^{page 385 note 1} Ott, Heinrich, ‘Language and Understanding’, New Theology No. 4., ed. Marty, Martin E. and Peerman, Dean G. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1967), pp. 124–146Google Scholar. This article first appeared in Theologische Forschung 31 Kerygma und Mythos VI–2 (Hamburg-Bergstedt, West Germany: Herbert Reich Evangelischer Verlag)Google Scholar. It also appeared in Union Seminary Quarterly Review (March 1966), trans. Dean, ThomasGoogle Scholar. See also Funk, Robert W., Language, Hermeneutic and Word of God (New York: Harper and Row, 1966)Google Scholar, Robinson, James M. and Cobb, John B. Jr., (eds.), The Later Heidegger and Theology, Vol. I of New Frontiers in Theology (New York: Harper and Row, 1963)Google Scholar and Robinson, James M. and Cobb, John B. Jr., (eds.), The New Hermeneutic, Vol. II of New Frontiers in Theology (New York: Harper and Row, 1964).Google Scholar

^{page 385 note 2} Barth, Karl, Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum, trans. Robertson, Ian W., The Library of Philosophy and Theology (London: S.C.M. Press, 1960)Google Scholar. In the preface to the second edition Barth writes that ‘in this book on Anselm I am working with a vital key, if not the key, to an understanding of that whole process of thought that has impressed me more and more in my Church Dogmatics as the only one proper to theology.’

^{page 385 note 3} Lessing's terminology, though archaic, can be easily translated into the modern idiom: ‘Judgments of historical probability can never provide the ground for the certainty of faith.’ Ott, ‘Language and Understanding’, p. 130.

^{page 386 note 1} Tillich, Paul, Systematic Theology, Vol. I (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951). pp. 71–75.Google Scholar

^{page 387 note 1} ‘Being emerges from language, when language directs us into the dimension of our existence determinative for our life. Is that the “meaning” of the word of God? Then hermeneutic in theology would indeed be nothing else than the “doctrine of the word of God” (Ebeling), faith's doctrine of language. The reverse is also true: the theological doctrine of the word of God would be the question as to being in the horizon of Biblical language. Fuchs, Ernst, Zum hermeneutischen Probelm in der Theologie: Die Existential Interpretation, Gesammelte Aufsätze, I (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1959), p. 115Google Scholar. Translated by Robinson, J. M. in Robinson, and Cobb, , The Later Heidegger and Theology, p. 55Google Scholar. Quoted by Funk, Language, Hermeneutic and Word of God, p. 47.

^{page 387 note 2} Novak, Michael, Belief and Unbelief (New York: The New American Library, 1965), pp. 41–43Google Scholar

^{page 387 note 3} Tillich, Paul, ‘The Significance of the History of Religions for the Systematic Theologian’, The Future of Religions (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), pp. 80–94Google Scholar. Cf. Tillich, Paul, ‘The Present Theological Situation in the Light of the Continental European Development’, Theology Today, VI, No. 3 (Oct. 1969), pp. 299–310Google Scholar; and Tillich, Paul, ‘What is Wrong with the Ldquo;Dialectic” Theology?’, The Journal of Religion, XV, No. 2 (April 1935), pp. 127–145.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 387 note 4} Buri, Fritz, How Can We Still Speak Responsibly of God?, trans. Hardwick, Charlie D. (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1967).Google Scholar

^{page 387 note 5} ibid., p. 2.

^{page 388 note 1} ibid. Cf. my review in Interpretation, January 1969. Buri presents a modern statement of the classical nineteenth-century liberal case for natural theology as apologetics. One wonders, however, if he does not assign too much to theology when he attempts to make it responsible for the world and God. ‘Damit aber ist bereits ein zweites gesagt: Christliche Theologie ist nicht nur der Offenbarung Gottes in Christus verantwortlich, sondern um der Universalität dieser Offenbarung willen ist sie auch der Welt gegenüber verantwortlich. Sie ist dafiir verantwortlich, dass diese Offenbarung in der Welt gehört und von der Welt verstanden werden kann. Zu diesem Zwecke ist ihr die Offenbarung anvertraut, und sie hat dafür zu sorgen, dass sie von der Welt als Antwort auf ihre Frage nach Gott und dem Heil verstanden werden kann. Theologie ist nicht diese Offenbarung, sondern sie ist selber ein Stück Welt—der Welt, in der sie lebt. Aus dieser ihrer Welt heraus hat sie nach der Bedeutung zu fragen, die jener Offenbarung für ihre Gegenwart zukommt. Sie muss von der Offenbarung so reden, dass sie heute Offenbarung ist. Sie ist also gleichzeitig der Offenbarung und der jeweiligen Weltsituation gegenüber verantwortlich. Sie muss von Gott in der Sprache ihrer Welt reden.’ Buri, Fritz, Wie Können Wir Heute Noch Verantwortlich von Gott Reden? Sammlung Gemeinverständlicher Vorträge und Schriften aus dem Gebiet der Theologie und Religionsgeschichte, Heft 248 (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1967), p. 4Google Scholar. There is a slight variation in the translation (ibid.). Does Buri really mean that the theologian is responsible for enabling this revfelation to be heard and understood by the world? And does he really mean that ‘revelation is entrusted to theology'? And if he really does mean these things, can they be accepted as an accurate description of theology ? Even the theologian—or should one say, especially the theologian?—also lives by faith and not by what he knows.

