^{page 170 note 1} I quote from the mimeographed versions of the addresses given at the Conference of Church and Society, to which the page-numbers refer. The three addresses were as follows:

H.-D. Wendland: ‘The Church and Revolution’

Richard Shaull: ‘The Revolutionary Challenge to Church and Theology’

Archpriest Borovoy: ‘The Challenge and Relevance of Theology to the social revolutions of our time’.

^{page 172 note 1} Christian Social Ethics in a Changing World, edited by Bennett, John C., Association Press, New York, 1966Google Scholar. It really is a pity that the German preparatory book (Die Kirche als Faktor einer kommenden Weltgemeinschaft, Stuttgart, 1966Google Scholar) does not include Shaull's contribution.

^{page 172 note 2} Christian Social Ethics in a Changing World, p. 25.

^{page 172 note 3} op. cit., p. 32.

^{page 173 note 1} For instance André Philip in the second preparatory volume Responsible Government in a Revolutionary Age, p. 120.

^{page 175 note 1} ‘Christians in the Technical and Social Revolutions of our Time.’ At first it had been planned to convene the Conference under a more neutral title, ‘God, Man and contemporary Society’. But during the preparations the explosive character of contemporary society became more and more apparent (on this point the Christians in the developing countries were most insistent) and the concept of revolution was increasingly clearly adopted as the main theme—understood in a very broad sense (bearing in mind the differences between the ‘revolutionary changes’ in the different areas of the world).

^{page 176 note 1} If some people thought they could trace signs of a new (perhaps ‘red’) variation of the ‘German Christian’ heresy in the ideas of Shaull and his friends, in my own view this was unfair. In the whole of his revolutionary thinking, which is thoroughly comprehensible, Shaull shows that he is no vague enthusiast nor romantic in his concept of revolution. He is deeply aware of the ambiguity of all revolutionary commitment, and gives clear expression to it: ‘The struggle for a new order takes place in the midst of opposition, repeated failure and the constant appearance of new threats of dehumanisation’ (Christian Social Ethics in a Changing World, p. 38f). His whole emphasis is the following, however: the Christian choice cannot be to moralise while ‘keeping one's own hands clean’, taking anxious care not to become involved in any dangerous situations. Admittedly, the Christian does not simply swim with the current or revolution; but on the other hand he is not a spectator watching from the bank either. Shaull expresses this as follows: ‘The Christian looks for stability on the other side of change; he is therefore free to be fully involved in the revolution. At the same time, his understanding of what is going on there obliges him to work constantly for reconciliation’ (op. cit., p. 32)

^{page 177 note 1} Castillo-Gardenas, Gonzalo: ‘Christians and the Struggle for a new Social Order in Latin America’ (mimeographed conference-document, p. 5).Google Scholar

^{page 177 note 2} Philip, André: ‘The Revolutionary Change in the Structure of European Political Life’ (pp. 120–121Google Scholar), article in the Second Preparatory Volume for the Conference entitled Responsible Government in a Revolutionary Age.

^{page 178 note 1} Gollwitzer, Helmut, published in Junge Kirche, 1966, p. 637Google Scholar (free translation).

^{page 179 note 1} For instance, a step of this kind is represented by a statement presented in October 1966 to the Consultative Committee of this movement by the theological study-group of the Christian Peace Conference. Referring to the problems raised at the Conference of Church and Society, this study-group tried to answer the question of the possibility of participating in revolution involving the use of violence. The study-group answered the question in the affirmative, making the reservation however that military force can be resorted to only as an ‘ultima ratio’. ‘Ultima ratio’ means:

(a) if violent measures have already been used by the oppressors …;

(b) if all possible methods of legal criticism and legal actions have been courageously and patiently tried, without success;.

(c) if a situation has arised which (owing to the action or failure to act of the oppressors) is more harmful to human beings than a violent revolution would probably be.

The document concludes with an important theological explanation: ‘If Christians support revolution, they derive the right to do so not from the idea of revolution but from the Christian Gospel. In so doing the goals of humanisation and justice (which are the goals of revolution) are not made relative. On the contrary, we should understand these goals more deeply, more objectively, more concretely. This means that our participation in revolutionary action must not be motivated by hatred, nor by confidence in force, but solely by sympathy and solidarity with those who suffer … and by the hope of a new, just order, by readiness to forgive’ (Junge Kirche, 1966, p. 658fGoogle Scholar).

^{page 181 note 1} See Molnar, A., ‘Mezi revoluci a valkou’ (‘Between Revolution and War’), theological annex to the Krestanska Revue, 1967, No. 1Google Scholar. See also Seibt, F., Hussitica (Zur Struktur einer Revolution), Cologne, 1965Google Scholar, on our subject, especially chapter 2.

^{page 181 note 2} It is not by chance that the Czech theologian J. L. Hromadka was one of the pioneers of an ‘ecumenical theology of revolution’. See my paper ‘Zur Frage der “Geschichtsphilosophie” J. L. Hromadkas’ (‘On Hromadka's philosophy of history’) published in Evangelische Theologie, 1965, pp. 413–28.

^{page 183 note 1} See Fahlbusch, E., Evangelisches Kirchenlexikon, III, Sp. 646Google Scholar. Fahlbusch's article is one of the best things written on the subject by a Protestant.

