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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 February 2009
This essay will attempt to make some systematic clarity out of the thought of St. Augustine in reference to his conception of evil. The problem of evil is one which confronted St. Augustine at every point of his intellectual development; it is everywhere either to be openly seen or to be perceived lurking just beneath the surface of the question at issue. This assertion, however, needs some qualification as will become evident as the essay develops. The essay will attempt to show that the problem of evil for St. Augustine resolves itself into the problem of the will. This problem is, for Augustine, clearly at the base of man's moral dilemmas. The question of the will of God is at the root of the theological-philosophical doctrines of creation and natural order. The problem of the will comes to the fore as the metaphysical question par excellence; bound up with the question of the motivation of the will (or more particularly here, the question of the ‘cause’ of the defection of the human will) is the arch-problem of the introduction of a dynamic link into the movement from an unmoved Creator to a changing creation. An attempt will be made to point out the bearing of the more overtly theological questions of grace and predestination upon the questions of the will, evil and creation. Of a piece with these concepts is that of the Augustinian epistemology.
page 257 note 1 op. cit., I.I.I.
page 257 note 2 De civ. Dei, XI.18, 22, 23.
page 258 note 1 For something of the colour of the times in this regard, see Daniel-Rops, Henri, The Church in the Dark Ages (Dent-Dutton, London, 1959)Google Scholar. Cf. also the opening Books of De civitate Dei.
page 259 note 1 4.29.
page 259 note 2 III.7.12, IV.16.31, Vll.II.
page 259 note 3 I.I.
page 259 note 4 op. cit., 11, and cf. Soliloquies, II.33.
page 260 note 1 De immortalitate animae, 12.
page 260 note 2 De lib. arbit., III. 17.48, cf. De civ. Dei, XII.8.
page 260 note 3 De lib. arbit., II.20.54.
page 260 note 4 ibid., I.12.25.
page 260 note 5 ibid., III. 17.48.
page 261 note 1 ibid., I.16.35.
page 262 note 1 XI.21.
page 262 note 2 This ambiguity, I believe, is inherent in the human power of volition, which, Of course, participates integrally in a creatio ex nihilo.
page 263 note 1 The distinction of nothings should be made at this point, for it will be helpful to us as the discussion progresses. The first sense of the word ‘nothing’ is that of the absolute absence of something; this is referred to as ouk on. The second sense of the word is that which denotes the absence of something, but which is an absence having the potentiality to become something; this is referred to as me on.
page 263 note 2 II. 15.39.
page 263 note 3 De nalura boni contra Manichaeos, 1.
page 263 note 4 De moribus ecclesiae catholicae, 10, 16.
page 263 note 5 De natura boni …, 25.
page 263 note 6 De civ. Dei, XII.25.
page 263 note 7 idem.
page 263 note 8 De incarnalione verbi Dei, 6.
page 263 note 9 II. I6.44.
page 264 note 1 Flückiger, Felix, Geschichte des Naturrechls (Zollikon…Zürick: Evangelischer Verlag AG, 1954), Vol. I, p. 248.Google Scholar
page 264 note 2 4.34.
page 265 note 1 Soliloquies, II.33.
page 265 note 2 cf. De natura boni …, 6.
page 265 note 3 De civ. Dei, XIX. 13.
page 265 note 4 cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, S.T., I, q. 48, art. 5, ad 1; and Jolivet, Régis, Le Probléme du Mai d'aprés Saint Augustin (Gabriel Beauchesne et ses fils, Paris, 1936), p. 40.Google Scholar
page 265 note 5 cf. De beata vita, where nihil is referred to as that which perishes, 2.8, 4.30.
page 265 note 6 De lib. arbit., II. 16.44.
page 266 note 1 II. 17.45.
page 266 note 2 idem.
page 266 note 3 De civ. Dei, XXI.8.
page 266 note 4 Without a doctrine of the Trinity, the question of God's existence is meaning-less—if man has fallen away from the truth to nothingness. This will be discussed further, below.
page 267 note 1 De civ. Dei, XXII.24, cf. Éitienne Gilson, Introduction a L'Étude de Saint Auguitin, 3rd ed., p. 197.
page 267 note 2 De lib. arbit., III.18.52.
page 267 note 3 De natura boni …, 34, cf. 36.
page 268 note 1 Bk. IX, passim.
page 268 note 2 IX.7.13.
page 269 note 1 cf.IX.10.15.
page 269 note 2 cf. Eckhart, Meister: ‘… the purity of the soul consists in never turning aside to anything (at which it does not ultimately aim). To turn aside is to die and finally not to be.’ Meister Eckhart: A Modern Translation, by Blakney, Raymond B. (Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1957), p. 173.Google Scholar
page 269 note 3 XII. 15. Origen, somewhere in his De principiis, makes a similar suggestion; and other forms of the same idea are not unknown to the mystics, e.g. Angelius Silesius.
page 270 note 1 De praedestinatione sanctorum, 34 (XVII).
page 270 note 2 Enchiridion, IX.2g, cf. De civ. Dei, XII.22, and De babtismo, II.5.6.
page 270 note 3 De civ. Dei, Xl.ai, XXI.8.
page 271 note 1 De lib. arbit., I.I.I, cf. III.20.57.
page 271 note 2 De praedestinatione sanctorum, 16 (VIII), cf. 29 (XIV).
page 271 note 3 Flückiger, op. cit., pp. 383ff.
page 272 note 1 St. Thomas Aquinas makes this point with rather more precision than does Augustine, but does so in reliance upon him; e.g. S.T., I, qq. 48–49; De malo, I.I, 3; S.C.G., III.7–10, 13, II.46; and Compend. theol., 115. Cf. also Maritain, Jacques, St. Thomas and the Problem of Evil, (Marquette Univ. Press, Milwaukee, 1942)Google Scholar. See also Webb, Dom Bruno, ‘God and the Mystery of Evil’, The Downside Review, Vol. LXXV, No. 242, autumn 1957.Google Scholar
page 272 note 2 De civ. Dei, XI.22.
page 273 note 1 Perhaps in referring to this primal condition as one of ‘ambiguity ’we are overly trespassing on ground more adequately covered by Sören Kierkegaard in his The Concept of Dread. Of great interest in this general context is C. S. Lewis' brilliant novel of science fiction, Voyage to Venus.
page 273 note 2 De lib. arbit., II.20.54.
page 273 note 3 A History of Christian Thought (recorded and edited by John, Peter H., 2nd ed., 1956, p. 94.Google Scholar
page 274 note 1 History of Dogma, E.T., Vol. IV, p. 79 et passim.
page 275 note 1 We are not concerned here with the later refinements upon this concept which are evinced in later Scholasticism, e.g. in John Duns Scotus.
page 276 note 1 The ultimate ambiguity of existential reality has come strongly to the fore in this discussion. It is difficult to say how much the reading of Paul Tillich (e.g. his Das Dämonische) and Nicolas Berdyaev (especially The Destiny of Man, and The Meaning of the Creative Act) has contributed to this view; perhaps it is unnecessary to say, but it is right that their names be mentioned.