Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-t5tsf Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-05T13:35:04.521Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Newton, Einstein and Barth on time and eternity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 October 2014

Li Qu
Li Qu*
Affiliation:
Department of Religion and Philosophy, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong [email protected]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

For two hundred years after 1687, Newton's notion of absolute time dominated the world of physics. However, Newtonian metaphysical absolute time is so ideal that it may only be realised and actualised by God. In the early twentieth century, Einstein breaks this dominant understanding of time fundamentally by his Special Theory of Relativity and General Theory of Relativity. In the Einsteinian paradigm, we are forced to think no longer of space and time but rather to look at a four-dimensional space-time continuum, in which time appears to be more space-like than temporal. The Newtonian theory implies that there is an absolute, dominant point from which the universe can be observed, whereas Einstein argues for the opposite: there can be no vantage perspective and no universal present by which God can divide past and future.

Barth takes a trinitarian approach to interpret the concept of time. For Barth, the Father is coeternal with the Son and the Holy Spirit. The eternal immanent Trinity acts concretely as the temporal economic Trinity, thus the triune God is pre-, supra- and post- to us. In actual temporality, the Father, Son and Holy Spirit transcend time concretely in our history and penetrate time absolutely from divine eternity. God's eternity is both transcendent and immanent to human time.

Such a trinitarian temporality might serve as a ‘dynamic privileged perspective’ since time, energy and movement are all created by God from eternity. On the one hand, the triune Creator transcends his creature and its creaturely form – time absolutely; on the other hand, even when God enters time and moves together with the time ‘uniformly’ in the Son and the Holy Spirit, he becomes concretely simultaneous with all time. Also the Barthian perspective might provide something which is lacking in Einstein's relative time, i.e. the direction of time from the past to the future. Since every historical event in Einsteinian four-dimensional continuum is posited as a static space-time slice and Einstein equations are time-reversible, there is no ontological difference between time dimensions at all. However, in Barth's trinitarian opinion, such extraordinary events as the creation, resurrection and Pentecost are ontologically superior to other events in human history because they do change our temporality in an absolute way. Penetrated by the trinitarian eternity, those discrete space-time slices also become communicable and hence take genuine temporal characteristics, i.e. the past, present and future.

Keywords

absolute timeBarthEinsteinNewtonrelative timetrinitarian eternity
Type
Research Article
Information
Scottish Journal of Theology , Volume 67 , Issue 4 , November 2014 , pp. 436 - 449
Copyright
Copyright © Scottish Journal of Theology Ltd 2014 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 For Newtonian opinions of time, with special reference to its influence on philosophy and theology, see Achtner, Wolfgang, Kunz, Stefan and Walter, Thomas, Dimensions of Time, trans. Williams, Arthur H. Jr., (Grand Rapids, MI, and Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2002), pp. 110–14Google Scholar; Luscombe, Philip, Groundwork of Science and Religion (Peterborough: Epworth Press, 2000), pp. 30–2, 130–2Google Scholar; Osborn, Lawrence, ‘Theology and the New Physics’, in Southgate, Christopher (ed.), God, Humanity and the Cosmos (London and New York: T & T Clark International, 2005), pp. 119–28Google Scholar; Hodgson, Peter E., ‘Relativity and Religion: The Abuse of Einstein's Theory’, Zygon 38/2 (June 2003), pp. 393–409CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 Newton, Isaac, The Principia: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, trans. Cohen, I. Bernard and Whitman, Anne (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1999)Google Scholar.

3 Newton, Principia, p. 408.

4 Newton points out: ‘It is possible that there is no uniform motion by which time may have an exact measure. All motions can be accelerated and retarded, but the flow of absolute time cannot be changed. The duration or preservation of the existence of things is the same, whether their motions are rapid or slow or null, accordingly, duration is rightly distinguished from its sensible measures and is gathered from them by means of an astronomical equation.’ See Newton, Principia, p. 410.

5 As Lucas, J. R. puts it: ‘time is not what the clocks say, but what they are trying to tell’. See Lucas, A Treatise on Time and Space (London: Methuen & Co., 1973), p. 64Google Scholar.

6 Newton, Principia, p. 941.

7 Achtner et al., Dimensions of Time, p. 113.

8 ‘These definitions are metaphysical’, Hodgson argues, ‘so that it makes sense to speak of doubling the speed of clocks or enlarging space. Without the concept of metaphysical time as an ultimate reference this would have no meaning, and similarly for space. Such definitions need to be supplemented by more physical definitions if they are to be of practical use. Absolute space can be defined physically as the unique reference frame that, if it exists, can be recognized as such by all observers irrespective of their velocities with respect to that frame. Absolute time can be defined in a similar way.’ See Hodgson, ‘Relativity and Religion’, p. 397.

