^{page 151 note 1} cf. Aulén, Gustaf, Christus Victor, trans. Hebert, A. G. (London: S.P.C.K., 1931).Google Scholar

^{page 151 note 2} For a positive interpretation of Anselm's Cur Deus Homo? compare such works as: Mclntyre, John, St. Anselm and His Critics (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1954)Google Scholar; Williams, George Huntston, Anselm: Communion and Atonement (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1960)Google Scholar; and the ‘Introduction to Anselm of Canterbury’ in Fairweather, Eugene R. (ed. and trans.), A Scholastic Miscellany: Anselm to Ockham, vol. X of The Library of Christian Classics, eds., Baillie, John, McNeill, John T. and Van Dusen, Henry P. (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1956), pp. 54–8.Google Scholar

^{page 151 note 3} In the history of the doctrine of the atonement, numerous concepts have been introduced to explicate Christ's death. For example, we may note the ideas of sacrifice, ransom, warfare, legal guilt and debt. These concepts are used as illustrations, models, analogies or as the basis for more formal arguments. I use the word motif to refer to a distinctive interpretative model, such as the ransom motif or the sacrifice motif, which is used to explicate the death of Christ.

^{page 152 note 1} Anselm, , ‘Why God Became Man’, A Scholastic Miscellany, I, 10: p. 117.Google Scholar The references to Anselm's treatise will state first the Book and Chapter, and then the page of the Fairweather edition.

^{page 152 note 2} In I, 7 Anselm offers a critique of the ransom theory from the standpoint of God's omnipotence and wisdom (Ibid., pp. 107–10). Since the devil is a part of God's creation and also has violated God's law, God is under no necessity to deal justly with the devil. Hence the ransom theory of the atonement would also have to answer the charge brought by non-Christians as to the apparent absurdity and impracticality involved in the incarnation, crucifixion and resurrection.

^{page 153 note 1} ibid., I, 6, pp. 106–7.

^{page 153 note 2} The strong Second Adam Christology which Anselm develops is generally overlooked. Anselm draws heavily upon this tradition in arguing for the humanity of the Saviour. E.g. in I, 3 he points to the proportionality between Adam and Christ, Eve and Mary, the devil's conquest of man by the fruit of a tree and Christ's conquest of the devil by suffering on a tree (Ibid., pp. 104–5).

^{page 153 note 3} ibid., I, 4: p. 105.

^{page 153 note 4} cf. ibid., Preface: p. 100 and I, 20: p. 138.

^{page 153 note 5} cf. ibid., I, 1: pp. 101–2; I, 3: p. 104; and II, 15: p. 165.

^{page 153 note 6} cf. ibid., I, 2: p. 103.

^{page 153 note 7} ibid., I, 11: p. 119.

^{page 153 note 8} ibid., I, 13: p. 122.

^{page 153 note 9} The motif of debt-satisfaction is usually confused with the legal guilt-penal substitution motif. Yet the concept of debt, and its counterpart satisfaction, is to be distinguished from the penal motif. As we shall see, the debt motif from the realm of commerce is much more appropriate to Anselm's general point of view.

^{page 154 note 1} ibid., I, 15: pp. 123.4.

^{page 154 note 2} ibid I 15: P 124.

^{page 155 note 1} Anselm can speak of man honouring God in a variety of ways, but they are parts of the same general obligation: to honour God is to fulfil God's purpose in the creation (ibid., I, 16–18: pp. 125–34), t 0 attain to blessedness (ibid., I, 10: p. 118), to contribute to the order and beauty of the universe (ibid., I, 15: pp. 123–4) and to conquer the devil (ibid., I, 22–3: pp. 139–41). Since these activities are part of a single obligation, Anselm can say that man can not be blessed if he does not pay what he owes to God and restore the honour of God.

^{page 156 note 1} cf. the following passages: (1) ‘… human nature was created in order that hereafter the whole man, body and soul, should enjoy a blessed immortality. It is proved that it is necessary for this purpose for which man was made to be achieved …’ (ibid., Preface: p. 100). (2) ‘Surely we argue conclusively enough that it was fitting for God to do the things we speak of, when we say that the human race, that very precious work of his, was altogether ruined; that it was not fitting for God's plan for man to be entirely wiped out; and that this same plan could not be put into effect unless the human race were delivered by its Creator himself (ibid., I, 4: p. 105). (3) ‘It is easy to see from all this that, unless God is going to complete what he began with human nature, he made so sublime a nature for so great a good all to no purpose. But if we know that God made nothing more precious than the rational nature, created to rejoice in him, it is certainly incongruous for him to let any rational nature perish altogether’ (ibid., II, 4: p. 148). (4) Note especially the analogy of the lost pearl (ibid., I, 19: p. 135). (5) Other references include the following: ibid., I, 9: pp. 112–15; I, 10: pp. 115–18; I, 16–18: pp. 125–34; I 25: PP 144–6; II 5: PP 149–50; II 16: PP 166–72; and II, 18: pp. 176–9.