^{page 388 note 2} On the question of Barth'understanding of responsibility and of sin as the ‘impossible possibility’, see my article, ‘Is Karl Barth a Universalist?’, Scottish Journal of Theology, Vol. 20, No. 4 (November 1967), pp. 423–436, esp. p. 431.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 389 note 1} ‘Our primary contradiction is not of the “natural theology” of the Vaticanum as such. This is only a self-evident consequence of our initial contradiction of its concept of God. We reject this because it is a construct which obviously derives from an attempt to unite Yahweh with Baal, the triune God of Holy Scripture with the concept of being of Aristotelian and Stoic philosophy. The assertion that reason can know God from created things applies to the second and heathenish component of this concept of God, so that when we view the construct on this side we do not recognize God in it at all, nor can we accept it as a Christian concept of God.’ Church Dogmatics, III/1, p. 84.

^{page 389 note 2} ibid., p. vii.

^{page 389 note 3} Richard R. Niebuhr's assertion that Barth reduces revelation to propositions is gross nonsense. Niebuhr, Richard R., ‘Religion and the Finality of Christianity’, Harvard Divinity Bulletin, Vol. 27 (April 1963), pp. 25–30.Google Scholar

^{page 389 note 4} cf. Hendry, George S., The Gospel of the Incarnation (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1958), esp. p. 134.Google Scholar

^{page 389 note 5} Barth, , Church Dogmatics, II/1, pp. 257–321.Google Scholar

^{page 390 note 1} cf. Smith, John E., Experience and God (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968)Google Scholar and my review in The Christian Century, 24th July 1968, p. 944.

^{page 390 note 2} The enduring significance of Barth's ‘Christocentricism’ is that it calls attention to the difference between prescriptive and descriptive statements about God and the critical hermeneutical significance of this distinction. The Christological and soteriologicalz focus of ‘very God, very man, very God-man’ should be understood not so much as a description of Jesus but as a definition of God and man. And perhaps the confession should be translated not ‘truly God, truly man’ but rather as ‘true God, true man’. The point is not that Jesus is ‘really God’ and ‘really man’ with a loud homiletical emphasis on the ‘really’ as if we had in the backs of our minds somewhere the concept of God and the concept of man and the force of the confession was to show that these two clear and distinct ideas are really and actually to be attributed to some point back there in the history of Israel. By no means! The point is that in Jesus Christ we see true God and true man and what we see there calls into question and refutes and shatters our own, and therefore idolatrous, ideas about God and man. Cf. Church Dogmatics, IV/1, pp. 79–154.

^{page 390 note 3} Feuerbach, Ludwig, The Essence of Christianity, trans, by Eliot, George (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), pp. 1–12Google Scholar. Cf. the selections from Feuerbach and the introduction to Chapter Five in my anthology, Phenomenobgy of Religion (New York: Harper and Row, 1969).Google Scholar

^{page 391 note 1} Barth, , Church Dogmatics, II/1, p. 188f.Google Scholar

^{page 391 note 2} Buri, How Can We Still Speak Responsibly of God?, pp. 49–57, et passim. Cf. Buri, Fritz, Thinking Faith, trans, by Oliver, Harold H. (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1968)Google Scholar, et passim.

^{page 391 note 3} Barth, , Church Dogmatics, II/1, p. 13f.Google Scholar

^{page 392 note 1} ibid., II/1, p. 74.

^{page 392 note 2} ibid., II/1, p. 33

^{page 394 note 1} Feuerbach, , The Essence of Christianity, p. 16.Google Scholar

^{page 394 note 2} In the case of theology, this is a collective ‘I’ referring to the Church. Identification with the community, however, is quite distinct from adopting an artificial position.

^{page 395 note 1} Barth, ,Church Dogmatics, II/1, p. 246fGoogle Scholar

^{page 396 note 1} This should be contrasted to Buri's presumptuous opinion that the theologian stands between God and the world. Supra, p. 388, n. 1.

^{page 396 note 2} Of course in so far as Tillich's division between question and answer is pedagogical, the trouble diminishes.

^{page 396 note 3} Supra, p. 392, n. 2.