9 ‘What Einstein did’, Craig points out, ‘in fact, was to shave away Newton's absolute time and space, and along with them the aether, thus leaving behind only their empirical measures. Since these are relativized to inertial frames, one ends up with the relativity of simultaneity and of length.’ See Craig, William Lane, Time and Eternity (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2001), p. 47CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For the philosophical and theological significance of Albert Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity and General Theory of Relativity, see Barbour, Ian G., Religion and Science (London: SCM Press, 1998), pp. 177–81Google Scholar; Craig, ‘The Special Theory of Relativity and Theories of Divine Eternity’, Faith and Philosophy 11/1 (Jan. 1994), pp. 19–37; Craig, ‘Relativity and the “Elimination” of Absolute Time’, in Øhrstrøm, Peter (ed.), Time, Reality, and Transcendence in Rational Perspective (Aalborg: Aalborg University Press, 2002), pp. 91–128Google Scholar; DeWeese, Garrett J., God and the Nature of Time (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), pp. 65–84Google Scholar; Fagg, Lawrence W., The Becoming of Time (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1995), pp. 29–42Google Scholar; Hodgson, ‘Relativity and Religion’, pp. 393–409; Russell, Robert John, ‘Time in Eternity: Special Relativity and Eschatology’, Dialogue: A Journal of Theology 39/1 (2000), pp. 46–55CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Torretti, Roberto, ‘On Relativity, Time Reckoning and the Topology of Time Series’, in Butterfield, Jeremy (ed.), The Arguments of Time (New York: OUP, 1999), pp. 65–82Google Scholar.

10 Cf. Achtner et al., Dimensions of Time, p. 124.

11 Torretti, ‘On Relativity’, p. 71. Of course, here a ‘second’ is a second within our earthly inertial frame where ‘one second is no longer defined to be 1/86400 of a day: it is 9,192,631,770 beats of a cesium atom’. See Davies, Paul, About Time (New York: Touchstone, 1996), p. 22Google ScholarPubMed. People changed the definition of second with the latter, presumably the cesium atom clock is more accurate, ‘but accurate relative to what?’ Davies asked (p. 22). Indeed, without a Newtonian absolute time, it is difficult to say one measurement of time is more accurate than another.

12 Cf. Achtner et al., Dimensions of Time, p. 126; Fagg, Becoming of Time, p. 36.

13 Cf. Barbour, Religion and Science, p. 179.

14 Robert John Russell calls it the ‘downfall of the present’: ‘There is no physically significant way of determining a universally agreed upon present according to SR. The inevitable implication is that there is no universal, unique “present”—only “present” defined by each moving observer in an equivalent way. SR invites us to look at the union of space and time in “spacetime”.’ See Russell, ‘Time in Eternity’, p. 50.

15 ‘The dependence of time’, Hodgson argues, ‘on the spatial coordinates and on the relative velocity of the two frames implies that the absolute simultaneity of events cannot be established. This does not imply, however, that temporal simultaneity has been disproved, since it does not exclude the possibility that absolute space and time can be established in some other way, as may be possible in the context of the Big Bang theory.’ See Hodgson, ‘Relativity and Religion’, p. 403; Barbour puts it in a simpler way: ‘Different observers “project” spatial and temporal dimensions of the four-dimensional spatiotemporal interval in different ways, but each can calculate what the other will be observing. There are rules for translating into equivalent relationships in another frame of reference’. See Barbour, Religion and Science, p. 178.

16 ‘We can draw graphs showing time as if it were another spatial dimension. It is sometimes said that we can present the cosmos as a static spatiotemporal block that different observers “project” as spatial and temporal dimensions in differing ways.’ See Barbour, Religion and Science, p. 179. Hawking, Cf. Stephen, A Brief History of Time: From the Big Bang to Black Holes (New York: Bantam Books, 1998), pp. 21–2Google Scholar; Lameter, Christoph, Divine Action in the Framework of Scientific Thinking: From Quantum Theory to Divine Action (La Grange, IL: Christianity in 21st Century, 2005), p. 47.Google Scholar

17 Hartshorne, Cf. Charles, A Natural Theology for our Time (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1967), p. 93Google Scholar.

18 Craig, ‘Relativity and Divine Eternity’, p. 19.

19 Craig, Time and Eternity, p. 44. An example of such reasoning can be found in Mosersky, Joshua M., ‘Time, Tense and Special Relativity’, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14/3 (2000), pp. 221–36CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

20 ‘Relativity Theory’, he argues, ‘does not provide good grounds for thinking that God is timeless. The Einsteinian interpretation of STR is based essentially upon an untenable and obsolete verificationist epistemology and so cannot force abandonment of the classical concept of time. Moreover, GTR in its cosmological application furnishes us with a cosmic time parameter which may be plausibly interpreted as the appropriate measure of God's time since the moment of creation. The past finitude of cosmic time does not imply the finitude of God's time, for whether one adopts a substantial or a relational view of time, it is coherent to speak of God's existing temporally prior to the creation of the universe and the beginning of cosmic time’. See Craig, Time and Eternity, p. 66.

