
16 In this respect, what is good is communicative or self-diffusive, orienting others to itself (see e.g. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, vols. 4–12 of Opera omnia, Leonine edn (Rome: ex Typographia Polyglotta, 1888–1906), 1.5.4, 1.19.2).
17 See e.g. Thomas Aquinas, Commentaria in Aristotelis libros Peri Hermeneias, in vol. 1 of Opera omnia, Leonine edn (Rome: ex Typographia Polyglotta, 1882), 1.9.14.8–9, 23–4.
18 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, in vol. 22/3.1 of Opera omnia, Leonine edn (Rome: ad Sanctae Sabinae, 1970), 23.4 corp. and ad 15–16; De potentia, in vol. 2 of Quaestiones disputatae, 10th edn, ed. P. Bazzi et al. (Turin-Rome: Marietti, 1965), 1.5 corp.
19 See Mastricht, Theoretico-practica theologia, 2.15.14–15. In this connection, it is worth noting that a robust account of God's aseity ought to recognise not only that God has no efficient cause, but also that God has no final cause; God is his own end.
20 On which, see e.g. Aquinas, Summa theol. 1.19.1, 3; 1/2.10.2; Voetius, Gisbertus and Beeckman, Engelbertus, De libertate voluntatis, in Disputatio philospohico-theologica (Utrecht: Waesberge, 1652)Google Scholar; Turretin, Francis, Institutio theologiae elencticae, 3 vols, 2nd edn (Geneva: Samuel de Tournes, 1688)Google Scholar, 3.13.2–6, 10.3.4; cf. Muller, Richard A., Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology, 2nd edn (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 2017), pp. 199–203Google Scholar, 229–31.
21 Regarding the distinction between absolute necessity, on the one hand, and immutability or eternity, on the other, see Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles, in vols. 13–15 of Opera omnia, Leonine edn (Rome: Typis Ricardi Garroni, 1918–30), 1.83; Turretin, Inst. 4.2.13.
22 Cf. e.g. Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles, 1.75–6.
23 The phrase ‘freedom of contrariety’ signifies a liberty to will something (‘a’) or to will something else (‘not-a’, ‘b’, ‘c’ and so forth). For the language of tending and extending, see Aquinas, De potentia, 1.5 corp.; Gisbertus Voetius, Selectarum disputationum theologicarum, pars prima (Utrecht: Waesberge, 1648), 1.13 (240).
24 Note Aquinas’ observation that the powers of the soul (intellect and will) are ‘reflected about themselves’ so that ‘the will wills itself to will’ (voluntas vult se velle) (De veritate, 22.12 corp.).
25 See Aquinas, De veritate, 22.14; Summa theologiae, 1/2.8.3, 12.4. The key distinction here would be that whereas the divine will's self-determination toward creatures occurs without movement or the reduction of inactive potential to actuality, the created will is still moved in that (a) its exercise is intermittent, (b) its desire is evoked or incited by external objects, (c) it must have such external objects proposed to it by the intellect, and (d) its volition of an end often temporally precedes its choice of means, leaving the latter to involve, at least initially, a reduction of inactive potential to actuality and thus a second, additional act of the will connecting the means to the end.
26 Aquinas, De potentia, 3.15 ad 7. For other places where Aquinas suggests that inactive potency is not necessary to ground contingency, see e.g. In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, ed. M.-R. Cathala and R. M. Spiazzi (Turin-Rome: Marietti, 1950), 5.14, n. 974; Summa contra gentiles, 1.82; Summa theologiae, 1.25.3.
27 Lombard, Peter, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae, 3rd edn, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum 4B (Rome: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1971), 1.43Google Scholar, n. 10.
28 Anselm, De libertate arbitrii, in vol. 1 of S. Anselmi Cantuariensis archiepiscopi opera omnia, ed. F. S. Schmitt (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1946), I (208).
29 ‘“God is not able to do except what is good and just,” that is, he is not able to do except that which, if he would do, would be good and just’ (Lombard, Sent. 1.43, n. 2).
30 Anselm, Cur Deus homo, in vol. 2 of S. Anselmi Cantuariensis archiepiscopi opera omnia, ed. F. S. Schmitt (Rome, 1940), 2.5, 17 (100, 125).