^{page 157 note 1} On the matter of God's love, the most important evidence to bear in mind is the general thesis of Anselm that it is God who redeems the world-God the Son incarnate reconciles God and man, renews the life of man and conquers the devil. That Anselm is determined to show that this could only occur in accordance with God's justice does not detract from the priority of God's action. Furthermore, the concern for God's justice is certainly as Scriptural as the concern for God's love. At this point Gustaf Aulén simply misinterprets Anselm. Aulén sees in the necessity of Christ's humanity a foothold for a Pelagian view of salvation: because man had to repay the debt, Aulén argues, Anselm has made salvation the work of man (cf. Aulén, pp. 102–9). But this is to take Anselm's point out of context. With Aulgn's logic, every Second Adam Christology would be judged Pelagian, as well as the Nicene-Chalcedonian position on the necessity of Christ's humanity. For other references in Anselm to the love of God active in man's salvation, cf. Anselm I,9:pp. 112–15; II, 5: pp. 149–50; and II, 16;pp. 158–61. Regarding the meaning of Christ's death, cf. ibid., I, 9–10: pp. 112–18; II, 15: pp. 164–5 and II 11: pp. 15–61, where Anselm relates the death of Christ to the reconciliation of God and man, the conquest of the devil and the renewal of man.

^{page 158 note 1} The attempt to defend or support one theory of the atonement usually proceeds by attacking all other theories. Thus it would be customary to show the inadequacies of other theories and attribute to them whatever real or imagined problems one can devise. Cf. Aulén's treatment of Anselm (Aulén, pp. 100–9). Such a procedure is erroneous because most of the theories are valid with respect to their basic affirmation. Because they arise out of one basic insight, they are therefore all limited and open to attack for being incomplete. It is also the case that all the theories of atonement arise in given historical periods, strongly influenced by the current attempt to explicate the meaning of Christ for the present age. Tillich is correct in saying that this is the reason why the church does not have an official doctrine regarding the atonement, comparable to the Doctrines of the Trinity and Christ (Tillich, Paul, A History of Christian Thought, ed. John, Peter H. (2nd ed.; Cambridge, Massachusetts: by the editor, 1956), p. 138).Google Scholar Taking these things into account, our procedure will not be to defend Anselm by trying to destroy alternative views. Nor can it be absolutely claimed that Anselm alone possesses the virtues we shall wish to praise. Instead, I would argue that Anselm makes certain points explicit and offers a view that is wider in scope than others.

^{page 160 note 1} The centrality of the eventfulness of the NT is again demonstrated by the success of Jürgen Moltmann's eschatological interpretation of Christianity (cf. Theology of Hope, trans. Leitch, James W. (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers 1965)).Google Scholar

^{page 163 note 1} For example, cf. chapters I and II (ibid., pp. 37–138).

^{page 164 note 1} This point of view appears in Schleiermacher's doctrine of God, where he acknowledges the concepts of holiness and justice as conceptions of divine attributes, but refuses to conceive of God as one who is displeased. For Schleiermacher the God-world relation is not one of simple reciprocity where the action of the world changes God. But instead of attributing such a view to the so-called pantheistic or idealistic tendencies, I believe it stems from Schleiermacher's insistence upon the radical sovereignty of God. God's relation to the world is determined only by God's intentionality and never the effects of the world upon God. Unfortunately Schleiermacher did not develop a concept of judgment along these lines (e.g. the steadfastness or faithfulness of God) but omitted the tradition which speaks of the judgment of God and thereby did not do justice to his own viewpoint or the biblical tradition at this point. Cf. Schleiermacher, Friedrich, The Christian Faith, ed. and trans. Mackintosh, H. R. and Stewart, J. S. (2nd ed.; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1928), pp. 325–54.Google Scholar

^{page 164 note 2} An example of this perspective is found in Baillie, D. M., God Was in Christ (2nd rev. ed.; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948), pp. 157–202.Google Scholar Baillie rejects the concept of God being reconciled because it threatens the primacy of God's love. This, I would argue, creates difficulties in his attempt to affirm God's opposition to sin and the way in which atonement is a decisive historical event. The eternal love of God, bearing the sins of the world, tends to neutralize— if not deny— these other ideas.