^{page 397 note 1} Church Dogmatics, II/1, p. 95.Google Scholar

^{page 398 note 1} Emil Brunner, ‘Nature and Grace’, Barth, Karl and Brunner, Emil, Natural Theology translated by Fraenkel, Peter with an introduction by Baillie, John (London: The Centenary Press, 1956), p. 58.Google Scholar

^{page 398 note 2} Funk, , Language, Hermeneutic, and Word of God, pp. 180–222.Google Scholar

^{page 399 note 1} Barth, , Anselm, pp. 18, 21, et passim.Google Scholar

^{page 399 note 2} ‘This brings us to the concept of understanding as such … It is impossible to understand another person or text, e.g. a mythological one, if we do not allow it to question us with the utmost frankness … It would, perhaps, be going too far to speak of being unreservedly open to the text, for that is rarely possible, either with the Word of God or with the word of man. But if our aim is to understand it, we must surely try to approach it as openmindedly as possible. That is a matter of principle. It is impossible to understand any other person unless we are ready to let him tell us something we did not know before, something we could not find out for ourselves, something we have hitherto been prejudiced against, perhaps with much justification. We shall never understand him if we are sure we know beforehand the limits of our understanding. We shall never understand him if we lay down these limits before we have given him a chance to speak for himself. These limitations, it is true, are found in all personal relationships. They are signs of real narrow-mindedness. Thus it is certain that even if we manage to be completely openminded, it will take us a long time to reach a perfect understanding. No doubt from time to time we shall be jolted out of our narrow-mindedness and widen our sights for a moment. But is quite another thing to regard as our sacred duty and an iron law to confine ourselves within our narrow-mindedness and refuse to budge an inch. I do not see how I can understand another man or a text unless I am ready to show a certain amount of flexibility … To understand another I shall have to overcome this unsympathetic attitude, and cease to maintain it as a matter of principle. Such sympathy, or its absence, can never be taken for granted, whether towards others or towards a text. It can never be guaranteed or contrived artificially by our own reason or strength, any more than we can contrive it in our relation to God. For genuine understanding between man and man, however incomplete, the discipline of the Holy Spirit will undoubtedly be necessary. For it is only through the Holy Spirit that the Old and New Testaments can be appreciated as a testimony to the Word of God. Not even myths or persons like Goethe for instance can be understood without this initial sympathy, that is, without something of the discipline of the Holy Spirit. The erection of this doctrine of the prior understanding as the norm, which lies at the root of Bultmann's hermeneutics, would seem to be the death of all right and genuine understanding. For it appears to compete with the Holy Spirit and unduly to restrict his operation. We are surely justified in approaching this doctrine with scepticism and the use to which Bultmann puts it. For it rules out all genuine communication.

‘Thirty years ago, when we launched the new movement in theology, our aim—or at least mine—was to reverse the current understanding of the New (and the Old) Testament; and understanding in general, man's knowledge, as we saw it, depended on his being known by the object of his knowledge. We were concerned with the Word, God's gift and message to man. We felt that the Word of God also throws light on the words men address to one another. Our aim was to emancipate understanding, both of the Bible and of things in general, from the Egyptian bondage in which one philosophy after another had tried to take control and teach us what the Holy Spirit was allowed to say as the Word of God and of man in order to be open to understanding. And though we did not know the Word, we were seeking to demythologize the belief that man was the measure of his own understanding and of all other understanding.… Now as I see it, Bultmann has forsaken our road and gone back to the old one again.… Unlike most of those who cannot follow him, I am perplexed not so much by his resolute opposition to anything smacking of the supernatural, or the denials and eliminations in his restatement of the kerygma, as by—shall I call it—the “pre-Copernican attitude” which lies behind them.’ Barth, Karl, ‘Rudolf Bultmann, an Attempt to Understand Him’, Kerygma and Myth, Vol. II, ed. Bartsch, Hans Werner, trans. Fuller, Reginald H. (London: S.P.C.K., 1962, pp. 125–128Google Scholar. Cf. Ogden, Schubert M., Christ Without Myth (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961), esp. pp. 111–126.Google Scholar

^{page 400 note 1} Cummings, E. E., ‘all ignorance toboggans into know’, A Pocket Book of Modern Verse, ed. Williams, Oscar (New York: Washington Square Press, 1954), p. 385.Google Scholar

^{page 400 note 2} Hart, Ray L., Unfinished Man and the Imagination (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), pp. 60–68.Google Scholar

^{page 400 note 3} Hamer, Jerome, Karl Barth, trans. Maruca, Dominic M. (Westminster, M d.: Newman, 1962).Google Scholar

^{page 401 note 1} Supra, p. 388, n. 2.

^{page 401 note 2} Barth, , Church Dogmatics, II/1, p. 284.Google Scholar

^{page 401 note 3} Karl Barth, ‘No!’, Barth, and Brunner, , Natural Theology, p. 79Google Scholar. Cf. Hart, , Unfinished Man and the Imagination, pp. 138–162.Google Scholar

^{page 402 note 1} Marcuse, Herbert, One-Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964).Google Scholar

^{page 403 note 1} Supra, Section I.

^{page 403 note 2} Barth, , ‘No!’, p. 122.Google Scholar