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Christianity and Politics: Another View

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 February 2009

John J. Haldane
John J. Haldane
Affiliation:
Department of Moral Philosophy, University of St Andrews, Fife, Scotland KY16 9AL
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Abstract

Abstract

The essay explores the relationship between Christian faith, ethical thought and political action. It examines two views of the matter. First, the autonomy thesis, advanced by writers such as Edward Norman in his Reith Lectures and elsewhere, which claims that Christianity in general is independent of political concerns, and that Church leaders in particular have no business engaging in political debate, or using their teaching authority to commend or condemn the actions of governments. Second, the commitment thesis, here derived from writings of Kenneth Leech, which maintains that fidelity to the biblical revelation involves an explicit commitment to Christian humanism, and thereby to practical opposition to capitalism and support for radical socialism.

Type
Research Article
Information
Scottish Journal of Theology , Volume 40 , Issue 2 , May 1987 , pp. 259 - 286
Copyright
Copyright © Scottish Journal of Theology Ltd 1987

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References

1 Norman, E., Christianity and the World Order, (Oxford: University Press, 1979)Google Scholar and ‘Christianity and Politics’ in M. Cowling (ed.) Conservative Essays (London: Cassel, 1978).

2 Dummet, M., Catholicism and the World Order, (London: C.I.I.R., 1979)Google Scholar.

3 Leech, K., ‘The New Radical Right and the Church in Britain’, Christian, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1981, p. 16Google Scholar. See also his The Social God (London: Sheldon, 1981)Google Scholar.

4 Dummett, op. cit., p. 35.

5 Leech, op. cit., p. 15.

6 Leech, op. cit., p. 14.

7 Leech, op. cit., p. 15.

8 Leech, op. cit., p. 17.

9 I examine recent attempts to provide a naturalistic account of thought and present arguments against them and against the very project of reductive naturalism in ‘Psychoanalysis, Cognitive Psychology and Self-Consciousness’, in Clark, P. J. and Wright, C. J. (eds.) Mind, Psychoanalysis and Science, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986)Google Scholar.

10 For relevant discussions of this alternative, which is best described as ‘value realism’ see Dunlop, F., ‘The Objectivity of Values’, Downside Review, Vol. 99, No. 335, 1981CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Trethowan, I., ‘Miss Murdoch on the “Good”’, same journal, Vol. 89, No. 294, 1971Google Scholar. The latter provides a useful introduction and commentary to Murdoch, I., The Sovereignty of Good (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1970)Google Scholar.

11 For explorations of this thought and of its implications see Murdoch, ‘The Idea of Perfection’ op. cit., pp. 1–45; Kolnai, A. ‘Aesthetic and Moral Experience’ in Ethics, Value and Reality (London: Athlone, 1977) pp. 187–210Google Scholar; and Wiggins, D. ‘Truth, Invention and the Meaning of Life’, Proceedings of the British Academy, 62, 1979, pp. 331–378Google Scholar.

12 This objection to value realism has come to be presented under the title: ‘the argument from queerness’ following Mackie, J., Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977) pp. 38–42Google Scholar. 1 cannot discuss it here, but for a reply see Bond, E. J., Reason and Value (Cambridge: University Press, 1983), Ch. 5Google Scholar.

13 On this see Trethowan, op. cit.

14 Romans: 3.8.

15 Gorgias 475 b-e.

16 Such a conception of the moral life is also to be found among the Greeks. See again Plato, Gorgias and elsewhere, and Aristotle, , Nicomachean Ethics, 1107a 12–14 (Ross edition, Oxford: University Press, 1925)Google Scholar.

‘But not every action nor every passion admits of a mean; for some have names that already imply badness … It is not possible then ever to be right with regard to them; one must always be wrong.’

17 My use of the term ‘intuitionist’ in this context is not intended to suggest a view of moral knowledge as involving an occult faculty of intuition. The perception of values is a complex accomplishment involving sensuous, affective and intellectual responses to the world, but it is not in any way occult. For further discussion of this issue in connection with the recognition of aesthetic properties see my ‘Concept-Formation and Value Education’, Educational Philosophy and Theory, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1984Google Scholar.

18 See: Kolnai, A., ‘Deliberation is of Ends’, op. cit., pp. 44–62Google Scholar.

19 This identification is argued for by Trethowan, op. cit.

20 See: Aquinas, De regimine principium.

21 On abortion and nuclear warfare see my ‘The Ethics of Life and Death’, Scottish Journal of Theology, Vol. 38, No. 4, 1985; and ‘The Morality of Deterrence’, Heythrop Journal, Vol. 26, No. 1, 1985.

22 Mark: 12.17.

23 Aristotle makes this point in a passage in which he relates moral knowledge to experience or wisdom; see: Nicomachean Ethics, 1094b12–1095a13.

14 On Being Sure in Religion (London: Athlone, 1963) especially Ch. 2Google Scholar.

25 Leech, op. cit., p. 17.

26 In particular there is reason to examine sympathetically the view associated with. Chesterton and others which goes under the title of Distributism. It is unclear how this stands in relation to liberalism, socialism and capitalism and it would be a useful task to clarify the issue. On the contemporary relevance of Chesterton's social philosophy see: Cahill, P. ‘Chesterton and the Future of Democracy’ in Sullivan, J. (ed.) Chesterton, G. K., A Centenary Appraisal (London: Elek, 1974), pp. 182–205Google Scholar.

27 A version of this paper was read to the Theological Society, St Mary's College, University of St Andrews.