^{page 443 note 1} Schleiermacher's pragmatic and epistemological critiques are found in Schleiermacher (1830, §14.3, pp. 71–73), whereas his metaphysical critique is found in Schleiermacher (1830, §47, pp. 178–84).

^{page 443 note 2} Cf. Wiles (1986).

^{page 444 note 3} Schleiermacher (1830, p. viii).

^{page 444 note 4} Schleiermacher (1830, § 4).

^{page 444 note 5} Schleiermacher (1830, §14.3, p. 71).

^{page 445 note 6} Schleiermacher (1830, §14.3, p. 71).

^{page 445 note 7} Schleiermacher (1830, $14.3, pp. 71–72).

^{page 446 note 8} Schleiermacher (1830, §99, p. 422 and §122, p. 566).

^{page 446 note 9} See for instance my article ‘On the Very Possibility of Intelligent Design’ in Moreland (1994, pp. 113–38).

^{page 447 note 10} Quoted in Loos (1966, p. 19, n. 1). The quote may be translated, ‘Of course no one was as skilled at veiling what in the end he really did and did not hold of miracles.’ The pun centers on the word translated ‘veiling’—Schleiermacher literally means ‘veil maker’.

^{page 448 note 11} See especially Schleiermacher (1830, §§11 and 100).

^{page 448 note 12} Schleiermacher (1830, §14.3, p. 72).

^{page 448 note 13} Schleiermacher (1830, §14.3, pp. 72–3), italics added. Though Schleiermacher seems in this passage to be granting more room to miracles than Spinoza, in point of fact Schleiermacher is agreeing with Spinoza that designating something a miracle constitutes an expression of ignorance. The locus dassicus for Spinoza's view of miracles is found in chapter 6 of Spinoza's Tractatus Theologico-Politicus—see Spinoza (1670, ch. 6).

^{page 449 note 14} Schleiermacher (1830, §47, p. 181).

^{page 449 note 15} Schleiermacher (1830, §47, p. 180).

^{page 449 note 16} Schleiermacher (1830, §14.3, p. 71).

^{page 450 note 17} Schleiermacher (1830, §47, pp. 181–2). Actually, Schleiermacher introduces an unnecessary subtlety here, distinguishing miracles in which something that was supposed to happen fails to happen (negative miracles) from miracles in which something that was not supposed to happen does happen (positive miracles). The logic is the same for both cases, however, since in either case something still happens (even the failure of some event happening constitutes an event).

^{page 452 note 18} Quoted from Brandt (1941, p. 214).

^{page 452 note 19} Newton (1958, p. 302).

^{page 452 note 20} Pearcey and Thaxton (1994, p. 90).

^{page 453 note 21} More than half of Newton's writings were concerned solely with religion and alchemy—see Gregory's introduction to Spinoza's Tractatus Theologico-Polilicus in Spinoza (1670, p. 9).

^{page 453 note 22} Locke (1690, p. 382). See also the paragraphs on miracles in Locke (1695).

^{page 453 note 23} Humc (1748, ch. 10).

^{page 453 note 24} Peter Lipton's model of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) might even make ‘divine intervention’ the best explanation for a given phenomenon—see Lipton (1991).

^{page 454 note 25} Bradleyand Swartz (1979, pp. 147–149).

^{page 454 note 26} Alan Richardson (1942, p. 127) takes this position in his discussion of Jesus' miracles: ‘Only those who came in faith understood the meaning of the acts of power. That is why any discussion of the Gospel miracles must begin, as we began, with a consideration of the biblical theology, with the faith which illuminates their character and purpose.’

^{page 455 note 27} Quoted in Brandt (1941, p. 36).

^{page 455 note 28} Schleiermacher (1799, p. 40).

^{page 455 note 29} Brandt (1941, p. 146, n. ^*).

^{page 456 note 30} Compare Spinoza (1677, bk. 1, def. 7) with Schleiermacher (1830, §81.2, p. 334).

^{page 456 note 31} Spinoza (1670, p. 124).

^{page 456 note 32} Spinoza (1670, p. 126).

^{page 457 note 33} For a helpful historical discussion of the traditional understanding of miracles, see Loos (1965, pp. 37–42).

^{page 458 note 34} See Loos (1965, p. 43).

^{page 458 note 35} Tennant (1925, p. 10).

^{page 459 note 36} Process theologians, for instance, do this all the time—see Case-Winters (1990, pt. 3).

^{page 459 note 37} Schleiermacher and Spinoza employ the language of ‘ordination’, ‘will’, and ‘decrees’ throughout their work, and use these terms synonymously. When applied to God this language signifies the necessity of what is determined coming to pass. See Schleiermacher (1830, §54, p. 211 ff.) and Spinoza (1670, ch. 6) for examples of how they use these terms.

^{page 461 note 38} Schleiermacher (1830, §47, p. 180).

^{page 461 note 38} Schleiermacher (1830, §47, p. 180).

^{page 461 note 40} By efficacious prayer I mean prayer which makes a difference in the sense that without the prayer being offered, things would have turned out differently. In the subsequent discussion of efficacious prayer I have been helped enormously by Nancey Murphy's article ‘Does Prayer Make a Difference?’—see Murphy (1989).

^{page 462 note 41} Cf. Schleiermacher's discussion of human responsibility for sin in Schleiermacher (1830, §81.2, p. 334).

^{page 462 note 42} Weatherford (1991, p. 28).