21 Cf. Craig, Time and Eternity, p. 180.

22 ‘Scotus argued that,’ Leftow points out, ‘if events are not yet present time, they are not yet present to God in eternity. William Lane Craig, Bowman Clarke, Richard Creel, and Delmas Lewis have in effect revived Scotus’ argument. They contend that if it is now true to say that events exist in eternity, it is also now true to say that these events exist in time.’ See Leftow, Time and Eternity, pp. 230–1; Cf. also Rea, Michael C., ‘Four-Dimensionalism’, in Loux, Michael J. and Zimmerman, Dean W. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics (New York: OUP, 2003), pp. 174–6Google Scholar.

23 The historical development of Barth's understanding of the concept of time and eternity from The Epistle to the Romans, The Göttingen Dogmatics, The Resurrection of the Dead to Church Dogmatics is too complicated to retrieve here.

24 Barth, Karl, Church Dogmatics, 13 part volumes, ed. Bromiley, G. W. and Torrance, T. F. (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1956–75)Google Scholar. Referred to hereafter as CD.

25 On the relationship between the holy Trinity and God's threefold temporality, Russell comments: ‘Barth claims that eternity has a threefold character: as pre-temporal it is the source of time; as supra-temporal the divine life is related to all created moments as the principle of their unity; as post-temporal God is the goal of creaturely time lying beyond the end time. Thus the eternity of God embodies the intrinsic structure of time, namely succession without corruption. Finally Barth understood both the unity and the direction of time to be intimately related to the inner life of the Trinity.’ See Robert John Russell, ‘Is Nature Creation? Philosophical and Theological Implications of Physics and Cosmology from a Trinitarian Perspective’, in Gregersen, Niels Henrik, Parsons, Michael W. S. and Wassermann, Christoph (eds), The Concept of Nature in Science and Theology (Geneva: Labor et Fides, 1997), p. 103Google Scholar.

26 Augustine, Confessions 11.12, trans. R. S. Pine-Coffin (London: Penguin Books, 1961), p. 262.

27 CD II/1, p. 622.

28 For Barth, eternity is always real duration. There is no difference between beginning, middle and end. When time is related to eternity, it is not separated from its beginning and end.

29 As Hunsinger puts it: ‘When God humbles himself in Jesus Christ by entering time, he becomes one of us, like us in all things’. See Hunsinger, ‘Mysterium Trinitatis: Karl Barth's Conception of Eternity’, in Disruptive Grace: Studies in Theology of Karl Barth (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2000), p. 203.

30 Cf. CD II/1, p. 629, also Dale Dawson, R., The Resurrection in Karl Barth (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), p. 38Google Scholar.

31 See CD II/1, p. 630.

32 Cf. George Hunsinger, ‘The Mediator of Communion: Karl Barth's Doctrine of the Holy Spirit’, in Disruptive Grace, pp. 173–9.

33 CD III/2, p. 526.

34 CD III/2, p. 438.

35 CD III/2, p. 522.

36 Gunton, Colin, ‘Barth, the Trinity, and Human Freedom’, Theology Today 43/3 (1986), p. 318CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

37 Pannenberg, Cf. Wolfhart, Systematic Theology, vol. 1, trans. Bromiley, Geoffrey W. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1991), pp. 405–7Google Scholar.

38 For Barth, Busch says, ‘the mistake in the concept of time that was dominant in the intellectual world around him was to think of time as “absolute time,” the “absolute reality,” “the naked structure of the sphere” to which we belong’. See Busch, Great Passion, p. 264.

39 According to Busch, the concept of ‘absolute time’ is rooted theologically in an ‘absolute’ eternity, eternity cut loose from creaturely time. Cf. Busch, Great Passion, p. 268.

40 Lucas thus argues: ‘Einstein formulated the principle that there are no privileged observers and elevated it from a truth about electromagnetism to a general metaphysical principle; whereas Newton, more cautiously, did not.’ See Lucas, John, ‘The Special Theory and Absolute Simultaneity’, in Craig, William Lane and Smith, Quentin (eds), Einstein, Relativity and Absolute Simultaneity (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 280Google Scholar.

41 For the defence of ‘absolute simultaneity’ which Einstein excludes from his Special Theory of Relativity, cf. Michael Tooley, ‘A Defense of Absolute Simultaneity’, in Craig and Smith, Einstein, Relativity and Absolute Simultaneity, pp. 229–43; Richard Swinburne, ‘Cosmic Simultaneity’, ibid., pp. 244–61.

42 Weyl, Hermann, Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Science (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1949), p. 116Google Scholar.

43 Cf. Ellis, George F. R., ‘Physics in the Real Universe: Time and Space-Time’, in Petkov, Vesselin (ed.), Relativity and the Dimensionality of the World (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), p. 50Google Scholar.

44 Russell, ‘Is Nature Creation?’, p. 104.