^{page 183 note 2} See Wendland's paper at the Conference on Church and Society, footnote 6 (p. 6). If one studies the standard works on Christian Ethics, one finds hardly any mention in them of the question of revolution, or merely a superficial one. This applies to N. H. Søe (Christliche Ethik) who is Lutheran, to Emil Brunner (Das Gebot und die Ordnungen) who is Reformed, and to B. Häring (Das Gesetz Christi) who is a Catholic. W. Trillhaas (Ethik) and H. Thielicke (Theologische Ethik, II/2) also devote only short sections to the question.

^{page 183 note 3} Wendland's address at the Conference on Church and Society, p. 5. This conservative rejection of revolution is apparent especially in German Lutheranism even at the time of the Reformation (i.e. in Luther himself, especially in his decision to oppose the peasants' rebellion). The anti-revolutionary spirit reached its climax probably after the French Revolution. In his lecture entitled ‘Von Ordnung und Revolution’ (Posthumous Works, 2, Munich, 1966, pp. 153–192)Google Scholar Hans-Joachim Iwand traces its different forms very perspicaciously. To Julius Stahl revolution was simply ‘the rule of sin’ and ‘the opposite pole’ to Christianity. And in the view of A. Fr. Vilmar the Church is the last stronghold of legality and of divinely-appointed authority, it is therefore anti-revolution incarnate and will ‘victoriously outlive democracy and despotism, with which it has nothing to do’ (quoted by Iwand, p. 157).

This mistrust of revolution is still apparent in German Lutheranism today, not only in Otto Dibelius (who almost consistently maintains the view of the nineteenth century, see p. 186, n. 4) but also in Trillhaas, W. (who writes that revolution means ‘the release of egoism, the falsification of truth, the breakdown of all respect; the lowest come up on top and the upper classes (the nobility) are forced down’ (Ethik, vol. 2, Berlin 1965, p. 424)Google Scholar. It is even apparent in Bonhoeffer, who says, ‘According to Holy Scripture, there is no such thing as a right to revolution’ (Ethik, vol. 2, Munich, 1953, p. 273)Google Scholar. However, Bonhoeffer, through his personal action, broke through these hard-and-fast concepts and has thus perhaps helped to change the traditional anti-revolutionary attitude of Protestant ethics. See also Iwand's essays on the Christian right to resistance, op. cit., p. 193–242.

^{page 183 note 1} E. Fahlbusch, op. cit., p. 641.

^{page 183 note 2} Vilmar formulates this as follows: ‘Law and property, marriage, family, education, authority and obedience, rulers and subjects—all these are the general bases (or general concepts) on which society (even in the pagan world) rested and still rests.’ And now: ‘it is these orders (which are the “indispensable preconditions for the vocatio gentium”) that the Ministry must advocate unreservedly and to the utmost of its ability, using all their human energy and also the full power of the Holy Spirit’ (quoted by I wand, op. cit., p. 159).

^{page 184 note 1} With regard to the ‘Order-theologians’ of the nineteenth century Iwand rightly asks: ‘Does not the ethic of the New Testament spring from the distinction between the two aeons, and is not the Christian life related to the “powers of the future world”? Why then do the Lutheran theologians keep looking backwards at that past epoch thus acting according to the old Thomist principle: gratia non destruit, sed reparat naturam’ (op. cit., p. 160).

^{page 184 note 2} On the theme ‘How can the Church contribute to the transformation of Society?’ see my own address at the Conference of Church and Society (printed in Communio Viatorum, 1966, pp. 217–20).

^{page 185 note 1} Shaull is very critical of traditional theology: ‘the old images and concepts have lost their power’ (p. 6). He has understanding for the most radical ‘death-of-God’ theologians. Nevertheless his theology is not simply a ‘secularised’ and ‘humanised’ version of the biblical message. He has an amazing sense (like his friend Paul Lehmann) for the central pronouncements of the Christian tradition (e.g. for the Messianism of the Bible) and also for the dogma of the Trinity. The ‘transcendental’ themes of the Kerygma are very important to him—and he interprets them in a revolutionary way. (Cf. Christian Social Ethics, pp. 27f, 31f.)

^{page 185 note 2} Wendland, p. 12: ‘The Kingdom of God presents a challenge to the present constitution and form of this world, in so far as it is not in accordance with the holy, life-giving will of God.’ The moving dialectic of God's Kingdom is expressed in a similar way by Shaull: ‘The Kingdom of God always stands over against every social and political order, thus exposing its dehumanising elements and judging it. At the same time, the Kingdom is a dynamic reality; it is “coming” through the work of him who is restoring the nations’ (op. cit., p. 36).

^{page 186 note 1} W. Trillhaas, op. cit. p. 425.

^{page 186 note 2} Rich, A., Glaube in politischer Entscheidung, Zürich, 1962, p. 96.Google Scholar

^{page 186 note 3} Kirchliche Dogmatik, III/4, p. 626.Google Scholar

^{page 186 note 4} Otto Dibelius's view is the following: ‘May God preserve us from a “theology of revolution” as advocated in Geneva. During the twentieth century the clearance-sale of the Church's spiritual life has gone so far that this final suggestion is really not necessary’ (quoted in Junge Kirche, 1966, p. 640).